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CORRESPONDENCE,

DESPATCHES, AND OTHER PAPERS,

OF

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH,

SECOND MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY.

EDITED BY

HIS BROTHER,

CHARLES WILLIAM VANE, MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY,

G.C.B., G.C.H., G.B.E., ETC.

SECOND SERIES.

MILITARY AND MISCELLANEOUS.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

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PREFATORY ADDRESS.

A distinguished writer has observed (*Quarterly Review*, vol. lxii., p. 277), that, in the early part of Lord Castlereagh's political career, there were persons disposed to form a low and very erroneous opinion of him; "but when his situation became more prominent and his character better defined, that polished benevolence, that consummate address, that invincible firmness, and that profound yet unostentatious sagacity, won the respect and confidence of reluctant Senates at home and of suspicious Cabinets abroad." Every attentive reader of the volumes here presented will, I trust, admit that the traits of the illustrious Statesman are sketched not by the hand of Partiality, but by that of simple and sober Truth.

This Second Series embraces the period between the admission of my lamented Brother into the British Cabinet and the eventful year 1813. During the first part of this period, he was at the head of the Board of Control; subsequently, at that of the War and Colonial Department; and, towards the conclusion, he held the then most important office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs. As in the preliminary observations to the different Sections of my work I

have endeavoured to mark the circumstances under which the Papers contained in it accrued, it would be superfluous to enter here at any length on the subject.

Suffice it then to remark that numerous documents and letters in this division of the Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh prove not only that his ever active mind was intently engaged in providing adequate means of home defence against any hostile attempt from abroad, but that the plans of the expeditions undertaken in 1807, 1808, and 1809, with one exception, (that against Constantinople) emanated from him; and his Correspondence abundantly attests his unwearied zeal and energy in carrying them into execution, his anxious attention to the minutest details, and his earnest solicitude for not merely supplying the necessities of the troops engaged in these enterprises, but for affording them all possible comforts.

One prominent feature in the volumes now placed before the reader is formed by the copious Correspondence between my Brother and his personal friend, Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose pre-eminent qualifications he above and before all seems to have had the sagacity to discover, at a time when he was obliged to exert all his influence, both with the Cabinet and with the King, in order to procure his appointment to the chief command of the British army in the Peninsula. The accuracy of his judgment was amply attested by the subsequent career of our great Captain.

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LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF

LORD CASTLEREAGH.

NEGOCIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA,

RELATIVE TO

THE RESTITUTION OF THE DOMINIONS OF THE KING OF SARDINIA.

1799, 1800.

At the commencement of the war of the French Revolution, Charles Emanuel IV., King of Sardinia, having leagued himself, in 1792, with Austria against France, lost in consequence the provinces of Savoy and Nice, which were wrested from him by the latter. In 1797, though he united himself with France against Austria, the Directory, fomenting the discontents of his subjects, made them a pretext for war, and compelled him in 1798 to renounce possession of all his continental territories, which were incorporated with France; the king retaining Sardinia alone, to which he was obliged to retire with his family. The fortune of war having in 1799 placed those States in the

hands of Austria, the British Government entered into negociations with the court of Vienna for their restitution to their former sovereign. In less than a month from the date of the last of these letters, the decisive victory of Marengo abruptly terminated the negociation, by once more placing the continental provinces of the kingdom of Sardinia under the dominion of France.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto.

Downing Street, June, 1799.

It is for this reason that it is judged here to be extremely desirable that (if it be not already done) no time should be lost in replacing the King of Sardinia in the possession of his dominions. Your lordship is apprized of the steps which have already been taken for this purpose; and, if any occasion should occur, you will co-operate in their success, as far as may be done with prudence and discretion at Vienna.

Should the Austrians aim at the recovery of the Novarese, this is certainly within their own power, and could not be very strongly objected to by the King of Sardinia, if restored by their efforts to the rest of his dominions. But it would, in that case, be desirable that the hands in which the barrier of Italy is placed should in some other mode be strengthened; and any proper arrangement which should open to that power a more extensive communication with the sea-coast would operate favourably to the interests of this country in the Mediterranean.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Mr. Jackson.

August 5, 1799.

Having already explained to you in conversation the substance of his Majesty's opinion concerning the line to be followed, in regard to the views which the Court of Vienna is supposed to entertain respecting the Novarese territory, I have

only to repeat to you that, however it would unquestionably be his Majesty's wish to discourage any pretensions of this kind, and though it is hoped that the influence of the Court of St. Petersburg and the example of the generous and disinterested exertions of the Emperor of Russia may operate powerfully, yet that it is foreseen that a situation of things may arise, in which it may be necessary that his Majesty should, in so far as he is concerned, acquiesce in the views of the Court of Vienna in this respect; and in this case, though, as an alternative which, upon every account, it would be desirable to avoid, his Majesty would wish that the King of Sardinia should be compensated by such a portion of the Genoese territory adjacent to his dominions as may be deemed an adequate equivalent for the surrender of the Novarese; there being no motive either of justice or of policy to prevent his Majesty from concurring in a measure for satisfying the pretensions of his ally out of the territories of a power which has for centuries been constantly under the influence of France, and with which his Majesty is at this time engaged in a war, the result of repeated provocations, injuries, and insults, offered to his Majesty.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Minto to Lord Grenville.

Most secret. Vienna, August 17, 1799.

On the side of Italy, your lordship will find less moderation. I do not yet know the full extent of those views, but I now know that their extent is considerable. The suspicion I have already expressed in former despatches concerning the King of Sardinia's territories on the Continent is now verified. The Emperor proposes to retain Piedmont, and to take all that part of Savoy which is important in a military view. I have no doubt of his intention to keep the country of Nice also, if he gets possession of it, which will make the Var his boundary with France. But in case he should not acquire Nice, I presume he will take the Genoese frontier on the side of Venti-

miglia, and it is much to be wished that he may. But, in effect, the whole territory of the Genoese Republic seems to be an object of serious speculation. M. de Thugut[1] said enough to satisfy me that it is not his wish to restore that Republic; that the Emperor would be very glad to add that great trading city and seaport to his dominions, if he were not seriously opposed by England and Russia in that design; and that he would not insist, however, on retaining Genoa, nor even on any other plan concerning it, if it were to be anxiously resisted by the allies.

If the Emperor did not keep Genoa for himself, his next wish seemed to be that it should go into the scheme of indemnifications to other dispossessed sovereigns. The Legations will, I am persuaded, be retained by the Emperor, and Venice will certainly continue subject to him.

I am not yet master of the designs on Tuscany. Baron Thugut seemed to reject with some degree of warmth the idea of the Emperor's appropriating his brother's territory to himself; yet he did not disavow explicitly the possibility of Tuscany being reserved to form part of some general and extensive plan of territorial arrangement. In truth, I felt the subject so delicate on the score of family connexion, that I rather shrunk from the inquiry. My information does not extend further south, and the Pope was not mentioned; but I shall not neglect any opportunity of pushing my discoveries in that direction.

In these projected changes, Piedmont seems to be the principal feature; and, on that point, I should imagine that your lordship will find Austria so strongly bent as to hazard every thing for its accomplishment. I am so much impressed with this idea, that I should not think I expressed myself too strongly by saying that this Court would probably make it the pivot on which their whole system would hereafter turn; and that they would, in the choice of their allies, prefer that power, or those powers, which should concur or acquiesce in this view. It

[1] Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

seems to me as if a determined opposition on the part of Great Britain and Russia to the acquisition of Piedmont might probably throw Austria once more into a connexion with the French Republic, and become a motive, as it would furnish a pretext, for a separate peace on that condition. M. de Thugut, in arguing this point, represents, in the first place, the importance to Europe at large, and the necessity, for the safety of the Emperor's Italian dominions, that this barrier against France should be placed in secure hands. He then shows the inadequacy of such a power as the Duke of Savoy to that charge, and he supports that argument by the experience of recent events.

With regard to England, he contends that we have a separate interest in this arrangement; observing that, while the Emperor held the Low Countries, and a weak prince was in possession of the Alps, he was exposed to perpetual danger and offensive war from France, without the means of offence on his part—that the Low Countries were themselves open to incursion every moment, and the frontier of France in that quarter was, on the contrary, the strongest in Europe, and required several campaigns of sieges, as well as of superiority in the field to suffer any impression from the Emperor's arms—that Lombardy was in a somewhat similar situation by the weakness of the power to which the barrier of the Alps was entrusted —that those circumstances made Austria the natural ally of France, and established on the part of the former almost a necessary and dependent relation with the latter; but that the case would be entirely altered and nearly inverted, when the Emperor should have nothing to fear in the Low Countries, and when he should not only be secure in Italy by the possession of the Alps; but, standing on strong ground himself, should be placed on a weak frontier of France—that the general interest which he would share in restraining the power of France within due bounds would furnish a principle of natural connexion with England, which would be improved by the want of

naval support, if the acquisitions made by Austria should give rise to naval or commercial views in that government. Such are the arguments urged by the Austrian minister, and submitted to his Majesty's consideration.

When I seemed struck by the extensive scheme of aggrandizement which he had opened to me, and, among other things, observed the consequence it would naturally produce in Prussia by furnishing to that Court a motive for falling upon the smaller States of Germany, in order to keep pace with the growth of Austria, or by inducing it even to attempt checking the progress of Austria by active alliance with the French Republic, he seemed at first disposed to defy Prussia, and to rely on the superior power of the Emperor for restraining that rival; but, when I represented the doubt which must exist concerning the part which Russia would take in a contest between Austria and Prussia on such grounds, he seemed disposed to compromise the matter with Prussia, and to admit of her taking something also, *provided*, however, it were not much. He contended that Prussia was unreasonable in stating any acquisitions proposed to be made by the Emperor as an aggrandizement, relatively, at least, and as compared with the power of Prussia; and he said he had heard of Prussia's proposing the *status quo ante bellum* as the basis of peace—that Prussia could not be in earnest in that proposal, for that power had already acquired since this war a greater accession of territory and population than the whole amount of the Emperor's ultimate views, without having contributed anything, however, to the common cause. He alluded to the acquisitions made by Prussia in Poland, which he stated at 5,000,000 souls—that hitherto the Emperor had lost on balance, rating the Low Countries at a population of 3,500,000; and that, after the acquisition of Piedmont, he should not gain above 200,000 or 300,000. He reckons the population of the Venetian States acquired by the Emperor and all he obtained in Istria and Dalmatia at 1,800,000.

The point to which it is my duty, after a discussion, much too long I fear, on such a variety of matter, to recall your lordship's attention, is the proposal made by M. de Thugut for a mutual and confidential communication on the ultimate object of the war. If his Majesty should refuse altogether that condition, the object of which is to withhold the communications to be made by Austria from the Emperor of Russia, a proposal might be made to receive these communications separately, and to communicate them afterwards from England to Russia. There might probably be an advantage in his Majesty's forming a mature judgment on these points, and becoming a channel of communication to Russia; by which means the first impressions might be conveyed to the mind of that prince from a quarter which he respects, instead of sending them crude from hence to Petersburg.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto.

Most secret. Downing Street, September 4, 1799.

I have said enough in my former despatch to enable your lordship to prove to M. de Thugut that his Majesty is very far from entertaining any views hostile to the interests of Austria. Very much of the reasoning urged to your lordship by M. de Thugut in support of his plan of peace in Italy, as far as that plan is understood, appears to his Majesty's servants to be perfectly well founded, in reference not only to the separate interests of this country, but also to the permanent tranquillity of Europe. Nor is the aggrandizement of the House of Austria in itself a point to which this country has been accustomed to look with dissatisfaction or alarm.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto.

Downing Street, February 8, 1800.

Another point of indispensable necessity is, that if, in consequence of any concert with his Majesty, Austria shall at a

peace retain Venice and Genoa, and possibly acquire Leghorn, a treaty of commerce and navigation should immediately be entered into between his Majesty and that Court, which shall ensure to his Majesty's subjects equal advantages of commerce with those to be enjoyed by any other nation there; shall protect our merchants and manufactures from the imposition of exorbitant or prohibitory duties; and shall recognise and establish the law of neutral navigation, on the footing of the Danish and American treaties, to the exclusion of what are commonly called the principles of that armed neutrality which took place during the American war.

Extracts of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto.

Downing Street, February 14, 1800.

Having received, since I began this letter, despatches from Mr. Jackson, containing a detailed account of the present military and financial resources of Piedmont, it will be necessary for me, in order not to delay this messenger, to defer to another opportunity the discussion of what relates to this point. But, from the general tenor of Mr. Jackson's despatches, I am induced to hope that the subsidy, which his Majesty has it in his contemplation to grant to the King of Sardinia on his restoration, will be sufficient, when taken in aid of his own means, to afford a material co-operation to the Austrians in the course of the next campaign.

The Austrian plan last mentioned by your lordship with respect to that country is, as your lordship judged, much more consonant to his Majesty's wishes than that which had before been in contemplation. It would, however, be desirable that the Court of Vienna should relax from its demand of Alexandria, and this may perhaps be obtained, whenever a minister of the King of Sardinia is admitted to discuss these points at Vienna. But your lordship is already apprized that the King's consent to this plan is given only in the supposition of the sig-

nature of a treaty of commerce and navigation, of which I shall speak more particularly in the course of this despatch.

* * * * *

There would remain behind the promise, on his Majesty's part, not to enter into any negociation with any other Court during the continuance of this concert, which shall be inconsistent with that spirit of strict and intimate union which it is his Majesty's object to establish; a like promise not to raise any obstacles in the way of such arrangement of Italy as shall be settled on the grounds already stated to your lordship; and a mutual engagement as to the future arrangement of the Netherlands, in whatever form that point shall now be settled between the two Courts.

Extracts of a Letter from Lord Minto to Lord Grenville.

Vienna, April 10, 1800.

His Majesty's express assent to the Emperor's retaining the three Legations is also insisted on as an essential point. Being now apprized that the Emperor attaches more importance to this acquisition than almost to any other, I have observed that the silence of his Majesty on this point, leaving me without the power of objecting or protesting, may be considered as a virtual acquiescence.

Baron Thugut does not consider the mere acquiescence of his Majesty in the arrangements proposed for Italy as sufficient, and he desires an article binding his Majesty to make common cause with the Emperor, if he should be attacked in odium of this treaty.

I am most at a loss to acquaint your lordship with Baron Thugut's present notions and intentions concerning Piedmont, as he opened in the last conference ideas perfectly new, and, indeed, so new as to be very imperfectly digested.

He has for some time past reverted with greater warmth

than ever to the repugnance he had shown at first to the return of the King in person.

The disputes between the Austrian general and commissioner and the Piedmontese government have risen to a greater height than ever, and there is at present a very bitter animosity between them. On my pressing for the restoration of the king's government as an essential part of the conditions to which his Majesty had consented, he declared that it would be impracticable to carry on the war with the king at Turin—that, besides the obstacles that would be thrown in the way of supplies and of all exertion on the part of Piedmont, the Austrians could not venture to advance on any enterprise, while they had so much reason to apprehend that, on the first disaster, they should be deserted by those in their rear, and lose even the means of retreat. I still urged the restoration of the king's government, and he then threw out the idea of restoring the government, in the king's name, and of the actual administration being placed in the hands of an English minister, appointed by the King of Great Britain, and receiving regular powers from the King of Sardinia. He said that the Emperor could confide in such an administration, both for the fair application of the revenues of Piedmont to the war, and for a faithful adherence to the cause. These were the last ideas previous to the arrival of your lordship's instructions.

In the last conference, however, another perfectly novel system was intimated. Baron Thugut said that so many difficulties were made by other powers respecting Piedmont, that the Emperor was now disposed to abandon it altogether, and to restore the whole to the King of Sardinia, as well as consent to his personal return and resumption of the government. But it should be on condition of the Emperor's demolishing all the fortresses bordering on Lombardy; that he would also restore the Republic of Genoa, under the Emperor's protection, that is to say, with the right of keeping an Austrian garrison at La Spezzia, or on some such position. On the other hand, the

Emperor, would keep the three Legations, the territory of Lucca, and the Valteline.

Lord Minto to Lord Grenville.

Vienna, May 1, 1800.

My Lord—The object of my late conferences with Baron Thugut has been to arrive at such an understanding on the various points in discussion as might enable me to transmit to your lordship the project of a treaty to which the Emperor will now engage to subscribe as soon as his Majesty shall have signified his assent to it. By this means, if his Majesty should be pleased to approve of the conditions now specified by this Court, the signature of the treaty need wait only for the answer to this despatch.

I flatter myself that this object is now attained; and although the draft of the project will still require some days, that the conditions are brought to sufficient precision to admit of my stating them distinctly in this despatch, with an assurance on the part of the Austrian minister, and in the name of the Emperor, that, if his Majesty shall approve of a treaty on this basis, his imperial majesty will immediately authorize the signature on his part.

The object of this despatch being rather to describe the proposed conditions of the treaty than to relate the arguments and discussions on either side, which have terminated in this result, I shall content myself with stating those conditions as shortly as is consistent with precision and clearness.

It is stated, on the part of the Emperor, that the exertions he has made and is making, and the present situation of his finances, require that the pecuniary succour to be furnished by his Majesty within the year should amount to £2,000,000.

The Emperor also requires that, instead of monthly instalments, the whole sum should be furnished in three equal payments: the first of which shall be made in the beginning of June; the second in the beginning of September; and the last

in the beginning of December. It is also strongly requested that the second instalment should be paid in specie.

These advances shall not bear interest during the war, and six months after the peace; after which period the Emperor shall pay the British Government, or the individuals named by them, interest at the same rate as the British loan for the present year, together with one per cent. for redemption.

It shall be stipulated that the Emperor shall retain certain conquered territories, as an indemnification for the charges of the war. These territories are specified to be:

1stly. That part of the Piedmontese and Genoese territories which is situated to the eastward of Finale, and of the western branch of the Bormida, and of the Tanaro, and to the southward of the Po, together with Alexandria and a small adjoining district.

2ndly. The Three Legations.

3rdly. The territory of Lucca.

4thly. The Valteline.

The remainder of Piedmont and of the Genoese territory, including Finale, shall be restored and ceded to the King of Sardinia, together with his former territories of Nice and Savoy, when they are reconquered from the enemy. The sovereignty of these territories shall be immediately vested in the King of Sardinia, and the government shall be administered in his name. These territories shall be guaranteed to the King of Sardinia by the Emperor and his Majesty.

The King of Sardinia shall, nevertheless, not return to Piedmont during the present war, and the government shall be administered by a regency, at the head of which shall be placed a British subject named by his Britannic Majesty, but holding a commission from the King of Sardinia, which shall vest virtually in him all the regal powers, under the title of Viceroy, or Lieutenant-General, or such other title as shall be approved of.

Piedmont shall raise and maintain such a body of troops as,

by its own resources, and with the aid of his Majesty, can be afforded, and shall furnish bread, forage, and carriage for the imperial troops employed within his Sardinian Majesty's territories, as far as the resources of the country can afford it, limiting, nevertheless, the number of imperial troops for which these requisitions may be made to such a number as shall be agreed upon between the Austrian government and the regency of Piedmont; although the number actually employed in the territories of the King of Sardinia should be greater.

All the Piedmontese troops shall be placed implicitly at the disposal and under the command of the Emperor, during the war; and the direction of all military operations and affairs shall be given to his Imperial Majesty, excepting the nomination of officers, which will remain to the king and his regency.

The Emperor will employ a sufficient force to defend the territory of his Sardinian Majesty already conquered against the enemy; and will endeavour to reconquer the remainder, so far as the events and circumstances of the war admit of it.

The Emperor will make a commercial treaty with his Majesty, by which Great Britain and Ireland shall be put on the footing of the most favoured nations, and by which the British manufactures shall not be prohibited, or subject to exorbitant duties amounting to a prohibition; and by which the laws of navigation with regard to neutral bottoms, in time of war, shall be adopted, which are established in his Majesty's treaties with America and Denmark, in opposition to that system which was attempted to be established by what is commonly called the Armed Neutrality.

[Baron Thugut did not think himself sufficiently apprized of the import and extent of these clauses to take the engagement in these general terms, wishing to reserve this matter for further explanation; but he promises generally to treat and settle it with as much favour as the subject admits of.]

His Majesty shall use his influence with the King of Sardinia and with the different princes and States in Italy, as well

as with the different Sovereigns of Europe, to obtain their acquiescence in this arrangement; and his Majesty shall, in particular, use his influence with the King of Naples to forego any claims he may meditate on any part of the Pope's territory, and to withdraw his troops from that territory.

The Emperor will, on his part, withdraw his troops from every part of the territories of the Pope, excepting the three Legations, which he considers as forming part of the late Cisalpine Republic; unless the Pope should himself request a body of Austrian troops for the support of his authority at Rome, in which case a body of Austrian troops may be employed in that service.

If these conditions are agreed to by his Majesty, the Emperor will immediately enter into a mutual engagement with his Majesty by a treaty to continue the war with vigour, and in concert with his Majesty, against the French Republic, and to prosecute the war not merely on a defensive principle, but offensively on the territory of the enemy so far as prudence admits, for the purpose of compelling the enemy to a reasonable and secure peace.

The Emperor will declare that he does not invade France for the purpose of conquest or partition, and that he will hold the places and territories within the former limits of France, as they stood before the Revolution, only until such a peace can be concluded as shall be consistent with the security and tranquillity of Europe.

The Emperor will also engage himself mutually with his Majesty to make no separate peace, and not to treat separately for a general or particular peace, during the period of this concert; but to communicate reciprocally all overtures and all answers made by or to the enemy on that subject; and the Emperor will engage himself not to conclude any peace during the period of this concert without the previous consent of his Majesty, and his Majesty shall enter into a similar engagement on his part.

The Emperor will further engage specifically that he will agree to no peace which should leave the Netherlands in the hands of France, without the previous consent of his Majesty; as his Majesty shall, on his part, engage himself to agree to no peace which shall impair the integrity of the empire, or disturb the present territorial distribution of Germany.

This concert shall last and be binding for one year, to be reckoned from the 1st of March, 1800; but, three months before the expiration of that term, that is to say, in the beginning of December next, the two Courts shall consult with each other on the expediency of prolonging their concert, and on the conditions which it may be proper to stipulate on each hand for that purpose.

This despatch having been read to Baron Thugut, he approved of it as a correct statement of the matter to which it relates. I have the honour to be, &c.,

MINTO.

Extracts of a Letter from Lord Minto to Lord Grenville.

Vienna, May 1, 1800.

With regard to Piedmont, the ideas which are mentioned in my despatch No. 16, of leaving the whole to the King of Sardinia and demolishing the fortresses, seem to have been thrown out, as I suspected at the time, either with too much levity, or in a moment of spleen and disgust with the vexations experienced in the affairs of that country. Baron Thugut has returned (without further notice of those loose suggestions) to the former plan already approved of by his Majesty.

I am sorry at the same time to say that I have entirely failed in my best endeavours to procure the Emperor's consent to the return of the king's person. I have, for a considerable time back, been assured that the residence of this Court at Turin was considered at Vienna as so totally incompatible with exertion or success in the war, and would bring so much foreign and hostile intrigue into the very theatre of the war,

that the Emperor was determined to withdraw altogether from that country, if this point should be insisted on. Baron Thugut, at the same time, considers the proposal he has made to place the administration of that country virtually in his Majesty, as a sufficient testimony that he has no sinister purpose in the exclusion of the King of Sardinia's Court, and is anxious only to have such a government in that frontier country as may enable the Emperor to prosecute the war without unnecessary embarrassments, and to pursue his advantages without uneasiness concerning his rear. He relies also on his offer to guarantee, and his desire that his Majesty should also guarantee, these territories to the King of Sardinia, as a proof that he has no intention to turn the king's absence to his own advantage, or to oppose the King of Sardinia's restoration and return at the peace. He quotes, as an example of a similar arrangement, the regency, composed of English and Dutch, which governed the Low Countries at the period of the war of the Spanish succession.

On the whole, I am under the necessity of submitting this proposition to your lordship as the only expedient that has hitherto been thought of to reconcile that energy which is necessary for the success of the war, with the ultimate security of the King of Sardinia's dominions, and the present security and ease of his subjects. At the same time, I have told Baron Thugut that I could not hazard even a conjecture concerning the sentiments of his Majesty on this proposal. If it should not be approved of, I hope that some other arrangement may be thought of. It would no doubt be desirable that your lordship should in that case suggest what would be agreeable to his Majesty, and I should flatter myself the Emperor will be found well disposed to adopt any scheme which does not leave his operations subject to those embarrassments which he thinks result from an administration purely Piedmontese. At the same time, it must be considered that time is precious, and that it is highly desirable to leave no further option to this

Government between the alliance with us and peace with France, as would be the case if the conditions already adopted at Vienna should be altered, and the discussion should be opened again.

The three Legations are known to your lordship to have been an object which the Emperor has long had much at heart. It has become an indispensable article of our concert, and one from which there is no chance of his receding. His argument as to the right is, that these countries are not at present any part of the Pope's territory; that they were ceded to the Cisalpine Republic by the treaty of Tolentino; and that the Emperor was afterwards called upon by the Pope himself to ratify that treaty, and the consequent cession of these countries in the treaty of Campo Formio. This argument, which is purely technical, and seems to pass by the substantial merits, and all those obvious and powerful considerations which result from the peculiar and odious nature of that violence to which this cession was made, satisfies, however, the conscience, both political and religious, of the Austrian cabinet; and this acquisition must be considered as determined on. With regard to the remainder of the Papal dominions, the Emperor has recently signified his approbation of the Pope's repairing to Rome, and has offered him a frigate to convey him to Ancona, where, as soon as he lands, the Pope's colours are to be hoisted, and the place and country put into his possession, leaving such an Austrian garrison as he may himself desire.

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While I am on this topic, it may be proper to touch on the expectation which is now expressed that his Majesty should exert his influence over the different princes of Italy for the purpose of reconciling them to the proposed arrangement, and silencing their opposition, public or secret, to that settlement which his Majesty shall have approved. The first point is to obtain from the King of Sardinia the cessions required from him, and his acquiescence in the other points on which he is

concerned. The Emperor desires that these propositions should be made by England to the King of Sardinia, and that our whole authority should be exerted to obtain an immediate acquiescence. In my own opinion, the settlement is so substantially advantageous to the King of Sardinia, compared with all he has had to fear, that I should not expect much opposition from him; but I have some reason to apprehend that he may not be inclined to take any important step without previously consulting the Emperor of Russia. This would in the first place create very great delay. It would carry the affair to a tribunal, which we know to be unfavourable, and the authority of which will not be acquiesced in here, and it will very much indispose this Court. I mention this difficulty before it arises, that your lordship may in your wisdom devise the proper measures to be resorted to on such an occasion; and that your lordship may feel the importance of a speedy decision on the part of the King of Sardinia, as the Emperor —not considering himself secure in those indemnifications which he claims for the charges of the war, until those cessions are either made or assured to him—might use this pretext for not signing the treaty.

The Emperor expects, with the same confidence, that his Majesty should speak plainly and firmly to the King of Naples, and require of him an acquiescence in the proposed arrangement in favour of the Emperor on one hand, and a departure, on the other, from any pretensions of his own on the Papal territory. The Emperor is not averse to any reasonable indemnification that could be found for his Sicilian Majesty in any other quarter.

The territory of Lucca is a new demand, and is founded, I think, simply on the desire of acquiring and the power of doing so. This object had never been mentioned before, (except, as your lordship will have seen, on the supposition of giving up Piedmont) and I had, on the contrary, been told that the Emperor limited his views to those acquisitions which were

formerly described to me. I confess, one cannot see without regret another independent unoffending State merge in this great Empire; nor the people of the Republic of Lucca, who were extremely happy under their own Government, and distinguished amongst the Italians for industry and simplicity, exposed to all the demands of a foreign sovereign. But I do not see that England can state a sufficient interest in the preservation of that Republic, either from its connexion with us, or from the influence of this change on the general balance, to oppose this proposition either with success or without offence. The population is stated at about 120,000 souls, and the revenue must be very trifling.

The same observations apply to the Valteline. This demand is also brought forward now for the first time. I think I have even been authorized to disclaim for the Emperor any views on that country; and I am much mistaken if the same declarations were not distinctly made to Mr. Wickham in person, when he was here. I have not failed to make these remarks; but, on one hand, the small value of this country in population (about 130,000 souls) and in revenue, is pleaded; and on the other, its great convenience and importance to the Emperor, as affording a communication between the Tirol and Italy, is relied on. It is urged also that it is now *res nullius*, having been annexed to the Cisalpine Republic, and that no injury is done to any one by still uniting it to Lombardy. I confess that the importance of its situation, as a military link between the Milanese and the Tirol, makes an impression on my mind, and I rather think Mr. Wickham had made his mind up to this demand, and was surprised when he learnt the contrary. But I do not feel sufficiently confident of Mr. Wickham's opinion to quote it positively. Baron Thugut states the whole of the Emperor's acquisitions, as at present proposed, at a population of about one million and four or five hundred thousand souls; of which he reckons the three Legations by much the most valuable part, rating them at about 800,000 souls. He will

not allow the revenue to be of any important amount. In this calculation I do not include the Venetian territories, which he considers as his compensation for the Low Countries.

I have been under the necessity of reserving the commercial treaty for further explanation, for want of a sufficient knowledge of the precise demand of his Majesty, and because Baron Thugut was not clearly informed of the present laws established in the Emperor's dominions on this subject. He would not undertake to admit, throughout the Emperor's dominions, all English manufactures, without exception, to a competition with some of their own which they may wish to favour; but he will engage, even now, not only to place England on the footing of the most favoured nations, but to make it *the most favoured* nation. And that England may not lose the advantage which it possesses at present, by a change of sovereign at Genoa, he will consent to make Genoa a free port, and not to lay heavier duties on English manufactures for the consumption of the Genoese territories than have existed heretofore.

The Possessions of Austria in Italy will be:—

1. The ancient territories of the Milanese and the Mantuan, as they were before the war.

2. The States of Venice on *terra firma*, which may be of advantage to Austria in respect to their geographical position, but in point of population and revenues are notoriously inferior to the Netherlands.

Acquisitions.

The three Legations, the population of which may be estimated at between seven and eight hundred thousand souls	750,000
That part of the territory of Genoa eastward of Finale, computed at	250,000
The territories to be ceded by the King of Sardinia, containing not more than	200,000
The Valteline, with Chiavenna and Bormio .	130,000
The territory of Lucca	125,000
	1,455,000

Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto.

Downing Street, May 13, 1800.

But while we remain in total uncertainty as to the main question of peace and war, and see the Austrian Minister, at the same moment, professing a desire of intimate union and concert with this Government, and, on the other hand, carrying on negociations with the common enemy, which he refuses to communicate to you, all our measures and resolutions are necessarily at a stand.

I cannot, therefore, too earnestly recommend your lordship to bring this matter, at length, to a definitive issue, and to ascertain precisely whether it be M. Thugut's intention to enter into the proposed engagement with no other change than that of some addition to the pecuniary aid, or whether he is merely keeping this negociation open, in order to raise his demands upon France, but with the ultimate determination of concluding a separate peace on the best terms which he shall be able to procure.

The increase of pecuniary aid would, as I have already hinted to your lordship, not be objected to in the former case; but if this assurance were given before the real intention of the Austrian Government be ascertained, it may only serve to prepare the way for fresh demands.

With respect to the Legations, nothing was said to your lordship in my former instructions, for this obvious reason, that this is not a point in which his Majesty is called upon to interfere in the same manner as he is with regard to the interests of the King of Sardinia, or to the arrangements respecting Genoa.

The King has no obligation of treaty or interest to maintain the integrity of the Papal dominions, or to oppose the pretensions which the Court of Vienna forms to those possessions. But neither, on the other hand, ought he to be required to guarantee to Austria, before a peace, the acquisitions which she meditates in that quarter.

The arrangements to which his Majesty authorized your lordship to accede respecting Piedmont and Genoa sufficiently prove that his Majesty has no jealousy of the increase of Austrian power in Italy, but, on the contrary, acts on the principle of strengthening that barrier which the military means and resources of the Court of Vienna can alone oppose against the future enterprises of France on that side.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto.

Downing Street, May 17, 1800.

With respect to the Three Legations, the Republic of Lucca, or the territory of the Valteline, it is certainly very superfluous to enter into the question of right upon these subjects. The Austrian Government has unquestionably the power in its own hands to retain these acquisitions as conquests made from a hostile Government; and the only consideration for his Majesty's Government is, whether an arrangement of this nature in favour of Austria is so far repugnant to any British right, interest, or engagement, as to induce or justify his Majesty's opposition to it. This question there can be no difficulty in answering negatively; and you are, therefore, authorized to express his Majesty's acquiescence in these plans of acquisition, in so far as he is concerned in them. The mode of expressing this assurance will be matter of some delicacy, but on that I forbear to dwell till I receive the project itself.

With respect to the Court of Naples, his Majesty is under no engagements to favour any acquisitions of that Power from the Roman State. He sees no other means of indemnification for that Power; nor indeed is there any apparent necessity to make provision for that purpose; neither can his Majesty by any means approve the tone of menace held out by a Court so little able in its present situation to support intimations of that nature. The fact, however, is, and I have had frequent occasion to observe it, that many of these points which form the subject of complaint at Vienna are solely produced by the

peculiar asperity and harshness which distinguish the conduct and language of the Austrian Minister on every occasion of dissatisfaction or contest.

The opposition of the Court of Naples to the views of Austria in Italy is not encouraged here; but neither is it possible for his Majesty to hope to conciliate those whom the daily communications they receive from Vienna tend more and more to indispose and irritate. The task would be hopeless, and the attempt would be in the highest degree invidious.

The engagements, therefore, which are in question respecting the exertion of his Majesty's influence with the Italian powers for the promotion of the plans of Austria cannot be too cautiously worded. Nor does it, in fact, appear that the Court of Vienna can reasonably require more from his Majesty on that head than a full acquiescence in what Austria wishes to acquire—a forbearance from all actual opposition to these plans, and from all language or conduct which might encourage others to oppose them; and possibly an advice in favour of submission and concession, if his Majesty's opinion or wishes should be consulted. More than this has, however, been done respecting Piedmont, in compliance with the desire of the Austrian Minister.

PEACE OF AMIENS; DISCUSSIONS WITH FRANCE; RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.

1801—1803.

The war between Great Britain and France, commenced in 1793, had continued for eight years without intermission; when, in the beginning of 1801, the firm determination of the King to refuse further concessions to his Roman Catholic subjects caused Mr. Pitt's retirement from office with the members of his administration. The country had become weary of war; and the successor of that illustrious statesman, his personal friend, Mr. Addington, conceived that this change afforded a favourable occasion for attempting to treat with the French Government for peace: the preliminaries were signed in London on the 1st of October, 1801, and the definitive treaty at Amiens on the 27th of March, 1802. The projects of insatiable ambition pursued and conceived by the First Consul of France soon produced discussions between the two Governments, which terminated in a declaration of war by that of Great Britain, on the 18th of May, 1803.

Arguments Demonstrating the Continuance of War to be preferable to the Conclusion of Peace.[1]

We must take it for granted that France meditates the destruction of our naval and commercial greatness, and the ruin of our finance.

If a definitive peace be made according to the preliminaries, without making a provision for the continuance of our commerce in those States which are under French influence; and if, in consequence thereof, France shall unite those States in a system hostile to our trade and navigation, will she not be able to effect this purpose?

2. If we continue the war, and so long as we continue it with naval success, can she, by any similar effort and combination, produce the same effect?

By the preliminary Articles, none of our ancient treaties are revived, and we restore almost all the colonies of France and her allies; we restore her trade with those colonies and allies, and we deprive ourselves of the monopoly we enjoyed in their commerce. 2. We enable France to make a commercial system between herself, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, for destroying our Navigation Act, for prohibiting the import and transit of our merchandise, &c.

We at present raise a revenue of £36,000,000 a year upon a trade of £70,000,000 a year. By the peace we shall lose whatever trade we possessed with Martinico, St. Lucia, Tobago, St. Domingo, Demerara, Essequibo, Berbice, and the Dutch Spice Islands; and the whole of our loss will become the gain of our enemies; and we shall entirely lose the shipping and employment for our sailors, which the trade to those colonies demands. Our valuing these points of trade at only £10,000,000 a year, which our enemies have lost, and we enjoy the concession of, will make a difference of £20,000,000 a year.

[1] This paper, without title, date, or name, is in the handwriting of Mr. Edward Cooke.

Before the war, we had a favourable treaty of commerce with Holland, with the Low Countries, with France, and, except in some articles, with Spain, with Piedmont, Tuscany, Naples, &c. We have now no commercial treaty with any of those countries but Naples. Suppose France was to engage those countries in a mutual association to give in each other's dominions exclusive preferences to their own manufactures, native and colonial, over those of Great Britain, and to prohibit English goods until England relaxes the Act of Navigation.

I have not materials to state precisely what would be the full effect of such a combination. It would certainly enable our enemy to ruin our cotton trade, by withholding the raw material; to injure our woollen trade by manufacturing all the wool of Spain; and it would be a great spur to their manufactures; and there can be no doubt but our capitalists would lend them money, and that our manufacturers would go over, when the encouragements at home were diminishing, and increasing in France, &c.

Such a combination would, I suppose, lessen our trade at least £5,000,000 a year. We should then have to raise an income of £36,000,000 a year, on a trade of £55,000,000, instead of £70,000,000.

But who can say what will be the effects of such a diminution of our trade—what discontent, what emigration, what despondency, what bankruptcy?

I fear that, if I had the necessary official documents, I could prove that, under the system I have stated, peace would be our entire ruin; and certainly there is nothing in the Preliminary Articles which prevents it.

Suppose a naval war to continue, our commercial monopoly would continue, and our supply of the foreign colonies would be increasing, and our enemies would be growing in a worse situation every day; for, being under the necessity of purchasing colonial articles, they must purchase from us cir-

cuitously. The necessity of paying for them would absorb their capital, and would prevent their reviving their own manfactures; and the internal state of France and her allies would be daily growing worse. Spain is already bankrupt; and if the French were to seize on Portugal and Naples, or engage them to exclude us, they would merely deprive us of a part of the carrying trade, and make our commerce with those parts be carried on by neutrals instead of ourselves. The possession of Portugal by the French would give us the Brazils.

The addition therefore of debt, by one or two years more war, would not be so dangerous to our finance as the peace supposed. The peace supposed is certain, demonstrable ruin: the war preserves at least the chance, the possibility of a more favourable arrangement.

I know not what effect the sailing of the St. Domingo fleet may have upon this statement, as I consider that measure, if successful, to be a most fatal blow to us. There are about 400,000 inhabitants in St. Domingo. The slaves are emancipated; they are at present in a doubtful state, hardly kept down by Toussaint. If Toussaint is faithful to the French; if he gets a support of 15,000 French soldiers; if, with their assistance, he shall be enabled, under Buonaparte's directions, to organize the black inhabitants, and form such a system as may combine freedom, industry, and subordination—farewell to Jamaica!—not all the fleet of England can protect it. I never could understand the policy of saying that it was advantageous to assist the French in re-organizing St. Domingo. I never could understand that a State of Free Blacks in that island, independent of France, was more dangerous than such a State under the dominion, and direction, and power of France. The first was calculated by its nature to fall to pieces in a very short period, and into a state of mere wild nature, an object of horror to all powers: the second, to become a consolidated empire, of great strength, inevitably formed to

be the destruction of Jamaica, and certain of giving to France a trade of £8,000,000 a year import and export. I fear now that, if the French force shall really have landed at St. Domingo, our power of beginning the war again, without the certain loss of Jamaica, is impracticable. The passage to Jamaica is so short, the wind so favourable and so constant, and the facility of bribing the Americans to send them vessels, &c., so great, that, with such an immense force as may now be organized there, she cannot be safe.

If France and Spain are to keep up a great force in the West Indies during peace, and if we are to keep up an equal or superior force there to guard them, the peace will not be worth having—it will be worse than war.

I should like to see the documents necessary to prove minutely and correctly the above statements: they might be easily had; they ought to be called for in Parliament. I know enough of the general nature of them to be assured they would prove every word of the above statement.

Lord Hawkesbury, the other night, declaimed about capital. I admit the principle that capital will always find employment for itself. Can he prove that, if we make such a peace as to lessen the power of employing our capital at home, it will not be transferred to our enemies? Capital has no patriotism that I know of.

The conduct of Buonaparte is such as to justify our breaking off negociation consistent with public faith—to justify our demanding that all unsettled points necessary to a safe peace should be settled before the Definitive Treaty be signed. He cannot be trusted; and there is a great difference between the constructive and indirect breach of a treaty and the positive and direct breach of it. The necessity of going to war upon the one or the other may be the same—the plea, the apology, the justification, will be different.

Review of the Relative Political Situation of Great Britain and France.[1]

Secret.

The events which have passed subsequent to the signature of the Preliminaries, namely, the result of the Consulta at Lyons and the cession of Louisiana, the Floridas, and the Island of Elba, render the relative state of France still less satisfactory than it was when the treaty was discussed; and, inasmuch as some of those cessions cannot be a matter of indifference, in a maritime point of view, the clandestine manner in which they have been obtained naturally diminishes the hope which we might entertain, that the views of France were confined to the improvement of what she then possessed, rather than the extension of her dominions.

As it is impossible not to feel dissatisfaction at the events above alluded to, it will be equally so in the discussions on the Definitive Treaty not to express that sentiment; and, indeed, unless we are prepared almost to invite fresh encroachments by our tameness and apparent insensibility, we ought, without menace, in respect to the future, or even too strong a tone in respect to the past, which is to be avoided, if we are not prepared to resist what has taken place, we ought fairly to give her to understand that, although we have made many sacrifices for peace, amongst which we reckon our acquiescence in the changes in question, we cannot submit beyond a certain point; and that, if she entertains the same desire of peace which we feel, she must abstain from encroachments which tend to alter both her maritime and continental relations with the other powers of Europe.

Connected with this, some strong naval and military establishments, and a vigorous system of finance, are as indispensable to give even to the peace we have concluded any

[1] This paper, in the handwriting of my brother, must evidently have been composed after the signature of the Definitive Treaty on the 27th of March, 1802.

chance of permanence, as they are essential to our safety, in the event of hostilities being suddenly recommenced; and the frame of our establishments should be so contrived as to admit of a rapid extension at the outset of the war, so as to place us at once in security at home, whilst we are enabled to reap the full fruits of our maritime superiority, in striking an early blow against the colonies of the enemy.

In addition to making France feel, in our communications, how necessary moderation is, on her part, to the preservation of peace, we ought to adopt a vigilant system of conduct on the Continent, with a view of accelerating, as far as we can, the adjustment of those arrangements (namely, the indemnities) which alienate the several powers of the Empire, in particular, from each other. We ought to endeavour to bring them, if possible, to understand each other; to watch, in concert, the operations of the French Government; and to be prepared to make a common effort for their own preservation, if the encroaching policy of France should leave them no other alternative.

To have our due weight with them, we ought to show a reluctance to commit them in a new war, rather than a design to push them forward as instruments for our own purposes; and, in order to give the best chance for a vigorous exertion, it must be suffered to grow out of a sense of their own necessities, rather than our suggestions, or particular policy.

Such is the *general language and policy* which our situation seems to demand. How far a more precise and pointed pledge ought to be given, in the shape of an address or an amendment, is a consideration of greater delicacy. If a pledge is to be given, it must be either pointed at the strict maintenance of the terms of the peace, or it must be pointed at something beyond the stipulations contained in the treaty. The mere maintenance of the treaty would leave France at liberty to encroach either upon her own allies—viz., Holland, Spain, Switzerland, Italian Republic, Etruria, &c., or upon the other States of Europe in whose favour we have not stipulated: in

fact, it would leave the whole question open, except as far as Great Britain, Portugal, Naples, and Turkey, are concerned. France, therefore, has a wide game to play, without breaking the letter of the treaty; and, therefore, a pledge merely pointed to this would be feeble, and more likely to prove injurious than useful. If, then, any Parliamentary pledge is to be given, it must be pointed at circumstances not provided for in the treaty, and, I conclude, mark a determination on the part of this country not to acquiesce in further encroachments on the part of France, which may tend materially to alter either her maritime or continental situation with respect to the other powers of Europe.

To judge of the effects of such a pledge, we must form some conjecture of what may be the line of policy which France is likely to pursue, either in the event of its being given or not given. If her disposition is to encroach as far as she may venture to do, without again involving herself in war, by committing ourselves to resist such encroachment, avoiding any thing offensive in our mode of doing it, we may deter France from projects which she would otherwise attempt, and from which, being embarked, she could not with credit recede. But it is to be considered, at the same time, whether, in order to produce this effect, we must not be very precise and distinct in our pledge; and, if so, we must weigh the effect this may have either in committing us in a new war, on inadequate grounds, or of rendering our acquiescence in any unsatisfactory circumstances that may occur still more humiliating, after having made a declaration that we were determined to resist further encroachments on the part of France.

If the policy of France should be to aim at an extension both of her continental, maritime, and colonial authority—and she is prepared to pursue this object, even under all the consequences of a renewal of the war, we ought, before we enter into such a pledge, to weigh maturely how the fulfilment of it will accord with the policy of the moment and the means

by which the resources of this country, as well as those of other powers, can be most effectually employed to defeat such a design on the part of France.

If this is the system upon which France is disposed to act, it threatens equally the safety of the continental and maritime powers; and though her mode of acting may affect the one description of interest more immediately, at any particular time, than the other, yet both will be affected in their turn. This consideration, and, still more, the importance of not suffering France to separate the continental from the maritime contest, in point of time, ought to make both desirous of accommodating their views, so as to make their respective strengths, as far as possible, a common check against the particular hostility which France may meditate against either; and ultimately, if there is no refuge but in arms, that they may meet the contest together, rather than suffer the exertions of France to be directed singly against either.

If a continental co-operation is an important object in our military policy, as against France, the probability of obtaining this, at any particular time and under any particular circumstances, is to be considered. The longer the period of contest can be postponed, we may assume that the probability will increase in proportion as Austria is restored. Supposing the encroachment, on the part of France, to be purely continental, there is little reason to believe that Austria and Russia could at present be brought forward, unless the danger was imminent and pressing, and of a description rather affecting their particular territories than those of powers at present under the immediate influence of France. In such a case, it could hardly accord with either our duty or interests to be spectators.

If, on the other hand, France, more jealous of our maritime and colonial importance, should, by annexation of territory in Europe to that of her own, or by placing Buonaparte at the head of the Government of Holland, or by separate treaties with those States dependent upon her, endeavour to get a

more direct control over the navies, ports, and colonies of Spain, Holland, and Portugal, than she at present possesses, this operation could not be a matter of indifference to the continental Powers, even with a view to their own safety. Can we rely, however, on their acting with us in such an event? if not, ought we to act without them?—or can we afford to postpone the maritime struggle till we can obtain a continental co-operation?

There are two grounds upon which the postponement may be injurious: 1st, the loss of national character and authority, on our part, in submitting without a struggle to alterations in the maritime and colonial importance of France, which, upon every ground of policy, must be considered as matter of extreme jealousy and alarm to the interests of this country. 2ndly, the direct advantages France will reap, in the mean time, in maritime strength as well as general resources, from being permitted to make those acquisitions unmolested.

The first consideration appears the most weighty: the mere resources of colonies are slowly realized; and, without a marine capable of contending against ours, which the absolute possession of the navies of both Spain and Holland would not for years give her, they must remain in a great degree at our mercy, together with whatever may be expended upon their improvement in the mean time. The difference between the more or the less direct possession of those colonies by France, pending the interval when an efficient co-operation may be accomplished, would not perhaps in itself so immediately affect our safety as to leave us no choice but war; whereas, the effort prematurely made may disqualify us from bearing our part in the contest, when France may leave the considerable Powers on the Continent no other alternative but a struggle for their own preservation. There are two difficulties at present in producing a continental co-operation, exclusive of the degree in which the Austrian army and treasury have been

affected by the war: the first is, the degree of jealousy which prevails in the Empire with respect to indemnities, and the close connexion which subsists between France and the Court of Berlin: secondly, the almost impregnable military position of France, which leaves little hope of a successful operation against her or her allies, whilst Austria is exposed on all sides, having lost her former barrier, and not yet having had time to establish any new line of defence.

What, then, is to be done? Is there nothing left but submission to every insult and injury France may think fit to put upon us? The situation we are placed in is certainly both painful and critical: to submit to France, at any time, is little congenial to our habits and feelings; and it is difficult to persuade one's self that that line of conduct can be wise which tends to lower the nation even in its own estimation. Yet, were the consideration of character out of the question, short of some proceeding on the part of France, not merely converting those States now under her subjection more directly to her own purposes, but levelled directly either at our own possessions or those of the remaining powers of Europe, it is perhaps a matter of doubt whether the chapter of accidents, as against France — regard being had to her internal situation — is not more promising for us than any probable operation which could be undertaken against her, either by ourselves or any allies we could prevail on to act with us.

If our immediate interests are attacked, there is no choice; but circumstances, which may remotely, in a series of years, through commercial efforts, prejudice our interest, and consequently endanger our safety, are not, perhaps, of that description of danger which ought to induce us separately and suddenly to resume the war, if we can avoid it, without lowering ourselves as a nation in too great a degree; the rather as every thing, both in point of security, as well as character, depends on our not being financially exhausted.

How long a nation so full of resources as Great Britain is might go on, if those resources were to be called forth, without regard to the principles on which we have hitherto acted, it is difficult to say, and perhaps unnecessary to inquire, as it is a system to which we cannot look for our preservation. How long, acting upon legitimate means, we can continue at war, without reducing ourselves to a state of perfect weakness, or bringing on a change of our financial system, and perhaps with it of the frame of our Government, cannot be so indefinite in point of time, though it is to be hoped that it is yet remote. If the spirit of the country went along with us, we might possibly continue the war three, four, five, or even ten, years; but there is still a question whether war, with the certainty of danger in point of finance, presents to us a probable chance, in a military point of view, of improving our relative position in other respects as against France. A maritime war is in itself incapable of rescuing any usurpation France may make on the Continent from her: the most it can effect is to strip her of those Colonies she either possesses or wishes to acquire. If delay would not place this means of offence, which certainly is a substantive one, out of our reach, it is then to be considered how the interval would affect the powers and interests of each party. France would be in possession of a temporary advantage; we should be improving our resources, laying the foundation of a more general co-operation, and taking the chance of what might affect her Government in the mean time. And, should we ultimately find it necessary, from seeing little probability of a Continental confederacy against her, or from finding that her maritime strength was increasing in such a degree as to bring into question that naval superiority which we must at all hazards maintain, as the only counterpoise to her authority on the Continent, to act separately against her colonies, we should be in a better situation, in point of finance, to undertake it, in proportion as we should succeed in gaining time; and might hope to accomplish our purpose without being

reduced in that degree which would be the necessary consequence of a war following close upon the heels of the one that is now terminated.

Upon the whole, I see the possible and probable advantage of a distinct pledge not to submit to farther encroachment on the part of France; inasmuch as it may determine her not to make the attempt. At the same time, I cannot but hesitate, where so much is at stake, and where everything may alternately hinge upon a question of time and resources, rather than any effort of arms, in taking a step which may plunge us again singly in a war, without any other means of offence against France than those which touch her colonies, a species of attack which but remotely affects her present power, and is in itself inadequate to shake the source of her authority and the stability of her military empire, whilst it bears much more severely upon our resources than it does upon hers. I am the more disposed to act with caution on this point, (though I am by no means prepared to say it may not be wise) because I do entertain, in the event of its not having the effect of deterring France from her purpose, very great doubts as to the mode and time which ought to be chosen for renewing the contest. If resources were as of course, I should, as far as our country is concerned, prefer the state of war (even under present circumstances) to the state of peace; but, as there is a limitation to this question, it is essential to weigh what they are capable of effecting, if called forth at any particular moment, as well as to determine, if they cannot be uninterruptedly applied for a long period, at what time and under what circumstances they can have most effect. This is a wide and difficult speculation, depending on considerations impossible to foresee or appreciate; and, until I can form to my own mind some satisfactory system on this view of the subject, I feel the more difficulty in committing myself to any pledge which shall be understood to bind us to renew the war upon the first prominent act of encroachment on the part of France.

Perhaps it is difficult to distinguish between the language of decision, which I think we cannot but hold, and the precise pledge which I wish to avoid. What I desire is, that France should feel that Great Britain cannot be trifled with; at the same time, that I should wish to leave the line of conduct which ought to be pursued upon circumstances as they arise entirely open; and I should prefer explaining myself, both to France and the Continental Powers, in private communications rather than by a Parliamentary pledge. Whether anything has been said to France, with reference to her late encroachment in the course of the negociation, I know not; but I should think, now the peace is concluded, that we ought to explain ourselves very frankly with respect to our general desire of peace, provided her system was such as to permit us to adhere to it; and I should think it doubly necessary, if there is any reason to apprehend that Buonaparte has similar views with respect to Holland with those which were realized at Lyons with regard to the Cisalpine Republic.

I have endeavoured to bring together the topics which appear to me connected with the subject in question. If any proceeding is to take place in Parliament beyond the general tone in which the several individuals will naturally explain themselves in debate, it may be brought forward by Government by a country gentleman unconnected with, or by a leading political character not in, Government.

If, in either of the latter cases, it should be proposed and negatived, it must lower the tone of the country, and give an impression of weakness both at home and abroad. If the measure should be adopted, in proceeding from a country gentleman, it may seem the result of a general feeling, which Government did not think it necessary to call forth, knowing that the spirit existed, but which, being disclosed, it had no objection to acquiesce in. Coming from a leader, if of congenial politics with those of Government, it will, in some degree, look like a reflection upon the tone which Government has hitherto

observed; at least, it will afford the Opposition an opportunity of giving it this turn. If it proceeds from one who has opposed the peace, it would provoke strong resistance, and bear rather a construction of menace than firmness.

Upon the whole, if it is to be done, it had better perhaps proceed from the Government itself; and, if so, a favourable opportunity may be afforded by stating in the Message accompanying the Treaty such sentiments as may lay the foundation for it.

Mr. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

London, April 6 [1802].

My dear Lord—I wished to have seen you, and to have said a few words on the Definitive Treaty—I find nothing mentioned as to Louisiana, the Floridas, Elba, the Italian Republics, the Valais, the garrisoning of Tuscany and Liguria with French troops. I of course conclude that these points are admitted by our negociation. These were not discussed, and, I believe, not suspected, when the preliminaries appeared.

I find that no ancient or former treaty with Spain, France, and Holland, is renewed. I believe it is a principle of the Law of Nations that all treaties are put an end to by war, and that all points in which the interests of nations are concerned remain after a peace in the situation they are in at the moment of concluding a treaty of peace; and consequently all former treaties drop, if not specially revived.

I am not master enough of public law to say what may be the consequences of not reviving ancient treaties. If you turn to the peace of 1783, you will see the stress laid upon the subject by the negociators of that day; and though, at that period, a commercial treaty with France was in agitation, still our negociators stipulated that such a treaty should be confined to commercial articles, and not interfere with the old established

privileges, immunities, &c., of traders in the respective nations. However ignorant I may be of *all* the consequences which may arise from not reviving the ancient treaties, one or two points have been suggested of great importance.

It is said that our monopoly of commerce in the East Indies is affected by the omission. I understand that our original right of commerce, &c., in that quarter arose from Firmauns under the Mogul; that the French had similar right by similar Firmauns; that these rights have been from time to time regulated in our favour by stipulations in treaties; that these treaties having now dropped, our respective rights depend upon the original Firmauns. I am not master of this subject at all, and, I fear, write confusedly.

It is asserted, I believe with truth, that, by the ancient treaties not having been renewed, our right of cutting logwood on the Spanish main is at an end. This right we have always enjoyed under *positive* stipulations. In the treaty of 1783 with Spain, our boundaries in which cutting logwood was to be allowed were narrowed, and the King of Spain's right of sovereignty to the logwood country was acknowledged. It is stated by the Preliminaries that all the countries *conquered* by us from France and her allies should be restored — (except, &c.); in the Definitive Treaty, the expression is altered to *occupied or conquered.* We have *occupied* the logwood country; it belongs in sovereignty to Spain; we must, therefore, evacuate it.

As to Malta, surely the arrangement proposed is worth nothing in point of security. The preliminaries held out a hope that we might there place a barrier against France. That hope is gone: and I think every candid man must allow that we are driven from the Mediterranean completely. I know some urge that we cannot *now* send a man of war of any kind into that sea; for it is said by the treaty that the *French troops* shall evacuate the Roman State and Naples, and that the English *forces* shall, in like manner, evacuate Porto Fer-

rajo, and in like manner generally all the islands and ports of the Mediterranean. It is argued, that to *evacuate* means that, after the evacuation, the place evacuated shall not be entered during the continuance of the treaty enjoining the evacuation; and then it is said, that, as we have consented to evacuate the Mediterranean under the present treaty, we have by that consent agreed never to send thither any ship of war during the continuance of the treaty; and that we are not even warranted in sending a force to attack the Barbary corsairs, should they presume to seize our merchantmen. A remark is also made on the Article which mentions the French *troops*, and contradistinguishes them to the English *forces*. It may be urged that *troops* does not imply *ships*, which *forces* does; so that *we* are to evacuate the Mediterranean with our *fleet*, but the French *fleet* may occupy the harbours of Naples and the Roman State.

The amendment of the Article as to Portugal is ridiculous in the way it stands. You see that the French boundary of the Arrowary is to be taken from the point most distant from Cape Nord; and I hear that this point actually is at the mouth of the Amazon river.

It is said we are not to have any treaty of commerce; if so, what I stated to you in a paper some days since is intended. I do not hear anything as to the treaty with the Porte, made in France nine days after the Preliminaries were signed; nor of the treaty with Portugal, which contravenes the Methuen treaty. I suppose, however, the Chief Consul means they should stand.

I now, on the whole, beg you to consider whether the treaty, on the part of France, does not meditate a new war; and whether the whole of the arrangement is not in that tone.

Her concealing from us the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas at the time of the Preliminaries was both fraudulent, insulting, and hostile. Her usurpation of the Italian Republic, in order to establish her dominion over Naples, was hostile,

and a proof of unsatisfied and increasing ambition. Her refusing to renew all the ancient treaties is hostile. Her refusing, if it be true, any commercial system, is hostile.

By gaining Louisiana and the Floridas, she has an additional check on Spain. She becomes mistress of the back States of America, and mistress of the Bahama Passage, which commands much of ours and all the American West India trade.

By gaining the Arrowary, she commands an opening to the Brazils; and by the Cape of Good Hope and Cochin, her power of annoying our East India trade is established.

Suppose the French, Spanish, and Dutch navies fully recruited—suppose France conquers the rebel Negroes—then suppose a new war—we must fall.

I consider, therefore, the peace, from the tone in which it has been made, the views which it has discovered, the point of attack it has secured, as a fresh declaration of war on the part of France so soon as the triple navy can be recruited. The question then recurs, Would it be wiser to fight out the battle now, when we are in possession of all the points of attack, or nearly so, or to wait for a few years till France shall be prepared to renew the war, with all those points of attack in her possession?

I do not see that, if, with all our present advantages and superiority, we could not make a better peace, how we can hope to save ourselves at all in a future contest, which we are to begin with the loss of those advantages and that superiority.

Be it recollected that the Cape of Good Hope is a naval position, the Arrowary a naval position, Martinico a naval position, St. Domingo a naval position; that Elba is a naval position, that Louisiana is a naval position, that Florida is a naval position; that France, when peace was made, was in possession of none, and that we were in possession of most of them—that we had Malta, which is gone; that the Dutch, French, and Spanish navies were of no comparative force with ours.

What will be our case when, in a new war, we shall be driven from the Mediterranean; our flank turned by the Dutch navy recruited; a French flotilla menacing our centre; the Brest, Rochefort, L'Orient, Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena fleets threatening our other flank; and with all the naval positions above stated for the destruction of our foreign trade, and making an impression upon America in the hands of France? We then cannot expect that naval superiority we now enjoy; we can hardly hope for naval equality: and in land forces, as at present, we must be greatly inferior. Our inferiority by land will remain, our superiority at sea will be lost, and with it all our superiority of actual position, and that monopoly of trade which fed our expenses and increased our resources.

The loan of to-day proves that we were not driven to this peace by necessity.

Many more points may possibly occur to me; but the above are enough to make you think.

Ever most truly, &c., E. C.

Memorandum for the consideration of the Cabinet on the Negociation with France.

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Whitworth to be directed to present a note desiring to know whether the publication of the paper which the French Minister at Hamburgh compelled the Editor of the "Correspondenten" to publish was authorised by the French Government. If not, to call upon them to recall Reinhart, for having insulted the British Government in the face of Europe, without the authority of his Government.

If the French Government refuses, Lord W. to be directed to come away within a limited time, as the French Government may hesitate in conceding so far, unless they see some prospect thereby of preserving peace. Lord Whitworth to be furnished with the several projects, including our ultimatum, to make use of according to his discretion.

I think it important that he should thus be prepared privately to enter into discussion with them; but I conceive his instructions should be, that he was not authorized upon any account to enter into any official negociation with them till they agreed to disavow, in the most authentic manner, the proceeding of Reinhart as an indispensable preliminary.

I am inclined to think the battle ought still to be fought on the proposition before transmitted; namely, the permanent occupation of Malta, qualifying it, if any facility arises therefrom, by leaving the Order in possession of the Civil Government of the Island.

If France requires something to save her honour short of the permanent occupancy, I would still make my struggle upon the period of temporary occupancy to make it as long as possible.

To act up to our principle, as laid down in former despatches, I think we must insist upon the permanent possession of a naval station. I would take Lampedosa, limited as it may be in its extent, rather than weaken my claim to the longest possible period that can be had in the occupancy of Malta by contending for a second naval station.

Supposing France even to consent to our having Elba or Corfu, in addition to Lampedosa, as the occupancy of Malta for at least three years is indispensable to the making any thing of Lampedosa, or, indeed to its own independence, we should for that period be encumbered with the expense of three stations; and Lampedosa will always be so much the less valuable, in proportion as the possession of Malta passes soon from us; whereas, in seven or ten years, we might make it a considerable accommodation to ourselves, and a material support to Malta.

Whilst we possess Malta, with Lampedosa, we have every thing which we require, either in point of position, strength, or accommodation. In the course of events, a possession for seven years would, most probably, be a possession for ever;

and, if the island is ultimately to pass from us into the hands of the inhabitants, we shall be enabled to leave it in such a state, that with our support (Lampedosa being, at all events, ours), the risk to be run is not such as I should think it wise to guard against now, by getting into war, if it can be avoided by the other alternative.

I prefer seven years in Malta, with Lampedosa, much to three years in Malta, with Lampedosa and a second station, be it Elba or Corfu; to occupy all three would be embarrassing and expensive: if we contribute ultimately to the funds of Malta, the same objection would apply, strengthened by what may be requisite to be expended, to put Lampedosa in a state for occupancy.

There seem to be, exclusive of Lampedosa, but three stations that have been suggested: Candia, of great extent, no defences, bad harbour; and, being part of the Turkish Empire, not to be proposed by us, as the principle we go upon is to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey; Corfu, liable to considerable objection as a proposition proceeding from us, it being part of an independent State, under the protection of Russia — its defences extremely extensive, requiring a garrison of 12,000 men. Elba, preferable to Corfu in every respect; but, having been annexed to France, the First Consul would probably feel it more humiliating to part with it than Malta.

To the first, I conceive the objections are insurmountable; to the second, they are strong, as involving us in a much greater military establishment within the Mediterranean than is consistent with our peace policy. It would be as follows:— Gibraltar, 4,000; Corfu, 5,000; Lampedosa, 2,000; Malta, while ours, 4,000 — total, 15,000. Elba I conceive less objectionable, in point of garrison, and better than Corfu in point of harbour and position, but out of the question as a cession.

Lampedosa is free from objection, as requiring an expensive

garrison: it is to be presumed it may be made strong; it is good, as far as it goes, as a harbour, and may be improved; there is less difficulty in getting it, and in seven years it may be made something of. It may be said, but why not try for Corfu or Elba, in addition? My reason is, first, because I think you will not succeed in getting both, with a substantial tenure of Malta, which, in every point of view, I look upon as so much preferable, that I had rather extend my time of occupancy there than obtain a second Naval Station any where else; and, if we are ever to evacuate Malta, Lampedosa, locally, is better calculated to support our influence in that island than either Elba or Corfu, which is an important consideration, as Lord St. Vincent considers Lampedosa, with Malta independent, to be an adequate naval accommodation. But what makes me prefer contending for a long period in Malta, rather than wasting our claims upon collateral points, is, that I conceive nothing but Malta will really answer our purpose; and that, in proportion as our tenure is considerable, so is our chance good, either of a continuance of peace or of perpetual possession of it. My idea would be then to refer my Lord Whitworth to our former proposition, as admitting of but one modification, and that only to be had recourse to by him in the last resource — namely, that if the French Government was really desirous of peace, but felt its honour so committed not to acquiesce in our permanent possession of Malta as to have no choice but war, in case we persisted, that we would accept a long term of years—say ten, but certainly not less than seven — provided the permanent possession of Lampedosa was given to us as an equivalent.

I prefer sending him a single proposition, admitting of a simple modification, rather than perplexing him with a variety of alternatives, none of which, with the exception of Elba, we can venture ourselves to propose; and any of which, if acceded to by France, would probably lead to a very protracted negociation; whereas, in the other case, you can tell my Lord

Whitworth you are not authorized to enter into any official negociation whatever, unless the French Government are prepared, as a preliminary, to disavow Reinhart's proceedings at Hamburgh. But, that the French Government may know on what terms we should be willing to settle the whole dispute, you may give them to understand the outline of the project; and if they persist in resisting the point, permanent possession in Malta, notwithstanding the great boon offered to France in recognising the Italian Republics, you are to state the modification above mentioned as the alternative of this Court. And unless the French Government shall without delay acquiesce, first, in the disavowal of Reinhart; secondly, in the basis above stated, as the foundation of a convention; and, thirdly, in disavowing an intentional insult to this Government, by the publication of Sebastiani's Report, you are to make it understood that you are directed to leave Paris.

These three propositions seem so plain, and so little capable of being evaded, that it is expected you will be enabled to obtain a categorical answer to each of them without further reference home.

My opinion is, that with Malta for seven years, Lampedosa for ever, Holland and Switzerland evacuated, and the Turkish Empire and Naples under the avowed protection of Russia, if not formally guaranteed by her, that you would stand well at home, and well with reference to France, provided you have obtained suitable reparation on the two points affecting the honour of the country. On the first, it is enough to disavow any intentional insult; the second appears to me so malignant a libel upon the British Government, and published under circumstances so peculiarly ostensible, that it is impossible to expect Parliament will be satisfied with any vindication of the national honour which is not public and ostensible in its nature: whether this is to be done by recalling Reinhart, or in an answer to a note of ours, may admit of consideration. The former I should think preferable to both parties; but, after the steps

we thought it necessary to take towards Portugal, when a naval officer was insulted in his uniform by the police, we cannot uphold ourselves by letting such an insult as this upon the British Government, given in the face of all Europe, pass without an adequate reparation; besides, in putting this point foremost, we may be pretty sure that France will not go to war with us for Reinhart's manifesto, if she is disposed to settle the other points according to the ultimatum given to Lord W.; whereas, if she will not come into what we are determined to insist on, it is ten times more for our advantage to break off upon such an insult, than on any proposal of terms which we can make to France.

Note verbale from Lord Hawkesbury to Mr. Otto.

Lord Hawkesbury has received his Majesty's commands to communicate through Mr. Otto to the French Government the sentiments of deep regret, which have been excited in his Majesty's mind by the Address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, which was published by authority in the Moniteur of the 1st instant, and by the representations which have been made to his Majesty, on this subject, on behalf of the nation whose interests are so immediately affected by it. His Majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss Cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other Powers.

The Cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as every other independent State, the right of regulating their own internal concerns; and this right has,

moreover, in the present instance, been formally and explicitly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the French Government, in the treaty of Luneville, conjointly with the other Powers who were parties to that engagement. His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign Powers; and, with whatever regret his Majesty may have perused the late Proclamation of the French Government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will further attempt to control that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights. His Majesty thinks himself called upon, by his regard for the general interests of Europe, and by his peculiar solicitude for the happiness and welfare of the Swiss nation, to express these his sentiments with a frankness and sincerity, which he feels to be due to his character, and to the good understanding which he is desirous of preserving with the Government of France.

Downing Street, October 10, 1802.

DETACHED MEMORANDUMS,

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

Occupation of Malta.

Lord Whitworth to be recalled to his former ultimatum, and to be ordered to come away, in case he should not be able immediately to sign an arrangement substantially on the basis of that proposition.

He is distinctly to understand that the agreement must be conclusive and immediate between France and Great Britain, and not subject to reference to the other powers who were contracting parties to the Treaty of Amiens.

That a temporary possession of Malta, of the description contained in his instructions, must be insisted on as indispen-

sable, to enable Great Britain to put Lampedosa, or some other maritime possession, into a state of useful occupancy—a naval station in the Mediterranean being that security which his Majesty can alone deem substantial against the views manifested by France.

If it would relieve the difficulty, the term of years within which the British garrison should not be called on to evacuate might be specified in a secret article. With such a stipulation, his Majesty would consent to a public convention, embracing the several points contained in the ultimatum, and providing that Malta shall remain in the possession of his Majesty, till it shall be placed under the protection of a Russian garrison, under such arrangements for the benefit of the Maltese inhabitants as shall be agreed upon between Great Britain and Russia.

Sebastiani's Report.

We first decided, in consequence of Russia having refused her guarantee, and Spain having sequestered the funds of the Spanish Langue, that further stipulations were requisite before the evacuation could take place.

Russia having offered a qualified guarantee, we stated that, in justice to the Maltese, we could not concur in the proposition, without taking into consideration any representation they might have to make on the subject. We submitted, however, an outline of an arrangement for deliberation, reserving ourselves upon the decision till we could hear from Malta.

Two days after our communication to Russia was despatched Sebastiani's Report appeared in the Moniteur. We directed Lord Whitworth to complain of this paper on two grounds—1st, the insult thereby offered to the King's Government, the army in Egypt, and the officer in command; 2ndly, as disclosing views inconsistent with the Treaty of

Amiens and the general interests of this country; and we declared our determination not to enter into any discussions relative to the evacuation of Malta, till we had first received satisfactory explanation on both these points.

Talleyrand, upon this representation, recurred to the old complaints about the English press; denied that the Chief Consul had any views against the Turkish empire; desired to know what explanation and satisfaction we alluded to and required; stating that his Government could never consent to any relaxation of the Treaty of Amiens.

Buonaparte sent for Lord W.; told him that we must evacuate Malta, or it was war; talked of invasion, &c.; and, in the course of his conversation, although he denied any immediate wish to go to Egypt, at the risk of war, avowed that it was an object France never could lose sight of, and that, sooner or later, it must belong to her, either by the consent of the Turkish Government, or by the dissolution and dismemberment of the Ottoman empire.

Upon the receipt of this communication, we recurred to our former grounds of [complaint], which the French Government had studiously endeavoured to pass and evade; adhered to our former declaration of not entering into further discussion relative to the evacuation of Malta, till we had received the explanation and satisfaction we had desired; and added that, after the distinct avowal made by the First Consul of the ulterior views of the French Government in respect to Egypt, in confirmation of the many causes of suspicion and jealousy before existing, we could not avoid requiring some substantial security against those views; and that we conceived it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any security that could be deemed satisfactory, other than the military occupation of Malta.

These grounds have since been gone over in the Notes that have passed; the French Government, however, attempting to deny that any discussions whatever were pending, and con-

sidering the armaments alluded to in the King's message as unfounded.

The object of the French Government evidently is—first, to appear the complaining party, instead of being, as in fact they are, the party complained of; secondly, to throw upon us the difficulty of remaining armed, or the disadvantage of being the first to declare war.

The first must be met by steadily reverting to our original ground. The second is a case of more difficulty; but, as it is impossible to keep the country long in suspense, it seems indispensable to bring it to an issue, which may be done in two ways, either by acquainting the French Government that unless, within a certain time, some satisfactory explanation should be given on the grounds complained of, our ambassador had directions to leave Paris, or by accompanying such intimation—

If any thing is done, it must be done immediately—if any thing is done, it must be followed up, till satisfaction is obtained, or war declared. The necessity of taking the step depends on the Paper. It professes to be the official Report of an agent of the French Government, the sentiments of which the Government itself must be deemed to have adopted by its authorized publication in the Moniteur.

The insult, if any, is either against the Government, by imputing to it the having supported a rebellious competition against the Bey of Tripoli—against a General Officer in the chief command of the army in Egypt, by attributing to him the design of endeavouring to procure Sebastiani's assassination—or against the army, by charging it with dilapidation and plunder.

If this Paper is not complained of, on what ground can we argue our indifference to it? Can we deny its being an insult? Could we deny, were we to publish such a Paper in the

London Gazette, that it was an insult? If we admit that it is an insult, can we assign any good reason for not complaining of it, and what?

We cannot admit that we are too weak in a military sense. We cannot avow, if we are not prepared at once to claim Malta, that we are endeavouring to gain time under the mask of negociation. We cannot declare that we are determined to despise whatever menace or insult the French Government may think fit officially to publish. If not, can we draw a distinction between the present insult and one which we should think ourselves called on to take up? If not, can we explain our conduct in this case on grounds that are consistent with our honour, and will the facts bear us out? Will not d'Auvergne's case and others admit of much inconvenient colouring, and the effect of the whole injure us both at home and abroad? Can we, without taking any step, proceed in our discussions about Malta, on the ground of our communication to Russia? or are we prepared, without making what has been published a part of our case, to alter our ground?

Revenues of the Grand Master and Order of Malta.

Since the invasion of Malta by the French, the revenues of the Government and the Grand Master have not been received. The late Emperor and Grand Master ordered that all duties levied in the different Priories (which ought to have been sent to Malta) should be conserved in the different Treasuries, in order to be employed for any extraordinary expenditure at the restoration of the Order.

The Grand Master has alone the power of collecting these sums, which renders the election still more pressing. The revenues of the Grand Master and those of the Order have at all times been distinct. Those of the Grand Master, arising from the receipt of Customs, captures, territorial possessions in the islands of Malta and Gozo, magistracies, and rights of

the Pope, (*annates*) amounted to 1,200,000 livres. Those of the Order, arising from the tenth of the revenue of all the commanderies, the right of seizure, and other sources from which the public revenue arose, amounted to 6,000,000. The acquisition of two Priories in Russia and one in Bavaria will not compensate for the loss of the three Tongues in France, and in all probability of those in Spain. There remain six Priories in Italy; two in Austria; two in Germany; two in Russia; one in Portugal; all of which are very rich; and, supposing the separation of France and Spain to have diminished the revenues of the Order by one-half, they would still amount to 3,000,000 livres, which, with economy, would be sufficient for the Government of the island.

The critical situation of the island, and the complete want of all order or discipline, require the immediate election of a Grand Master. The defence of the island would require but a very small number of foreign troops: engineer officers are to be found among the Knights, who would volunteer their services; and there are among the inhabitants corps of sailors and gunners, and 12,000 men formed into Militia, who are very much attached to the Order, and serve for a very low pay.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury.

London, Monday, January 24, 1803.

My dear Hawkesbury—Since our last Cabinet, I have been led to consider attentively the qualifications under which we should explain ourselves in the outset of our negociations relative to Malta, and the rather from having understood from Castelcicala, whom I met at the Priory, that Caprara has been chosen by the Priory of Bologna since the Russian list was made out, and now stands amongst the number out of whom the Grand Master is to be chosen, if the selection is still to be left with the Pope.

I still remain of opinion that, having determined not to risk a war, the Cape then in our hands, by avowedly claiming

Malta *on the double grounds* then open to us, we cannot now refuse to negociate for placing it in a state of independence, and that we must fairly make the attempt; but, in doing so, I think we ought not only to rest in our answer to Russia upon the circumstances which now stand in the way of carrying the tenth Article into literal execution, but also advert distinctly to the general conduct of France, subsequent both to the Preliminaries and the Definitive Treaties. I think this important, not only as justifying the utmost jealousy on our part in insisting on effectual provisions for securing the independence of the island, but also as necessary to enable us to claim its possession absolutely, in case we should find it expedient to do so in the progress of the discussions, either from any fresh cause of complaint we may have to add to the many already existing against France, or from our deeming the arrangement itself, after every effort has been made to perfect it, such as we cannot assent to.

I have already alluded to the question of the Grand Master. I own it appears to me the first in importance. Whatever may be our system, if it is placed in the hands of a *Frenchman* in disposition, the possession of the island is likely soon to be theirs. From every thing I have heard, Caprara is such a man; and, if the Pope is to name, we have every reason to fear that such will be his choice.

An election by the Order in Malta may be hazardous; but it is not probable that the resulting choice of all the Langues, particularly in the event of an amicable arrangement with the aristocratic Priories, can be so bad; at least, it is impossible that it *can be worse* than the nominee of the most French Priory, which it is difficult to satisfy one's self will not be chosen by the Pope, subject as he is to the influence of the First Consul. To argue otherwise is to admit the influence of France to be inevitably paramount in all future elections; and, if so, the policy of making any attempt to remove the difficulties which might now justify us in keeping possession, (though

I should like the other course, if it can be made compatible with a rational security for the independence of the island, much better) becomes proportionably questionable. But, at all events, whatever risk may attach to this part of the arrangement, it is of the last importance that it should arise from the nature of the system, and not be of our own creating.

If Russia has sound views upon this point, it is impossible that she should wish to press this election farther upon us. I know your first impressions were, that we were pledged in terms to France to recognise a second nomination on the part of the Pope. I own I have not yet heard anything to satisfy my mind on this part of the question. I am led extremely to doubt that France so understands it; else Buonaparte was not likely to attach so much importance as he did to Ruspoli's acceptance. Ruspoli was even threatened with his displeasure, if he persisted to decline. This could not be for the difference of time which would have been requisite to refer to the Pope for a fresh nomination, rather than to Ruspoli, then in Scotland. At all events, as I view this subject, nothing but a distinct claim upon our good faith, on the *ascertained risk* of a misunderstanding with Russia, ought to induce us now to accede to such an appointment; and it may deserve consideration whether our accession to that part of the arrangement may not be considered as having been given in contemplation of the concurrence of Russia in the literal execution of the Article as it stood; and whether, if the most essential parts of that arrangement are necessarily opened to revision, *the whole* is not again become matter for discussion; and I should then wish much to look minutely into the form of election for choosing a Grand Master according to the Statutes of the Order, with a view of seeing whether, by the introduction of a right of approbation in Russia, or a right of nomination given to the Maltese *Consiglio populare*, out of the Knights named by the Langues, some provision might not be thus made to guard against an improper choice. Without a reason-

able security for an honest Grand Master, the whole of our arrangement must be a deception.

On my return to town to-day, I called at your office. As I may not have much time to converse with you to-morrow before the Cabinet, I have troubled you with the outline of what occurs. I have thrown upon paper the *grounds* upon which it strikes me we should *stand*, not as applicable to any useful purpose in its present shape, but as necessary to explain my own impressions for your consideration. I think we ought to lose no time in opening ourselves to Russia on the subject of the Grand Master, and that she ought to be made to feel all our apprehensions on this subject; and I think it would be desirable that this should be done before *we* express any *very sanguine expectations* of being able to get over the difficulties which arise from the claims these Maltese have upon us. It is enough, I conceive at present, to profess our disposition to make the attempt; but I doubt whether we are called on so early, before the negociation is more advanced, to commit ourselves in our note to any specific arrangement to which we, as far as depends on ourselves, should be willing to consent.

I have written more at length than I intended; I should have been tempted to go down to you at Coombe, to have an opportunity of talking this point over, but Hervey informed me you had company. I shall call on you to-morrow, as soon as I can dispose of some persons to whom I am engaged.

Ever, my dear Hawkesbury, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Note respecting Malta.[1]

Although his Majesty has observed with anxiety various events (some even affecting the Island of Malta itself) which have taken place, as well subsequent to the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty of Amiens as of the Preliminaries signed

[1] An office copy, without title, date, or known hand or signature, apparently addressed to the Russian cabinet.

in London, materially altering the relative state of possession in contemplation, of which the above treaties were avowedly concluded, and which in their consequences cannot be viewed with indifference by his Majesty, either as they affect the interest of his own immediate dominions, or those of the other powers of Europe—

His Majesty, nevertheless, anxious to make every effort for the preservation of a good understanding with France, consistent with the honour of his Crown, and the essential interests of his subjects, is desirous of leaving no means untried which may lead to the complete execution of the Treaty of Amiens, according to the true intent and spirit of that agreement.

His Majesty is therefore ready immediately to enter into amicable explanations, with a view of placing by fresh stipulations (to be agreed on in a supplementary convention) the Island of Malta, according to the declared purpose of the Treaty, in a state of independence, either of Great Britain or France.

His Imperial Majesty must be sensible that subsequent events, in no degree depending upon any act of his Britannic Majesty, have not only rendered the execution of the tenth Article impracticable in its present form, but established, in the conduct of one of the contracting parties to the Treaty, the indispensable necessity of further stipulations, for the purpose of securing the avowed object of the Treaty itself.

The undersigned has received the King's commands thus openly to state his Majesty's sentiments, that, whilst his Majesty will be ready with the utmost good faith to remove, as far as depends upon him, the difficulties which impede the execution of the tenth Article of the Treaty of Amiens, his Majesty cannot possibly acquiesce in withdrawing his troops from Malta till a satisfactory arrangement shall be agreed on for securing its independence: the essential and indispensable basis of which his Majesty feels it his duty explicitly to de-

clare must be the provision of funds competent to the military defence of the island; a due consideration of the rights and interests of the Maltese inhabitants; and the sanction and guarantee of his Imperial Majesty, in conjunction with that of the other Powers specified in the Treaty.

On the Interference of France in the Affairs of Switzerland.[1]

The question as to Switzerland arose in consequence of a successful effort on the part of the great body of the inhabitants to throw off the Government established in that country under the auspices of France.

France, in the Treaty of Luneville, had acknowledged the independence of the Helvetic Republic, and their right to settle their own form of Government. Notwithstanding much internal dissension, the French troops had lately been withdrawn, under an admonition, however, that troubles in Switzerland might render it necessary for France to interpose, and probably with a view of accelerating the circumstances which might afford a pretext for such interference.

Immediately on the subversion of the Government, the First Consul's proclamation appeared, directing its recall, under the pain of military interference; and, upon a delay occurring in the submission of the Swiss, a French army invaded the country.

The Swiss Envoy at Paris, from the people who wished to resume a form of Government little differing from their old constitution, applied to the several Foreign Ministers, from none of whom he received any encouragement, some not seeing him, others stating that they could not attempt or join in any remonstrance without authority from their courts. After being so refused, he applied to Mr. Merry, to whom he presented a note expressing that the sole reliance of

[1] Apparently the conclusion of a paper by Lord Castlereagh, though the MS. affords no indication that it is not complete in itself.

the Swiss was on the separate interference of Great Britain; that our interference could alone save the liberties of his country from being invaded, and the lives of the people from being sacrificed in a hopeless struggle against France.

Exclusive of our general right of interference against any alteration of the state of Europe, inconsistent with our interest upon principles peculiarly dangerous in themselves, we had the additional grounds of the Treaty of Amiens, avowedly made and so recognised in terms by France as being settled on the then existing state of Europe.

We had not only the case of Switzerland to complain of, but a succession of acts subsequent to the Preliminaries, some antecedent to, some subsequent to the Definitive Treaty, which marked a system of encroachment on the part of France inconsistent with peace. We had the strong motive for endeavouring to arrest such a system; and, so far as the attempt was politic on general grounds, it was the more advisable to make it whilst some of our conquests yet remained in our hands.

The chances of successful interference were difficult to calculate, depending, as they did, upon various events independent of us. There was the chance (though perhaps not an encouraging one) of what our own representation, unsupported, and not pushed to extremity, might do: it is by no means clear, however, that this did not, in fact, alter the First Consul's original purpose. There was the chance of what our representation might do, coupled with a spontaneous resistance, more or less protracted, on the part of the Swiss people receiving pecuniary succours from us. There was the further chance of both these, strengthened by an interposition, more or less decided, on the part of Russia and Austria. Such were the chances in our favour: success was everything both to the Swiss and to the general security of Europe.

As to the risks of our interference, as far as they affected the Swiss, they were either the same to which they were

already exposed, or, if at all increased, increased at their special instance.

As far as they affected ourselves, they were war; in case the acts which we determined to do, namely, to give pecuniary succours to the Swiss, in case they determined to persevere, should decide France to make it a cause of war with us; or, secondly, war, in case we should determine, upon seeing a prospect of doing it successfully, to resist by force the purpose France had in view. We determined that it was wise to incur the former; subsequent events decided us against involving ourselves in the latter; these were the absolute submission of the Swiss, and the indisposition of the Continental Powers, particularly Austria, to take any part.

Upon the case so stated to establish blame, it must either be contended that we should not have interfered at all; or that, having interfered, we should have persevered; or that the mode of our interference was ill-judged.

To maintain the first, it will be necessary to establish the policy of acquiescing in a succession of acts on the part of France, terminating with the one in question, without either making any effort to call forth the means of resisting them with effect, or even making France feel that her conduct was such as excited our jealousy.

In order to accomplish the first, it will scarcely be argued that we could not make the trial without being pledged to go to war ourselves, in case it failed; nor can it be maintained, even though it did fail, that no good purpose has been answered by this country having shown her disposition to co-operate in defence of Continental interests.

As far as France is concerned, it has already been observed, that it is by no means clear that our interference, though of a description to leave us fully at liberty to act according to circumstances, did not do good, in point of fact; nor does it by any means follow that Great Britain, in manifesting her feelings upon such points, though with a rational attention to her

means of interference, is not more likely to keep French ambition within bounds than if she were to appear either insensible to or afraid to express her feelings, but rather inclined to insulate herself for the sake of securing peace at all events.

To contend that, having interfered, we were bound to persevere, seems only maintainable upon the ground that our honour was committed by the terms and nature of our remonstrance, which is refuted by the note itself; for although it may be politic early to commit yourself upon a point, so as to make it impossible for another power to act in opposition to your wishes without being involved in war, yet it never can be wise, after the point is actually decided, and no retreat left short of submission to the other party, to make it a cause of war, without consideration of means or circumstances.

Not having originally thought it wise to commit ourselves, whilst the possibility of retrocession was greater, and when such a committal might have improved our chances of success, it would have been inconsistent with our original purpose to have acted as if we were committed, after we found the Swiss had submitted and the Emperor declined taking a part; in fact, it would have been determining to act without that which, being uncertain, had decided the nature of our representation being made as contingent and not positive.

If our interposition at all was not necessarily wrong, or such as left us no choice but perseverance, the fault must then be in the *mode* of our interference; that either something was omitted that might have contributed to our purpose, or that our representation was made in a manner which has disgraced us, followed up as it has been. As to the latter, as it appears upon the face of the note that we do not stand committed towards France to persevere, at all events, it can be as little alleged, in point of fact, that we were at all committed to the Swiss, from whom we never received any communication previous to that through Merry. They acted without the slightest encourage-

ment from us, and had partially submitted before Mr. Moore reached Switzerland.

It can as little be argued that, by any effort on our part, the co-operation of Austria and Russia could have been obtained: it may be said, why did we not foresee the probability of this invasion of Switzerland, and why did we not ascertain beforehand the dispositions of other powers, and, in the event of there being no hopes of an adequate confederacy, avoid interference at all?

The answer is, that it does not follow, even from the latter supposition, that an interference not committing our honour was unwise with such a Government as that of France. It is certainly desirable to avoid frequent discussions of a nature not to be followed up; but this principle may be pushed too far, and, in the present instance, total silence would have been, upon the whole, more awkward than our interference has proved.

Grounds for the justification of the British Government, in case of the Renewal of War.

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

If the country is involved in war so soon after the conclusion of peace, even before the execution of the Treaty itself has been accomplished, it will require a strong case on the part of Government to resist one or other of these three inferences: either that the peace itself was negociated upon improvident principles; or that the Treaty, such as it was, should have been executed; or that the principles which led you to accede to such terms do not justify you in policy in going to war, under present circumstances.

The defence of Government naturally resolves itself into two questions: the policy of the peace, and the justice, as well as policy, of the subsequent measures, which have led to war.

The question of peace abstractedly has already been amply discussed. The argument of experience may be stated against its supporters and in favour of its opposers; to which may be replied, that to have persevered in war till you could negociate a peace which could not be broken would have been to render the contest endless: had you done so, you could not have carried the country with you. To have obtained somewhat better terms might not have materially altered the ultimate result as to the renewal of war. In struggling for the improvement of terms, there was a risk of remaining at war with the public opinion divided; and, after an expensive and painful interval, being obliged to abate of your demands, and thus to have incurred the disadvantage of concession.

Whatever advantages, either in fact or in impression, have resulted from making the peace, have been paid for, either by what we have given up, or by what France has been enabled to do in that interval of peace, which she could not have done in war. In the former class, we may reckon Martinique and the Cape as of importance, and not recoverable without an operation. The other possessions restored, in a military sense, are unimportant; and, in a commercial view, whatever they may be worth, they are easily recoverable.

I do not reckon the military or naval reductions as any sacrifice; they are more than compensated by intermediate savings, regard being had to the competence of our present force, either for purposes of security, or of any scale of offensive measures within our reach.

In the latter class, we have nothing to lament. France has wasted more upon St. Domingo, and suffered more from that war, than any we could have waged against her. She has made no successful effort to improve or strengthen any other French colony; she has made no progress in restoring her navy at home, or in replenishing her arsenals. On the contrary, she has exhausted the latter in fitting out her armaments for St. Domingo, and she has injured her fleet by displaying it in

a state of imperfect equipment. She has done nothing effectual for the revival of her commerce. She has only proved to herself and all the world that her commercial hostility to us is as impotent in peace as in war. Such may fairly be stated to be the balance of relative convenience and inconvenience resulting from the peace.

The direct advantage of it to us I should simply state to be, that it has satisfied the country that its Government was desirous of peace, has done every thing to obtain it, could not but be desirous of preserving it, and that the recurrence of war is a measure of necessity, not of our seeking.

If we have no special grounds to regret having made the peace, the question then resolves itself into the adequacy of the case on which we recur to war, or place ourselves in that situation in which it becomes inevitable. Here it lays upon us to show that it has either arisen out of circumstances fairly justifying us under the equitable interpretations of the Treaty itself, or out of circumstances which have happened subsequent to the Treaty, and are of a nature to warrant the pretensions we have founded upon them.

It must be made distinctly to appear as not an attempt under false or inadequate pretences to mend a peace which we have since become ourselves dissatisfied with. In examining this question, the circumstances, and, perhaps, the policy, of this Government may best be considered with reference to certain epochs. Firstly, what passed between the conclusion of the preliminaries and that of the Definitive Treaty; secondly, what passed between the Definitive Treaty and our interference, in respect to Switzerland; thirdly, what passed from the month of October to the period of the rupture.

The conduct of France must be viewed as it bears upon interests specially provided for in the Treaty, or as affecting the state of things in contemplation of which the Treaty was made. The former is more immediately a question of obligation and engagement between the two Governments; the latter

is as clearly matter for us to act upon, provided the grounds are adequate to bear us out.

The general policy of this Government in terminating the war was to try the experiment of peace,

First, from a hope that France, having extended and secured herself, would find her interest in that system of internal improvement which is necessarily connected with peace.

Secondly, that our means of hostility were neither adequate to reduce France, nor to defend other powers.

Thirdly, that it would be time enough to call them forth for the purposes of our own security, whenever those interests of which we are sole and natural guardians were attacked.

The principles upon which the conduct of Government has been regulated, at different periods, are all referable to the policy upon which the peace was made.

And, first, as to the interval between the preliminaries and the Definitive Treaty, there was then much to induce a doubt whether the policy of France was not one of extension and oppression during that period. Buonaparte put himself at the head of the Italian Republic, annexed the Island of Elba to France, and it then became known that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France.

These acts made a strong impression ; but, as they were not considered separately as of sufficient importance to determine us to re-open the preliminaries, so they were considered as not conclusive evidence of a systematic spirit in the councils of France inconsistent with peace.

The Treaty was ratified ; but it was then declared that the peace could not last, if the conduct of France was such as it had been subsequent to the preliminaries, and previous to the Definitive Treaty.

The state of things during the second period—namely, from the ratification of the Treaty to the representation relative to Switzerland—was, on the part of the British Government, a sincere desire to execute the Treaty manifested in the orders

given to that effect in all quarters ; in their acquiescing in the mode of election of the Grand Master ; in their reception of the Neapolitan troops and the French Minister, General Vial; and in their repeated efforts to obtain the necessary guarantees.

Our conduct, in respect to restoring French subjects to all privileges within the country, and putting their commerce on the same footing as that of other foreign nations, was not less marked. The conduct of France showed no signs of moderation : her troops continued to occupy Holland, in breach of the Treaty of Amiens—Piedmont was annexed to France without the treaty by which France was to provide an adequate indemnity for the King of Sardinia being fulfilled.

Parma and Placentia were claimed by France, under a secret article with Spain.

The Government of Portugal was insulted by General Lasnes, and the dismission of D'Almeida insisted upon by France.

Switzerland was ultimately told that, if she did not submit to the will of the First Consul, a French army would enter the country. The direct conduct of France towards this country was as little calculated to inspire confidence.

Sequestrations were not taken off British property, in conformity with the Treaty.

Prohibitions against the import of British produce continued as during the war.

British vessels detained, and no redress given ; angry representations made in respect to the press and emigrants ; and libels published in the Moniteur, directly levelled at the British Government.

What might be considered, in the first interval, as insulated acts of ambition, coupled with these additional instances of a continued policy, went to prove a system inconsistent with peace, and against which, upon the principles the peace was made, Government were called upon, if possible, to provide.

They accordingly remonstrated on the interference in the

affairs of Switzerland, being solicited thereto by the Swiss: they also sent Moore with instructions, in case Switzerland was invaded, and the Swiss of their own spontaneous inclination determined on resistance, that he should advance them money.

The dispositions of Russia and Austria were both sounded, and orders were given for suspending the restitutions.

There are two questions — the justice and the policy of this decision.

On the first, it cannot be controverted that, if any nation betrays a systematic spirit of interference, destructive of the independence of other States, any power has a right to interfere, and to arrest, even by war, that system which may ultimately be inconsistent with its own security. This right exists under the general law of nations, independent of any treaty, whether executed or in progress of execution.

The case is additionally strong when these successive aggressions were either in breach of special treaties, and of that state of possession, in contemplation of which the Treaty of Amiens was avowedly concluded.

If such right exists, independent of treaty; if that right is fortified by the grounds on which the Treaty of Amiens was concluded; if the conduct of France would justify war, the treaty being executed, there cannot be a pretence to state that the treaty being only partially executed alters the question.

If we had a right to make it cause of war with France, we had equally a right to adopt any course of proceeding short of that, which in prudence appeared more eligible. We had a right to regulate our decision by what might be wise, regard being had to the part other nations would take in it.

We had a right to support what appeared to us the legitimate authority in Switzerland—at least, as good a right to interfere as France had; we had a right to consider the conduct of France as virtually an infraction of the treaty with us, and to refuse to execute it farther till satisfaction was given us;

but, under the decision that was taken to afford succours to the Swiss, which might have been deemed by France an act of hostility on our part, we not only had the right to suspend the restitutions, but we were bound to exercise that right, upon every principle of common prudence, until the issue of those instructions was known.

The orders, therefore, are to be defended upon this principle, without the aid of any other; but there is no difficulty in maintaining that, under the circumstances which preceded that remonstrance, without declaring what our policy would be under any particular supposition, that we were fully authorized to suspend the further execution of the Treaty till we saw, under all the circumstances of Europe, and the subsequent conduct of France herself, what it became us to do.

The remonstrance was not further followed up, and the restitutions were directed to be proceeded in.

That it was not followed up, is to be discussed on grounds of expediency; it cannot be contended that we were pledged in honour to further proceeding.

The policy may have depended partly on the state of Europe—partly on the purpose of France proving short of what might have been apprehended, and which, probably, was in contemplation at the outset.

There was every reason to believe that the Chief Consul, at one time, meant to make himself chief magistrate of Switzerland. There also was reason to suppose that he was not altogether without similar views upon Holland.

There is strong reason to believe that the interference of Great Britain did restrain and moderate, though not defeat, the interference of France in the affairs of Switzerland.

If the suspension of restitutions to France is clearly justified, the adoption of some line of conduct towards Holland is to be justified on the language then held by France, threatening that country with being treated like Switzerland, and on the military occupancy of Holland by French troops, contrary

to treaty, and in defiance of the strong remonstrances of the Dutch Government.

Such was the policy and conduct of Government during the second period. It was then determined to proceed in the execution of the Treaty, with the exception of Malta, which stood upon grounds perfectly distinct; every thing else was put in a course of execution.

It may be said this suspension in executing the Treaty was never before admitted: it never was denied; there was no occasion to add to the difficulties between the two countries by unnecessary avowals.

Although it was decided not to embark in a maritime war for objects in which we were only partially interested, the system of France had so distinctly disclosed itself as to justify the utmost jealousy of every point specially affecting ourselves.

Hitherto the arrangement relative to Malta had stood still principally on account of the guarantee of Russia being refused; this refusal took place in August; previous to this the Spanish Langue was suppressed. The greater part of the Italian Langue was destroyed by the incorporation of Piedmont; the Russian Langue was so far severed as to be confined to Russia. Thus were the funds nearly destroyed—the Order fundamentally changed, so as to have scarcely an existence—and the guarantee of Russia withheld.

In November, the Court of Petersburgh, in appearance, rather with a view of removing an obstacle to the execution of the Treaty, than from any interest which she seemed to take in the independence of Malta, so far yielded to the joint solicitation of the British and French ministers as to consent to give a qualified guarantee.

To this proposal we replied, that we could accede to nothing which could be deemed inconsistent with what was due to the Maltese—that we should consider how far the Maltese Langue might be so modified as to be less objectionable to Russia; but that, after the suppression of the Langues, in breach of the

Treaty, we could not consent to withdraw our troops till they were restored, and adequate funds provided for the defence of the island. This communication was made in January.

27th June. The French Government, having learnt the dispositions of Russia, and having acceded thereto, desired to know our intentions relative to Malta, and insisted on the execution of the Treaty. Sebastiani's Report came out at the same time. An answer was returned, stating that we could not enter into any further discussions relative to Malta, till satisfactory explanation was given, first, on the insult; secondly, on the ulterior views therein disclosed.

February 20. Lord Whitworth sees the First Consul, who admits the ulterior views of France on Egypt, menaced England with invasion, and declared that the question was Malta, or war. We then declared that we could not leave Malta till substantial security could be given for those interests which would be thereby exposed; that *we* saw no adequate security but Malta itself; but that we were ready to receive any proposal France had to make.

We then stood in the situation of having taken our ground in opposition to the declaration of the First Consul: we refused to execute the Treaty till we obtained satisfaction and security; we declared our security to depend on a naval station in the Mediterranean, together with an adequate arrangement for securing the independence of Malta. We farther declared, such were the difficulties of these objects being separately accomplished, that we saw no other arrangement which could prove satisfactory to us but Malta remaining in our hands.

The First Consul had told us that it was Malta and the Treaty of Amiens, or war. We had told him that we must in that case submit to the latter alternative. He said further, that we must regulate the press, and dismiss the emigrants. We adhered to our former declarations.

At this time several expeditions were preparing in the ports of France, avowedly destined for colonial service, but which

were of a description that they might be employed even for the purposes of invasion, upon an immediate rupture. We had a right to consider that rupture as at hand, from the language of the First Consul. We were therefore warranted *first* to take measures of precaution for any possible application of that force to purposes of hostility; *secondly*, to watch its application even to purposes of reinforcing their own colonies at such a moment, but particularly Martinique.

We were the more bound to act upon this principle, from a consideration of the state of our force at home; the Militia was altogether unformed; and it is not at the moment when an armament is upon the point of sailing to invade, that the defensive force is to be assembled.

The words of the law, "imminent danger of invasion," evidently must mean that state of things which renders the services of the Militia prudently necessary to the security of the country. Under these circumstances, the message was sent to Parliament: it stated the fact of *discussions* and the fact of *armaments* conjointly, as calling for precautionary measures.

It has been said, but where, in point of fact, were the armaments which justified the jealousy of Government?

There are two questions involved in this consideration; first, what there actually was; and secondly, what there might be before the measures requisite for our security could be effectually adopted.

There were, in point of fact, 6,000 men ready for sea at Helvoet.

There was a small force ready at Dunkirk and Havre. There was ready at Brest an expedition which sailed to the East Indies, and which was capable of reinforcement.

There were expeditions in a course of preparation in the southern ports of France, from which quarter about 7,000 men sailed at that time for the West Indies.

As to the number of troops, they were fully sufficient not only to justify, but to call for preparations. As to their state

of equipment and distribution, both strengthened the expediency of it.

Troops despatched from the west and southern ports of France, perfectly applicable to an attack on Ireland.

Humbert carried but 1,500, Hardy but 5,000: exclusive, however, of the force actually prepared, we were bound to be provided against any attempt which might be made in the narrow seas by a force embarked in craft.

In this point of view the camp of Brussels was a fair object of attention.

If then the nature of the discussion, and the means of attack which France possessed, justified the message as a measure of precaution, how much more was it called for in point of policy!

After what has passed on both sides, could France suppose us seriously determined to persist, if she saw us taking no one measure which could enable us to contend with her?

Chronological View of Diplomatic Correspondence with France during the Peace.

23rd May, 1802. Otto to Lord H[awkesbury], intimating the appointment of General Vial, to concert relative to the execution of the tenth Article.

24th. Lord H. to Otto, intimating the appointment of Sir A. Ball, for the same purpose.

June 5th. Lord H. to Merry, acquainting him with the above, declaring the disposition of this Government to give every facility to the execution of the Treaty; that it was willing to acknowledge, *pro hac vice*, the nominee of the Pope out of the Russian list, and desiring the French to unite with us in calling upon the several guaranteeing powers.

June 17th. Merry to Lord H., intimating the acquiescence of the French Government in the above suggestions.

June 10th. Lord H. to Merry, referring to his conversation with Talleyrand of the 3rd, relative to the French Princes,

and intimating that the British Government can[not] disturb any foreigner who conducts himself according to the laws of the country, and abstains from acts of hostility to States in amity.

July 25th. Otto to Lord H., representing against libels published in the English papers, and demanding the punishment of the editors.

July 28th. Lord H. to Otto, stating the law and habits of England on such subjects, and intimating that he had referred the paper enclosed to the Attorney-General for his opinion, whether it was such as he thought he could prosecute with success.

August 17th. Otto to Lord H. *Note raisonnée*, on the question of the Press, concluding with six demands:—1st. To control the Press; 2ndly, To remove certain persons from Jersey; 3rdly, To remove the Bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon; 4thly, That George and his adherents be sent to Canada; 5thly, That the French Princes should retire to Warsaw; 6thly, That Frenchmen wearing orders be sent out of the country.

August 28th. Lord H. to Mr. Otto, in reply to the points stated in Otto's note, recapitulating the arguments on the Press and Emigrants.

August 21st. Otto to Lord H., desiring that the Neapolitan troops may be received at Malta, and that general instructions may be given for concluding the evacuation, with the necessity of reference home.

August 23rd. Lord H. to Otto. Agrees to the troops being sent; explains the cause of delay; states the wish of the King to expedite the execution of the tenth Article; but observes, that the French Minister in Russia had not yet received instructions to co-operate with ours in pressing for the guarantee.

October 3rd. Merry to Lord H., announcing the proceedings in Switzerland; the mission of Colonel Mullner to Paris; his ineffectual application on the part of the Swiss, to the several foreign Ministers; that their only resource was in the protection of Great Britain, and enclosing a note soliciting aid.

October 10th. *Note verbale* from Lord H. to Otto, relative to Switzerland.

November 30th. Lord H. to Lord Whitworth, explaining the causes which had delayed the evacuation of Egypt, and intimating that orders had been sent.

June 5th.[1] Lord H. to Lord St. Helens, directing him, in the event of Russia acceding to the guarantee, to notify the same to Sir A. Ball, that no delay may take place—his instructions being that the evacuation is to take place upon the accession of the Imperial Courts being notified to him.

July 20th. Lord St. H. to Lord H. states that he has renewed his efforts to obtain the Emperor's guarantee, but the French Minister has not yet received his instructions.

August 3rd. Lord St. H. to Lord H. states further efforts to the same effect, but the French Minister still declines co-operating.

August 21st. Mr. Casamajor to Lord H. states that the Court of Berlin showed the utmost indifference to the guarantee of Malta.

August 31st. Mr. Casamajor to Lord H. states that the French Minister, Bignow, had received instructions to demand the guarantee, and that they were to act together.

August 16th. Lord St. H. to Lord H. announces with regret that Austria had positively refused her guarantee.

September 17th. Mr. Garlike to Lord H. announces the instructions being received by the French Minister to demand the guarantee.

September 18th. Sir J. Warren to Lord H. states the joint application being made.

November 25th. Sir J. Warren to Lord H. announces the qualified accession of Russia to the guarantee; encloses a project.

1803. January 27th. Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth represents again on the Press in England, and, *in the name of*

[1] The dates are here given in the same order in which they appear in Lord Castlereagh's MS.

the First Consul, desires to know what were his Majesty's intentions relative to Malta.

February 9th. Lord H. to Lord Whitworth states the right which his Majesty had of claiming a counterpoise to the acquisitions made by France subsequent to the Treaty; states that his Majesty was willing to have waved that right, when Sebastiani's Report appeared; that he could not enter into further discussions relative to Malta, till satisfactory explanation was given.

February 17th. Lord Whitworth to Lord H. states his communication to Talleyrand of the substance of the above despatch.

February 21st. Lord Whitworth to Lord H. giving a detailed account of his interview with Buonaparte.

February 28th. Lord H. to Lord W. states that, after all that has passed, but more particularly from the admissions by the First Consul, of ulterior views upon Egypt, the King cannot withdraw his troops from Malta, till substantial security can be given for the security of those interests which would thereby be exposed.

[The British declaration of war followed on the 18th of May.]

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury.

August 19, 1803.

My dear Hawkesbury—I have read with attention the Russian papers, and, as we shall not meet till the beginning of the week, I am induced to trouble you with such impressions as have occurred upon the perusal. I entirely concur with you that the proposition admits of no other reply than a distinct rejection, which cannot be conveyed in language of too much decision; nor will it be less consonant to my feelings if it marks in some degree the sense we entertain of the conduct of the Court to whom it will be addressed, in their recent overture. So far our course is a clear one—what remains is of more delicacy. In stating what occurs, I beg you will receive it as suggestions

for consideration, and not opinions. The present step is extremely critical; it may go far to decide the character of the war, both at home and abroad. At present, every idea is lost in that of invasion, and the country will be unanimous till the safety of the empire is provided for. A few months, it is to be hoped, will place the internal security of both islands beyond the reach of hazard; we must then expect the public mind to be turned to the avowed object, the possible duration and probable issue of the contest; and it is essential to our future prospects that we should hereafter, as we have hitherto done, carry the public feeling with us. We must not disguise from ourselves that the authority of Russia (however unfairly employed on the present occasion) is calculated seriously to injure our cause both at home and abroad. We have case enough in argument to resist it, but, in a protracted contest, likely in its nature to be unproductive (after our means of defence are completed) of any signal means of offence on either side, such an adjudication, and on such grounds, will operate powerfully to create and strengthen a peace-party in this country, the elements of which we know to be already in existence. It therefore deserves to be well weighed, whether we should confine ourselves to a simple rejection of the proposed basis, or whether we should amend the proposition which Russia has made to us.

In examining this question, it may be assumed that the discussion on all sides principally and practically turns on Malta; for, although there are collateral points to settle, none appear incapable of arrangement, this alone excepted. Russia has, in the spirit of a timid policy, recurred to our ultimatum—a very unfair criterion of our claims, after we have been forced into the war; and she has followed the outline of that proposition, substituting a temporary possession of Malta in herself, in lieu of that limited occupancy which we had agreed to accept, in order to avoid a rupture, not choosing or not venturing to adjudicate Malta to us, as she was called upon in justice to do, as some compensation for the aggrandizement of

France, subsequent to the late peace. She declines any duty beyond that of a simple mediation, in the performance of which, without looking in any degree to the justice of the retrospective claims, she finds France pledged in terms not to consent to our keeping Malta; she finds Great Britain retaining possession, but not pledged not to part with it if a suitable arrangement can be found to satisfy her just demands; and in this state of things it is at our expence that Russia requires that all the facilities shall be procured for settling the question. In point of fact, after the declared purpose of France in respect to Malta, supported as she now is by the sanction of Russia, nothing short of war, the most disastrous to France, can warrant an expectation that the First Consul could or would acquiesce in our keeping Malta: he might possibly yield it for an equivalent, but then he would expect that equivalent to be supplied, not out of *our conquests*, but our old possessions, and this would only alter the difficulty, not remove it: the contest will therefore soon be felt, and stated to be for Malta, and with this additional distinguishing feature, that the object is one in which the point of honour is involved on the side of France, whilst the point of interest, though certainly only in the sense of security, is involved on the part of this country. We have wisely never ventured hitherto to place the policy of the war upon the question of Malta. However highly it is valued, I do not think we could have carried public opinion with us in such an avowal, nor do I feel confident that we should long retain it under the pressure of taxes, were the question ever brought in point of feeling to that issue.

As the proposition now comes upon us from a quarter which, it will be argued, is impartial, if not friendly, I think it will be difficult to persuade the world that we do not fight for Malta alone, unless we state some distinct counter-project, in which we shall point out the basis of an arrangement, in consideration of which we would consent to negociate with a view of placing Malta in other hands. I am inclined to think we

run much risk in not making a distinct avowal of our principles at the present moment; I am the more inclined to do so from a persuasion that we must sooner or later make such an avowal; that it may now be done in strict conformity to the avowed objects for which we entered into the war; and that it is more for our character and security to take up our ground at once, and fight up steadily to that point of demand, under whatever fortune may attend us, than to proceed with indefinite views, in hopes of accomplishing more, but unprepared to stand to our purpose, should the country show an impatience for peace. In amending the basis as proposed by Russia, we have two courses to pursue, either to require further and material sacrifices from France on the Continent, in consideration of our parting with the possession of Malta, beyond those contained either in our own ultimatum, or the proposition of Russia; or we may propose a maritime arrangement, in the nature of an equivalent for Malta, which, as it must necessarily be inferior in value, may be considered as strengthening our claims to a better arrangement with respect to the Continent than that which Russia has suggested. I own I prefer the latter course, for various reasons, conceiving it very little probable that the war can at present be terminated on either principle. I consider the latter as calculated to carry the country most effectually with us. Any sacrifice of territory which we could call upon France to make, beyond the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland, would either be deemed of little value in itself, from being, in its nature, insecure, or so unlikely to be conceded by France as to be brought forward rather to cover our real design of retaining Malta. The Continent would easily be persuaded that a demand so extensive was not seriously made for their relief, but for our own convenience. If the latter course is pursued, we give an unequivocal proof of the sincerity of those views which we have hitherto professed; we adhere strictly to our declared object, upon which we have acted from the first: namely, the necessity of retaining a naval station in the

Mediterranean. We propose a basis, to which France is not precluded in honour from acceding, and one which Russia should not hesitate to accommodate, if she is earnest to bring about an arrangement. We occupy ground upon which the contest may be fought out, I am satisfied, with the general concurrence of our own country, and we shall throw the odium of the war, if protracted, either on our enemies or our false friends.

The proposition to which I look is one which could, in no case, be made from us to France; and consequently, though it may still afford the means of terminating the war, could not possibly, under the circumstances, have been employed to prevent the rupture; neither were we called upon before to suggest it to Russia, considering ourselves well entitled to expect her interference in favour of our claims to the possession of Malta in sovereignty; but, whilst we may complain of the part she has taken, it is neither inconsistent with our dignity nor our interest still to make every effort to reconcile our views, if possible, with those of so important a power. I should, therefore, be inclined to explain confidentially to Russia that, whilst we could not but sensibly feel the opportunity she had lost of providing in the most effectual manner for our mutual security, we were ready to place Malta in her hands, provided the Emperor would undertake the *perpetual military occupancy* of it, making such an arrangement in favour of the Maltese and the Order as should be deemed adequate to their respective claims—Russia, at the same time, relinquishing to Great Britain, Corfu, as a naval station, for the security of those interests which had been directly menaced, and which we were bound to protect. Highly as I have been led to estimate Corfu, comparing it with Malta, we are justified in considering the exchange as a sacrifice entitling us to additional demands on the Continent, which perhaps might lead to the establishment, by some military cessions on the borders of Holland, of a more effectual frontier for that country.

It is enough, however, at the outset, to profess a disposition

to adjust the question of Malta as above suggested, provided the Continental part of the arrangement can be settled to our satisfaction; and I cannot but feel it of some importance that we should indicate a disposition to yield a portion of our own claims, with a view not only of relieving the immediate sufferings of the Continent, but, as far as means can be found, of providing for their future security. Perhaps a main objection to this scheme is not the comparative sacrifice of interest, but the doubt, which may well exist, whether we shall ever experience what may really be deemed peace till the project of invasion has been fairly tried, and the issue been decided. I should rather wish the war not to end till either the attempt has been actually made, or till it is evidently abandoned from the hopelessness of the prospect; but I cannot think it advisable to court the event by omitting to occupy the ground which appears best calculated either to bring the war within a reasonable time to an honourable and advantageous termination, or, if it is to be protracted, to preserve that union at home, which can alone enable us to carry it on with effect. After the unexampled spirit which the country has shown, and the means, pecuniary as well as military, which will have been effectually displayed long before the proposed basis could be ripened into an arrangement, I doubt whether we shall find, upon the whole, a more favourable moment for explaining our views, always recollecting that we have from the outset professed ourselves cordially and sincerely disposed to negociate; to a confidence, in which disposition on the part of the country much of our present unanimity and exertions may truly be ascribed; and I am not myself sanguine enough to expect that any military operations (the issue of the invasion excepted) can be looked to, as within our reach, which are likely to enable us separately, through a protracted war, to treat upon higher ground, or to obtain better terms either for the Continent or for ourselves. The game of fatigue may be expected to act in the present contest not less powerfully than arms; but the

issue of such a contest cannot be altogether free from anxiety, when we advert to the nature of the efforts we are now making, and to the risk there always is, in a free and reasoning country, when it becomes a matter of opinion whether the contest is of necessity or not, that the arm of Government may be arrested in a way which cannot happen in a despotic and military system.

To make peace on grounds taken by ourselves, and strictly consistent with our original views, whilst the spirit of the country is unbroken, and its resources displayed but not exhausted; to have proved that we dared to recur to war, and that our policy was pacific, not from weakness but from principle; to have compelled France to withdraw from Holland and Switzerland, and to acquiesce, contrary to *her most decided policy*, in the effectual establishment of the British power in the Mediterranean, is, I own, as much of *advantage*, *honour*, and *genuine triumph*, as I can persuade myself we have the rational hope of accomplishing by perseverance in war; and I had rather trust the security of our own country, as well as that of the world, to a peace made on such a basis, with all the augmented security arising from what we may deem a new military era in the internal system of this empire, than waste the public feeling and public strength in efforts, which, upon any reasonable calculation, must be extremely uncertain. Were I even warranted in forming more sanguine expectations of Continental co-operation than present appearances justify, my decision would be the same, inasmuch as I think it unwise to risk what may continentally be called the last stake, where there is neither vigour nor concert to oppose to the power of an enemy impregnable at home, and, in opinion, irresistible abroad. Whatever may be the destiny of France, I do not see that there is anything which should tempt us to select the present moment, if it can be avoided, for pushing that question to an issue. If it can be waved, not only without further loss, but with some advantage gained, if the mischief can be circumscribed, I had rather leave

the rest to time, placing our own security beyond the reach of attack, which, in the present temper of the country, may be effectually done, than prosecute the war, in the hope of keeping Malta, which seems to depend on our means of reducing France. Right or wrong, the First Consul has committed himself specifically against that concession, and it is become too distinctly the touchstone of his power abroad and at home for us to hope he will easily yield. We must make up our mind to pay the price, if we mean to prosecute that object; and, if we do not seriously determine to do so, we only multiply our difficulties by postponing an avowal, which will at once explain to the world the conditions under which we have hitherto held and shall continue to hold possession of that fortress. In proportion as I see the evils of an obscure policy with reference to Malta, I consider the national character pledged to contend to the last extremity for that security of which Malta was taken originally as the measure and description; and it is for professional men to say whether that security is not furnished by Corfu, if not in a degree altogether equal, at least so nearly so as not to justify us in contending for the difference.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE BOULOGNE FLOTILLA; PROPOSED ATTACK OF CADIZ.

1805—1807.

It was not long after the elevation of Bonaparte to the Imperial throne of France that he directed his earnest attention to his long-cherished project—the invasion of this country. Britain alone, of all the States of Europe, dared to defy his power and to despise his threats. He detested our constitution, as presenting a model of limited monarchy; as opposing an obstacle to the universal dominion which he aimed at establishing; and, lastly, as a source of patriotism, strength, and stability. In consequence, nothing would satisfy him but its overthrow. He promised his soldiers the pillage of London; and on the 7th of August, 1805, published a manifesto, in which every excitement was held out. By his orders, the harbour of Boulogne was cleansed and improved; forts and batteries were erected for the security of the town; and he made that port the principal rendezvous for the flotilla of flat-bottomed gun-boats,

exceeding 1800 in number, which were hastily built along the whole coast. An army of 200,000 men, destined to be conveyed to our shores in this flotilla, was assembled, and for many months encamped on the heights above the town; and here Napoleon in person took up his quarters, for several weeks, giving entertainments and *fêtes*, to increase the ardour of his legions.

After all these preparations, however, deterred from any attempt by the vigilance, hardihood, and invariable success of our naval defenders, the Emperor eagerly availed himself of some suspicious movements of Austria, as a pretext for marching various divisions of his army to the Rhine and the Danube. Meanwhile, the annihilation of the remnants of the old navies of France and Spain at Trafalgar, on the 21st of October, 1805, infinitely augmented the superiority which Great Britain had previously possessed; and thenceforward the threat of invasion became a mere bugbear.

Proud was the attitude assumed by the British Government and nation to meet the projects of their implacable foe. The country was defended by upwards of 200,000 regular troops and militia; and 400,000 volunteers, of all classes and professions, started up in arms, to protect their hearths and their homes, in case, miraculously escaping our fleets,

the invader should make his appearance upon our shores.

The failure of several attacks on the flotilla lying in the ports of France — one of them directed by Nelson himself — owing to obstacles insuperable in their nature, induced scientific men of different nations to apply themselves to the invention of mechanical means for the destruction of shipping. To one of these inventions, as it will be seen, the first and several other Papers in this section relate. Mr. Francis, whom I conjecture to have been an American, was not the only projector of this class to whose proposals Government thought proper to listen, contrary to the universal opinion of professional men, who insisted on the inefficacy of all mechanical contrivances. The result of such experiments as were made with them served to verify this judgment. Both Mr. Francis and Colonel Congreve accompanied Sir Sidney Smith, who commanded our naval operations against Boulogne, for the purpose of directing the application of their respective inventions. The rockets of the latter appear to have been the only one of the engines of annoyance produced at this period that has stood the test of experience, and preserved the name of its projector from oblivion.

Mr. Robert Francis to the Right Hon. William Pitt.

August 9, 1805.

Sir—As the circumstances which led to my engagements with this Government, and my particular situation, may not be known to Lord Barham, the heads of them may aid in his decision with you on my business.

First. My experiments on submarine navigation in France having excited some curiosity in this country, Ministers thought it prudent to know the real merits of the invention, and sent an agent to me in Paris, inviting me to this country, which agent made three voyages with various proposals, the purport of which on my part were that, on my arrival here, I would exhibit the principles of my engines to Government, and, should they conceive the introduction of them into practice, in France, America, or elsewhere, to be injurious to the interests of Great Britain, I proposed to take the value of one ship of the line, or £100,000, to let the discovery lie dormant. Letters to this effect are in the possession of Mr. Addington, or Lord Hawkesbury.

Second. Being a neutral, and having flattering prospects at home, it was not my intention to take part in European wars; and, when I agreed to act against the French fleets, I hoped my system would be so well understood and established by this time, that I might return to America this autumn. But unforeseen events having occupied Ministers for the last four months, prevented giving effect to my mode of attack, yet I hope there will now be time for the following considerations.

If I am to act, it is necessary means should be adopted which shall give every possible effect to my system, with the least loss of time and risk of persons. For this purpose, a small squadron of three frigates, and one or two cutters to carry boats, catamarans, carcases, and implements, should be put under the command of an active, enterprising officer, who should have an independent cruising commission to run along the whole

line of the enemy's coast, and attack any vessel or vessels of the enemy, wherever he found it practicable with his means. As such might be calculated an experimental cruise, I conceive the inventor of a new mode of warfare ought to be considered the best judge of the mode of using his own engines to advantage; and I ought not to have more than one commander to consult, who should be a man of resource of mind, and some enthusiasm. If this measure is not adopted, and men exercised to the engines, I despair of doing any good for Government or honour to myself. Hence, if Ministers cannot adopt this plan, the next consideration is—

Is this invention, if carried to its full extent and generally known, a thing which may tend to reduce the British power by sea, or give strength to minor powers? And is it the best policy of the British Government to make it my interest to let it rest in its present state?

If the invention is insignificant, I do not expect any thing for it. If it is an invention which is capable of working a total revolution in marine war, *and which I believe*, I of course must have a high idea of its value to myself and country. But of this his Majesty's Ministers will judge.

These considerations lead to the following conclusions:— Will Ministers form it into a system, as before mentioned, so as to give it full effect? If not, will they agree with me to let it lie dormant? If not, I am willing to retire. I have so equally balanced each of those cases, in my own mind, that either of them will be equally agreeable to me.

I beg you, sir, to believe that, in thus expressing my sentiments, I am nowise displeased with the treatment I have received; on the contrary, I am fully satisfied with your open and liberal mode of acting; but, to prevent fruitless negociation and loss of time, and clearly exhibit my turn of mind on this subject, also to reduce the points for consideration to as few as possible, I have thought this short explanation necessary. I have the honour, &c.,

R. Francis.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Nelson.

Downing Street, September, 1805.

My Lord—I have not neglected to lay before his Majesty's Ministers your lordship's representation relative to the importance of Sardinia to the accommodation of our fleet in the Mediterranean; the degree in which the island is exposed to an attack from France; and the importance, by affording them some pecuniary aid, of encouraging the Viceroy and the inhabitants to look rather to the British Government than to that of France for protection.

Your lordship may be assured, that the King's Government on this, as on all occasions, is disposed to receive with the utmost confidence and deference any suggestion coming from your lordship. They are fully alive to the superior advantages Sardinia possesses as a naval station, more especially from its proximity to Toulon; and entirely concur in the expediency of watching and counteracting every effort of the enemy against that island.

Your lordship must be aware, that to put the island at all in an adequate state of defence would require a very considerable advance of money, in the first instance, as well as a permanent allotment of funds, for the support of an adequate garrison; that inadequate measures of precaution may have a tendency rather to invite attack than to provide for the ultimate security of the island; and that any arrangement which can be really effectual to its defence against a serious attack must be looked at as a question of expediency, with reference to other claims upon our resources at the present moment.

Unless, therefore, your lordship should have reason to believe that the French meditate an immediate attack, it does not appear to the King's servants expedient that any advance should be made to the persons entrusted with the government of Sardinia.

In limiting your lordship's views to a progressive advance, not exceeding, in the whole, £40,000, it appears to his Majesty's Ministers that they will best meet the spirit of your lordship's suggestion by authorizing you, in contemplation of an approaching attack, to make such advance as your lordship may think fit, not exceeding the amount above proposed. A sum of ready money, at such a moment, may enable the Viceroy to assemble the militia, and take other measures for immediate defence. An aid of this nature, under such circumstances, may, with great propriety, be granted without reference to his Sardinian Majesty; and I should hope that your lordship's object of making the inhabitants of Sardinia look up to the British Government may be effectually answered by its being understood that you have received instructions, not only to watch over the safety of Sardinia with your fleet, but that you are authorized, in case of immediate danger of attack, to make an advance of money, with a view of enabling the Government to assemble the militia and to provide for its immediate defence. The assurance of such an aid will animate the Sardinians, and give them confidence in their means of repelling attack, supported by your lordship's squadron, by having their measures previously arranged and digested.

The funds reserved for the moment of danger will, together with such supplies as can be furnished from the fleet, enable them to call the whole into action; and I should hope that, under this precautionary discretion, entrusted to your lordship, the Island of Sardinia may be as effectually prevented from falling into the hands of France, as it can be by any plan which is not formed upon a large scale, and which must depend for its adoption upon more general considerations.

I shall immediately transmit orders to Sir Alexander Ball, at Malta, to answer any bills your lordship may have occasion to draw upon him, with a view to the above service; or, if your lordship should apprehend any difficulty in negociating bills under such circumstances, a supply of dollars has been

forwarded to Malta, which will enable Sir Alexander Ball to furnish you with such proportion as you may require.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Cooke to Sir William Rule.

Downing Street, 9th September, 1805.

Sir—I am directed by Lord Castlereagh to desire that the Navy Board will order ten launches now in the River, and which will be pointed out to them by Mr. Congreve, to be inspected, and, if they shall be found to suit the object on which he is employed by Government, Lord Castlereagh wishes they may be taken up without delay for the service; and his lordship will settle the business with Lord Barham, and take care to have an order sent for authorizing the transaction.

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Downing Street, 10th September, 1805.

My dear Lord—The Ordnance stores connected with Mr. Francis's mode of warfare were some time since landed from the Sceptre and Diadem, armed defence ships, and placed for safety in the ordnance stores at Portsmouth.

It is desirable that these stores should now be again put on board the same vessels, and ordered round to Dover. May I request your lordship will give the necessary orders to the commanders of the vessels above-named, and I will settle with the Ordnance with respect to the issue of the stores in question, if your lordship will have the goodness to attach these vessels to Sir Sidney Smith's squadron.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum.

11th September, 1805.

The Admiralty to direct the Navy Board to build ten double canoes, on the principle of those lately constructed by them, with such improvements as Sir Sidney Smith will suggest, but upon a scale twice as large.

Secondly. In arming the said canoes, to desire the Ordnance to contract with Mr. Roebuck, the inventor, for twelve iron 6-pounders, and twelve iron 3-pounders, on his light principle —his terms are enclosed—and to supply Colonel Shrapnell's superficial case-shot for the above guns, equipping them with the necessary tackle for the Royal Marine Artillery to work the same.

Thirdly. The canoes to be fitted with frames for the use of Mr. Congreve's rockets, according to a principle he will suggest.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Sidney Smith.

Downing Street, 19th September, 1805.

My dear Sir—I recommend your seeing Lord Barham without delay. He is prepared to see you, and to arrange the transfer from Boulogne to Cadiz, without there being any time lost: you will endeavour to arrange what is to be detached with you, depending, of course, on Lord Nelson for such additions as he may think fit to supply, when you are under his command.

I have seen Mr. Francis, and enclose a memorandum of what appears to me best calculated to give effect to his operations, the detail of which I wish you to consider.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum for Sir Sidney Smith's private information and guidance.

The military surveyors from the Ordnance are ordered to be at Dover on Tuesday next; Sir Sidney Smith will make the

necessary arrangements for sending them off Boulogne, with proper assistants, directing that the service may be performed so as to attract as little notice as possible on either side of the water.

The survey of Boulogne harbour to be completed under Mr. Congreve's superintendence, with the least practicable delay; and the surveyors are desired to furnish Sir Sidney Smith, as early as possible, with a rough sketch of the bearings and distances of all the leading points to which they shall have been desired by Mr. Congreve to direct their attention.

Upon the receipt of their report, Sir Sidney Smith will take the same into his consideration, and, upon communication with Mr. Congreve and Mr. Francis, state his opinion, for the information of his Majesty's Ministers, of the probable success of an attempt to destroy the enemy's flotilla in the harbour of Boulogne, together with his plan for carrying the same into execution.

Lord Castlereagh has directed the Diadem and Sceptre, with Mr. Francis's stores, to proceed from Portsmouth to Dover, there to place themselves under Sir Sidney Smith's orders. They may be expected to reach Dover early in the week.

Mr. Congreve has been ordered to purchase not less than five hundred of his rockets, which will be completed by the 21st instant.

Sir William Rule has been directed to prepare ten launches for the reception of the rockets, according to Mr. Congreve's suggestion; and they are to be completed by the middle of next week. Mr. Congreve will take care to leave a proper person charged to carry forward all his arrangements in his absence; to superintend the completing and packing the rockets; and to attend them and the launches to Dover. He is also to concert with Sir William Rule the best mode of carrying them round to Dover, with the least possible observation.

The rocket launches may, if the weather permits, reach

Dover by the 25th instant. In case Sir Sidney Smith's own opinion should be favourable to the attempt, upon receiving the survey, he will proceed with all the necessary arrangements; but he will not take any step toward carrying the plan into execution, without special instructions. Lord C. requests Sir Sidney Smith will impress on all those engaged in this service the necessity of perfect secrecy, and every despatch consistent with the due execution of the service, as the enemy are likely, upon the slightest alarm, to move their most valuable vessels from Boulogne to other harbours for security.

It is suggested that Sir Sidney Smith should be directed immediately to select, from the most intelligent and enterprising of the seamen of his squadron, the following crews for Mr. Francis's operations :—

For 9 row galleys, at 12 men each, including one officer, 108 men. For 10 catamarans, at 2 men each, 20 men.

The above number of men to be selected from Sir Sidney Smith's own ship, together with such other ships of his squadron as may be permitted by the Admiralty to accompany him off Cadiz, the moment the service at Boulogne is performed. The Sceptre and Diadem, which are equipped specially for this service, Mr. F. states, can furnish crews for two boats.

The men selected for this service to be considered as permanently appropriated to it, and not to be changed, except upon being found deficient in enterprise, courage, or exertion.

In order to render this service one of profit, as well as honour, a scale of reward to be settled; the reward to be payable on the destruction of an enemy's ship, and to be shared in the manner usual in the naval service.

Where an enemy's ship is proved to have been destroyed by any particular galley and catamaran, the reward to be ex-

clusively theirs. Where the particular boat cannot be ascertained, the reward to be, in like proportion, divided amongst the galleys and catamarans employed in the operation.

The following rewards to be given:—

Ship of the line	£1000
Frigate	600
Sloop of war, or corvette . .	400
Smaller armed decked vessel . .	200

The above rewards to be immediately paid by the officer in command of the squadron; and, in case of any doubt arising as to the parties entitled, he is to direct a court of inquiry of officers to decide finally on the same.

Lord Nelson to Lord Castlereagh.

Victory, September 16th, at sea, 1805.

My Lord—I have been honoured with your lordship's letter of September 14th,[1] respecting the presents which have been received for the Dey of Algiers, together with the letters for his Highness and the Consul, which shall be forwarded with all expedition; and I have also received yours of the same date, with several enclosures from Prince Castelcicala. Nothing shall be wanting on my part to obtain the release of our Sicilian or Neapolitan [allies], but I own I have little hopes of success.

The sooner the presents arrive for the Emperor of Morocco, and those intended to be entrusted to me, the better.

Your lordship may rely that my correspondence with you will be regular, until I am told it is no longer wanted; and I have to entreat your indulgence for the free manner I may take in representing things in the manner in which I may see them, and only be assured that I am, with the highest respect, Your lordship's most obedient servant,

NELSON AND BRONTE.

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[1] An evident mistake—probably August.

Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Sir John Moore.

Downing Street, September 23, 1805.

Dear Sir—The Duke of York will have expressed to you the desire his Majesty's Government feel to have your opinion of the practicability of making an attempt against the Boulogne flotilla, under the protection of a land-force. I have desired Sir Sidney Smith to confer with you upon this subject, and to furnish you with the means of making any observations you may think necessary on the coast. I apprehend the point to be considered is the possibility of landing, to the westward of Boulogne, a force sufficient to turn the sea defences, which, being silenced, would admit of our naval force communicating immediately with the troops on shore, who might then possibly occupy a position from whence the flotilla in the basin might be destroyed without the necessity of attacking or reducing the town.

The prudence of the attempt must depend altogether on the amount and quality of force the enemy may have the means of bringing against us, during the time necessarily required for the attack. Of this we have at present no very precise estimate; but, in forming your judgment upon the whole of this subject, (availing yourself of the best information you can procure of the enemy's force) you will suggest the amount and description of force which, in your opinion, it would be necessary to employ on this service, if attempted.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham.

Downing Street, September 24, 1805.

My dear Lord—I have made inquiries about Johnson's cutter. His difficulty of making a tender of her to the Admiralty, as a hired armed ship, is, that the owners will not let her

out, and our friend, the smuggler, is not rich enough to purchase.

I send your lordship his project. I fear the purchase cannot well be made unless she is a king's ship, which would render a different commander and crew necessary. Does your lordship see any mode of obviating this difficulty?

I have another point connected with our experimental squadron to trouble you upon, which I apprehend there is no official difficulty in, if you think it right to indulge Sir Sidney Smith with his light vessel, for reconnoitring in, &c.; as she will be, to all intents and purposes, a king's ship. I understand the Navy Board may have her at an hour's notice. She is now at Gravesend.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Barham to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, September 25, 1805.

My dear Lord—If the cutter is purchased by Government, she must of course be commanded by king's officers, and cannot be placed under any other authority. If hired by the month, Johnson may command her, and his crew navigate her. I know of no other mode by which she can be employed in a regular way.

If it should be thought right to use the King's name, and to order by that authority an imprest to Sir Sidney Smith for all the expenses of this expedition, and suffer him to employ the money, and procure vouchers, and become answerable for the expenditure, it will remove all obstacles on the part of office, and the Navy Board be no otherwise concerned than in examining the vouchers and passing the account. How far the object is equal to this, your lordship and Mr. Pitt will be the best judges.

As to a reconnoitring vessel, Sir Sidney can find no difficulty in selecting one from the flotilla under his command,

without putting the public to an extra expense on this account. I must acknowledge to your lordship that all these dilatory proceedings promise nothing to repay our expense. The subject has already taken wind; and, if you do not *immediately* send Sir Sidney off to Cadiz, without thinking of Boulogne, that part of the project that bids the fairest for success will be lost. The combined squadrons now lie in a huddled, disorderly state at Cadiz. If the rockets can be of use, a better opportunity cannot be desired. Nothing here depends upon Johnson, nor reconnoitring boats. The object lies fair, and has a fleet to support it. Compared with this, the burning of boats is not worth a thought. In attempting the former, the professional people will go with you, but they are unanimous in condemning the latter.

To return to the best mode of conquering office difficulties, the imprest appears to me to be the most effectual. How far it may be safe to trust such a sum as may be required, in the hands and at the disposal of an individual, must be determined by your lordship and Mr. Pitt.

The offices I have served in make no advances of money without authority, and, when it is advanced, they require proof and vouchers that the contract has been performed. I know of no way of passing by these necessary guards but placing great confidence in Sir Sidney Smith, and joining the Comptroller of the Navy with him, and all this to be done by the King's authority. I am sorry there are so many difficulties in the way; but this must be the case when we step aside from the trodden path.

I am, &c.,

BARHAM.

Mr. Cooke to Mr. Thompson.

Downing Street, September 24, 1805.

Dear Sir—Lord Castlereagh arranged with Lord Barham that the Navy Board should be authorized to order Mr. Roe-

buck to provide ten 6-pounders and ten 3-pounders of his new construction, for arming the new double boats on Sir Sidney Smith's plan.

His lordship wishes you would take an opportunity of putting Lord Barham in mind to have this authority given, as Mr. Roebuck has applied to him upon the subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

E. Cooke.

Mr. Cooke to Mr. Robert Francis.

Downing Street, September 25, 1805.

Sir—I am directed by Lord Castlereagh to acknowledge your letter of the 23rd instant, stating that you have made a contract with Messrs. Caverton for one hundred carcasses of copper, at 2*s.* 6*d.* per pound, equal to £550 sterling. Also, that you had received an estimate for making one hundred clockwork-locks, at £14 each, amounting to £1,400 sterling, and I am commanded by his lordship to express his approbation of the contract you have entered into for the carcasses, and to desire that you will lose no time in contracting for the clockwork-locks above mentioned. His lordship further desires that you will give the necessary directions that I should be apprized of their being completed, that measures may be taken for forwarding them to you, and you will be pleased to correspond with me for that purpose, accordingly.

I am, &c.,

E. Cooke.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham.

Downing Street, September 27, 1805.

My dear Lord—Upon looking into the eleventh Report of the naval Commissioners with Mr. Pitt, it appeared to us that a slight alteration in point of form would be requisite in making the imprest to Sir Sidney Smith.

As First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. Pitt can, in strictness, do no act. As First Lord of the Admiralty, you are specifically enabled, by the King's Order in Council. The Treasury have acted in such cases; but it has always been through their secretary. The King's commands have also been conveyed by a Secretary of State.

Upon the whole, we submit for your lordship's consideration, that the most regular mode will be for me to signify to you the King's commands; that you do, upon that authority, direct the imprest to be made; and the whole will then proceed, in due course, as a measure of cabinet.

I enclose a sketch of the letter I should propose to write to your lordship; also one to Sir Sidney Smith, with respect to Johnson's cutter.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Letter referred to in the foregoing.

Downing Street, September 28, 1805.

My Lord—His Majesty's confidential servants having recommended that Captain Sir Sidney Smith should have the direction of a secret service of importance; and it being deemed necessary, in order to avoid disclosure, that a sum of money should be imprested to him for carrying on the same, I am to signify to your lordship his Majesty's commands, that you do issue directions, agreeably to his Majesty's Order in Council of the 8th of June, 1796, to the Comptroller of the Navy, to execute, in conjunction with Sir Sidney Smith, the service above mentioned, under the authority wherewith he is at present invested; and to have such sums imprested to him from time to time, not exceeding, in the whole, the sum of £30,000, as the Comptroller of the Navy shall direct.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Sidney Smith to Lord Keith.

Antelope, off Etaples, September 29, 1805.

My Lord—I have waited till I had an opportunity of inspecting the enemy's position closely, before I ventured to answer your lordship's letter of the 24th instant, calling upon me, by direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to state what fire and explosion vessels I might require for the service on which I am employed; and I now beg leave to say, as the enemy appear to have stationed an advanced guard (in two lines) of gun-vessels *superior* in *number* and *weight* of metal to the force of that description under my orders, independent of the reinforcement that can be brought out any day at half tide, it becomes necessary to adopt some other mode of attack than cannonade, towards rendering their position in the road untenable, since, so long as they remain there, it is impossible for any inferior force to approach either the harbour, or even the neighbouring coast, without being completely checked, and kept at such distance as to preclude the occupation of the near position required for subsequent operations against the flotilla in the harbour, which latter we see in such close contact with each other, as to ensure the rapid spreading of flames, if once fire was communicated to any part of the line, or rather forest-like assemblage, of masts.

Such is the nature of local tide in Boulogne Bay and harbour's mouth, and such the precaution taken, by placing a sunk net between the pier-heads, that no explosion or fire-vessel, sent at random, could ever penetrate thereon, or under the surface of the water; but these vessels may be used, with reasonable hope of success, against the advanced vessels *outside*. At any rate, they should be shown their liability to this mode of attack by occasional explosions amongst them; and, provided there were some instances of grappling, (which I am persuaded, from the spirit of enterprise I have the satisfaction to observe among the officers and petty officers under my orders, there would be)

it would probably occasion them to withdraw and keep within the harbour. I therefore request that such fire and explosion vessels as can be appropriated to this service may be sent (in succession, as they are ready) to join me at Dungeness.

I am, &c.,

W. Sidney Smith.

Sir Sidney Smith to Lord Castlereagh.

Antelope, off Boulogne, September 29, 1805.
Half-past twelve, P.M.

My dear Lord—General Moore and I have every advantage that weather and good light can give us to see all that can be seen. The flotilla is concentrating there from the neighbouring ports, and hauling up the harbour in a dismantled state: 32 sail came out, with a broad pendant, on our approach, yesterday evening, and now lie off the pier, where they shall not lie long, if the weather allows of the coffers being sent in.

The troops are out, in front of the huts to the eastward of the town, firing a *feu de joie*, and the colours are all displayed on board the flotilla in the harbour, probably from some good news promulgated by the Moniteur, real or not. I cannot take my eye off this moving scene for long, so that I cannot enter into details. I have, however, written at intervals from interruption, both to Lord Barham and Lord Keith; to the former I have stated, that I have much to say, and the plans we have require explanation. I therefore wish to be ordered to town by telegraph, which order I shall meet when I land General Moore. Pray back this application, as I must see your lordship and Mr. Pitt before we go seriously to work, that things may begin right, and go on well to a good result, which, I own, I think within our power, if strenuously and well applied. General Moore, I am persuaded, would do his utmost to realize any plan laid down for him, with latitude

and discretion in the execution; but he is too wary to undertake such a task voluntarily, though, of course, foremost when ordered to go to work. We go on, as usual, pleasantly and well together. We have six deserters off, from whom we have some details, which make the army here to be about nine thousand regular troops, four of irregulars, and the crews of the vessels. One of these deserters, being a carman who served with us in Egypt, knew us immediately. He quits the French service, as knowing both services, and liking the English best. I am going to send one on shore again, to bring off a comrade; and, as the Italians seem disgusted, we may thus get them in succession. They have much arrear of pay due: on this score, we must not be under the same disadvantage, by keeping our ships too long out of port on home service. The Antelope has eighteen months due, and ten others have much. I have asked for them to be ordered to the Nore, to get their pay; and there they can receive and bring round Congreves, launches, &c.

Your Lordship's faithfully,

W. Sidney Smith.

Sir Sidney Smith to Lord Castlereagh.

Antelope, Dungeness, September 30, 1805.

My dear Lord—Although I am not yet enabled to make my official report to you, the surveyors not having had favourable weather to complete their survey, I have seen enough of their work and of the coast, as well as of the position of the advanced force of the enemy, to be quite certain that no rocket-boats can approach near enough without annihilation, till the advanced vessels are driven in, and the three detached posts *forced;* nor, indeed, then with certainty till at least the western heights are commanded: that all this is practicable, by going *fairly to work with adequate means*, I have no doubt, and I am ready to show the way by leading it. I fear nothing

from the enemy; but I apprehend more counteraction from behind, than opposition in front: my experience bids me apprehend it; and, if I am now withheld or thwarted, let those who deny me means bear the responsibility—not me. The Sceptre and Diadem are, I find, but transports, whose crews are sanctioned by the Transport Board, in the supposition that they are not under martial law; although the Act of Parliament, which that Board seems not to have had in contemplation, says expressly, that the crews of "hired *armed* vessels are:" this makes them non-efficient vessels against an enemy, notwithstanding which, the same letter that announces their being annexed to me announces the withdrawal of two of the best frigates that were in the squadron. It will be impossible for me to find boats' crews, or even to cope with a single division of the enemy's brigs with their long guns in fair battle, if I am left without an effective force, besides my twenty gun-brigs, with only carronades, whose *ne plus ultra* of distance and *comparatively bad rate of sailing* are known and despised by the enemy that we affect to hold so cheap. I hold *them* cheap at close quarters; but we must be enabled to close with them by land as well as sea, towards which the means I have specified in the enclosed memorandum are the least that can be applied; and, surely, the magnitude of the object will justify the effort, even if we have not complete success, which, I repeat, I have little doubt of, if we do not nibble at it and starve the cause.

I found Deal and Dover full of speculators and guessers, as to the object of the unavoidable movements of persons and things, and, of course, hitting on the one object (Boulogne), partly from its being the one always occupying their minds, and partly from the evident practicability of such an enterprise: the enclosed shows, that an idea of such practicability has reached Ireland from France. In France, they have the idea it will be done, from the palpable utility to us of the measure, and even the necessity of it; they are working indefatigably

at the entrenchments, and are drawing such troops as they can spare thither; the Italian regiments came from the eastward; and it was given out that 15,000 men were coming from Brest; let us be beforehand with them. General Moore regretted the absence of the two regiments gone from Shorncliff to Portsmouth. They could surely do this job before they went to Gibraltar; he hesitates only on the responsibility. In the field of battle he is at home, but he wishes authority to place him there: if he wishes that responsibility quite removed from him, and the command should be extended to a lieutenant-general's.

I am, my dear Lord, &c.,

W. Sidney Smith.

PS. A frigate is just added, so I don't lose *two*.

Memorandum referred to in the preceding Letter.

Secret. September 30, 1805.

Recommended to the consideration of the Admiralty by Sir Sidney Smith, as applicable to the local service about Boulogne.

Ten *large* Dutch doggers, or schuyts, with stout anchors and cables, such as ride on the Dogger Bank during a heavy sea in the winter time, to be fitted with water-tight magazines for the rockets, and to have fireplaces, cabins for officers, and bed-places for seamen, to serve as rendezvous and refuge for the launches and other rocket galleys, and to draw so little water as to approach the shore, and throw the heavy shell-rockets which can neither be elevated nor carried in sufficient quantity by the launches; these to be commanded by lieutenants, with a complement equal to two launches' crews, for reciprocal relief-watch on board, for navigating, &c., and armed with the two long guns now to be landed from the gun-brigs before the winter sets in, muskets, pikes, cutlasses, and pistols proportionate, so as to give each man personal weapons. Complement, fifty men; unless put on the esta-

blishment of a ship of that number of guns—say twenty, with a captain, officers, warrant and petty officers proportionate; and one set of books and accounts, denominated the Woolwich Division of Rocket-boats, and kept together.

A coasting decked flat-bottomed river barge, or a Dutch bylander, not drawing more than three, or, at most, four feet water, with four good anchors, and cables, and davits on the quarters as well as on the bow, *to be attached* to each transport, as well as the flat boats, with a falling platform, or wide gang-board at the bow, for landing a fieldpiece *mounted;* and for embarking and re-embarking troops, by grounding them on a flat sand, each of these vessels carrying a company complete, under cover and barricade, against musketry.

W. Sidney Smith.

Sir Edward Newenham to Sir Sidney Smith.

Clonmel, September 24, 1805.

Sir—There is no person to whom I could send the following extract of a letter, with more propriety than to the defender of the honour of the British arms at Acre, or the hero of the Nile, who dissolved the armed neutrality by his decisive victory off Copenhagen. The extract is of a letter from a near relation of mine, who is now, and has been these twenty-six years, a resident in France, and whose information I have always found *correct.* My correspondent's letters are sent by a private hand to Basle, or Neufchâtel, and then to Hamburg. Mine go the same tour.

"Last evening, I conversed with many intelligent officers of the sea and land service belonging to Toulon, who told me that the army, denominated the army of England, was immediately to be withdrawn from the coast, and part to rendezvous at Strasburg and Coblentz. If such an event takes place, the chief Ministers of your King might easily land a body of men by a sudden onset between Ambleteuse and Boulogne, or Estaples and Boulogne, while the light vessels attack

and burn the flotilla at Boulogne. There will be very few cannoniers at Boulogne, or along that coast; none of those places are well fortified towards the land; and, as Boulogne is surrounded by rising grounds, a few cannon and bombs would destroy it; but to accomplish this, a feint must be made as if to attack Brest or Cherbourg. Nothing should transpire in your public papers."

As my foreign information has proved right for a number of years, and which I have pronounced in Parliament, and desired it might be *taken* down, I think I can rely upon the above.

I have the honour, &c.,

EDWARD NEWENHAM.

PS. My address is Sir Edward Newenham, Blackrock, Dublin.

Minute relative to the proposed Attack on the Enemy's Flotilla at Boulogne.

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

It appearing, from the report and survey of the Ordnance engineers, that a station may be taken by the rocket launches within 2000 yards of the centre of the basin, and about 1200 yards distant from the enemy's batteries, it is proposed to make an attempt to set fire to the flotilla by successive discharges of rockets from 12 launches, each carrying 48 rockets.

In order that the rocket launches may arrive at their proper station, the attack must be made when none of the enemy's flotilla are advanced in the road, or, if advanced, they must be previously driven in.

It seems desirable, if possible, to conduct the attack so as to avoid the necessity of disposting the enemy's advanced guard; with this view, it is proposed that the British squadron, with the exception of light vessels occasionally appearing off for the purposes of observation, and making daily reports of

the enemy's position, should be withdrawn for the three or four days preceding the attack. When every thing is prepared, and the weather favourable, if the enemy's vessels are reported *not to be without the harbour*, the squadron, consisting of such number of vessels as may be requisite to protect the launches, and to annoy the enemy with shells after the rockets have been discharged, to sail from Walmer Roads, so as to arrive off Boulogne about half ebb, which will secure the attack from interruption from the enemy's boats till the following flood. The period of low water seems the most favourable for discharging the rockets; the enemy's flotilla will then be more exposed to combustion.

When the necessary preparations have been made, should the enemy's vessels be reported to be at anchor in the roads, in order to avoid the loss of the season, it will be necessary to proceed off Boulogne with a squadron of sufficient numbers and strength to dispost them, as this may be found *ultimately necessary;* all the requisite arrangements for carrying the same into execution to be immediately made.

In either case, whether the attack is to be effected by surprise or force, an active bombardment, directed against the basin, should immediately follow the discharge of the rockets, with a view of distracting the enemy's attention, and preventing them from putting out any fire which may have taken place.

The attack to be made as soon after dark as the tide will permit, when the lights in the houses at Boulogne may serve as a direction, both for the launches rowing in and for directing the rockets.

A steady officer to be appointed to each launch, who is to be answerable for placing the boat in a proper position, and discharging the rockets in the direction of the basin.

A directing boat to lead in, taking a station 2000 yards from the centre of the basin (this point to be previously laid down on the chart with the utmost precision, and ascertained

by land or sea marks), about 1200 yards to the south-west of the Imperial battery.

The directing boat having dropped an anchor at the proper station, each launch is, in succession, to row round this boat; and, having discharged their rockets, immediately to retire. Fresh launches to follow each other at such intervals as will not unnecessarily expose them to the concentrated fire from the enemy's batteries, before they can take their station and discharge their rockets.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham, Master-General of the Ordnance.

Downing Street, October 1, 1805.

My dear Lord—I am very thankful for your letter, and very grateful for your constant disposition to facilitate the public service in my hands.

One of the objections to experimental warfare is, its tendency to break in upon the established forms of office, which are very valuable in themselves, and important to be upheld. In the present instance, the Admiralty was not acting upon any wish of its own, but rather yielding to an arrangement which was pressed upon them by me, in consequence of Sir Sidney Smith and Mr. Congreve concurring in opinion that these double boats, constructed on a large scale, were peculiarly adapted to the rocket-system, from their being much steadier in the water than a single boat with a round bottom. As the Admiralty have gone so much already out of their way on this point, I shall be much obliged by your suffering it to be completed by the Ordnance; and I will take care, in any new case that may arise, that the point shall be considered with the Department, before any official application is forwarded upon it.

We have mails this morning from Vienna, of the 15th, and from Berlin, of the 20th; the intelligence is not so favourable as we could wish.

The Elector of Bavaria, after entering into engagements to join his troops with those of Austria, has suddenly recalled them into Franconia, and Russia is resolute in her neutrality.

The King proposes to meet the Emperor of Russia on the frontiers. The entire Russian army is ordered to be placed on the war establishment, and the language of the minister is, that the entrance of the Russian army will not be acquiesced in.

The Russians had reached Brünn, in Moravia, on the 20th ult., and would probably join the Austrians about the 5th of October. Alopeus does not appear to have fully acted up to his instructions in apprising the King of Prussia of the alternative on which he had to decide; his retreat now becomes more difficult.

Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Sidney Smith.

Downing Street, October, 1805.

Sir—Mr. Johnson was employed, during the late war, in various services of a confidential nature by Government, wherein he proved himself of much utility by his dexterity and boldness, and by his knowledge of the coasts of the enemy.

And, as you consider that he may be of material service if he were attached to your command in a proper vessel, I have consulted with Lord Barham upon the subject, and settled with his lordship an arrangement by which this object may be effected.

Mr. Johnson has represented that the Nile cutter, of tons, can be immediately purchased, and he will engage to have her manned without delay, with a skilful and experienced crew, upon which he can depend.

I am, therefore, to desire that, out of the sums which shall

be imprested into your hands by the Comptroller of the Navy for executing the service committed to you, you do empower Mr. Johnson to purchase and fit for sea the said cutter, for any sum not exceeding , lodging with you the deed of sale thereof, in order that, when her service shall no longer be wanted, she may be sold to the best advantage, and the proceeds of the sale placed to the account of the imprest.

As soon as the cutter is purchased, Mr. Johnson will have her manned without delay, and the Admiralty will take her into their service as a hired armed vessel, and place her under your command.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Nelson to Lord Castlereagh.

Victory, October 2, 1805.

My Lord—It being strongly reported that the Dey of Algiers has been killed, and the man who was Minister of the Marine elected in his place, I shall of course withhold the King's letter and presents, till I know if it is all true; for, in that case, I shall submit to the Consul the propriety of withholding the King's letter, and of handing the presents to the new Dey, who used to be much our friend. My congratulatory is prepared for his accession, instead of the Dey's escape from assassination. The last never was our friend.

I hope I shall act as your lordship will approve.

I am, your most faithful and obedient servant,

NELSON AND BRONTE.

Lord Nelson to Lord Castlereagh.

Victory, October 3, 1805.

My Lord—Since my letter of yesterday, Admiral Louis has joined, and I have got an accurate account of the anchorage of the combined fleet. About twelve sail of the line are

anchored in the great Bay; and if gun and guard-boats, which I should suppose are pretty numerous, do not prevent them, the way is open to Mr. Francis. But I have but little faith; however, that is for his Majesty's Ministers: he shall have every assistance from me.

The rockets, if the account of them is true, must annoy their fleet very much; but I depend more upon hunger for driving them out, and upon the gallant officers and men under my command for their destruction, than any other invention. But rely, these gentlemen shall have every justice done their plans.

I am, ever your lordship's most faithful
and obedient servant,

NELSON AND BRONTE.

Lord Keith to Sir Sidney Smith.

Edgar, off Ramsgate, October 3, 1805.

Sir—I have received your letter of the 29th ult., on the subject of the mode of attacking the enemy's flotilla at Boulogne, and requesting that such fire and explosion vessels as can be appropriated to this service may be sent in succession, as they are ready, to join you at Dungeness.

It has been the constant practice of the enemy, for these last two years, to keep a force in Boulogne Roads, in fine weather and east winds, varying from fifty to one hundred vessels, as an advanced guard, and to cover the beach opposite the basin, but I am not of opinion that such a force is at all equal to that under your orders.

Whatever mode of attack you may determine upon will be duly weighed when communicated to me, and carried into execution, as soon as I receive orders from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to that effect. But experience has convinced me that any attempt to dislodge a few brigs from the Roads will be attended with no good consequences, even

although it succeeded; as they would resume their station the next tide, as has always been the case heretofore, whilst the risk, on our part, is considerable, and the expense great and certain.

At the time the attempt was made to burn the flotilla last year, there were in Boulogne Roads 150 sail; and, although the night was fine, the duty well performed, and the alarm considerable, the damage sustained by the enemy was small, and the expense on our part great.

I have to add, that the orders of the French admiral are, that no vessel is to have more than two feet water under her keel at low water, from which you will see the almost impossibility of getting fire and explosion vessels inside or even alongside of them, while they are moored in small numbers in open order along the shore, which they always are, and as, in the moment of danger, they can be almost instantaneously hauled on shore, and the vessels got afloat again the next rising tide. It is therefore doubtful if any of them would be destroyed with the expenditure of all the fire and explosion vessels and carcasses we have prepared; but, in a crowded state, (such must be the case previous to any attempt to invade this country) I think that I can venture to assure my superiors, that so prepared, I could destroy many, and create much confusion among the whole.

The fire-vessels now prepared, as well as the mortar-boats and gun-boats, are not of a description to enable them to ride at Dungeness at this season of the year, nor in Boulogne Roads, except in fine weather and an off-shore wind.

I have the honour, &c.,

KEITH.

Lord Keith to Lord Barham.

October 3, 1805.

My dear Lord—I have sent Sir Sidney Smith's public letter and my answer to the Board. He sent it by express, with the

enclosed. He has told me nothing we did not know these two last years; and, as for attempting to burn a few vessels in that extensive road of Boulogne, it is nonsense: we shall get our ships crippled, fail of success, and be at a great expense. In the former business, each explosion cost 200 barrels of gunpowder, £800; vessels, &c., £1,200; besides boats, and 13 carcasses, some holding 120 barrels of gunpowder. If Government really intend to destroy the vessels in Boulogne, it must be done by a large military force and a well digested plan, or by a dash in a dark night by a few determined *seamen*, well prepared to set fire, and return instantly to their boats. Both schemes are attended with risk.

I am, &c., KEITH.

Sir Sidney Smith complains of want of force. If your lordship look at his list, it is as numerous as at any time during the war, and in my mind perfectly equal to the present state of things on that coast.

Sir Sidney Smith to Lord Castlereagh.

Antelope, at anchor in Boulogne outer Road,
soi-disant Imperial Battery, S.E. ¼ E., 5,200 yards.

My dear Lord—We did not make much progress after I despatched my last letter, for want of wind. The breeze did not come till six yesterday evening, when the squadron stood in, and the Antelope anchored abreast the centre of their line, a gunshot and a half from them, their numbers being twenty-nine brigs and a galliot. The enemy reinforced their vessels with numbers of men, and have a line of long, swift-rowing pinnaces, as guard-boats, between and in front of them, our vessels not having been able to take their stations, from baffling winds and the heavy sailing of the gun-brigs, till to-day. I could only establish our counter-line of guard-boats, and try to send carcasses among them in the night. Our vicinity occasioned them to fire at they knew not what, on *one* of their line firing at one of ours, who got too near in; except that one, we

have not had occasion to return a shot; they even fired musketry at nothing. Mr. Robinson having prepared carcasses, and having volunteered his active services, and Captain Secomb his, I sent them away with eight galleys: the sea ran so great, that they filled, and nothing but the cork kept them up; they could not reach the enemy's line, whose expectations were thus disappointed as well as our own.

Mr. Congreve is busy getting his apparatus in order; but there is no use in firing rockets at random in the air at their line, 3 northward Imperial Battery, 21 southward, and they occupy the point from which alone we can reach the *basin*. I have tried four rockets from Sagittarius horizontally to ricochet on and from under water; they go some distance, and *rise* or *fire* after having been under water: two had shells, both of which went some seconds under water with great velocity, as we could see by the fire through the water—they then burst under water. We shall improve upon this. In short, my dear lord, we are at work in earnest, and will do all that can be done, but we must have the tools we ask for now, or we shall not be able to vary our modes of attack as they vary theirs of defence. They are now passing ropes from brig to brig, and placing intermediate boats. Their instructions we know to be, in case one is boarded, to run below decks, and hoist a light from thence, when the next vessels on each side are to fire volleys of musketry on the decks of the one attacked. We must get at them from *underneath*, as we cannot from *above;* but get at them we will, if it can be done anyhow. I send a demand for advance stores, which would preclude the necessity and danger of loading carcasses on board ship. The storekeeper has told me he is not allowed to give any particular squadron any extra thing; I must, therefore, refer the enclosed to the Ordnance in London!!! through your lordship.

I am, &c.,

W. Sidney Smith.

Lord Barham to [*Lord Castlereagh*].

Admiralty, October 4, 1805.

My dear Lord—The Admiralty Board are of opinion that the enclosed letters should be sent officially to your lordship, and even mentioned to the King; but I have overruled both opinions, as, I flatter myself, the impossibility of doing anything essential without an army will very soon become manifest, and release us from the anxiety of seeing our bravest men cut to pieces in fruitless attempts.

There seems to me such a want of judgment in our friend Sir Sidney, that it is much safer to employ him under command than in command.

I have never met with two opinions from professional men on the subject of attacking the enemy's vessels while under their batteries. To support this kind of warfare, after the experience we have had, will bring our judgment with the public into disrepute, and end in nothing but disgrace. The vessels employed upon it might be used to much more advantage in protecting our trade to the westward, or in convoying the ships that are intended to make an attempt on the enemy's fleet at Cadiz. In this attempt, the opinions of professional men will accompany you; but in attempting the opposite coast, without an army, you will meet with no support but from projectors.

I am, my dear Lord, faithfully yours,

BARHAM.

PS. I beg you will return the official letters, and Lord *Keith's*.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham.

Secret. Downing Street, October 4, 1805.

My dear Lord—As soon as I have seen Sir John Moore, with respect to the present state of the enemy's coast, I shall be very desirous of conferring with your lordship upon it.

In the mean time, I shall only observe that Lord Keith,

probably from not being aware of the nature of the proposed operation, seems to have misstated the real question for consideration. His lordship argues the hazard and inutility of attacking the flotilla of the enemy when advanced in Boulogne Bay under the protection of their batteries, as a general principle of warfare.

It may have been proved to be dangerous and unprofitable; but the only question at present is whether these advanced vessels, by any means within our reach to apply, can be disposted so as to admit of the rocket launches approaching near enough to arrive within range of the basin, namely, within 2,500 yards.

I am, my dear Lord, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Cooke to Sir Sidney Smith.

Downing Street, October 4, 1805.

Dear Sir—Lord Castlereagh directs me to acquaint you that he has approved of your proposal that Mr. Johnson should be employed in the Nile lugger, under your command; and he desires that you will be good enough to have a proper person survey the vessel, in order that it may be purchased at a reasonable price.

The blank in Lord Castlereagh's letter to you is left open, until you shall ascertain the sum which the Nile will cost in its purchase and equipment, which, when ascertained, you will be pleased to state to me for Lord Castlereagh's information, that you may be authorized to fill up the blank accordingly.

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

Lord Nelson to Lord Castlereagh.

Victory, October 5, 1805.

My Lord—The troops which the enemy landed at Cadiz on their arrival are embarked again, and it is said they will put to sea the first fresh Levanter.

I have only two frigates to watch them, and not one with the fleet. I am most exceedingly anxious for more eyes. I hope the Admiralty are hastening them to me. The last fleet was lost to me for want of frigates — God forbid this should!

And I want a frigate to send to Algiers with my letters and the presents; for, although the old Dey is gone, they will be doubtless very acceptable to the new Dey. I shall send him a very civil letter; and I think Mr. Cartwright will so manage as to make him believe that the presents came, but that I sailed before the King's letter arrived: if a letter is usual upon these occasions, your lordship will, of course, send one.

Mr. Matra, the Consul at Tangier, I understand, has been very ill, and is, I am told, from age and infirmities, incapable of exertion in doing his duty, and that some rascally Jew does all, and all goes wrong. I write, my lord, what I hear, and what I believe. I can have no anger or dislike personally to Mr. Matra: I never saw him; but, upon several occasions, on one particularly, respecting Captain, now Sir John Gore, he received the reprehension of Government. We should have a younger man, of honour and of business; for, if he is a money-making man, he ought not to be appointed.

I am, with great respect, your Lordship's
most faithful and obedient servant,
NELSON AND BRONTE.

Mr. Pitt to Lord Castlereagh.

Walmer Castle, October 6, 1805.

Dear Castlereagh — You will have learned from General Moore the substance of what passed between him and me, which left me convinced that any attempt at landing is attended with too much risk to justify the experiment. I still entertain considerable hopes of something effectual being done by the rockets,

and I trust you will not have had much further difficulty in overcoming the objections both of Lord Keith and the Admiralty. Your answer to Lord Barham places the subject exactly in the true light. I return the papers on that subject, and also those from Lord Lavington. Under the very peculiar circumstances, it seems impossible to object to allowing the £20,000 for which he has drawn. I hope to remain here till this day se'nnight, and shall be extremely glad if you can execute your intention of coming on Thursday. With this wind, I am much disappointed not to have heard of anything fresh from the Continent.

Ever sincerely yours,
W. Pitt.

Lord Nelson to Lord Castlereagh.

Victory, October 13, 1805.

My Lord—I have been honoured with your lordship's letter of September 24th, relative to Sardinia. I send you a copy of my letter to his Royal Highness the Viceroy, which will bring forth the present state of the island. Should Sardinia at this moment—which I think very probable—be taken by the French, it will be absolutely necessary to dispossess them of the seaports, or our fleets will not be able to watch Toulon, should the combined fleets get there, or even a squadron of them. I must not say more of its importance: never will its importance be too highly estimated, should the enemy unfortunately get possession of it.

I am, with the highest respect,
Your Lordship's most faithful
and obedient servant,
Nelson and Bronte.[1]

[1] The hand that penned this letter was very soon afterwards stiff in death. The battle of Trafalgar, the crowning triumph of Nelson's glorious career, was fought on the 22nd of the same month.

Nelson and Bronte to H.R.H. Duke de Generene [?].

Copy. Victory, September 27, 1805.

Sir—Your Royal Highness will readily believe that, during even my very short stay in England, I did not neglect to represent to his Majesty's Ministers the exact state of the island of Sardinia, and of the very great distress your Royal Highness was in from want of pecuniary assistance; and I have the satisfaction of assuring your Royal Highness that the necessity of succouring his Sardinian Majesty, to enable him to prevent Sardinia from falling into the hands of the French, is sensibly felt, and proper measures will be speedily taken for that essential purpose.

I hope your Royal Highness is assured that, whether I was at Pulla or in the West Indies, the interest and welfare of your Royal House was always near my heart, and that I am ever, with the purest attachment,

Your Royal Highness's
most devoted, humble servant,
NELSON AND BRONTE.

Sir Sidney Smith to [*Lord Castlereagh*].

Walmer Roads, Antelope, October 16, 1804[*5*],
not landed till the 17th, on account of the bad weather.

My dear Lord—You will, with Mr. Pitt, be anxious for a report of Mr. Francis's experiment. To make it a military, and an impartial one, I have caused it to be signed by the officer to whom the whole detail was entrusted, and, having pruned it from exuberant matter, and reduced it to a simple narrative of facts, without speculative opinions, I can answer for its exactness, the whole having passed under my eye. This Captain Owen, who was an attentive observer, admits to be a correct statement, and now handsomely acknowledges himself to have been in an error from which he is undeceived. He

said, a few minutes before the explosion, that he should have no objection to remain on board, from an idea that the resistance of the vessel would be sufficient to occasion it to act laterally on the water only; whereas, the starboard side of the vessel was lifted bodily, then went to pieces; she then appeared to break in two by her own weight, so lifted; and, from the middle no longer holding her together, the masts, as she sunk again, fell over, and crossed each other; in short, in less time than you have taken to read these six lines, they were, as it were, as two felled trees would appear on the axe cutting the last fibre that held them upright, and the hull appeared a misshapen black mass floating on the surface, with the casks that were in her hold going astern. This news will, of course, get over to Boulogne, and deter them from lying in the outer road, which is what we want for our ultimate operation. That Imperial Battery must be erased from the list of obstacles somehow or other. I am casting this in my mind; but it can only be done by seizing a favourable *moment* of wind and tide; and, if I am to write to Ramsgate on every proposition, the precise time of practicability will be lost; yet this I am absolutely required to do *previously* to executing any object, as your lordship will see by the letters Lord Keith had sent from Romney, before I met him at Walmer; the contents of which I was at that time ignorant of. Copies of these shall be sent to you, in order that you may cause the necessary latitude to be given towards the execution of the operations in contemplation; otherwise you can have no satisfactory result beyond what might be expected from the ordinary cruising service.

I am, my dear Lord,
Yours truly,
W. Sidney Smith.

I shall, of course, be punctually and correctly obedient. So I have answered.

Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty.

Downing Street, October 16, 1805.

My Lords—Having directed a military survey to be made of the harbour of Boulogne, with the view of ascertaining how far it may be practicable to approach within such a distance of the basin as to bring it within the range of rockets of a combustible nature lately prepared by Mr. Congreve, and the report received being favourable, I am directed to convey to your lordships his Majesty's commands, that you do issue the necessary orders for causing an attempt to be made, supported by an adequate naval force, thereby to set fire to and destroy the enemy's flotilla in that harbour.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Sidney Smith.

Downing Street, October 21, 1805.

My dear Sir—The success of Mr. Francis's experiment gives me great confidence in our means of annoying the enemy in their ports, with little comparative risk to ourselves. I am anxious to hear of the destruction of the Boulogne flotilla, if it was only for the purpose of liberating you for more important enterprises. I should be glad to hear when you calculate upon making the attempt. I cannot, upon reflection, wish you to risk much at present for the Imperial Battery. If it was in one of *our* harbours, if ten times stronger, I should encourage you to the attempt. If invasion at this moment was the order of the day, I should think it worth attacking, in order to expose the enemy's flotilla, when issuing from their port, more completely to our assault; but, under present circumstances, trusting to your rocket launches approaching near enough, notwithstanding this impediment, I am averse to your exposing your squadron, or—what I value not less—yourself, for an

object which you could not maintain under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and of which you could make no use. The advantage of its conquest must, under any circumstances, be of the negative description; and at present they do not seem to be required.

I am, &c.,
CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Cooke to Sir Sidney Smith.

Downing Street, October 23, 1805.

Dear Sir—It being intended that the special services of Mr. Francis and Mr. Congreve, who are employed under your command, should be defrayed out of the moneys which have been directed to be imprested to you, I am desired by Lord Castlereagh to acquaint you that several sums, to the amount of about £3000, have been advanced to Mr. Francis from this Office, which, in order to bring them into a regular state of account, are to be ultimately paid from your imprest fund. I wish, therefore, that you would have the goodness to arrange with Mr. Francis that he should repay me the sums I have advanced him, and that he should, in lieu of these advances, receive equivalent sums from you.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
E. COOKE.

Mr. Cooke to Sir Sidney Smith.

Downing Street, October 24, 1805.

Dear Sir—Lord Castlereagh, under the circumstances of your letter, directs me to acquaint you that his lordship approves of the Nile cutter being purchased for Johnson for £2600. There will, however, be great difficulty in having her fitted and coppered in a king's yard. His lordship, therefore, wishes you would direct the equipment in a merchant's yard.

I am, &c.,
E. COOKE.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Robert Francis.

Downing Street, October 24, 1805.

Sir—I have spoken to Lord Barham on the subject of your letter. His lordship is disinclined to make the arrangement you suggest; but he is willing to facilitate your carrying out to the intended place of service, after the Boulogne operation is terminated, in Sir Sidney Smith's ship, any reasonable proportion of officers and men which may be required to man and conduct your boats, &c.; and, in case they should render service as volunteers in this new branch of naval warfare, they may rely on being rewarded and distinguished in their profession.

If, therefore, Captain Secombe is disposed to an enterprise, a temporary arrangement might be made for his having leave of absence from Admiral Holloway; and he will have the chance of establishing claims to a more distinguished command, by this opportunity of rendering service.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Cooke to Mr. Robert Francis.

Downing Street, October 24, 1805.

Sir—I wrote yesterday to Sir Sidney Smith, stating that Lord Castlereagh wished that the sums you have received from me should be repaid by you to me; and that the amount thereof should be advanced to you out of the imprest which has been made to Sir Sidney for the services on which you are employed. You will be good enough to arrange this matter accordingly.

I paid in to Mr. Davison, the other day, the remaining £1400, which you wished to have lodged at his house.

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Nelson.[1]

Downing Street, October 27, 1805.

My dear Lord — Accept my particular thanks for your letters of the 1st and 2nd of October. I have given an official answer to that part of your correspondence which relates to the question of blockade, considering it would be most satisfactory to your lordship to receive a formal instruction on this point, for the direction of your conduct.

With respect to the enemy's fleet in Cadiz, I hope your lordship will either have the glory of destroying it at sea, or that we shall find the means, sooner or later, of getting at them in port. I have not thought it desirable to send either Mr. Congreve or Mr. Francis to your lordship, till they have provided themselves with all the necessary means of giving effect to the respective modes of attack.

Since your lordship sailed, the power of Mr. Francis's instrument has been satisfactorily ascertained by an experiment upon a large vessel purchased for that purpose, and which was approached in the usual manner, and the carcass thrown across the cable. The failure of the attack had hitherto been occasioned by the weight of the carcass being too great to be swept by the force of the tide under the bottom of the vessel; the explosion, in this case, acting perpendicularly, spent itself along the bow of the vessel, and did not penetrate the bottom. By the application of a sufficiency of cork, to correct the weight of the carcass, and to render it liable to the influence of the tide, it was, in the late experiment, so balanced as to be at once swept under the vessel; and, consequently, was placed in immediate contact with and under her bottom. The explosion taking place at the moment to which the lock was adjusted, it blew the ship into fragments, as your lordship will perceive by the enclosed official report.

[1] Written before the intelligence of Lord Nelson's death, on the 22nd, could reach England.

The quantity of gunpowder employed on this occasion did not exceed 170 pounds weight.

I have thought it right to say thus much in confidence to your lordship, that you may be able to estimate the power of the weapon, if its application can be ensured. This must depend on circumstances, and must be more or less liable to failure, according to the position of the enemy's fleet. It is worth remark, however, that, in the only two attempts that have yet been made against the enemy's ships with these instruments, the failure has not been the result of not arriving at the object, and placing the carcass across the cables, but has been occasioned by the carcass being too heavy in itself, and from that circumstance, hanging perpendicular to the bow of the ship, instead of being sucked under the bottom by the tide.

This is only meant for your lordship's own eye. I own, having thus ascertained, beyond a doubt, the complete power of a carcass thus applied to destroy any ship, however large, I cannot but feel a strong persuasion that it may be frequently applied with effect; and, in cases where it does succeed, its effect cannot be counteracted subsequent to the explosion; whereas, the fire occasioned by the rockets may, like any other fire, be extinguished by the exertions of the ship's company.

I hope to forward both these weapons soon to your lordship, and I am sure your lordship will facilitate their application.

With the greatest personal regard and respect, I am, my dear Lord, your most faithful and obedient servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.

Downing Street, November 7, 1805.

My dear Lord—Accept my congratulations on the additional glories which your profession has acquired. Nelson terminated his life in a manner worthy of himself.

I think this wind will give a smooth passage to the Elbe. We are now most anxious to get the cavalry embarked. Let me beg your lordship to push it forward with the utmost despatch. It is my wish that, as soon as one regiment is shipped, it should proceed under a proper convoy, leaving the other to follow. I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Sidney Smith to Lord Castlereagh.

Dover, November 8, 1805.

My dear Lord—The enclosed correspondence speaks for itself. I wish it may be more intelligible, and appear less contradictory to your lordship than it is to me. I may take the bombs to be spectators of an imperfect bombardment from two row boats, who roll so much, that no precision can be expected from them; it is a novel mode of warfare to expect to annoy the enemy without being within reach to be annoyed in a degree in turn. I am here urging forward the preparations to *complete* the launches: every thing Mr. Congreve asks I give him immediately; the moon is too light for Lord Keith's suggestion, of going in the dark at present. I shall go the moment Mr. Congreve announces himself to be ready; we must go in with the flood, and out again with the ebb; so that part of the Minute requiring us to fire at low water is impracticable; we can fire at half ebb, which may be better than when the flood is returning to float the vessels.

I profited by the Gazette to animate our people, and to remove some of the *terror* that had been assiduously and artfully instilled into them. Alas, poor Lord Nelson! I grieve on every account.

Your lordship's faithful and
obedient servant,
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Collingwood.

Downing Street, November, 1805.

My Lord—The enclosed letter was written the night before I received the intelligence of Lord Nelson's great achievement and fall. In transmitting it unaltered to your lordship, however it may revive feelings which time can hardly obliterate, I am persuaded it will not fail, if possible, to recommend more strongly to your consideration the investigation of a point to which his lordship's most anxious attention had been long directed.

The unexampled victory gained by the fleet now under your lordship's orders has certainly narrowed the motive for undertaking an extended operation against the Spanish ports. There yet remains, however, sufficient temptation to investigate the operation in all its details, and to look at it as one worthy to be undertaken, so far as it may not interfere with objects of yet greater magnitude. I therefore commit it, in the same confidence, to your lordship's perusal, and shall hope to receive your suggestions upon it.

I cannot conclude without expressing to your lordship my warm sense of your distinguished services, and the satisfaction I have derived from observing the strong mark of favour which his Majesty has thought fit to confer on you.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Nelson.

My dear Lord—In the present state of affairs, it is impossible to form any plan with respect to future operations which intervening events may not induce us to abandon. There are, however, certain leading objects of such magnitude as to excite the utmost anxiety to be prepared to attempt their accomplishment, if our efforts should not be wholly directed to the Continent on this side the Bay. The immense importance (not less with respect to the facility it would give us of applying

our resources, even upon a larger scale, to Continental purposes, than the complete security it would place us in during the remainder of the war) of laying hold of Cadiz, with all the maritime strength therein deposited, has, I know, made its full impression on your lordship's mind; and I well recollect, when I last had the pleasure of conversing with you, that the advanced period of the season alone prevented your lordship from then pressing an attempt against that place on the consideration of the Government.

What I am now solicitous to learn from your lordship is the earliest period in the ensuing year when your lordship would deem that an enterprise of this nature might in prudence be undertaken. It certainly would be highly desirable, for many reasons which will suggest themselves to your lordship's mind, that it should not be postponed for a moment beyond what prudential considerations with respect to weather absolutely require; and particularly in order that the troops may return, after the service is performed, to take their share in the Continental struggle before the season is advanced.

With this view, I should be desirous of learning (supposing the expedition prepared to avail themselves of the first easterly winds that may be expected at the close of February or beginning of March) what sort of weather they might hope to find on their arrival off the coast of Spain, and whether your lordship would have any difficulty, with an adequate land force, to open the Bay of Bulls by seizing the defences on the northern side, to place a fleet of the magnitude there to be assembled in safety during the equinox, which, we must presume, upon the supposition of their sailing as above suggested, would find them there.

If an attempt is to be made on Cadiz at all, it appears to me indispensable that it should be undertaken with a force capable of setting opposition at defiance. I am inclined to believe (on which point I should be naturally desirous of receiving your lordship's opinion) that 40,000 British troops would have

little to fear from any or all the force Spain could assemble; and that such an army might, in a week's time, do everything at Cadiz that we should have any motive for attempting, and might, with as little hazard, on its return, early in April, perform the same operation on the ships and arsenals at Ferrol. If this calculation is not too sanguine, we might hope to have our troops returned and applicable to any ulterior purpose the beginning or middle of May.

The above outline will be fully sufficient to call your lordship's serious attention to this important subject; and I have to request, with the least practicable delay, that your lordship will favour me with your detailed ideas, not only upon the practicability, but the time and mode of executing the attempt. Your lordship will also furnish me, from time to time, with such information as you may be able to procure, bearing, in any degree, upon this question.

Your lordship, in any inquiries you may make, will guard against the design being brought into the most remote suspicion. What is passing on the Continent will enable us to make our preparations here on the largest scale, without exciting the jealousy of Spain; and, even in the mode of assembling the armament, we should have the means of apparently giving it an opposite direction. I know I can rely not less on your lordship's prudence than counsel in this important business, and it will increase my satisfaction if a great public service of the nature suggested should be accomplished under your auspices and directions.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Sidney Smith.

Downing Street, November 14, 1805.

My dear Sir—I return the correspondence with Lord Keith. As his lordship seems to have waved his objection to your having the means of strengthening your general bombardment, it is unnecessary for me to take any steps on this point. As opposed to the enemy's batteries, I consider the presence of the

bomb-vessels of no importance, with a view of distracting the enemy's attention by keeping up a fire upon the basin: after the rockets have been discharged, their assistance may be material. I am aware that force may be necessary to dispost the enemy: my hopes of success, however, rest more upon an approach effected by surprise, and I trust you will prefer this game, although I know your natural gallantry would rather prefer the direct attack.

I shall reply to your letters upon the Nile, &c., to-morrow. With my cordial congratulations on the late glorious achievements of your profession and upon your promotion,

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Sidney Smith to Lord Castlereagh.

On board H.M. sloop Diligence, off Boulogne,
November 22, 1805.

My dear Lord—As Lord Keith keeps me in pretty good employment by his expectation of details from me, I am only enabled to give the same to your lordship in the second place, though I should be very glad if I had no other correspondent than yourself. You will see my original report. I send your lordship some documents which would never reach you through any other channel, and which will show you that, though there is no contending with elements, when all preponderate in the same scale against one, there may be moments when a thing may be practicable, and which a detached commanding officer should be at liberty to profit by, without being curbed by one post, and goaded by another alternately. Rain and wind are bad concomitants in a preparation for fireworks on shore, but worse afloat; in fact, though (I don't place the fact on *record*) the launches *rolled* so much from the ground-swell, when in the shoal waters of the bank, that the rockets went out of the frame into the water. Your lordship will see by the enclosed letter from Admiral Holloway, that he anticipated our with-

drawing, and has no great faith in the experiment at best. My own opinion (from what I have seen of the long range and ricochet bounds on the water of Mr. Congreve's rockets) is that they are a most valuable addition to the force of swift-rowing boats, as the smallest can throw a *six-pounder* carcass or shell, and a stout vessel can throw a *broadside* more formidable than that of any bomb-vessel of her size, without being encumbered and embarrassed with the weight of ordnance, or anything but the ammunition itself. This must be carefully kept and skilfully managed, or there is danger in the application.

I hope I shall have those with me in my new squadron that have been taught, and by next summer we shall have practice enough to try Boulogne in fine weather. In winter, it is out of the question; for the fishermen dread to be drawn into this bay, unless they have the port to run into, and many are stranded by missing it, or from the gale coming on at an improper time of tide for entering it. I give nothing up that is practicable, and I hope to be well supplied in the *Pompée*, and have a good *rowing* force, with leave to act at such times and places as circumstances, at *the moment*, may require. Had these been my instructions, instead of the limited and precise ones given me, you might have had a *blaze somewhere*, if not at *Boulogne*, to gratify the impatient, and justify the adoption of the system. Mr. Francis's coffers, we know, will blow *brigs up*, and may larger ships, but the placing them is a perilous business; his boats are too ticklish for these seas: all have come on board full of water, and kept up by the cork only; but the men wet and discouraged by risk and suffering. This climate, at this season, will not do for these things; so the sooner we go south the better.

I am, my dear Lord, yours faithfully,

W. Sidney Smith.

I recommend young Spilsbury for having thrown rockets from the Sagittarius, being close enough to the enemy's line for ricochet firing. Pray give him a *lift* in return.

I will answer fully about Johnson's cutter; she will not stand Government in more, on the whole, than that tonnage in *two* useless hired vessels, with *ordinary* seamen. These are, and will be, I am persuaded, more than *able*, and will repay the cost in annoyance of the enemy.

Mr. Francis to Lord Castlereagh.

Dover, November 25, 1805.

My Lord—From the day I found Mr. Pitt determined to practise my invention on the French fleets, I urged that it might be arranged into a system by itself. After thirteen months' essay and argument, I have still to plead that it may be systemized, and this I do, believing it the best interest of Government; for, as to myself, having shown how to construct the carcasses, and apply them with simplicity and certainty, little more can be required of me; it must be for regular bred seamen to use them, and seek opportunities to destroy the enemy.

I have taken the liberty to send your lordship a copy of a letter which I wrote to Sir Sidney on the necessity of system. I hope your lordship and Lord Barham will see its importance, as I do, and order an arrangement similar to that I have mentioned, to which I have no doubt Sir Sidney will be happy to acquiesce.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Robert Francis.

[*Enclosure.*] *Mr. Francis to Sir Sidney Smith.*

Dover, November 25, 1805.

Dear Sir—In consequence of the loss of launches and the boisterous season of the year, I presume there is little hope of using the rockets to advantage till the spring. This appears to be the opinion of Mr. Congreve: should it be yours also, it will give you time to concentre the whole force of your mind on the carcass system, and get it so arranged as to secure

success to every attack which may be made. Hitherto, every attempt with the carcasses has proved the absolute necessity of following my original plan, of draughting a given number of men for the carcass-boats, who should be made familiar with the carcass and its use. Men so exercised will go to work with confidence; they will handle the carcasses with care, *nor ever throw one overboard, fearing to be blown up.* They will be attached to their particular boat, and take care of her; they should do little other duty than that of attacking the enemy with carcasses; they would then be fresh and vigorous for the attack. Their reward, in case of success, should be made known to them; they would then act with enthusiasm, and success would be the consequence. For what fleet of the enemy, or probable number of their guard-boats, could resist twenty of our boats thus organized with carcasses and arms to defend themselves?

Admitting the enemy to put themselves in the best possible state of defence, their vessels must act only on the defensive; they cannot follow our boats, and our men, who run in to throw the carcasses, risk not more than one volley of musketry, which experience has shown does little execution in the uncertain aim which must be taken in a dark night.

Yet, on our side, the mode of attack is most tremendous, for the success of a carcass instantly annihilates the vessel and her unfortunate crew: hence, comparing our mode of attack with their means of defence, how little is our risk compared with that of the enemy! how infinitely have we the advantage! Should their guard-boats attack our carcass-boats, ours should be of a class to defend themselves; and, thus arranged, where could the enemy find craft to guard all points of their line against twenty boats, which are formidable not only from their numbers but their strength.

The successful experiment of blowing up the brig and these observations will, I hope, convince you, Sir Sidney, of the immense advantages which may be gained by a judicious prosecu-

tion of my plan; but it must be organized, or it can do no credit to either you or me, nor be of any use to the nation.

A permanent officer and crew must be in each boat. It will not do to change the officers at every attack, to give each young man a chance of promotion; on the contrary, each officer and man must have experience, and be perfect master of the engines to be used, with every detail on the mode of using them in all possible cases. As it is obvious that such experience is necessary to secure success, it is evident that it cannot be acquired otherwise than by giving this specific duty to a certain number of officers and men, and practising them in it.

Suppose, then, the establishment to consist of 20 boats, each 12 men to row, 1 to steer, 1 in the bow, and an officer—total 15 men in each boat; or, for the 20 boats, 300 men, who could be distributed on board the Pompée, Sceptre, and Diadem; the two latter being armed store-ships already attached to the carcass system. The greatest difficulty is to carry twenty good boats in three ships; they could, however, be carried in four, at five boats for each vessel; and if Captain Owen, of the Immortalité, could be attached to this little squadron, the whole preparations might be arranged in the four ships, with perfect convenience.

The plan here proposed is simple: it has no extraordinary show to alarm the enemy, or excite wild speculations; it can move from place to place with facility; may be here, at Brest, Ferrol, or Cadiz, in a few days; and will be always ready to act at a moment's warning, which is essentially necessary to take advantage of winds, tide, and other circumstances. It will, in fact, be a system of itself adequate to the purposes for which it is intended. With such arrangement, I conceive the success will be certain; the honour will be in proportion to the execution done with little means, not in a ratio to extensive command. Witness the affair of General Mack, at Ulm, and the contrast at Acre, for the reasons here given. I hope, Sir Sidney, you will turn your whole attention to the carcass

system for six months to come; bring it to as narrow a compass and perfect arrangement as possible, and you will find it develop much honour and national interest.

The boats, in general, of the fleet are not well constructed for an attack with carcasses: the eight galleys I had made are excellent for summer operations; but, for the winter, I think the twelve-oared double-banked cutter the most useful and secure kind of boat; each of which should have four musketoons and six or eight blunderbusses. A number of such boats should be procured immediately, which may soon be done, were an order given.

Recapitulation of the proposed establishment:—The Pompée, L'Immortalité, Sceptre, and Diadem; twenty twelve-oared cutters, in which case the ships may leave their other boats, except the launch and a gig.

A hundred and fifty or two hundred men extraordinary, which, with the usual ship's company, will be sufficient to completely man the carcass boats at all times. Perhaps one or two cutters for despatches, or look-out, may be necessary.

When I consider this little squadron, it is like a grain in the scale of British power; when I contemplate what it may perform with little risk, I see the probability of its annihilating all that remains of French and Spanish fleets—I say annihilating, for I appeal to every mind the least acquainted with science and its progress, if such must not be the consequence of prosecuting this new invention with intelligence and vigour.

Have the goodness to consider the plan here proposed with attention, and please to let me know your opinion and decision on it.

With all respect, your most obedient,

ROBERT FRANCIS.

Having considered the importance of a well organized squadron, it will be well to leave an active and enterprising

officer on this station, in case Captain Owen should accompany you. It should be a person who will apply the carcasses to the enemy the moment they appear, and I recommend it as the real interest of Government that Captain Seacombe should have the power and means so to act: he is the only captain who has invariably adhered to the system from the commencement, and who has exhibited sufficient enthusiasm, united to courage, to carry it into effect. Could he be moved from the Utrecht into a useful vessel, and have four or five boats, I can supply him with carcasses of powers to destroy the pile batteries, or French vessels; thus fitted, he could watch his opportunity, and some impression would be made on the coast of Boulogne before spring. Such an arrangement will be no expense to Government, for every thing is ready; if not made, I doubt much whether any thing *will* be done in this quarter, as the other captains do either not understand the machines, or are indifferent about them, as not being connected with the ordinary operations with which they are familiar.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Sidney Smith.

Downing Street, November 26, 1805.

My dear Sir—I have read, with much satisfaction, your orders during your late visit to the French coast: nothing can be more clear and judicious; and, if success has not attended the operation, it is attributable to the weather, and not to you. I think it desirable to keep up the jealousy of the enemy with respect to Boulogne, at the present moment, and have no doubt what has been done has retarded any arrangements for strengthening Holland. It certainly is not my wish that you should again embarrass yourself at such a season with an equipment only to be used in milder and more settled weather; I shall, however, express to Lord Keith a wish that, so far as it can be done without interfering with other services, the enemy may be menaced at Boulogne, which will either discourage them,

as long as we are embarking troops in the Downs, from throwing reinforcements into Holland, or, if they do, may expose them to a *coup de main* on Boulogne.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Francis to Lord Castlereagh.

Dover, November 26, 1805.

My Lord—In addition to my letter of yesterday, I have the honour to send you some thoughts on the mode to be pursued in attacking the fleet in the inner Roads of Brest. It is similar to one I delivered to Mr. Pitt last year; but, having now more experience in the use of the carcasses, there is at present a greater certainty of success.

Since writing your lordship, I have had a conversation with Sir Sidney on system; he likes my plan, but thinks his squadron should consist of more ships than I have mentioned, not for my particular use, but for his security, in all cases. Of this I do not pretend to judge; but, my lord, I give it to you as my decided opinion, founded on calm reflection and a knowledge of the immense powers of the engines to be used, that the Brest and other fleets of the enemy which lie in open ports may be destroyed by pursuing the plan here proposed. The attainment of such an object surmounts all smaller considerations; and, in this work, if Sir Sidney wishes two or three ships extraordinary to accompany him, they may perhaps be as well with him as lying in the Downs during the winter doing nothing.

What I beg of Lord Barham is good boats, and sufficient of them well manned; and I hope his lordship will see the necessity of our having them, as our whole business is boat-work; good boats, well manned, and in unusual numbers, make themselves respected. My lord, letters which I write you on this subject are for you, Lord Barham, and Mr. Pitt only; for perhaps my ideas of system and the mode of acting may not

be the opinion of other men. My wish is to do that which is right, and offend no one. I have the honour, &c.,

ROBERT FRANCIS.

Thoughts on attacking the French Fleet in the inner Road of Brest.

To Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith.

When the power of the carcass is considered, and that so small an engine, which may be carried in and used from a boat, is capable of destroying a ship of the line, it follows that the whole of the operations against the enemy is reduced to boat-work. The boats should, therefore, be as numerous as necessary, and perfect as possible. As to number, it should be such on all attacks as to carry sufficient carcasses to make havoc among the enemy wherever they are found; they should also be of such number and strength as would leave no chance that the enemy could have, always prepared and ready for action, an equal number, of equal strength. In my letter of yesterday I mentioned twenty boats as being sufficient for general operations, each of which should, on an attack, destroy one vessel; and which will be the case when the men are exercised to the use of the carcasses. But suppose a powerful nation like this to make a carcass expedition to destroy the fleet in Brest Roads, there are there thirty vessels of various kinds—the annihilation of which, in one night, would electrify England like the victory of Lord Nelson, and animate the whole coalesced and even lukewarm States of Europe.

What, then, is necessary to secure success to so glorious an enterprise? We have seen one boat and carcass destroy one vessel; and fifty boats should destroy fifty vessels—which would leave the Port of Brest a naked scene, never more to be decorated with ships of war. Suppose, then, fifty boats, with one hundred carcasses, to run into Brest Roads on the flood of the night and return with the ebb, what would be their risk? At two miles from Camaret Bay they could leave the ships;

they would then be nine miles from the French vessels; the tide runs from three to four miles an hour; and in one hour and a half they would be among the enemy. In passing the gullet, there is a Fort Porzie on one side, and Saint Sebastian on the other, to guard the entrance; the distance between them about one mile and a half, which is thirteen hundred yards from each to the centre of the gullet, at which distance the boats running up the centre could not be seen from the forts on a night usually dark. On their arriving among the enemy, *they*, not expecting so unusual an attack, could not be on their guard with sufficient boats to oppose ours; or, were *they*, it could not prevent some of our boats throwing their carcasses, on which the first vessel blown up would spread general dismay, and occupy their boats in saving their own people. As to pointing the guns of their ships on our boats, that is impossible. First, because there is not time; second, because they would fire on each other. A few volleys of musketry must be borne, which does little execution.

Were fifty boats employed in so important an enterprise, six hundred men would be wanting, and, with this view of the subject, I conceive there is a flattering prospect that six hundred men would destroy the greater part of the Brest fleet in one night, and perhaps without losing one boat's crew; but, admitting half the men were lost, which is almost impossible, still our loss would be infinitely less than in other engagements of equal importance, conducted in the usual mode of war. Hence, Sir Sidney, the enterprise is worthy of you; it is grand and simple, is attended with little risk, and is worthy of the nation; if it succeeds, it will be unique in history, and produce as abundant a crop of laurels as has fallen to the lot of man. What is wanting is boats, men, and powder. I have every other thing requisite. Should you carry with you twenty boats well armed, perhaps any more which may be necessary can be got in Lord Cornwallis's fleet. Should this system clear the Roads of Brest, it will also sweep every other open port of the

enemy. The prudent measure is to be well prepared, and watch a favourable moment for the attack.

With respect, yours sincerely,

ROBERT FRANCIS.

Note delivered to Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith.

Dover, November 28, 1805.

The Diadem, Captain Pearcy, and the Sceptre, Captain Salt, having been appropriated to carry boats, coffers, and carcasses, the large wooden coffers being abandoned for the present, and the small copper carcasses only to be used, it is found that the Diadem will be sufficiently capacious to carry as many such carcasses with their locks and powder as may be necessary for an expedition. She is a vessel which sails well, and can always keep up with the fleet.

The Sceptre is a smaller, confined vessel, sails badly, is at present of no use to carry coffers, is not large enough to carry boats, and her expense to Government is £8000 per annum. Instead of the Sceptre, it will be much more convenient to have two unarmed, three decked West Indiamen, of about five or six hundred tons each, for the express purpose of carrying boats and their crews. They could each carry ten boats between decks, and two on the booms, or even the main hatchway, and their expense would not be more than that of the Sceptre is at present. Such will be an excellent mode of carrying the boats, both for security and concealment. When such vessels arrive before the port of an enemy, an attack will not be suspected, because the means cannot be seen. In this manner, ships of war will not be embarrassed with boats, and a less number of ships of war may appear before the enemy than if they carried the boats, which again will prevent suspicion of attack. This is, therefore, the cheapest and infinitely the best mode of carrying the boats, and is absolutely necessary when a system of war is reduced to boat-work.

Approved, W. SIDNEY SMITH. ROBERT FRANCIS.

Lord Collingwood to Lord Castlereagh.

Queen, off Carthagena, December 12, 1805.

My Lord—The subject on which your lordship has done me the honour to ask my opinion is of that magnitude, and leads to such important consequences, that I shall give my judgment upon it with great diffidence.

I have been stationed off Cadiz a considerable time, this war and the last, not without paying some attention to the nature of its defence; and it has always struck me as a place of exceeding great strength. Since the receipt of your lordship's letter, I have given the subject my most mature consideration, and will now state the result as clearly as I can, praying your lordship to keep in mind the little knowledge I have of land defences. The place appears to be as strong by art as high ramparts and all the skill in fortification can make it. I do not mean that solely as an objection, because I am well convinced that, where proper ships can be brought up to them, no walls can stand them; but, when combined with other circumstances, is well deserving of consideration.

Cadiz has a natural outwork in the rock and shoal water about it. The nearest part to which ships of the line can be brought, is off St. Philip's bastion, within the Porques, from which, for more than three-quarters of a mile, is rocky shoal water. In sailing in under a fire, and other circumstances, the probability is, that the ship would be a mile off, which is too great a distance to expect much good from. Nor is there any part of the town that I know where ships can approach it nearer; for, on the south side, the irregular rocks along the shore lie at a greater distance. On the land-side, I am told, it is exceedingly strong, and the isthmus so narrow there, that I should suppose the progress against it in that point would be very slow.

With respect to Bull Bay as an anchorage, I do not believe it to be a place of any security for a fleet, in the

event of a gale of wind. Ships anchor there occasionally in the summer, because, in this serene climate, they may anchor any where. Towards Rota, it is rocky and foul ground; when Lord St. Vincent first anchored off Cadiz, a wing of his fleet extended to that part where, in two days, their cables were destroyed, and the fleet was moved to where there was a better bottom. Towards Santa Catalina, and the other end of the bay, it is a loose sand, and gives no security for ships riding there. As to shelter, if your lordship casts your eye on the map, you will observe that it affords none against a south-west wind, which is the only point that danger is to be apprehended from on this coast.

I am afraid your lordship will think what I have stated is very discouraging to what is proposed; but, whenever your lordship asks my opinion upon any subject, I will give it with my best judgment. I may be wrong: a more perfect knowledge of the place would perhaps decide otherwise. Besides, my lord, I have been informed that Cadiz depends almost entirely for fresh water on what is brought daily from Port St. Mary. If that is the case, it would be scarcely tenable without that part of the continent from which the supply is drawn.

Having laid before your lordship the circumstances which, I conceive, bring the success of that undertaking into doubt, will your lordship allow me to offer that which, I think, is perfectly practicable; and, as it would require but a short time for execution, and answer the great purpose of destroying the maritime strength of this place, would perhaps have most of the advantages proposed by possessing Cadiz? It is to destroy the arsenal, without attempting the town. This would require a considerable force for a very short time, to be undertaken by landing near the town of St. Pedro, from which the Caraccas is distant about six miles, and by a rapid march proceed to the arsenal, with such light artillery as could be carried without delaying the march. At the same time, a

part of the army should attack the Torre Garda which commands the isthmus; and, if they carried it, the communication with Cadiz is cut off; if they did not, they would prevent any interruption from thence to the principal scene of operation.

Perhaps your lordship has plans of the arsenal, and will know what defences it has, and what impediments the troops are likely to meet with. I know of none except the frequent ditches and drains of a low country, which would require consideration for the artillery. Twelve-pounder carronades, which have trunnions, may be carried over a bad piece of ground on poles like a chairman's, and be remounted in an instant. The attack should be veiled till the moment of its execution. I would, therefore, propose that a certain part of the army should be previously landed on the coast near St. Lucar or Rota, and, attacking one of those places, while the ships and two or three bombs threaten Cadiz, draw the attention of whatever disposable force may be in the country to a point remote from where the business is to be done; and this Rota party should make their alarm before the real attack points to its destination. The time for this operation would be the dry season, when the days are long, and when all the Spanish ships will probably be at the Caraccas for the purpose of their repair.

I have only to add my assurance to your lordship of my utmost zeal and ability in the execution of whatever service is undertaken, and that I am, with the highest respect, &c.,

COLLINGWOOD.

October 13, 1807.

When the troops arrive at the bridge of Guazo, a party must be left to maintain it, and prevent its being broken down. —*Note added to a copy of this letter, furnished at Lord Castlereagh's request.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve to Lord Castlereagh.

No. 8, Arundel Street, December 12, 1805.

My Lord—I have had the honour to state to your lordship that I had several propositions of importance to make to your lordship for carrying the rocket system into effect; and I now beg leave to detail them. In making these propositions to your lordship, I presume it to be your lordship's intention still to make Boulogne one of the objects—indeed, the principal one—of attack; while, at the same time, Sir Sidney Smith carries out with him an equipment of rockets, and the apparatus for using them, which can be applied to any vessel on the spot, previous to the construction of his double boats for rocket batteries.

Out of the original equipment of the rocket launches, there now remain at Dover five, which are by this time in complete repair; but these, my lord, independent of their not being able to act at this time of year, are not sufficient in number for the purpose.[1] I have therefore to propose to your lordship, that the enclosed list of vessels which have been seized for smuggling, and are now lying useless in Dover harbour, should be appropriated to the service, as I am confident they can be equipped at a very trifling expense.[2] They would be capable of discharging a great number of rockets under all circumstances, would be their own magazines, and act independently of any other vessels. I only regret, my lord, that I did not know of them in the first instance. They are now rotting at Dover, and will cost Government nothing to put them into this service.

The next plan I had to propose to your lordship, is the equipment of some of the gun-brigs with frames for projecting

[1] These luggers are much fitter for cruising in deep water, consequently applicable to Gibraltar.

[2] Dover passage-boats more suitable.

rockets.[1] The expence of this will be trifling, as it only requires a small moveable frame, to be fixed, when wanted, over the stern of the brig, in which situation a great number of rockets may be thrown, without danger or inconvenience.

The third plan I have to propose, is the providing the small boats of the navy with a frame, for using shell-rockets as an occasional arm, both offensive and defensive, in any boat attack that may be contemplated.[2] The experiment was lately tried, and it is found that a small boat may, without the smallest inconvenience, be armed so as to contain in itself a force equal to twenty-four rounds of a 6-pounder, using Shrapnell's shells—the shell rocket at 15°, ricocheting 1000 yards at least.

But, my lord, it is the two first of these propositions I am the most anxious to impress upon your lordship's consideration, as this seems the true moment of preparation for any future operation against Boulogne, when nothing can be put in practice; and, if your lordship will empower me, *I pledge myself, at very little expence, the rockets being in store, to put in readiness, by the time it can be applied, a very formidable expedition against Boulogne*, independent of the equipment to attend Sir Sidney, under the direction of Mr. Bray, who is now master of the subject.

Boulogne, my lord, is, and must be, while it remains in its present state, the first object of attack. I have already at Dover a large depôt, with all the means of fitting the vessels I have mentioned to your lordship. I have therefore to request your lordship's attention to this letter, and that your lordship will allow me half an hour's conversation on the subject, when you shall please to appoint me.

I cannot conclude, without requesting your lordship's attention also to the enclosed copy of a letter to Colonel Neville,

[1] Highly advisable, with due precaution; and the officers instructed should be employed.

[2] May be used with great advantage.

which I was induced to write concerning the expence of the rockets, as that point seems to have been misunderstood by the Ordnance. I have the honour, &c.,

WILLIAM CONGREVE.

Copy of a letter to Colonel Neville (enclosed).

Dear Sir—In consequence of what you yesterday mentioned relative to the expence of the rockets, I have thought it proper to prepare a statement, by which, I trust, it will appear that, if the calculation be fairly made, they will not amount to more than one-fourth of what you stated.

In the first place, I must observe, that the expence of the buildings ought on no account to be charged to the quantity now made, since, if the weapon be adopted, that expence, on being divided among a great number, will vanish; and if it be not adopted, the buildings and apparatus, as I have before stated to you, will be applicable to the making of signal rockets of a superior and improved description. So also the apparatus made at the laboratory for using them should not, on the same principle, be charged to the number now made.

But, sir, the principal point on which the calculation fairly hinges, is this: Is, or is not, the rocket the cheapest way of projecting a given quantity of carcass matter to a certain distance? I pledge myself to prove that it is the cheapest known; and surely this is the true way of considering the question. Only, my dear sir, let it be remembered that the rocket is little more than a cartridge attached to the carcass, not requiring any ordnance to discharge it; *that the quantity of powder is but little more; that the principle difference is in the labour*, which may be very much reduced when the thing is properly systematized. Let it only be considered in this way, that the spirit of the rocket system is *the use of ammunition without ordnance*, and it must strike every one that, if put on a proper footing, it must, for particular purposes, as a carcass, be productive of a saving instead of an expence, without going into

any comparison of the quantity of matter discharged in a given time, the ease of comparative conveyance, and many other points.

WILLIAM CONGREVE.

Mr. Francis to Lord Castlereagh.

Ibbotson's Hotel, Vere Street, Oxford Road,
December 13, 1805.

My Lord—I have the honour to send you reflections without disguise, with what I conceive fair and honourable proposals for a final settlement with Government. You will have the goodness to consider them, and let me have the honour of your decision as speedily as possible.

With all respect, I have the honour, &c.,

ROBERT FRANCIS.

Memorandum for an Equipment of Rocket Boats to be sent out with Sir Sidney Smith.

December 20, 1805.

It is proposed to send 1,500 rockets and ten sets of frames, with stores, &c., complete for ten boats. The rockets and necessary apparatus are in readiness, and it only requires, to complete the outfit, that two small brigs should be either hired or purchased, to convey the stores, and act as tenders. Mr. Bray has, by Sir Sidney Smith's orders, found two suitable vessels in the River, which are either to be hired or sold.

It is further requisite that some officer of the navy should be appointed exclusively to this service. I therefore beg leave to recommend Mr. William Perkins, an old lieutenant in the navy, who volunteered in the late business off Boulogne. This officer was on board the Antelope on that occasion, and Sir Sidney would approve of his appointment, as he is perfectly master of the service, and very zealous for its success.

WILLIAM CONGREVE.

Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve to[1]

No. 8, Arundel Street, January 2, 1806.

Sir—The vast importance that now seems to attach to the speedy recommencement of vigorous measures against Boulogne induces me to address you without further delay, on a principal point connected with that service.

It is, sir, to obtain a reinforcement of rocket boats at Dover, in lieu of the five which unfortunately foundered on the 21st of November. For this purpose I beg to enclose a list of several condemned smuggling luggers, which are now lying quite useless in the Pent at Dover, and which are peculiarly adapted to the purpose without any expence to Government. Should you, sir, be pleased to send orders to the Custom House to deliver them up, or any that may have been since seized, they may be fitted upon the spot in a very short time.

These boats, which are now rotting in Dover harbour, would, with the remaining launches, form a very considerable flotilla for the large description of rockets which I am now employed in constructing; and, if this system of attack be but persevered in, it must infallibly succeed, from the immense quantity of fire discharged, and from the position of the enemy's vessels, demonstrated by the late official survey; but, sir, I cannot resist saying that the attack might be rendered much more terrible if combined with mortar boats; and I have ventured to flatter myself that ten or more such vessels will soon be constructed, as that which you have been pleased already to order is nearly completed, and is much approved of by all the professional men who have seen her.

Pardon me, sir, for suggesting that this is the true season for preparation, when nothing can be immediately put in practice. I have had painful experience on this point, and I do therefore presume to urge my request, that you will be pleased to grant me the within-named vessels as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

William Congreve.

[1] Mr. Cooke, I presume.—Ed.

PS. Permit me, sir, to assure you of my increased confidence in the projected plan of attack on Boulogne, and of my most fervent desire to make every effort towards its accomplishment.

List of Vessels in Dover Harbour, seized by the Custom House, and applied for by Mr. Congreve, to be converted into Rocket Boats.

The Patty, of Dover,	hovelling	lugger	49ft. long,	13ft. broad.
The Hind,	do.	do.	44	13
N——,	do.	do.	48	15
The Nancy, of Deal		do.	55	15
The Fox, of Folkestone,		do.	46	14 6in.
The Fox, of Sandgate		do.	47	15

Four large fishing boats.

One lugger, name not known, besides several that have been seized since this list was made out.

W. Congreve.

Mr. Robert Francis to the Right Hon. William Pitt.

Ibbotson's Hotel, Vere Street, January 6, 1806.

Sir—That you may have an opportunity, before you come to town, to judge of what I conceive my rights, and the interest of Government, I have taken the liberty to send you a copy of my letter to Lord Castlereagh. You will, no doubt, at the first thought, consider my demand great; but there is one reflection which usually accompanies all negociations, whether between nations or individuals—that is, the power which each may have to support certain claims.

Now, in this business, I will not disguise that I have full confidence in the power which I possess, which is no less than to be the means, *should I think proper*, of giving to the world a system, which must, of necessity, sweep all military marines from the ocean, by giving to the weaker maritime powers advantages over the stronger, which the strong cannot prevent.

This power I felt before, and when I came to this country, but I did not think right to insist upon it; nor could I expect Ministers to believe it till I had given them sufficient demonstration. Fortunately, it is concentered in me and two of my friends, who are governed by my success in this country. Hence, on such power I have a right to set what price I think proper; but I hope I am not of a disposition to abuse the advantages which the arts have given me, either by unreasonable demands, or any other illiberal act.

In the following proposal, I have not raised the sum first mentioned to Lord Hawkesbury; and it must be observed, I did not come here so much with a view to do you any material good as to show that I have the power, and might, in the exercise of my plan to acquire fortune, do you an infinite injury, which Ministers, if they think proper, may prevent, by an arrangement with me.

I did, however, zealously endeavour to be of service, and have proved that infinite good may be done. But I presume Lord Barham has not had time to take into consideration the peculiar situation in which I stand, nor to consider my invention in all its consequences; however, it is true that he should see it in all its consequences, and judge of the propriety of a fair and honourable arrangement with me. Although, sir, you will be overwhelmed with business on your coming to town, yet I hope you will not let this escape your memory.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBERT FRANCIS.

Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve to Lord Castlereagh.

8, Arundel Street, January 14, 1806.

My Lord—When I had the honour to see your lordship last, I had not an opportunity of stating all the points which required your lordship's sanction and arrangement. The only point which I had then the honour to mention, was the fitting the smuggling luggers, to which your lordship was pleased to

agree; and indeed, I cannot refrain from repeating, that it seems of the utmost importance, as they can be prepared immediately, and as it is probable that it will be some months yet before the double boats are finished, and moreover as, by firing the rockets *fore and aft*, perhaps as little motion will be felt as in the double boats themselves. I shall therefore, my lord, proceed, immediately that I get the Treasury order, to Dover for the purpose of making an estimate and drawings for their equipment; and, as your lordship has been pleased to honour me with the trust of fitting them without reference to the Navy or other Board, permit me to say, not only that your lordship may rely on every exertion on my part to diminish all expences, but that I am confident the expence will be less, the effect more certain, and the service much more expeditiously carried on, than it otherwise would be; for I must be permitted to say that, had I not been thwarted by the interference of so many different authorities, and by the delays necessarily consequent, the misfortune that befel the late equipment would never have happened. The regular boards have no leisure, and therefore no inclination, to give *due energy* to any works of novelty, and without *it* they cannot but fail, if it depends on them—pardon this freedom, my lord, but it requires your individual energy to give success to any thing of this kind—indeed, your lordship little knows what I had to struggle with in the late business; for it is no part of my system either to make or dwell on difficulties.

My lord, as I am now about to leave town, I beg to trespass a little longer. Before my departure, I am anxious to know finally whether it is your lordship's determination that the equipment of rockets which I have prepared for Sir Sidney at Gibraltar should proceed, as, in that case, it yet remains for your lordship to give the order for a transport to convey them. There are now completely ready, my lord, 1500 rockets, and ten sets of frames; and it is highly probable that they may render considerable service against the Spanish gun-boats—

the shell-rockets in the action with *them* in the bay, the carcass-rockets when they are lying in the harbour of Algesiras. One transport would convey the whole, as Sir Sidney proposes to adapt the frames to the boats of the country.

Will your lordship permit me the honour of attending you to-morrow on this point, to receive your final orders, and at the same time to show your lordship one of the large-sized rockets. I have the honour to be, &c.,

WILLIAM CONGREVE.

Lord Collingwood to Lord Castlereagh.

Queen, April 12, 1806.

My Lord—Nothing could have given me more pleasure than to comply with any request your lordship could make to me; but, before I knew of any promotion which was to take place, I had sent the Martin, Captain Grainge's ship, home with the Chiffonne's convoy. He had some time before seized on a Portuguese vessel, which had on board several officers of the Emperor of Morocco's navy, who were going on some service upon which he had sent them. The vessel was missing, and I cannot yet know what is become of her: so that when the Emperor demanded them, they could not be restored. This circumstance being likely to lead to a disagreeable discussion, I thought Captain Grainge would be better out of the way of it, and sent him to England sooner than I otherwise intended, where he would have arrived before I had the honour of your lordship's letter.

I beg to take this opportunity of giving your lordship my best thanks for the trouble your lordship was so good as to take in getting my pension settled on my daughters. I had not mentioned this subject to your lordship myself, because the only thing that I felt much interest about was the getting my two daughters included in the succession to my title, on which subject I had wrote to Lord Barham; and, as I hoped his Majesty would grant what my heart was so much set on, I was

well content that the pension should remain, as the Parliament had settled it, with the title for two successions. By a letter from Lord Barham, I am in hopes this was accomplished for me; and, if your lordship would have the goodness to tell me it was so settled in my patent by his Majesty's late Ministers, I shall be infinitely obliged.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

COLLINGWOOD.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Collingwood.

Downing Street, May 21, 1807.

My Lord—On the eve of my resigning the seals of the War department, in February, 1806, I was favoured with a letter from your lordship, in reply to one of mine, relative to Cadiz. I have deposited that letter, among my private papers, in so secret and safe a place, as, for the moment, to elude my search for it. As I am now desirous of again calling your lordship's attention to this most important subject, allow me to begin by requesting that, if you have the means of furnishing me with a copy of the letter in question, you will have the goodness to do so.

With respect to the importance of striking, if possible, a blow in that quarter, I apprehend that it is at least as great, if not greater, than at the period alluded to. Including eight sail of the line in ordinary, the accounts I have seen report twenty-two sail of French and Spanish ships of the line to be now in Cadiz, of which eleven are ready for sea. The means of defence on the part of the Spaniards must be considerably reduced by the auxiliary corps of the best troops which has been marched into Germany, and which is now cantoned in Hanover; and I have no reason to suppose that any exertions have latterly been made, either to improve the defences of the place, or to add to their military strength within Spain.

In looking to our own means of undertaking a decisive operation against Cadiz in the present season, it must depend, in

a great degree, upon circumstances. Beyond all question, if the means can be found before the close of the year, there is every motive for not adjourning it over the spring; as we can hardly flatter ourselves that, in the present state of his power, Buonaparte will suffer any maritime point of such moment to remain long exposed to attack: and I can have no doubt that, within the period requisite to move the troops from a distance, we shall see French garrisons in Ferrol, Cadiz, Lisbon, and Carthagena.

Until we are ascertained of the turn things will take in the Baltic, we can form no opinion when we can have the whole or any part of our disposable strength applicable to any other object. The whole corps now employed there, under Lord Cathcart, exceeds 25,000 men. It is possible circumstances may occur which would liberate a large proportion, though not the whole, of this force. How far it could be adequately reinforced from home, or its movements combined with a corps of 7000 men, which has been ordered, upon the return of the troops from Alexandria to Sicily, to embark under General Moore's command, and to proceed to Gibraltar, there to receive further instructions, must remain to be judged of hereafter. What I am now desirous of, is that every contingency should be previously looked at, and every combination considered, which can throw any light on this subject, or improve our chance of bringing the effort within the scope of our power.

With this view, I shall trouble you with a statement of certain points, on which I should be glad to receive your opinion; trusting that you will not confine your remarks to them, but furnish me with such further observations as your experience and knowledge of the subject will suggest as material.

1st. What do you consider as the present effective strength of the garrison of Cadiz?

2dly. What force of regular troops have they the means of assembling upon Cadiz, including the troops before Gibraltar, within ten days?

3dly. Have they a militia capable of rendering material aid, and to what amount?

4thly. Considering the proportion of the army absent from Spain, and the state of preparation in which they are at Cadiz, what amount of force, in British troops (coming without previous alarm) should you suppose equal to the attack of the place?—meaning thereby not the reduction of the fortress of Cadiz, but such a temporary occupancy of the harbour above the fortress, including the Carracas, where the arsenal is, and which is not defended, as I understand, by any works, as would secure the surrender or destruction of the fleet.

5thly. It is understood that there are two lines of operations, which may be undertaken either separately or conjointly, according to circumstances. The one is a landing on the north side of the Bay of Bulls, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Rota; the corps either to reduce or mask the fort of St. Catherine, and to proceed on to take a position to the eastward of the harbour. The other is to land on the sandy peninsula, on the point of which Cadiz stands, out of the reach of the guns of the fortress, with a view of pushing on, and seizing the bridge which communicates with the Carracas. The landing, in either case, I should suppose, is not difficult. Have you any means of ascertaining what impediments the country presents to an army advancing from the side of Rota?—and what obstacles would the enemy have the means of interposing after a landing effected to the southward?

6thly. Which of these lines of operation (facility of landing included) do you conceive the most practicable, if the force employed was not of such a magnitude as to enable you to be superior on both points of attack? and, supposing the main attack to be made from the side of Rota, might not a force landed on the peninsula, though inferior to that of the enemy, by securing the bridge, be posted with safety, and contribute materially by bombardment to the success of the main attack?

7thly. What do you consider as the latest possible period

of the year when a fleet of transports could be prudently employed in this service?

8thly. If the force was such as to leave but little room to doubt the success of the operation, what works must be reduced on the north and east side of the Bay before the fleet could take up a more safe anchorage; and how long would their reduction probably require?

9thly. Is there any good roadstead on that coast, to which the transports could retire after landing the troops, and in which they might lie in safety, still remaining so near as to be recalled at the shortest notice?

10thly. Would it be possible for an army landing at Cadiz, after the service was performed, in case the season should be too far advanced to render it safe for the transports to remain on that coast, to march upon Gibraltar and embark?

11thly. The orders for the movement of General Moore's corps being despatched in duplicate for Plymouth and Cork, the 15th of August (allowing a week for their execution in Sicily), within what time do you conceive the arrival of these troops may be reasonably calculated upon at Gibraltar?

12thly. Do you conceive Ferrol is open to a conjoint attack by land and sea?—and with what force?

13thly. From the nature of the approaches by sea, might an attack be prudently undertaken against Ferrol later in the season than against Cadiz?

14thly. How far do you consider Carthagena as exposed to a *coup de main;* and, if practicable, with what force, and within what months?

I am sensible that, on several of these points, it may be impossible for you to give any deliberate or conclusive judgment without more means of general or local information than an officer constantly at sea, and occupied with all the arduous duties of an extensive naval command, can be expected to possess. On the other hand, I am sure your lordship will feel no reluctance to afford me such suggestions confidentially as

may assist his Majesty's Ministers, together with other channels of information, in judging how far any thing can be undertaken, in the course of the autumn, within the sphere of your command, looking at the interval which is to elapse before France can make a new distribution of her army, as that within which we can alone hope to find her and her allies vulnerable on their maritime frontier.

I have the honour to remain &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

It is particularly desirable that the intended movement of the force under Sir John Moore from Sicily to Gibraltar should not transpire.

Lord Collingwood to Lord Castlereagh.

Ocean, off Syracuse, October 16th, 1807.

My Lord—Your lordship's letter of the 21st of August followed me to Tenedos; but, before it got there, I had returned to the coast of Sicily, and did not receive it until the day before yesterday. I enclose to your lordship a copy of my former letter on the subject of Cadiz, of which I had a rough one, and wish I could give satisfactory information on the several heads your lordship has required. This delay of the letters by their long carriage, I am afraid, has passed the season when any thing can be undertaken on the coast of Spain, as there is no bay near which can afford shelter for a large fleet of transports, and the months of December and January are, in some years, very moderate weather; in others, very violent; and in the best winters, it does not often happen that the beach could be landed upon. The object is certainly one of first magnitude; the season alone is against the enterprise. The number of their ships, I believe, is not so great as is represented to your lordship; the best statement I have of them I enclose. Those ready for sea are in the Bay, near the town, and quite out of the way of annoyance from any thing at the Carracas.

I will endeavour to answer the queries which your lordship has stated. I wish I could do it with more satisfaction to your lordship and to myself.

Reply to the 1st. I have understood the garrison does not exceed between four and five thousand men, including the several posts on the island of Leon.

2. In the neighbourhood, that might be brought to oppose the troops, about 8000. Sir Hew Dalrymple can probably state the exact number at St. Roche.

3. Of their militia I have no knowledge.

4. Not knowing correctly the number of Spanish troops in the neighbourhood, it is impossible to estimate what number would be necessary to oppose them; but, as the Spanish troops posted in the town, &c., could not, at the time of such attack, quit the defence of their posts, but make detachment only from them, I apprehend that no great force could be brought into the field, until they arrived from St. Roche, near Gibraltar. What would probably give the most formidable opposition to our troops would be the gun-vessels, which, in number between forty and fifty, would fill the Canal of Pedro or river of St. Mary. In the management of them, the Spaniards are particularly expert.

5. Of the two points to land at, viz., St. Pedro and the Bay of Bulls, that of St. Pedro appears to be best. If the landing is on the Island of Leon, the march to the bridge is short. If, to avoid passing the bridge, it is made to the southward of the canal, the distance is greater, but appears to be less intersected with rivulets than the way by St. Mary. The march, both from Bull Bay and the beach of Leon, have a bridge to pass in the canal of which gun-vessels can be introduced: both are intersected by branches of small rivers; but that by Leon is the shortest, and appears to have the fewest rivulets. At Bull's Bay the beach would be smoothest for landing.

6. Not having travelled by either of the routes, I have no

knowledge of impediments which may be in either of them; but that from the south by Leon, being the common way from Cadiz to Caraccas, is likely to be the best. If there was a doubt or difficulty about the bridge at , the arsenal and ships might be bombarded and burnt from the point of the island, for the canal is narrow.

7. After the autumnal rains have fallen in October, there is no longer certainty of good weather. Vessels would lie upon the coast at anchor at a considerable risk, and the communication between ship and shore very precarious.

8. When St. Catherine's fort was reduced, and the batteries in Bull Bay destroyed, the ships might move further into the Bay on that side; but I do not think they would, in any part of Cadiz Bay, be out of the range of shells. I cannot judge of the length of time which might be required to take St. Catherine's. It appears a strong-built work, with a deep ditch.

9. The nearest bay or road is Tangier, in Barbary, where a good number of ships might lie, but not a large fleet.

10. I do not know the country between Gibraltar and Cadiz, more than it is mountainous, and the enemy would have time to make impediments.

11. The troops from Alexandria are not yet all arrived in Sicily; and, supposing them to sail from hence on the 22nd, which is as soon as can be hoped for, it will probably be the middle of November before they are at Gibraltar.

12 and 13. I am not at all acquainted with the bays or country about Ferrol; but I have been told, that where the fleet anchored on a former occasion was a very bad place to lie, and fit only for summer months.

14. The citadel of Carthagena, which commands the town, arsenal, and bay, is situated on a high hill, the sides of which are fortified with several batteries, and line of communication from it to the town works. This hill is inaccessible on the sea-side by the number of separate works, each commanding

that below it. The entrance of the harbour is narrow, and all its points fortified. If there is any weak part of this garrison, it is towards the land. If an attack was to be made upon this part, the landing, I apprehend, must be in a bay to the eastward, and the arsenal attacked from the land side.

Your lordship will perceive, that there are some points on which I have ventured to give my ideas, without having had the means of acquiring much information; for observation from the sea of places and defences can give little means of judging of their real strength or weakness.

When I was off Cadiz, I was endeavouring to get a proper vessel to prepare as a fire-ship for Carthagena, which, I think, it is open to; and the ships lying near each other, gives the more chance of its success. I left the orders with Admiral Purvis, but I suppose he has not been able to get a suitable ship for the purpose.

I am cruising on this side Sicily, in hope of hearing soon what is doing in the Adriatic: not knowing what part the Russians might be ordered to take immediately, I ordered the ships which were off Venice to drop down towards Cattaro and Corfu, that they might not be hemmed-in by so large a force, and to give interruption to the French in taking possession of those new acquisitions. Admiral Siniavin has since that sailed down the Mediterranean with eight sail of the line and five frigates, and Gregg I believe to be still in the Adriatic, with about the same number of bad, infirm ships.

Your lordship may trust I will do whatever I can for the annoyance and destruction of the enemy; and I suppose before long the island of Sicily will be attacked by a great force, and, by what I hear from the shore, there appears no alacrity in its inhabitants for its defence.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

COLLINGWOOD.

AFFAIRS OF TURKEY, PERSIA, AND THE EAST INDIES.

1801—1806.

It is shown, in the Biographical Memoir prefixed to the first volume of this collection, that the first office held in England by Lord Castlereagh was the Presidency of the Board of Control, to which he was appointed in July, 1802, under the administration of Mr. Addington. As the head of that department, to which the interests of our Eastern possessions are entrusted, few of his papers seem to have been preserved.

The documents that do exist possess a stronger interest from the critical circumstances in which almost the whole of those Eastern countries were placed, at the time when they were composed. The Turkish Empire was threatened with immediate dissolution, as well from the ambition and intrigues of France as by a rebellion, which well nigh rent the Asiatic provinces from the sway of the Porte. Persia was rudely shaken by the military successes of the Russians on her north-western frontier; and, to say

nothing of the coalitions of native potentates, there is to be found in many of these communications evidence of the dread entertained of French machinations in our Indian possessions, and of the anxious vigilance exerted to prevent agents of that nation from stealing into those countries.

The Earl of Elgin, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, to Mr. Harford Jones, Resident at Bagdad.

October 21, 1801.

Sir—Your letters of the 23rd and 25th of September, directed to Mr. Straton, were delivered on the 18th instant, and on the following morning I received the duplicates which you addressed to me on the 28th of September, accompanying a letter from Ali Pasha.

My letter of the 23rd of September will have informed you of the intentions which the Porte then entertained relative to the succession to the Pashalyk of Bagdad, and of my endeavours to meet your wishes on an occasion so decisive of the future influence of your mission. I have since had further communications on the subject with the Ottoman Ministers, and have uniformly consulted and acted in concert with the agent of Ali Pasha.

The state of things at Bagdad, as you represent them to have been in the end of September, and the consequence obviously to be dreaded from a delay in nominating to that Pashalyk, have claimed my particular attention, not only in allusion to my instructions from Mr. Secretary Dundas, but more especially on account of the negociations and treaty of Captain Malcolm in Persia, and our increasing connexion and intercourse with the Persian Gulf and the neighbouring countries. I therefore determined on obtaining an immediate interview with the Ottoman Ministers, with whom I have accord-

ingly held a conference yesterday, in which I entered much at length into all the different matters which have formed the subject of your late communications to the embassy.

The result of this discussion is, that the Porte is quite aware of the inconvenience of leaving the Government of Bagdad vacant—that, the practice of the Court having established it as a principle that the Grand Signor is natural heir to all his public officers, to whose families he appropriates such a portion of the succession as he may see meet, the property left by the late Solyman Pasha does belong to the Grand Signor—that a further practice, equally prevalent, makes it necessary for any claimant to a similar dignity to make proportioned acknowledgments to the principal members of Government; and that, till this moment, no intimation has been received either of the extent of the succession, or of the terms of Ali Pasha—that, notwithstanding, his qualifications and pretensions are favourably received at the Porte—that the Porte, by no means wishing to impose terms upon him to the extent of her claims, will consider fairly and liberally the proposals which he has announced by my Tatar, as being then on the point of transmitting; and that, as soon as the parties come to an understanding, no time will be lost in giving to him the Firman and the Three Tails.

I state this as the result of a great deal of conversation, many details of which it were unnecessary to enumerate; suffice it to say, that the exertions and proceedings of the other candidates are known, and are not at present likely to occasion difficulty; and that the unfortunate events at Bagdad, which terminated in the massacre of the Janissary Aga, though lamented as a most shocking instance of disorder and inhumanity, do not create any impression of a nature to delay or prevent the nomination of Ali Pasha.

The next topic taken under consideration in this conference referred to Persia and its relation to Turkey, to the Pashalyk of Bagdad, and to the Wahaby. And I have now the satis-

faction of acquainting you that it is determined to send a mission immediately from hence to Baba Khan, for the purpose of an amicable explanation and adjustment of all differences and sources of misunderstanding which may exist between the two empires; and, secondly, to send some wise man of the law to the Wahaby, in the hope of coming to terms of accommodation with that sectary. A council is to be held this day in the Divan, to regulate the instructions for these missions.

In recommending a direct communication from the Porte to the King of Persia, I alluded (in addition to the suggestions conveyed by your intelligence) to the alliance formed between the Governor-General in India and the Persian monarch, on the one hand, and our union with Turkey, on the other, as presenting a means of intelligence which may be beneficially resorted to in any such attempt to effect a reconciliation; and I expressed my belief that the Governor-General would attend to any request which might be made to his Excellency for showing an interest in the amicable views of the Porte towards Baba Khan, either by an overture at the Court of the latter sovereign, or through the medium of the Persian Ambassador now in India. I mention to you this insinuation, as it proved highly acceptable to the Turkish Ministers, and may lead them to direct their Minister to apply for your advice when he reaches Bagdad.

The affairs of the Wahaby next engaged the most serious attention of the Ottoman Council. The conduct and the strength of those sectaries, the interests in opposition to them, and the difficulties in attacking them by force, were all fairly canvassed. And, in the failure of the endeavours now to be made at accommodation with them, a uniform system of measures against them will be traced, and orders given to pursue it, from the Governments in Syria, from Mecca and Bagdad, in combination with any plans which may be concerted with the King of Persia.

I should observe, that an apprehension is entertained as if the Imaum of Muscat was not unfavourable to the Wahaby. It would be essential to procure and transmit to me accurate information on this matter, and to suggest any means which might be advisable towards putting an end to such a connexion.

On the whole, you will, I flatter myself, agree with me in opinion, that the affairs of Bagdad have thus undergone a very ample and very important discussion, and that the intentions of the Porte for its tranquillity and prosperity are highly satisfactory, whether in reference to the settlement of its Government, or to the plans in agitation for its immediate neighbourhood.

The Porte seem well apprized of the conduct of the Russians on the banks of the Caspian Sea, at Tiflis and Rumbec, and at Kars. They consider these operations as directed certainly against the interests of Persia, but not on any extensive scale of ambition, or as likely to be carried beyond their present progress. Explanations on these matters have passed between Russia and Turkey, which leave no apprehension on the minds of the Ottoman Government.

It remains for me only to say, that I forward the whole of the communications in this letter to you under the strictest confidence. I am confident that you will observe every degree of discretion, in stating what you may think necessary to make known to Ali Pasha of the discussions immediately referring to his nomination. I convey to you what regards the missions and views relating to the Persians and Wahaby, the impressions of the Porte on the subject of the Russians, as points of great interest and benefit for you to be informed of, but I should hope there will be no necessity for you to make mention of them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ELGIN.

Lord Elgin to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company.

Constantinople, February 12, 1802.

Honourable Sirs—The Marquis Wellesley has done me the honour to send under flying seal for my perusal the annexed series of Papers, which are to convey to you the particulars and the result of Captain Malcolm's mission to the Court of Persia. While I congratulate your Honourable Committee upon an event, from which the Government of India so reasonably expects to derive important political and commercial advantages, I must be allowed to acknowledge how highly gratified I feel myself by this mark of confidence from the Governor-General, whose opinion of the part which I have had to act in reference to Captain Malcolm's mission will best appear to you by a perusal of a former letter from his Excellency to me on the subject, a copy of which I subjoin.

The Marquis Wellesley, by this opportunity, has further made me acquainted with the objects of Sir Home Popham's mission, and with the instructions which his Excellency had drawn up for that officer, dated October 16th, at Patna. By a letter, written in the month of June last, Sir Home Popham did make a general communication to me of the commands which you had laid upon him, and at that time requested my interference with the Porte in reference to the Sheriffe of Mecca. The prospect which I entertained, soon after the receipt of this letter, of being able to proceed in person to Egypt, rendered it on every account more eligible to take with me directions upon that subject to the Vizir, rather than trust solely to any efficacy from an official order from Constantinople; and accordingly I lost no time in acquainting Sir Home Popham with my projects, requesting an interview with him at Cairo. The late political occurrences in Europe having necessarily detained me here, Mr. Straton, the Secretary of the Embassy, has proceeded to Egypt, amply informed on the

relative situation of the Porte and the Sheriffe of Mecca, and charged with strong recommendations on the subject of Sir Home Popham's mission, as well as with a direct firman from the Porte, a translation of which I enclose.

Meanwhile, I am sorry to say that the influence of the Porte over the Sheriffe of Mecca has not yet undergone any change whatever, subsequently to the final conquest of Egypt; nor have I any recent intelligence to lead me to decide whether Sir Home Popham will now find the French influence abated, at the court of the Sheriffe, nor how far other Arab powers on the borders of the Red Sea may be inclined to listen to our proposals.

On the more weighty consideration, "how far such establishments, if attainable, would be beneficial to our interests," the communications which have been made to me by the officers on that station have led me distinctly to the opinion that the promotion of trade in general through the Red Sea would be prejudicial to us; that, with the claims we may now advance, we ought to secure the monopoly, and the power of regulating such commerce from India as is necessary for the consumption of the countries bordering on the Red Sea; and that it would be highly advisable to make a settlement at such a place as Aden, safe and accessible at all times to our shipping, and from whence the intricate navigation of the Red Sea could more beneficially be carried on by the dows and other small vessels of the country. A post of this sort, I may be allowed to add, would of itself be a great security against any future attempt of the French to affect our East India possessions by the way of the Eastern provinces of Turkey.

The island of Kameran had indeed appeared to the late Admiral Blankett so desirable an acquisition in allusion to the views of the enemy, that, on an application to that effect, I obtained eighteen months ago from the Porte a general recommendation and safeguard for our troops, should they land on any point within the Red Sea. But I imagine Aden to be

equally useful in a military point of view, and much more so commercially, nor would an establishment there create jealousy as much as it would do at Kameran.

Having had frequent communications, direct and indirect, to make on these subjects, I had entertained hopes that instructions would have been given to me, in virtue of which I might have ensured the good-will and influence of the Porte in favour of the precise objects which the East India Company wished to attain after our conquest of Egypt; but, being without authority or information to that effect, I was obliged, when the period arrived, to be satisfied with obtaining from the Porte an offer to permit the conveyance of the East India correspondence by Suez and the Red Sea, and to encourage the commerce from the British possessions in India with the Red Sea. This offer was sent to England in August, 1801. I am in daily expectation of answers upon it.

I avail myself of this opportunity of writing, to advert to some other subjects relating to the affairs of the East India Company, to which I have taken upon myself to apply the influence which the eventful circumstances of my mission have enabled me to enjoy at this court.

The first object has been that of facilitating the conveyance of your packets through the Turkish dominions. Nothing can exceed the regularity and zeal which your agents at Bagdad, Bussorah, and Aleppo, uniformly exhibit. They have left me nothing to do further than showing occasional attentions, and sending trifling presents to the governors of their residences, by the advice and through the medium of those gentlemen. The direct road from hence to Aleppo was indeed intercepted by the rebellion of one Kutchuk Ali, at Payass; but I found means to become mediator between him and the Porte; and I am happy to find that, after a long negociation, my success has been so complete, that several Tatars have already resumed that route; and the Porte, after admitting him into favour, have re-established the post-horses, &c., through his district.

To the westward of Constantinople, the provinces have been, and continue to be, in a state of such general confusion, that the ordinary post, which is exclusively in the hands of the Austrian Government, had become both dangerous and uncertain. Mr. Tooke, whose hearty and unremitting care to your concerns had devised means to diminish the inconveniences as much as possible, found himself occasionally under great embarrassment. In fact, by employing the German post alone, he had the use of only one out of two routes from hence to Vienna; and, besides, it is very obvious that, even should expedition be attainable, still, by forwarding the packets from hence by an Austrian conveyance, the space from Constantinople to Vienna had a disadvantage over every other part of the distance between India and England, as no security can be had against the letters being opened while in Austrian hands. These reflections applied particularly to my communications with Government, and accordingly induced me to establish an agent at Bucharest, with an English messenger, who proceeds regularly on the 1st of every month to Vienna, whence he sets out on his return the 15th. From hence to Bucharest, Tatars carry on the communications, as through the rest of Turkey.

This establishment, which early received the sanction of Government, and has been so useful during the Egyptian expedition as to have made me increase the number of regular messengers on that line, may not perhaps be deemed requisite solely for the communications with this embassy after the conclusion of peace. Meanwhile, your Honourable Committee will observe from the enclosure (marked No. 2) that the Marquis Wellesley expresses the greatest interest in its continuance; and I therefore feel it incumbent upon me to bring the matter under your consideration, as an arrangement that has been found equally necessary and beneficial, and as supplying a great desideratum in the system of overland conveyance now in existence between England and India.

I am sorry to think that Mr. Jones, of Bagdad, should have thought it necessary to trouble you with a communication of my opinion on his late dispute with the Pacha of that place. The line between his situation and mine is far too distinctly drawn for any idea to have occurred of my interference in any way with him. But, when he urged me to deliver my sentiments, I stated not only what I thought to be right, but what the uniform instructions of Government pointed out to me to be their wishes. I beg you, however, to understand that I did not write in allusion to his instructions, with which I am totally unacquainted; and that I should be extremely mortified, were the partial judgment I had to pronounce to go at all beyond the points to which it was directed, or call in question the ability and extreme attention which I have ever observed on the part of Mr. Jones in the execution of his duty.

The complaint made to me by the Pacha required my immediate interposition, as the Pacha took occasion, from this circumstance, to deny our right to employ at Bagdad any other than a subject of his Government, and expressly to refuse a permanent residence there to any Englishman hereafter. It was necessary to set aside at once a pretension which might prove in the highest degree inconvenient to the Company, and which would certainly find support from the French interest. Accordingly, I had the satisfaction of transmitting in my despatch above alluded to (dated August), an offer from the Sultan to his Majesty, to admit the permanent establishment of a British agency or consulship at Bagdad.

In regard to Bussorah, your Honourable Committee no doubt know that, soon after my arrival here, an arrangement recommended to my assistance by Mr. Secretary Dundas and Mr. Duncan, did enable me to erect Bussorah into a regular and avowed Residence.

I need hardly observe, that such formalities on the part of the Porte do not regulate the rank or the functions of the

Resident; but they confer, as a matter of right, what otherwise is liable to be continually disputed or withdrawn by caprice or intrigue. The Porte, resting upon opinions sanctioned by long custom, systematically and politically feels the greatest reluctance to grant a consular appointment; because it admits into their country a Frank, with immunities and rights highly obnoxious to Mussulmans. Still no European power ever does place an accredited agent in any part of this empire unprovided with this authorization.

In a word, I flatter myself with the hopes that every opportunity during my embassy at Constantinople has been carefully improved towards impressing on the minds of the Turks how very essentially they are indebted for the recovery of Egypt to our East India interests; how immediately it is become an object of national policy for them to favour those interests, as forming a security for our prosecution of the same line of conduct towards Turkey, as long as the Porte remains friendly to us; and, above all, I have brought to their understanding that the concerns of the East India Company respecting Turkey, though beneficial to the public and gratifying to individuals, have still the peculiar recommendation of neither occasioning a sacrifice from the Porte, nor creating a rivalship with any other power.

It remains for me only further to add, that if, in reference to the above subjects, or any others which might occur, my interference at the Porte can be conceived to be of any use, I shall have great satisfaction in executing your commands.

ELGIN.

Translation ad Sensum of a Letter dated May 8th, and received June 15th [1801 *or* 1802].

I have now to inform you that both letters and persons are arrived from Reshd, all which agree that the whole of the Russian craft at Enzellee have been ordered to return to Derbend and Baku, and that they are preparing for their depar-

ture. Various conjectures are made on this circumstance, which will probably, in a few days more, be cleared up; and when I know anything certain, I will immediately communicate it to you.

There are persons arrived from Baku in twenty-three days, who openly say that there are 14,000 Russian troops at Derbend, and that others are following them, and these persons also say that there is a considerable number of vessels belonging to Government coming from Astrachan to Derbend and Baku. When the troops above-mentioned arrived at Derbend, the inhabitants of Shirwan deserted the place, and took a station about three days' march therefrom. It seems the general opinion that all this country will be in trouble during the course of this year.

It is necessary also to acquaint you that the Armenian merchants at Astrachan and Moscow have agents at Baku, Enzellee, Ghilan, and Tehran; and they have written to them in the most pressing manner to finish their affairs, and to hold themselves in readiness to depart, since the places where they are now residing will soon be thrown into trouble. Several of the agents stationed at Ghilan and Enzellee are my friends, and, to my certain knowledge, they have all some way or other finished their affairs, and sent all their property on board the ships (at Enzellee). And of this one of those agents, more particularly my friend, informed me in the strictest confidence.

Sir Hugh Inglis's Queries to Mr. Harford Jones.

If the Turks are driven out of Europe, are they likely to become an Asiatic power able to take care of themselves?

What is to become of Egypt! Should the Russians, the Mamelukes, or who else, have it?

What would become of the Pachalik of Bagdad? Would it be for the interest of this country that the Persians had it—

that it remained with the Turks, or was erected into an independent State?

By what means can the French be kept out of Egypt and out of Syria, in the event of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire?

Extracts of a Letter from Mr. Harford Jones to Sir Hugh Inglis, Bart.

Bagdad, November 29, 1802.

My situation and the duties of my office have caused me to reflect on the probable consequences of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire; and the information I have obtained from channels not accessible to many makes me think a great revolution in the Turkish Empire is near at hand, unless, as you observe, the period of it shall be protracted by some fortunate and unforeseen event. In order to make myself more clearly understood, I shall class the accidents which to me seem probable soon to arrive to the Turkish Empire under separate heads.

Radical dissolution of the Empire, by the Turks being driven out of Europe by force—I am very far from considering that the latter case necessarily comprises the former. The manner in which the spiritual and temporal powers are blended in the person of the Ottoman Emperor has not been considered with proper attention; for it is by the intimate connexion of these powers that the Turkish Empire has been kept so long from falling; since every Sunny who rebels against the Imam (the Grand Signor) renders his marriage null. A Pacha, therefore, always affects to relieve the Imam from evil ministers, but never professes to take up arms against his person. The House of Othman can never lose the Imamet but by a renunciation forced or upheld in favour of some more powerful Mussulman family. As long as the House of Othman possesses this office, the allegiance of every Sunny being due to it, though the Prince may be changed, in consequence of certain canonical

disqualifications, real or pretended, there cannot be a radical dissolution of the Turkish Empire by any European power.

The Ottoman Emperor takes the title of Guardian of the Holy Cities (Mecca and Medina); and, as it was obtained by Selim at the same time with the Imamet, there are some doubts whether the loss of the former does not imply that of the latter. However, I consider it as most probable that, the guardianship of these cities being by force transferred to any other Mahomedan prince, would deprive the Ottoman Prince of so great a part of his sanctity, that he would soon be obliged to make a renunciation of the Imamet in favour of the victor. Here, then, would certainly be what I should call a radical dissolution of the Turkish Empire: but what bound the old Turkish Empire together would cement the new Tartar or probably Arabian Empire, which would start up in its place.

But, as the powers forming such a league will probably include in their designs a part of Asiatic Turkey, the change of manners and sentiments in those quarters may render the great Pachas negligent both of their spiritual and temporal obedience, when they find the Caliph Sultan too weak to save the Empire. In this case the head of the Ottoman House may become a mere pageant, and that part of the Turkish Empire unpossessed by the European powers may split into independent principalities.

It is to this situation of things my opinion inclines, because, in looking through Asia, I see no Mahomedan power or family to take the place of the Ottoman Emperor. Before, however, I offer my opinion on this subject, I will advert to your question of—What would become of Egypt? If we could not keep it ourselves, I should think it were better that any European power possessed it than the French or the Mamelukes (in the end, another name for a French Government), for, having means of supporting a communication with the Mamelukes greater than those of Great Britain, and near 4,000 having passed into France, who might be sent to their native

soil as agents of the French, that influence would necessarily preponderate.

Considering Egypt in our hands as, for many years, a drain of both money and men, if any security could be obtained that it would not become a channel through which India might be attacked, I should think that we had effected all that true policy required; and, at all events, we might insist on retaining Makinga, which to us, as the leading maritime power, may be called the key of Egypt.

On the subject of the independent principalities likely to be erected on the Turks being forced out of Europe, those in the Upper Armenia and Mesopotamia more particularly seem to demand consideration. It is not unlikely, from the power the Russians have established in Georgia, that the former will be under their influence, and, as the Christians are numerous in those countries, it is not improbable that the Mahomedan government there may be at last subverted. These circumstances render the fate of the Pachalik of Bagdad more interesting to us. As to your question, whether it would be for our interest that the Persians had it, I think that, inasmuch as it is for the interest of Great Britain that an efficient government should be established there, and that of Persia would, by no means, be such—it certainly would not. In case of the dismemberment of the Empire, I think it would be advantageous to us that the Pachalik should be erected into an independent State, which must be done by our assistance, because it might otherwise fall into different petty governments; and because it might be necessary for us to have the direction of the government and the command of its resources, which might be rendered by our industry very extensive, the country producing silk, sugar, indigo, flax, hemp, tobacco, madder, wheat, barley, and rice, whilst the date and the olive would be an inexhaustible source of wealth.

From my intercourse with the chiefs of the different tribes of Arabs, with men of influence in the city, and the heads of

the surrounding villages, encouraged with this view, I am happy to mention that the Government is determined, in case of need, to resort to the most intimate connexion with the British Governments in India, and that I find the best disposition, or, indeed, wish, in all ranks of people, to see a British force in this country capable of giving security to it. I would, therefore, wish to recommend that provisional orders be sent to the Governments in India to afford military succours to the Pacha of Bagdad, not exceeding 1000 men and six field-pieces, whenever he shall, through the Resident, require it, the Ministers and Secret Committee giving him instructions as to what circumstances would authorize it. This force would be sufficient for security; a larger might create jealousy.

As to the means of keeping the French out of Egypt and Syria, the surest are by keeping a superior fleet in the Mediterranean. There is, however, another question — Should the French get into Syria and Egypt, how can they be kept there? Supposing the natural obstacles to an expedition against India sailing from the Red Sea are well understood, it remains only to consider that which may be planned from Syria. This is an enterprise which it appears probable to be undertaken. When the natives of Asia were more on a par with the Europeans than they are at present, the army of Alexander marched to the banks of the Ganges. If the passage of the Euphrates and that of the Tigris had been properly guarded, Darius indeed might have been saved.

To any one commonly acquainted with the situation of the country intervening between Syria and India, I would fain put the question—What is there to prevent 20,000 troops, led on by a man of spirit, from performing it? From Aleppo to Beer, on the Euphrates, is about three days' journey for a caravan, which might probably be seven for an army. At Beer, the army finishes all serious inconveniences till it arrives at Hidchah; for the baggage and artillery may be transported by water. Hidchah is defenceless. From thence to Bagdad

is about seventy miles, and the fortifications of Bagdad are too weak to permit resistance. At Bagdad, the hostile army, with a common degree of prudent political conduct, might form immense magazines; and the King of Persia would not resist 20,000 Europeans determined to pass through his dominions.

Should such an expedition be undertaken in concert with Russia, from Bagdad, the French might join the Russians on the shores of the Caspian, by a march of forty days, and the King of Persia would be at their mercy. The King of Persia last year marched from Tehran to Meshed and returned between the months of April and September; and, from Meshed to Gasna, where the army would meet the Nilab, which falls into the Indus, is a march of not above 415 miles. There, suppose them joined by the Afghans; for the spoils of India would probably decide the barbarians of the North as to the part they should take. Let whoever may doubt this march recollect that of Timur from the confines of China to the mountains of Angora.

As to the passage by the Red Sea, when the difficulty the British had to transport 6,000 men from India to Suez is considered, though backed with all the resources of India, and certain of an undisturbed passage, it is not likely the French can do much against India from Egypt, exposed to the certainty of having their armament attacked, if not destroyed, in its progress.

It will not escape observation that, if the preceding observations be just, it will be necessary to establish a Resident at the Court of Persia, and to endeavour to establish an effective influence with the Pacha and in the Pachalik of Bagdad. It is my humble opinion that, if the French should land in Syria, the Pacha should be strengthened by at least 5,000 of our troops, who might arrive by the easy navigation of the Persian Gulf with less expence than the conveyance of those to Suez. On their arrival at Bussorah, they would have a fertile country to march through, and water-carriage to Bagdad.

Lord Elgin to Lord Castlereagh.

Constantinople, November 30, 1802.

My Lord—Although it may not be conformable with the practice of foreign missions to address the President of the Board of Control, yet, as I have acted during the whole of my embassy in compliance with verbal instructions from Mr. Secretary Dundas, in directing a very particular degree of attention to the interests of our East India concerns, in so far as they stand connected with this empire, I feel it may be of some benefit for your lordship to know, at my departure from hence, in what state all those matters rest in which my interference has been called for. I therefore beg leave to submit to your lordship's perusal a copy of my letter to the Secret Committee, in date February 12th, 1802, as also a copy of my letters to Mr. Jones, on the occasion of a vacancy in the Pachalik of Bagdad.[1]

The prospect which I entertain of being very soon in England renders it wholly superfluous to enter into further details with your lordship at the present moment. Meanwhile, I wish to mention to your lordship that, in consequence of a great deal of confidential conversation with Colonel Harcourt on his passage to India, I have directed the most vigilant watchfulness, on the part of all British Consuls, &c., to the views and proceedings of the French within this empire, especially towards Syria and Persia; and that I have taken upon myself to demand from the Porte, and I have obtained, the official recognition and establishment of British agents at Bagdad and at Bucharest.

Under the conviction, in which I decidedly am, that the utmost energy and restlessness of Buonaparte's Government will ever be directed against this empire, whether as an object of immediate conquest, or ultimately in a view to affect our Indian interests, it is my duty most earnestly to solicit your

[1] For those letters see the commencement of this section.—Ed.

lordship's attention, as well as that of all his Majesty's Ministers, to the necessity of selecting able and zealous persons for the agencies in the Turkish provinces, and particularly for those in Egypt. Such persons, by supporting a right impression of the political system, national character, power, and commerce of England, may do a great deal towards counteracting the intrigues and thwarting the attempts of France, which this empire has not the possibility of opposing. Our late experience, while it tends to ascertain the plans of Buonaparte, points out the excessive difficulty and expence of driving the French away, if ever once established; and yet, as far as my observation goes, the resources which an able Englishman may find in the Government of the country and the prejudices of its inhabitants, however feeble these means may be in themselves, still are such as, under proper guidance, may be brought to present a barrier to enterprises which the French could not undertake, if their schemes are thus watched and foreseen.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, &c.,

ELGIN.

Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, July 2, 1803.

My Lord—I do myself the honour to lay before you extracts of my latest correspondence with Meerza Bozurg, and of the letters I have received from my people in Persia. The capture by the Russians of Erivan and Nackshevan rests on the authority of the accounts received here on the 30th of May. No one here doubts the Russian army being before them, and the fact of their capture is more generally credited than denied.

Of the state of the Afghan government, the accounts we have at present are confused, and, in some respects, contradictory, though all agree in this point, that it is in a horrible state of anarchy and confusion.

I beg to call your lordship's attention to the information contained in the paper in cipher. The wonderful consequences

which, this year or next, must follow the fact mentioned therein, will, some of them, in my humble judgment, concern us very nearly.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Translation ad Sensum of a Letter from Meerza Bozurg to the Resident, received June 23, 1803.

After compliments—

The intelligence you gave me of the execution of Mohammed Beg and Abdul Aziz Beg regularly came to hand, and the copy of his Highness the Pacha's letter to you on this occasion was laid before his Majesty's Ministers, to whom it afforded particular satisfaction, and by whom it was reported to the Prince Royal. Your attachment, friendship, and devotion to us were not passed over on this occasion. As, however, his Majesty marched from hence, on the 7 Seffer (*i.e.*, May 27), for the purpose of punishing the Turcomans, who have committed some excesses towards their confines, we, your friend, sent copies of your letter and its enclosures to Camp; in order that his Majesty may also understand the attention you pay to everything which concerns us.

In respect to the State seal for his Highness the Pacha, I declare to you the delay you experienced in receiving it has been entirely owing to the indisposition of the engraver. It is now, however, completed, and I delivered it to your messenger; but, being a thing of value, he was afraid to take charge of it, and I therefore delivered it to your man, Coja Abdullah, to forward to you by the first safe opportunity. I flatter myself you will be pleased with it.

The state of our friendship requires that you should frequently continue your communications.

Translation of a Secret Enclosure in the above.

As the royal Standards have marched for the punishment of the Turcomans, I sent all your letters and their accom-

paniments to Camp, in order that the value of your correspondence may be fully understood, and the attention you pay us amply known.

Some time ago, you mentioned to me that an Ambassador to this Court had been appointed by the Court of Constantinople, who might soon be expected to arrive at Tehran. This circumstance was hinted by me to his Majesty's Ministers; but, to the present moment, which is the 16th of the Moon of Seffer, we have no further intelligence of this mission; so that, whatever you know on the subject, you will without fail have the goodness to communicate.

Extract of a Letter, date June 8, *from Coja Andreas, at Tehran, and received the* 23*rd.*

Aka Mohammed Nebu Khān presented to his Majesty a Pushaish of 6000 tomans, and received a Calaat. He has been created Khān and Mélik oo Tyar, and appointed Ambassador to Bengal: his suite is to be larger than that of Hajy Khullul Khān. It is said, however, he is first of all to go to Bushire, and to return to the Presence accompanied by the new Resident at Bushire, and afterwards to proceed to India.

The King left this on the 27th May with a very small force, and it is said he will only be about fifty days. His Majesty has also answered the Resident at Bushire's letters, inviting him to Tehran at the time of his return.

Extract of a Letter, dated May 23*rd, from Owannes Pitcairn, at Tehran, and received June* 23*rd.*

A detachment of the Russian troops at Teflis marched to Châr against the Lesghi Tartars, of whom they made a great slaughter. Alexander, the late Prince of Georgia's son, fled, and came to Tauris, accompanied by 130 persons; of these, eight persons came to his Majesty soliciting assistance. It is now a month since these people arrived here, and they have not yet received an answer from the King.

I, a few days ago, got secret intelligence, of undoubted authority, that the King has sent an agent to the Russians at Teflis, with a letter stating—From friendship I have hitherto taken no notice of the irruption you have made into Georgia; but now I require of you to depart in the same manner as you came, and to make way for the Prince Alexander to mount the throne of his father. If you neglect this admonition, you may rely that, when I return from Khorassān, I shall march against you.—This, I was told, was the purport of the letter; but for that I will not answer, though you may rely that an agent and letter from the King have been sent to the Russians at Teflis. Erivan and Khandja are besieged by the Russians.

About eight days ago, the Prince Ibrahim marched with about 5000 troops, towards Kermān, to quell some disturbances.

Bagdad, July 2, 1803.

The confidential Minister has this moment come to inform me that Mecca is taken by the Wahaby. The Bashaw is yet unacquainted with the fact, which, one may well fear, will dissolve the Ottoman Government. The advice came in at night; and, to assist the Government at the Porte, advice of a different nature will be publicly sent by this Tartar. I have no cipher for the Ambassador; therefore I cannot trust the fact in common character.

These people are in a disposition, the moment it is necessary, to throw themselves into our arms in form of alliance. Not a moment should be lost in giving me or Soph[1] full provisional instructions and powers. These may lie dormant, or be used according to circumstances; but they should, at all events, be here.

H. J.

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[1] Sofian Aga, the agent of the Pacha of Bagdad at Constantinople.—*Note to the original MS.*

Mr. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, July 31, 1803.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose, with a duplicate of my last despatch to your Excellency, the copies of a letter from me to his Excellency the King's Ambassador at the Porte, and copies of letters to me dated the 8th June and the 4th July, from the Residents at Muscat and Bushire.

The plague, notwithstanding the heats, keeps going on. I have no late intelligence from Persia worthy your lordship's notice; and, though great preparations are making here for the Pacha to march against the Wahaby, I consider it still uncertain whether such an ill-judged measure will, or indeed can, take place.

The enclosed packets, No. 2, private and most secret, No. 3, private and secret, reached my hands yesterday morning from Bussora and Muscat.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. Jones to his Excellency William Drummond.

Bagdad, July 31, 1803.

Sir—The Pacha having, the day before yesterday, sent the confidential Minister to communicate to me a part of the despatches which he received from the Grand Vizir, in regard to some suspicions which the Ottoman Ministry entertain of the conduct and principles of the Imaum of Muscat, as well in respect to the Wahaby as to the French, I consider it my duty to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a Report made to my Honourable Superiors at Bombay by the Resident at Muscat, and by them lately forwarded to me; leaving it to your Excellency's superior judgment whether any or what parts of it may be necessary to be communicated to the Porte.

Having taken up the pen, I feel it difficult to refrain from troubling your Excellency with a few words on the subject of

the present state of this country; of the orders lately transmitted here by the Porte for the Pacha to march against the Wahaby; and of what appear to me to be the only measures the Porte has to adopt, with any chance of success, to preserve her present possessions at Bagdad and Bussora.

Presuming that a copy of my address of the 9th of May, last year, to his Excellency the Governor-General, will be found amongst the records of the Embassy, it is not necessary I should detain your Excellency on the state of this country, further than to say that every difficulty and disadvantage, which it is therein stated to labour under, in respect to the Wahaby, has, from that period to the present, increased tenfold, with the still more weighty addition of Cossim Beg, the son of the late Mohammed Beg, whom the Pacha lately put to death, having, with the whole of his own Arabs, and the Arabs under the influence of his tribe and family, made overtures to the Wahaby, which, I have the strongest reason to believe, have been accepted. For your Excellency to understand the extent of this mischief (if Cossim Beg's conversion be fact), it is necessary to observe that the influence of the Alabege Arabs, which is the name of Cossim Beg's tribe, extends from, or nearly extends from, Samavat, on the Euphrates, to Beer, on the same river.

That the Porte, on receiving intelligence of the capture of Mecca by Saoud, should have issued the peremptory orders it has done to the Pacha of Bagdad to march immediately against the Wahaby, I easily conceive to have been a matter politically necessary; because something immediately ostensible and public might, perhaps, be the only means the Ottoman ministry had of preventing those disastrous disturbances which might well be expected to take place at Constantinople, on the news of this extraordinary event becoming known. How far the Porte, in good policy, ought to wish the Pacha to attempt to carry the orders he has received into execution, is a matter well worthy their serious consideration, and on which

I wish, with proper deference, to offer your Excellency my sentiments.

The difficulty of marching a body of troops from Bagdad against these Sectaries has already been admitted, in its fullest extent, by the Porte, and practically ascertained by this Government on the occasion of the present Pacha, then Kia, marching against them in 1798-9. If your Excellency, however, has any curiosity to learn in detail the nature of these difficulties, you will find them, as they stood in the year 1796, explained with much accuracy in an *exposé*, which the late Pacha made on this subject to the Porte in that year, a copy of which was transmitted by Mr. Smith to me from the Records of the Embassy. I must add, however, that, as I before have said, the inability of this Government to contend with the Wahaby has become since last year tenfold, so many of the impediments mentioned in 1796 by the late Pacha to the march and subsistence of an army from hence on a campaign against the Wahaby are increased more than a hundredfold: for instance, places from which we might at that time have drawn supplies with a tolerable degree of convenience are now in the hands of the Wahaby; tribes that were then either friendly or neuter have submitted; and public opinion, which, though last, in an affair of that sort is not least, then counted the Pacha of Bagdad for much, and the Wahaby for little, now, unfortunately, counts the Pacha for nothing, and the Wahaby for everything.

Great and weighty as are the considerations of the difficulties of the Pacha's march, of the immensity of the preparations he must make to undertake such a march (an idea of which may be formed by mentioning, that an army of 10,000 men will require 40,000 camels), and of the advantages of ground which the Wahaby possesses and the force he can bring into the field — great and weighty as they are, they are, in my humble opinion, only secondary ones to some I am about to mention, namely, the risk to which the tombs of Imaum

Ali Hossein and Cossim will be exposed from the Alabege Arabs by the Pacha's absence; and the risk the continuance of the Turkish Government, from the mouth of the Shat ul Arab to Diarbekir, or perhaps the Empire itself, will be put to, in case the Pacha proceeds, according to the present orders of the Porte, and either suffers defeat, or is obliged to retreat. The smallest injury done to the tombs will infallibly bring down the Persians; and admitting, for the sake of argument, that the Pacha, surmounting all difficulties, had happily arrived at Direyia with an army of 15,000 men, that 15,000 men ill paid, ill armed, most of them led there *malgré eux*, and when there half starved, should stand against 100,000 fanatics, with swords in their hands, to whom death in such a cause is *glorious martyrdom*, is not very probable; but that they should defeat and reduce them is what history will not warrant one to suppose, nor imagination easily submit to have forced on it. I will not go so far as to say, that, if obliged to retreat, the Pacha and his army will never get back to Bagdad; but I think I may allow myself to mention that, with every thing hostile to him in front and rear, on the right hand and on the left, with a broken, dispirited, discontented, disorderly, famished army, if he effects a retreat, he will prove himself a great captain. Your Excellency may rely on it that an ill concerted and, consequently, unsuccessful expedition from hence, against the Wahaby, will infallibly cause the loss of this country to the Turks, and, most probably, not only hurl the present Sultan from his throne, but prove the total ruin of the house of Othman.

If, therefore, the Ottoman Ministry are masters of sufficient address to prevent the effects which the loss of Mecca and Medina must have on the Ottoman Emperor's claim to the veneration and obedience of his Sunni subjects, in his character of Khadem ul Horemeen and supreme Imaum, it would perhaps be the wisest policy the Porte could at present adopt to resolve, according to the advice given by the last Pacha, *qu'il*

faut uniquement se borner à une simple défensive; and either immediately to begin forming a systematic plan of future attack in concert with Persia, the Imaum of Muscat, the friendly powers on the shores of the Red Sea, and the few orthodox tribes of Arabs still remaining; or, trusting to the chapter of accidents, wait for the death of Saoud, which, from his great age, cannot be very far distant, and which may, probably, cause great dissensions among the sectaries themselves.

The late Pacha's recommendation to the Porte, *qu'il faut uniquement se borner à une simple défensive*, which, if it had been strictly pursued, in the sense Suleiman Pacha delivered it, would have prevented the Wahaby from so early possessing himself of Mecca and Medina, naturally brings me to present your Excellency with my opinion of what are the only measures the Porte has to adopt, with any chance of success, to preserve her present possessions of Bagdad and Bussora.

For this purpose, the first step necessary to be taken is that the Pacha, as soon as ever the weather becomes temperate enough to admit of it, should encamp, with as large an army as he can collect, at some eligible station between Meshed Ali and Hillah, a position that will enable him at once to protect Bussora, Sorg ill Shook, Imaum Aly Hossein, Hillah, Bagdad and Kazemeen, and from which, from the beginning of October to the end of May, he may, by unexpected and repeated predatory incursions and surprises, so harass the Alabege and other Arabs under the government and influence of the late Mohammed Beg, as may, perhaps, if the matter be not too far gone, induce them to return to their obedience to this Government, a point which I conceive to be of the very utmost consequence. The artillery and position of the camp ought to put it out of all fear of surprise by the Wahaby.

The defence of Bussora, for some time past, has been in a manner left by this Government to the Montefick Shaik, who, from the increasing power of the Wahaby over the other tribes formerly obedient to this Government, has made himself of

such consequence as to appropriate to his own use, in one shape or other, the whole, or nearly the whole, of the revenues of Bussora and its districts. As things stand at present, the Pacha dare not entirely trust and still less dare disgust Ahmood; for the tenure by which the Turks hold Bussora at this moment—and it were well if clearly understood at Constantinople — is the forbearance of attack by the Wahaby, on the one hand, and the good will and pleasure of Shaik Ahmood, on the other.

Since, however, so many of the maritime Arabs, if I may use the expression, have become converts to the Wahaby, Bussora is exposed to a danger, for which it is not in the power of Ahmood to provide a remedy—I mean that of being attacked by the river—for the Turkish Bussora fleet is in so miserable a state, as to men and vessels, that no reliance can be placed on it. If, therefore, the Honourable the East India Company could be brought to consent to such a measure, the Porte should immediately authorize the Pacha to subsidize from them two vessels of twenty guns, with a complement of Lascars and Sepoys of two hundred each, to be stationed at Bussora. This effective force, which would give security to the town of Bussora and respectability to the Turkish Government, would not cost the Pacha more, and, in my opinion, not so much as what is now paid for a useless and imaginary one; for the expensive office of Captain Pacha of Bussora might then be dissolved, and the major part of the Bussora fleet disposed of.

At the present moment, when such a measure is only thrown out for your Excellency's consideration, it would be improper to enter into any detail of minute arrangements; but I cannot help saying, supposing it was approved of by all parties, the vessels ought, for many reasons, to carry the Turkish flag, and to be considered as vessels subsidized, and not as vessels lent.

The arrival at Bussora of such a force would enable this Government to talk to the Montefick Shaik on more equal

terms than it can do at present; would certainly cool the ardour of the maritime Arabs in the cause of the Wahaby; would tend to increase the revenues of Bussora by the security afforded to the agriculturists on the banks of the river, and to commerce; and would be fraught with advantages to us sufficiently obvious to render a recital of them unnecessary; besides which, it would leave the Montefick at full liberty to harass and attack the Wahaby partially in the best manner he could.

It would be impertinent in me to expatiate to your Excellency how much it is our interest to support the Turks in possession of this country; but the Porte may rely on it as a fact that, without speedy assistance from us in some shape or other, the Ottomans will not be masters of it three years longer.

Should the Porte wisely determine to act for the present on the defensive, it seems clear to me that the northern force of this Pachalik encamped under the Pacha, between Hillah and Imaum Ally, and two vessels of the description above mentioned, stationed at Bussora, will leave no reasonable cause of apprehension for the safety of her possession of Bagdad and Bussora; and, if she should determine hereafter to undertake a well concerted expedition against the Wahaby, I will then trouble your Excellency with my opinion of what effectual assistance, both as to quantum and quality, may be demanded and expected from this Government.

Your Excellency, on this occasion, must excuse me the homeliness of the simile; but to order this Government to act at present offensively against the Wahaby is pretty much the same as ordering a man in a heavy sickness, from which, by rest and timely medicines, he might recover, to quit his bed and attack a man in strong health. A blow to him in that case is death; and defeat, or even retreat, will to the Pacha, if he goes, be inevitable, irremediable ruin.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Captain Seton to Mr. Jones.

Muscat, June 8, 1803.

Sir—I have the honour to inform you of my return to the duties of my station as Resident at this place. No political change of any consequence has occurred during my absence, except a declaration of war from the Wahaby against Muscat, in consequence of the Imaum's having appeared in arms in defence of Mecca and Jidda, lately captured by the Wahaby. Abdulaziz's orders are arrived at Behrein Grain and Ras ul Khymeh for the Uttobee and Joasme to put out their vessels to cruise against the trade of Muscat. On their pleading it was the season for the pearl fishery, the orders were repeated, and no delay allowed. In consequence, they have given public intimation to the merchants of Muscat.

I am, &c.,

DAVID SETON.

Mr. J. H. Lovett to Mr. Harford Jones.

Bushire, July 4, 1803.

Sir—I had last the honour of addressing you under 13th April. I learn from Muscat that the Wahaby has declared war against that place, in consequence of the active part lately taken by the Imaum in opposition to his designs upon Mecca and Jidda. Report has for some time added the former to the list of his conquests, and late letters from Muscat even annex the latter. One thing is certain, that his orders are arrived at Behrein Grain and Rasalkhyma, for the Uttobee and Joasme vessels to cruise against the trade of Muscat. On their pleading that it was the season for the pearl fishery, the orders were repeated, and no delay allowed; public intimation of which was accordingly given to the merchants.

A considerable degree of anxiety prevails at Muscat respecting the fate of the Imaum, who has not been heard of for some months. I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. H. LOVETT.

Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, September 29, 1803.

My Lord—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on the 10th instant, of your Lordship's very obliging and flattering commands of the 4th April, and respectfully to offer you my thanks for the permission you have condescended to give me to address directly to your lordship any observations concerning this country which appear to me of sufficient consequence to authorize their being laid before you.

The approbation of a great Minister must be satisfactory to persons employed in important and exalted public situations, and therefore most flattering, when conferred on those charged with offices of inferior consequence. For my own part, impressed with a deep and grateful sense of the value of the kind sentiments your lordship has expressed on my past conduct, I have to hope and strenuously endeavour that my future conduct may merit a continuance of them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Captain Megson to Mr. J. H. Lovett.

Muscat, October 4, 1803.

Sir—For your information, I have to communicate to you we arrived here on the 2nd instant, and completed our business according to my wish, and I fully intended sailing from hence yesterday; but a strange sail appearing in the offing, under French colours, prevented it. After lying by some time, she made sail, and came to anchor in the Cove alongside of us, and proves to be the French frigate Atalanta, of 38 guns and 300 men, said to have come last from the Isle of France in twenty-eight days, and is reported to have brought despatches for the Imaum. They also say two other frigates left the Isle of France at the same time, and were destined for this place, but as to the truth of this there is no certainty. As I

did not think the packets safe on board the Rahum Shah, I landed them under the care of Mr. Schott, a medical gentleman residing here, and to be forwarded by him to Bombay on an Arab Dingy, judging them more safe than if they were on board a vessel under English colours; and, as I had determined to remain here until the frigate left this, detaining them might be of serious consequence.

I hope these measures will be approved of by you and the Government of Bombay, as there appears to me a great risk of capture from this to Bombay. It is said the frigate will not remain here more than six or eight days, but the arrival of the Sultan will determine their departure. As yet, they have shown no hostile intention towards us; and it is uncertain whether they will be restrained by our being in a neutral port or not. I think we shall not be molested. All our treasures are on shore, and the horses will be to-morrow. It is not known whether the Shrewsbury escaped or not, as she only left this two days before we arrived. Previous to my departure, I shall make it my duty to give you such information as I can possibly collect that may tend to the safety of the Honourable Company's cruizers and packets.

This frigate is the handsomest I have ever seen—yellow sides and quarter-gallery; mouldings, white; her head rather high and white; has royal cross-trees and yards rigged aloft, but not fidded: this I mention for the information of the nautical gentlemen; but I hope they may not have so near a view as to distinguish her from any other. She appears to sail very fast. I am, &c.,

THOMAS MEGSON.

Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, October 25, 1803.

My Lord—It seems proper to communicate to your lordship the enclosed copy of a letter dated the 9th instant, from me to the Honourable the Governor of Bombay. From this letter

your lordship will be apprized of the nature of Suleiman Aga's mission, which, *as it stands at present,* is designed to carry to his Excellency the Governor-General a public testimony of the Pacha's esteem and respect, and, to use his Highness's own words, "to draw the knot of friendship tighter."

I flatter myself your lordship will pardon me if I add that, in times critical as the present, I feel the greatest satisfaction in seeing the Pacha thus forward to demonstrate unequivocally his attachment and friendship to the British Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. Harford Jones to the Honourable the Governor of Bombay.

Bagdad, October 9, 1803.

Sir—The Pacha yesterday invited me to the palace, to be present when Suleiman Aga took leave of departure on his mission to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General; and it is at his Highness's particular request that I am to express his hopes of your civilities to Suleiman Aga during his residence at Bombay, and of your assistance to him in the prosecution of his voyage to Bengal.

Suleiman Aga has under his charge letters from the Pacha to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, to the Governor of Madras, to yourself, and to Major Malcolm. His presents from the Pacha to the Governor-General consist of a mare, five horses, and four lions; and he has, as the Pacha informed me yesterday, written instructions for his conduct, *which, at present, form the whole of his credence, but which, if circumstances should require it after his arrival, at Calcutta, may probably be enlarged.*

Suleiman Aga will proceed from Bussora to Bombay in the Turkish vessel Sultanié, which will return to Bussora,

without attending the return of Suleiman Aga, as the Pacha has no doubt his Excellency the Governor-General will find him and his people a suitable conveyance for their return.

Although the unfortunate affair of Hagy Khullul is perfectly well understood in this country, yet you will permit me to observe, that a handsome and liberal treatment of the first Turkish Envoy that has ever appeared in India will clinch the favourable opinion which this Court now entertains of our conduct in that unhappy accident, and will infallibly, under certain circumstances, should they take place, be productive of consequences the most important to the national interests and those of the Honourable Company.

To point out any particular mode of treatment for Suleiman Aga would be both impertinent and improper ; but I presume I may venture to bring to your recollection that the Turks always give a Taïun to missionaries, of whatever description they be, the moment they enter their dominions. There is another point I would venture to recommend, provided it met your approbation, which is, to give the Turkish vessel Sultanié some slight repairs during her stay at Bombay : this, if I may use the expression, would be an act of hospitality that would make great impression.

Suleiman Aga will receive at Bussora the honours of salute and public entry, which, I conceive, will consequently be granted at Bombay. The last words his Highness made use of to Suleiman Aga in my presence are too remarkable not to be quoted :—" Tell the Governor-General his enemies are mine, his friends are mine." And I have only to add my sincere hope that this mission may prove what the Pacha so fervently wishes—a means of drawing the knot of friendship tighter.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosures in Mr. Jones's to Lord Castlereagh, of November 6.]

Mr. Harford Jones to Jacob Bosanquet, Esq., Chairman of the East India Company.

Bagdad, November 6, 1803.

Honourable Sir—Suleiman Aga, the Envoy from the Pacha to his Excellency the Governor-General, left Bagdad on the 9th of October.

It has been already mentioned that the Pacha, about the middle of last May, put to death, I believe upon the best of all grounds, self-preservation, Mahommed and Abdul Azeez Beg, and confined their nephew, Hadgee Ahmed Beg, with some of the younger branches of their families. Cossim Beg, however, the eldest son of Mahommed Beg, and Lahef Beg, the son of Hadgee Ahmed Beg, both grown to man's estate, retired to separate stations, with different parts of their tribe, the Alebege; and refused to listen to the overtures made on the part of the Pacha and this Government to induce them to return to Bagdad.

It was known that messengers had passed, after the execution of Mahommed and Abdul Azeez Beg, between Cossim Beg and the Wahaby, and it was easy to perceive that either the reduction of the Alebege Arabs or some arrangement with them, by which they would return to their customary obedience to this Government, was become a matter of great consequence. The latter was tried to be effected by offering to acknowledge Ali Ahmed, a near relation of the young Begs, as chief of the tribe, and to confer on him the offices Mahommed Beg held of counsellor and vakeel for Arab affairs at this Court. It was hoped by this means to render the young Begs of little consequence in their tribe, but the scheme failed from Ali Ahmed refusing to accept the proffered promotion.

For the reduction of the tribe of Alebege, the Government rested great hopes in the assistance it might receive from Timour Pacha, the Pacha of Orfa, who, it has been represented,

obtained his pardon from the Grand Signor and the Pachalik of Orfa in 1800, by the intercession and money of the late Suleiman Pacha at the Porte. The inhabitants of Orfa, however, were unwilling to receive their new Pacha, and no one more so than Timour's own son, who found means to debauch from their obedience a considerable part of their own tribe of Millee, and lived in a state of defiance and rebellion to his father's authority.

The opposition which Timour experienced from the inhabitants of Orfa in taking possession of his new government—for they opposed him for two years in arms at Orfa—by memorials to this Court, and, by prayers and offers of bribes at Constantinople, impressed such a distrust on his mind that he never would trust himself for any time within the walls of Orfa; and it is reasonable to believe that he might entertain suspicions, notwithstanding the Porte had sent a pardon in form for his rebellions, and elevated him to a Pachalik, whether, if a fair opportunity served, it might not wish to get rid of a person who had given, and perhaps might be thought likely hereafter to give, much trouble to the Ottoman Government.

There is every reason to suppose that, after the negociation failed with Ali Ahmed, a plan of operations had been concerted between his Highness and Timour Pacha for the reduction of the young Begs; but the intemperature of the season at Bagdad not permitting the Pacha to take the field so early as was necessary, Cossim Beg had an opportunity of falling on Timour Pacha in his camp; and, partly from the sudden manner in which the measure was executed, but more particularly from the treachery of his troops, supposed to have been debauched by his son, the camp of Timour Pacha was completely beaten up, and himself obliged to fly with a few attendants, leaving his baggage and treasure in the hands of the victor.

This unfortunate business necessarily confines the means this Government has of reducing the young Begs to its own strength and efforts, which, if the report be true that a mutual

good understanding subsists between the Wahaby and Cossim Beg, are, I fear, extremely inadequate to the purpose; and, if this report be false, the kind of warfare these Begs will probably carry on, that of retreating to and returning from the desert, according as the Pacha advances or retires, affords his Highness but little chance of making serious impression on them.

His Highness, however, joined his camp the evening of the 21st October, and on the next day I paid him a visit, at which some conversation took place, sufficiently interesting to induce me to trouble you with a copy of the notes of it. Attached to these notes of my conversation with the Pacha are copies of notes and letters to and from Mahommed Sayd Beg, Meerza Bosourg, and myself, among which it gives me great concern to refer to those which allude to the unfortunate business at Imaum Hossein. At his Highness's desire, I despatched to Meerza Bosourg a copy of the Governor of Imaum Hossein's account to this Government; but, from the conversation I have had with several Persians, who were at Imaum Hossein when the unfortunate accident happened, I apprehend this paper *is, in many parts*, softened, not to say false, in many particulars, and that, consequently, from the representations which the pilgrims will make on their return to Persia, and from persons of note and consequence having been dangerously, and, as it is believed, mortally wounded, the affair will be received in a serious light by the Court of Tehran, and probably bring on disagreeable discussions; for, it is said, and I believe with truth, that near fifty Persians are missing; that about ten bodies have been discovered; and that, on the night of the unfortunate business, after the tumult within the precincts of the tomb was quelled, the Persians were pillaged in their houses. It is fact, also, that the pilgrims have returned in a disposition to make the most bitter complaints to their government. The King of Persia, according to our latest accounts, was at Tehran, and, it is said, has relinquished his design of passing some months this winter at Isfahan.

The translation of a letter to me from a person at Yezd, a copy of which was laid before you in my despatches of the 6th of September, contained an account of the affray which happened at Caboul between the Afghans and the Kezel Bash, which, by letters lately received from that quarter, appears to have ended in the deposition of Shah Mahmood and the accession of Sujah ul Mulk to the throne. There are various editions of this event current in town, some of which mention Shah Mahmood having been put to death, others his being put into confinement, and deprived of his eyes: all of them agree, however, in the fact of his deposition. Abdullah Pacha, the ex-Pacha of Damascus, for whose head the Porte issued a firman, arrived a few days ago as a fugitive in the Pacha's camp, and threw himself on his Highness's protection. I hear the Pacha received and treats him in the handsomest manner; and I am told, though not from any official source, the Pacha has undertaken to procure his pardon from the Porte.

It ought not to be concealed, and indeed, from the preceding part of this address, it will easily be perceived, that the situation of this country is, in all respects, most critical, and that the Government is in as weak and embarrassed a state as can well be imagined. I cannot avoid lamenting that I have not yet received your reply to the letter from the Pacha, which I had the honour to forward at the beginning of this year.

I have not had the honour to receive anything from my honourable superiors in India since the date of my last despatches, and my present address proceeds to Constantinople by a Tatar despatched by the Government, whose despatches I have hastened by a small gratuity.

I have the honour to be, &c.

HARFORD JONES.

Notes of a Conference with his Highness [the Pacha of Bagdad].

In Camp, Friday, October 22, 1803.

The Pacha said every Tartar that arrived from Constantinople brought distressing accounts of the weakness and deca-

dence of the Ottoman power, notwithstanding which the Ministry at Constantinople were constantly and imperiously pressing him to send 30,000 purses (a million sterling) to Constantinople, as the amount of the late Pacha's treasury, and to undertake the campaign against the Wahaby. He said, and added the Resident could vouch for it, the smallest part of Suleiman Pacha's wealth fell into his hands; the greater part of it was secreted by his family in the three or four days preceding his death, when he, the Pacha, had little or no access to the interior of the palace. The whole expence of the Government was carried on by him from the Pacha's death to almost the time he received the tails, without his receiving, as the Resident knew, from the state the country was then in, any of the ordinary revenue; and that the Resident knew also the immense sums made away with in the time of the disturbances.

As to the campaign against the Wahaby, he said he had exposed over and over again the reasons rendering it impossible he should undertake it: those reasons, as the Resident well knew, have now additional force, from the defeat of Timour Pacha, and the accession of consequence and strength which the Alebege Arabs have obtained thereby. "If," said he, "the Porte will be quiet, and give me time, something may be done; but, if it persists in its present plan, and nothing happens at Constantinople, it must end in throwing the country into confusion, and probably in the loss of it. I can neither at present pay 30,000 purses, nor undertake the campaign against the Wahaby. I will do the best I can to defend the country under my government, for the Emperor, and if I succeed in that, the Ottoman Ministry, unless they are perfectly wanting in sense, will find I perform no small service."

The Pacha said the variety of matters he had been lately engaged in had caused him to be less attentive to the Court of Tehran than perhaps was perfectly politic; and therefore the Resident would much oblige him by indirectly communicating

to Meerza Bozurg how the matter really stood, and by hinting the Pacha's intention of sending a person to the King with presents and friendly letters.

To Mohammed Sayd Beg, the Confidential Minister.

My dear Sir—In consequence of the conversation which took place yesterday in his Highness's tent, I send you the draught of my secret note to Meerza Bozurg, which you will be good enough to read to the Pacha, who will make what alterations in it he pleases, if any appear necessary, and return it, that I may send away the messenger. HARFORD JONES.

Secret Note to Meerza Bozurg, enclosed in the above, and returned unaltered.

My very dear friend—One reason of the detention of Ismail Cossid has been that, for some time past, I heard it whispered the Pacha was about to send a person of consequence with considerable presents to the King; and, as the Ministers here have latterly been so much occupied by the arrival of several Capigi Bashis from the Porte, and other affairs of great importance, I have not had an opportunity of talking to them on this subject. I can now inform you, from a most authentic source, that his Highness really has this in contemplation, and that its execution is only retarded by some of the articles not being completed. It is, however, most probable that, immediately on his return to Bagdad, a proposition and presents will be despatched to the King.

In making this communication, it gives me great pleasure to be able to add that, in all my conferences with the Pacha or his Ministers, I perceive a uniform and warm disposition to cultivate the strictest friendship and good understanding with the Court of Tehran.

The Pacha has lately despatched an envoy, with a respectable suite and presents, to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General. HARFORD JONES.

To Mohammed Sayd Beg.

Bagdad, October 24, 1803.

My dear friend—In the moment of despatching the messenger for Persia, I am informed of some unfortunate misunderstanding between the Persian pilgrims at Imaum Hossein and the Agalee guard stationed there, in which blood is said to have been shed on both sides. Thinking it most probable either the Pacha would wish himself to write something on this subject, or that he would wish me to say something about it to Meerza Bozurg, I despatch a messenger to camp, and shall detain the Persian messenger until I receive an answer to this note. I hope the weather in camp has been better than it has been at Bagdad, or otherwise you must have suffered much inconvenience.

HARFORD JONES.

Mohammed Sayd Beg to the Resident.

My dear friend—Your note by your Nobatchy I received and read to the Pacha, who takes your conduct very kind. It is by his direction I enclose a copy of the Governor of Imaum Hossein's report to Government on the affair to which you allude, and assure you that the matter will be investigated, and proper measures taken thereon. I am also directed to say that you will greatly oblige the Pacha by giving him at all times information of what you think it is necessary he should know.

MOHAMMED SAYD.

Translation ad Sensum of the Arzee of the Thâbet, &c., of Imaum Hossein.

It is represented to the Supreme Governor his Highness the Pacha, that, on the Thursday, in the evening, the 3rd of Rejeb, there was a woman of bad fame within the precincts of the Sacred Tomb, and she was known publicly to be so; and that the Thâbet sent after the head of the police, who, with a man

belonging to the Thâbet, came to turn the woman out of the precincts of the Tomb. The woman cried out, at which time the Persians collected together, and protected the woman, and beat both the head of the police and the Thâbet's man, and there arose a scuffle within the precincts of the Tomb.

This being the case, the Thâbet and Hamoosh Aga and Sultan Aga came to the Tomb, for the purpose of seeing what this bustle was about, and, when they arrived within the precincts of the Tomb, the Persians attacked them, and would have killed them; at which time, Said Mortreeh, the Nekeeb, and the doorkeeper, and other officers of the Holy Tomb arrived, but the Persians still prevailed. At length, seeing the business took this turn, and that it was most apparent the Persians were bent on bloodshed, the Thâbet and the persons above-mentioned sought refuge in a corner of the Tomb, from whence they sent to Meer Said Ally and Meerza Mohammed Hossein, that they would, by their influence over their countrymen, prevail on them to disperse; they came, but found it impossible to effect this, and, when the affair had arrived at this pitch, that there was no other remedy, the Thâbet and the others sent for Hajee Saheb (the chief of the Agalees); and Hajee Saheb, fearing the affair might become worse, came with some of his people, and when he entered within the precincts of the Tomb, and saw the multitude, he became afraid for himself and his people, from the stones that were thrown and the clubs that were lifted up; and there was a great battle within the precincts. The rest of the Agalees, hearing the noise which this occasioned, ran to see what was the matter; and, seeing Hajee Saheb in this condition, and his people wounded, they regretted not having their arms, since the whole of the Persians were armed.

His Highness the Pacha must be aware that the Tomb is a place of general pilgrimage for all sects, and, therefore, that the battle became general within the precincts of the Tomb; so that it was impossible to put an end to it. People on both

sides were wounded; and one of the officers of the Tomb was killed, and the Persians stormed the door of the chamber where the sacred chaplets are sold, and carried away all the chaplets and turbehs. Such is the business; to command, rests with his Highness.

AMEEN, Thâbet.
SAID MORTIZEH, Nekeeb, &c.

Note to Meerza Bosourg.

Bagdad, October 26, 1803.

My dear friend—I am sorry to mention an unpleasant affair has happened between the Persian pilgrims at Imaum Hossein and the Agalee guard there. I enclose a copy of a note from Mohammed Sayd Beg to me, and of the Arzee from the Thâbet of Imaum Hossein to the Kia. I can make you strong assurances that, if the servants of this Government shall be found to have been in fault, the Pacha will make no scruple of punishing them; but, from all I can at present learn of the business, it was pure accident, and, therefore, it is most evident that matters of this sort ought not to produce coolness, or even discussion, between two Governments who are equally desirous of maintaining the strictest ties of friendship.

HARFORD JONES.

Translate of a Letter from Seyud Sultan, Imaum of Muscat, to Captain Seton, Resident, dated the 4th of Regeb, or 22nd ultimo, received 22nd November, 1803.

From the time you left this for Bombay, I have been in daily expectation of hearing from you of your safe arrival and good health, and I hope that it is only business which has prevented your writing.

Since you left us, affairs in this quarter have, through God's blessing, assumed a prosperous aspect, and amity and unity have been established between me and my brothers. About the time you sailed, I also went to Sohar, and from thence two days' journey to Yinkul, which is the pass by

which the Wahaby were to invade the country; and, there collecting my troops, I was employed against the Wahaby.

When here, you informed us that a vessel was coming from the Ruler of the French; on the 12th of Jamadyul Sani, a vessel of that description arrived, three-masted, 47 guns, some 28, some 18-pounders, and 350 men, as declared by those who had seen her, and who brought accounts from Shaikh Seif of her arrival, and asking for orders, or that I should return in person, as their business was not known. On receiving this information, I left Yinkul, and arrived at Muscat the 26th (or October 13th), and learned from Seyud Seif the vessel was still there, but that the captain had not come on shore, and would not communicate to those sent to him the reason of his coming, until I should return.

The captain, having heard of my arrival, sent two of his people, one an interpreter, named Monsieur Iss, in an Arab dress, and another, to request an audience, that he might explain what his business was. I inquired of Monsieur Iss, who said that he and the captain were come with letters and presents, by the order of the Sultan of France, and that the vessel belonged to the Padshah (Emperor or King) Bonaparte, who was the Sultan Kubir of France; that they wanted a factory, and had brought with them a confidential person from France to reside as captain in the factory.

I sent two confidential people with him to converse with the captain, and instructed them that, if they found it was positively a factory he required, they should answer him that it would not be granted; but, had he any other business, it did not signify, I should see him in the morning; but, if a factory was positively required, there was no necessity for a house, or an audience, nor would his letters or presents be accepted. They went and learned from the captain he had no other business but to demand a house as a factory, and to settle the people he had brought with him to reside in the factory, who were, one the interpreter, Monsieur Iss, and the other Ali

Mufozuk Cavenach. My people, understanding their wishes, answered that Seyud Sultan would not give a house, nor receive their letters or presents, nor see the captain, and returned.

The evening of the 27th the conversation took place, and the morning of the 28th (the 15th October), the ship was gone. On inquiry at what hour he sailed, I learned about the eighth hour; but it was not known whether they went away satisfied or displeased with the answer they got.

I now write you that it may be understood that my principal inducement for giving the French this answer, and risking a rupture with them, was my alliance and friendship with the Honourable Company and with the Honourable Governor, which I pray to God may last for ever, and daily increase, and that there may be no difference between the two States, either in property or territory; and, for the better information of the Honourable the Governor, I am sending two confidential persons, on my part, to Bombay, who will circumstantially relate to him what has passed. Moreover, you requested Seyud Sief, when you left Muscat, to get you some Backer Soleh, or desert cows, which he informed me of, and I sent, and have now brought four, two male and two female, which I have given in charge of Ahmed ben Hamed, with two hundred pomegranates, which will, I hope, reach you in good state.

Do not allow the friendship between us to cool; write to me often of your health, and whatever business you may have in this quarter, or whatever you may want; write me without hesitation, and not be lazy, as I shall not be satisfied till I hear from you. Give my respects to the Honourable Governor. What more, &c., &c.

A true translate.

D. Seton, Resident.

A true copy. James Grant, Secretary to Government.

The Governor of Bombay to Mr. Harford Jones.

Private. Bombay, December 4, 1803.

Sir—I have the pleasure to advise you that a cessation of hostilities took place between the Honourable Company's armies and those of Dowlut Row Scindia, about the 20th ult., preceded towards the beginning of the month by another splendid but dearly bought victory by General Lake, over seventeen battalions of Scindia's forces, who, after a desperate resistance near a town called Cassolee, in Indostan, were entirely cut up, with the loss, as usual, of seventy of their guns. In this engagement we know that General Ware and three or four other of our officers on the staff lost their lives; but these are not the only casualties, although we have not yet got the names of the others. General Lake had his coat cut through with grape-shot, and two horses killed under him; and his son is wounded in the knee, though he will not lose the limb.

The Admiral is here, and the greater number of his fleet, so that we consider ourselves as safe from attack, but are uneasy at not having heard from England since the end of May. I am, &c.,

JONATHAN DUNCAN.

Mr. Manesty to Mr. Harford Jones.

Bussora, December 7, 1803.

Sir—It becomes my duty to inform you that, having been suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to carry into execution the intentions of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, in deputing Jonathan Henry Lovett, Esq., on a mission to the Court of Persia, I shall leave this place in a few days on my way to Bushire, whence I shall, without delay, prosecute a journey *viâ* Shiraz to Tehran.

The circumstance naturally suggests to me the propriety of soliciting from you a digested and detailed early communica-

tion of the wishes of his Majesty's Ministers and of the Honourable the Court of Directors connected with Persia, as far as their orders to you on the subject may have given you a knowledge of them, in order that I may possess a criterion by which to regulate some of my proceedings in my approaching intercourse with the Persian Monarch and his Ministers, and thereby contribute to the success and accomplishment of such measures as you may be entrusted to take, in consequence of the desire at present felt by our Government to ascertain the public situation, relations, and connexions of a country, which, from locality, is now become a portion of Asia politically interesting to Great Britain.

With such a communication, I should also with pleasure receive an intimation of the line of connexion maintained by you with individuals in Persia, and a list of your correspondents and agents there, particularly specifying those who may have rendered themselves by their past conduct worthy of a future confidence, and who are, from ability, inclination, rank, and distinction, capable of rendering service to a British representative at Tehran, and authorized to employ them in important affairs.

I will further inform you that, if any political question of importance be in agitation between the Pacha and the Persian Monarch, I shall, with activity and readiness, notwithstanding late unpleasant events, endeavour to secure the accomplishment of such wishes as the Pacha may, through you, express to me, to cement an advantageous political union between the parties, and to obtain, for your information, a knowledge of the real sentiments of his Majesty towards the Pacha.

In the event of your receiving from Aleppo, Constantinople, or Europe, any packets addressed to me in Persia, I request you will transmit them to Tehran, at which place I shall hope to find an acceptable reply to this letter.

It is at present probable that Mr. Lovett may, on my arrival at Bushire, resign to me the total charge of the affairs

of that Residency, and repair to Bussora, in order to take on himself the charge of this factory and of the public duties of my office; and, at all events, whether that projected arrangement takes place or be abandoned, such measures will be adopted by us on a personal consultation as will secure the eligible transmission hence to India and Europe of the national correspondence. You will please to address your future official communications to Bussora to Jonathan Henry Lovett, Esq.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, December 7, 1803.

My Lord—With the duplicate of my address to your lordship of the 6th of November, and its accompaniments, I have the honour to lay before you a copy of my letter of this day to the King's Ambassador at the Porte, with copies of the papers referred to in the margin of that letter.

I must, however, take the liberty of repeating the remark I have already made to his Majesty's ambassador, that the translations of the letter and notes which I received yesterday morning from Meerza Bozurg seem to me to be particularly interesting, both as confirming the intelligence from Georgia, which I have before had the honour to transmit; and communicating from such respectable authority, that an attempt to restore that country to its native princes really occupies the thoughts of his Persian Majesty.

It is with singular pleasure I extract the following passage of a private letter, dated the 24th of September, from the Honourable the Governor of Bombay to me, and received last night:—"You will have heard of our being at war with Scindia, Holkar, and the Berar Rajah. Hitherto our operations have proved as successful as could be expected. The Madras army has reduced Ahmednagur and the Bombay Branch, but

the stress of the campaign is only now opening; at the same time there is no doubt of its speedily putting us in possession of Agra, Delhi, Bundelcund, and Cuttack, as well as of the remaining possessions of Scindia in the Guzerat."

Major Malcolm writes me from Bombay, under the 25th of September. A salute is this moment fired for the fall of Panghur, the chief of Scindia's possessions in the Guzerat.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosures in the preceding Letter.]

Mr. Harford Jones to Mr. Drummond, Ambassador Extraordinary at the Porte.

Bagdad, December 7, 1803.

Sir—I had last the honour of addressing your Excellency under the 6th of November, since which I have not had that of receiving your Excellency's commands. I now do myself the honour to lay before your Excellency copies of sundry papers; and, conceiving it possible that your Excellency may judge it expedient to communicate certain parts of the despatch to me, received yesterday from Meerza Bozurg to the Ottoman Ministers, I enclose, besides the translations mentioned in the margin, a Persian copy of the Meerza's letter and notes.

It appears to me a circumstance of no small interest, that the information I lately transmitted from Georgia is confirmed in all the material parts by Meerza Bozurg, and I hope that the assistance I afford this Government in their transactions with the Court of Tehran will be acceptable both to your Excellency and the Ottoman Ministers. I must not, however, conceal that, subsequently to my return to town from camp, and subsequently to my addressing, by his Highness's desire, my letter of the 14th of November to Meerza Bozurg, the Pacha has (as it is said by consent of the Persian pilgrims of consequence) re-appointed Mohammed Ameen Aga to the Thabetship of Imaum Hossein.

I flatter myself the reply I gave to the letter dated the 13th of October, from the Imperial Internuncio, Baron Sturmer, to me, will coincide with your Excellency's ideas of propriety; and your Excellency, I am confident, will perceive at the first glance the impolicy of his Majesty's Ministers, or the Honourable Company, consenting that the national agent here should publicly charge himself with the concerns of any other Government, and by that means involve himself and his mission in all the interested, but to him and his employers uninteresting, disputes of such Government Barratlies, or Protected, at this place. In my humble opinion, the best footing this matter can rest on, is to do only what may be convenient for foreign protected persons, when such interference is requested as a favour, either through your Excellency, or directly to me, by their respective Ministers at the Porte.

I have singular pleasure in extracting, for your Excellency's notice, the following passage of a letter from the Honourable the Governor at Bombay, to me, dated the 24th of September, and received last night:—

"You will have heard of our being at war with Scindia, Holkar, and the Berar Rajah. Hitherto, our operations have proved as successful as could be expected. The Madras army has reduced Ahmednagur and the Bombay Broach; but the stress of the campaign is only now opening. At the same time, there is no reason to doubt of its speedily putting us in possession of Agra, Delhi, Bundelcund and Cuttack, as well as of the few remaining possessions of Scindia, in the province of Guzerat."

The following is a passage in a letter from a friend at Bombay, dated the 25th of September, and received last night:—

"A salute is this moment fired for the fall of Panghur, the chief of Scindia's possessions in the Guzerat."

Under the 19th of November, the Resident at Bussora writes me regarding the French frigate Atalanta, which appeared at Muscat, as follows:—

"As the Viper entered the Gulf on the 25th ult., and was long

detained in the vicinity of the Coins, by the prevalence there of a north-west wind, I conclude that the Atalanta frigate never entered the Gulf, and that, having accomplished the object of her voyage to Muscat, she returned thence to the Mauritius."

Abdallah Pacha, the Pacha of Damascus, is living at Hillah, and I am told his Highness the Pacha means to return to Bagdad, previously to the commencement of the month of Ramazan.

A report has this moment reached me, which, though I mention to your Excellency, I give but little credit to, that Abdul Aziz and his son Saoud have been both assassinated, whilst at their prayers, by an Afghan, who was immediately cut to pieces by the Wahabies present. I mention this to your Excellency, more particularly because it is also added that Alyanac Mohammed Tartar has, on this account, been despatched express to Constantinople, and therefore it will be in your Excellency's power immediately to ascertain how far it deserves credit.

I have the honour to enclose ten packets containing Bombay couriers, addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, which I received last night from Bussora, and to be, with the greatest respect, sir, &c. HARFORD JONES.

Bulletin.

Bagdad, ce 9me Novembre, 1803.

La guerre civile, qui s'est éclatée a Caboul, pour cause d'un enfant, vers le commencement de cette année, entre les Aphgans et les Kizilbaches, a été des plus sanglantes et des plus affreuses. Dans l'espace de trois jours, on n'a pas épargné l'incendie, le pillage, la dévastation. Le nombre des morts on fait monter à plus de quatre mille dans la ville. La présence du Roi Mahmoud Chah seule l'a pu appaiser. Mais elle eut des suites plus sérieuses que l'on ne pensoit pas.

La partialité que le roi avoit montré dans cette action pour les Kizilbaches a fâché beaucoup les Aphgans. Le mécontentement s'est répandu dans leurs cœurs déjà exercés aux révolutions. La fermentation s'augmenta faute de la politique du

Gouvernement. On forma le projet jusque de détrôner le roi. L'on vint à la résolution le plus secrètement possible.

Chah Zadé Chedjah el Mulk, frère paternel et maternel de Zeman Chah et son partisan, s'étoit sauvé à ce que l'on pense aux Indes, après l'établissement de Mahmoud Chah. On le rechercha et l'on l'introduisit à Caboul incognito sous un habillement de dervich. La rébellion s'éclatat. Mahmoud Chah fût déposé, aveugle, et mis à Bala Hissar, forteresse de Caboul, et Chedjah el Mulk déclaré Roi des Aphgans.

Suivant quelques lettres de la Perse, les Kilidge Zey, tribu puissante des Aphgans, ont soutenu cette dernière partie, et Chedjah el Mulk a cédé le trône à son frère aîné, Zeman Chah, aveugle, qui étoit retenu à Bala Hissar par Mahmoud, en s'offrant de lui servir comme Régent. La relation des Pélérins arrivés de Corassan est contradictoire. Ils racontent que la susdito Tribu des Kilidge Zeys s'est prévalu de cette occasion favorable pour chasser du Gouvernement celle des Seddon Zeys pour y remplacer la sienne. Le résultat en est incertain.

Chah Zadé Keamrum, fils de Mahmoud, Gouverneur de Candahar, a fait beaucoup de Vexations pour ramasser de l'argent et former une armée, pour aller secourir son frère a Caboul. Mais son entreprise a été échouée après la nouvelle de son aveuglement. Il s'est resolu de se fortifier dans sa ville.

Chah Zadé Pherrouzeddin, frère de Mahmoud, Gouverneur de Herât, s'est déclaré indépendant de toutes les parties. Il s'est mis la couronne. Il a frappe de la monnoie, et s'est fait déclarer roi.

Voilà l'état actuel de l'Aphganistan, selon les relations indirectes les plus veridiques ; c'est-à-dire selon les nouvelles qui nous sont parvenues de la Perse et du Corassan. Les trois villes principales du royaume se sont formées indépendantes. Les chemins sont impraticables — une espèce d'anarchie règne actuellement dans ce royaume. On n'en pourra savoir le vrai résultat que lors de l'arrivée des lettres directes de Caboul, Candahar, ou de Herât ce qui ne doit pas tarder davantage.

Bulletin.

Bagdad, November 20, 1803.

Of the four daughters which Suleiman Pacha left at his death, two were married, one to the present Pacha, and one to Selim Beg, who was put to death at Bussora, shortly after the disturbances at Bagdad, in September, 1802, of which he was considered as the principal cause. The two others were affianced, one to Niseef Aga, and the other to Daoud Beg, both enfranchised Georgians of the late Basha; and though it is said, and more particularly with respect to Neseef Aga, that the present Pacha had reason to be dissatisfied with their conduct during the disturbances above-mentioned, he nevertheless failed not to carry into effect the disposal Suleiman Pacha had made of these two daughters, and they were married to the persons to whom they had been during their father's lifetime affianced.

The widow of Selim Beg, the wife of Neseef Aga, the wife of Daoud Beg, and one of the late Pacha's sons, called Saleh Beg, are all by the same mother, a woman, it is said, of restless and intriguing spirit; and who, it is supposed, found means to secure to herself and children a very great share of the treasures of Suleiman Pacha.

Thus much, however, is certain, that, from the time of the death of Selim Beg, but more particularly from the time of the Pacha's elevation to the Pachalik, by the receipt of the imperial firman, the lady above-mentioned and her daughters lived on very indifferent terms with other parts of the family, but more particularly with their half sister, married to the Pacha; indeed this was carried to such an indecent length that, upon Sarah Kanoum, the Pacha's wife, insisting, contrary to the advice of her mother, on visiting Selim Beg's widow during her indisposition, and on arriving at her home, the eunuch was ordered to tell the Pacha's lady that her sister was abroad.

In a very few days after this, Neseef Aga was dismissed from

his office of Kapikiassi; and the Resident having, soon after, occasion to see the Pacha and the confidential Minister, they complained of the trouble that several of the females of the late Pacha's family were continually giving the Pacha. The dismission of Neseef Aga, however, appears to have alarmed his mother-in-law and the rest of her family; and, previously to the Pacha's leaving town, on the 21st October, explanations took place in the Pacha's hareem, and promises and oaths of oblivion for the past, and good understanding and friendship for the future, were reciprocally given and received.

Early, however, in the month of November, the town was much astonished to find the house of the Janissary Aga beset, and the Aga most grossly abused, two nights successively; on the last of which the business was carried to such excess, that one of his principal officers was fired at in the court of his house, (the Janissary Aga's) with a pistol.

Immediately after this, reports became very frequent in town that some accident had happened in camp, or, if it had not happened, that it would happen; and, although the camp was not distant more than thirty miles, and orders were almost hourly arriving from the Pacha, the generality of the inhabitants, who knew not what to make of what they saw going forward, swallowed these improbable stories with surprising credulity, and every thing appeared rapidly approaching to a state of confusion and disturbance.

It does not appear the conspirators, however they might have flattered themselves, had been able to form any considerable party in Camp; and, on Thursday, the 10th of November, the Kaimacam, early in the morning, in consequence of orders from Camp, seized and imprisoned near twenty persons; amongst whom were Mokbad Aga, preceptor to Saleh Beg, the late Pasha's son; Kheleed, the chief eunuch to his mother; and a person of the name of Hassoon, whose life the Pacha had granted, on the intercession of the Resident, after the disturbances in September, 1802.

Although Hassoon was not regularly under the English protection, yet having, from the period above-mentioned, been supported in a manner by the bounty of the Resident; having been openly employed by him in various trifling services; having almost lived in his house; and the Resident being fully convinced of his most perfect innocence in the present business, humanity, as well as a regard to his credit in the town, induced him to interfere with the Kaimacam in this unfortunate person's behalf. Finding, however, that the Kaimacam, though willing to oblige the Resident, had not the power of doing so, and considering all the disagreeable consequences which must necessarily follow, in the event of a person so notoriously under his private protection as Hassoon being executed, the Resident determined immediately to ride to Camp, and accordingly left Bagdad about eleven in the forenoon of the 10th November.

A step of this sort necessarily occasioned much talk in the town; and, a little before the Resident mounted his horse, he received two messages from the mother of Saleh Beg: the first desiring him to intercede with the Pacha in behalf of herself, children, and servants; the latter requesting permission to seek an asylum for herself and infant son in the Resident's house. To these messages the Resident returned such answer as propriety and humanity would naturally dictate, without, however, committing himself in the smallest degree.

It so happened that, mistaking the road, the Resident remained in the desert, without tent or food, the night of the 10th, and did not reach Camp until the 11th, in the morning. He dismounted at the confidential Minister's tent, who, after the first compliments were over, informed him the Pacha had, late the preceding night, received intelligence of his coming, and of the motive of it, and that the Pacha had directed him to inform the Resident, previously to their interview, that Hassoon was pardoned.

To the confidential Minister the Resident communicated the messages he had received, previously to his leaving Bagdad,

from the mother of Saleh Beg, and begged of him to give him his opinion how far it might be proper to speak to the Pacha on the affair. The confidential Minister, on this, showed the Resident letters and other papers which the Pacha had received, without signature, from Bagdad, giving an account of the beginning and progress of the conspiracy, and concluding by advising the Resident not to open with the Pacha any conversation respecting the females and children of the late Pacha, unless his Highness entered on it himself.

In the evening, the Resident had an interview with the Pacha of near three hours and a half, in which the Pacha gave him more than common proofs of his confidence and regard. It was reported, and, indeed, generally believed in town, but certainly erroneously, that the unfortunate shot which killed the Pacha's brother, in the disturbances in September, 1802, was fired by Hassoon; and on the Resident's entering his Highness's tent, he said, "Mr. Jones, you know, and I know, what Hassoon has done, but if it had been twice as much, when you ask his pardon at my hands, I most freely and voluntarily grant it."

After this, to the Resident's great astonishment, his Highness entered into a detailed account of the jealousies, misunderstandings, and intrigues, which for many months past had been going forward amongst the women in the harem; matters which a Turk, in common life, rarely mentions to his most intimate friend. It were useless to repeat all his Highness said on these subjects; the drift of his conversation, however, was an enumeration of the misbehaviour of the mother of Saleh Beg and her daughters; of the cabals she was constantly forming with her sons-in-law; of the repeated explanations and forgiveness which had taken place in the harem on these points; of the repeated forgiveness and of the promises of amendment which had been repeatedly made and as repeatedly broken by the mother of Saleh Beg and her party. In one part of this detail the Pacha made use of the following words—"You

know one of the daughters of the late Pacha is my wife; and if, previously to her sisters leaving the harem, in the palace, to live with their husbands, I had made a distinction, in point of dress, or attendants, in favour of my wife, no one could with justice have blamed me; but I assure you, on my honour, that the moment they left the palace, in these respects, whatever the one had, the other had the same."

After this, the Pacha showed the Resident the proofs which had been sent to him of the mother of Saleh Beg having distributed money for the purpose of exciting an insurrection in the town, and a list of the persons said to be distributors and receivers. The Resident felt himself called on to tell the Pacha that he conceived, and indeed was convinced, many persons mentioned in the list were innocent of the crime laid to their charge, and that their names had found place in it partly from what they had done during the former troubles, and partly to gratify a diabolical spirit of private revenge and malice. Both the Pacha and the confidential Ministers, who were present, admitted there were many persons on the list whose guilt seemed even to them very doubtful; and his Highness assured the Resident no one should be punished without ample proof of his deserving it.

In this part of the conversation, the Pacha desired the Resident to give him his opinion as to the propriety of permitting the females of the late Pacha's family to retain in their hands the enormous treasures they secreted at the period of the late Pacha's death, and which he said they made use of to disturb his Government. The Resident replied, policy certainly demanded this money should not be left with them, if they made such an ill use of it; but that of the justice and propriety of taking it from them his Highness must be the best judge. By the reply the Pacha gave, it seemed to the Resident as though he had already settled the affair in his mind.

Amidst a variety of matters relating to the present state of the Government, the Resident took occasion to mention to the

Pacha his idea that the affair at Imaum Hossein had not been viewed in so serious a light by himself and his Ministers as it deserved; and it appeared that the Pacha, at all events, has been most grossly deceived in the business, for he had been made to believe that only one Persian had lost his life. The Thâbet had been changed that very morning, immediately on the Resident's arrival in Camp; and on the Resident's explaining to the Pacha the affair as he believed it to stand, his Highness desired him to write a letter to Meerza Bozurg, a copy of which will be found in the Appendix, No. 1.

On the 12th, in the evening, the Resident returned to Bagdad, and Hassoon was immediately delivered to him.

On the 13th, seven persons were strangled at various periods in the course of the day.

On the 14th, early in the morning, the Resident received a letter from the confidential minister, translation of which will be found in the Appendix, No. 2; and, on the same day, Mohbad Aga, Kheleed Aga, and Suid Kutheree, left Bagdad for Bussora, to be from thence banished to Bombay; and the person under whose charge they went received a letter from the Resident to the Resident at Bussora, a copy of which is in the Appendix, No. 3.

On the 15th, two more persons were strangled, and orders came for the punishment of the mother of Saleh Beg and her daughters, who, however, threw themselves on their sister, Sarah Kanoum, the Pasha's wife, and the chief eunuch of the palace was on this occasion despatched to Camp. Intelligence was also received that the Pacha had caused Neseef Aga and Daoud Beg, sons-in-law to the mother of Saleh Beg, to be arrested, on the 14th, in Camp, and seals were affixed by the Kaimacam on their houses and effects.

On the 16th, in the evening, the chief eunuch of the palace returned from Camp, and the mother of Saleh Beg and her daughters were removed to the Pacha's harem, where it was announced to them the Pacha, at the intercession of Sarah

Kanoum, permitted them to remain in Bagdad, but not to return to their respective houses; and it is now supposed the greater part, if not the whole, of these ladies' treasures have been given up to the Pacha.

The report of to-day is that Neseef Aga and Daoud Beg, allowed but one attendant, are banished to Courdistan, and conveyed there under a strong guard.

The numerous executions have struck great terror into the inhabitants, but the prevailing opinion is that more blood has been shed on this occasion than was necessary. The existence of the conspiracy to the extent reported is much doubted, and some go so far as to imagine it a contrivance to give the Pacha a decent pretext for seizing the treasures of the mother of Saleh Beg and her children, though it cannot be denied that this lady has been guilty of some imprudences, and perhaps intrigues, for which she most assuredly has been severely punished.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

The Resident to Meerza Bozurg.

Bagdad, 14th November, 1803.

After compliments—

My dear friend—A few days ago, I had the pleasure of writing to you, by Ismail Cossid, giving an account of what had happened at Imaum Hossein, enclosing a note from Mohammed Said Beg to me, and assuring you that the Pacha would take such measures, in respect to it, as both friendship and justice should require. Notwithstanding I have no reason to change the opinion I at first expressed that the business was pure accident, nevertheless, I now find that the Pacha, looking only to the preservation of a perfect good understanding between the two States, has taken up the matter, as if the officers of this Government were entirely in fault; and in consequence thereof, on Friday last displaced and imprisoned the Thâbet of Imaum Hossein, appointed Ally Chellaby, a person of pru-

dence and ability, in his place, and withdrew the Agalee guard.

Immediately after these changes had taken place, I had occasion to see the Pacha; and, in the course of conversation thereon, his Highness assured me that he would make a still further inquiry into the business, and, if it appeared any more was necessary to be done, orders should be issued for that purpose. I have before observed that this business, according to my judgment, ought not to bring on any unpleasant discussions; but, recollecting how much things of this sort are in general exaggerated by common report, it has appeared to me very necessary that you should know as soon as possible the satisfactory measures which have been already adopted by this Government, and the satisfactory assurances above-mentioned, which the Pacha made to me himself; for which purpose I despatch an express messenger.

I have also to inform you that Abdullah Pacha, the ex-Pacha of Damascus, has thrown himself on the Pacha's protection, and is at present in his camp. The manner in which his Highness has treated him would make one almost think that the munificence and generosity of the old Caliphs of Bagdad, so much vaunted in history, is copied by Ally Pacha; for, amongst other things which he sent Abdullah Pacha, he sent him fourteen horses, with the most superb furniture; 2000 pieces of gold for his private purse; 14,000 piastres for his public expenses; ten complete suits of clothes for a Pacha; ten Georgian slaves; and two most superb tents; appointing at the same time 100 of his own Itch Agasi to attend and wait on him.

The Pacha's camp is very large, and he has with him Arabs from all parts, who form a camp by themselves, to such an extent, that, when I passed through it, in my way to the Pacha's camp, I was near two hours in the middle of camels and Arabs.

Pray accept my best wishes for your health and happiness, and believe me, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

No. 2.

Translation ad sensum of a Letter from Mohammed Sayd Beg to the Resident.

After compliments—

My dear friend—I have to inform you the Pacha has commanded three of the persons concerned in the late plots at Bagdad to be punished at Bombay; and it is in conformity to his Highness's directions that I express to you his wishes they should proceed thither in one of the Honourable Company's vessels, and that they be not permitted to remain at any place short of Bombay, but, when landed there, to be afterwards at liberty to go where they please. The reason of this request is, because certain persons, who have been formerly banished to India, landed at different ports short of it, and remained there.

The Pacha doubts not but you will comply with his wishes in this respect, and the Kaimacam is directed to give you an account in detail why these persons are punished by banishment.

MOHAMMED SAYD.

No. 3.

To Samuel Manesty, Esq., Resident at Bussora.

Bagdad, November 14, 1803.

Sir—I am deprived of the honour of your letters since those dated in the month of September.

His Highness the Pacha joined his camp on the 21st of last month, and within these few days a conspiracy of a very extensive nature against his government has been discovered. It seems to have been proposed that an insurrection in the city and in camp should take place at the same time; and, by report, persons of considerable consequence are implicated in this dark business.

Early this morning, I received a letter from Mohammed Sayd Beg, the confidential Minister, expressing the Pacha's wishes in respect to certain of the conspirators, whom he proposes to banish. I do myself the honour of enclosing, for your

information, a copy of the letter above-mentioned; and I take the liberty of recommending to you to order that the conspirators[1] now sent to Bussora be conveyed to Bombay, according to the Pacha's wishes, in some of the Honourable Company's vessels proceeding there. Notwithstanding the unfortunate situation in which these persons stand, I feel myself bound to express a hope (although, from your uniform humanity, it is almost unnecessary to do so) you will direct that, as long as they shall be on board a British vessel, they be treated with decent attention.

May I beg the favour of you to lay a copy of this letter and its enclosures before our honourable superiors at the Presidency, assuring you, I have the honour to be, with perfect respect,

Sir, your very humble servant,

HARFORD JONES.

À M. Jones à Bagdad.

Buyukdéré, sur le Canal de la Mer Noire,
le 13me Octobre, 1803.

Monsieur — En réponse à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur d'écrire en date du 1er Juillet, je vous prie d'accepter mes remercimens sincères pour l'intérêt avec lequel vous avez bien voulu vous employer en faveur de la veuve Babie pour mettre à convert les biens délaissés de son défunt mari. Je vous prie aujourd'hui, Monsieur, de continuer aussi vos bons offices et vos soins au sujet impérial, Et^nc^ Babie, qui, muni du ferman nécessaire, s'est acheminé vers Bagdad pour y cueillir l'héritage de son défunt frère.

Il m'est revenu par ouï-dire que le Pasha de Bagdad s'est permis de molester sous différens prétextes notre Barataire Abdullah Jusuf, et de le maltraiter sans raison légitime: n'ayant point d'informations exactes à ce sujet, je ne saurois mieux faire que de recommander de mon mieux ce Barataire Impérial à

[1] Mohtad Aga, Governor to Saleh Beg, infant son of the late Pacha; and Kheleed Aga, Chief Eunuch to the mother of Saleh Beg, Suid Kutheree.

votre protection et à vos soins pour le mettre à l'abri des avanies de ce Pasha.

La complaisance avec laquelle vous vous êtes employé, Monsieur, jusqu'ici pour les nationaux et protégés de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale m' engage à vous démander si vous voudriez bien accepter le Vice Consulat Impérial et Royal à Bagdad, et si, pour cet effet, il suffit d'un concert de vous à moi, ou s'il faut que je m'adresse aussi à l'Ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique, ou à l'agent de la Compagnie des Indes résidant ici.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

STURMER.

À Monsieur le Baron Sturmer, &c.

Bagdad, le 20me Novembre, 1803.

Monsieur—J'ai l'honneur d'accuser la réception de votre lettre du 13me Octobre, et je suis bien aise que les petits soins et services que de tems en tems j'ai rendus aux Nationaux et Protégés de S. M. I. R. en cette ville, vous ont été agréables.

Pour ce qui concerne l'affaire de votre Barataire Abdullah Jusouf, je m'imagine que naturellement il ne manquera pas de vous donner les informations nécessaires: en toutes occasions, je serai prêt autant qu'il sera en mon pouvoir d'exécuter vos souhaits, mais la franchise exige que je vous dise sans équivoque que l'affaire du dit Barataire est une affaire dans laquelle je ne puis pas m'ingérer sans les ordres exprès de son Excellence, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à la Porte Ottomanne.

Pour ce qui concerne l'offre que vous m'avez fait du Vice-Consulat de S. M. I. R. à Bagdad, il me semble que je ne suis pas en liberté d'accepter un pareil poste, sans la permission expresse du Roi et de mes Superieurs immédiats Messieurs les très Honorables les Directeurs de la Compagnie des Indes, et outre cela il faut que j'ajoute, qu'ayant l'honneur de remplir l'office de Résident et Consul Britannique à cette cour, le poste de Vice-Consul d'une autre puissance, tant respectable qu'elle puisse être, ne me convient pas.

Au reste, Monsieur, j'ai l'honneur de répéter que je m'empresserai toujours de manifester la parfaite considération avec quelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Translation ad sensum of a Letter from Meerza Bozurg to the Resident, received December 6, 1803.

After compliments—

The arrival of Ismail Cossid afforded me particular pleasure, as it relieved me from the anxiety I was under in respect to your health, and informed me that the State seal for the Pacha met your approbation; for I beg of you to believe that, in every business which you may have here, I shall never be found wanting to do all in my power.

I must also offer you my sincere congratulations on your receiving from Constantinople the Order of the Crescent, the account of which you may be assured gave me the greatest satisfaction. May your credit and honour be daily increased!

The account you have been kind enough to give me of the expulsion of the Wahabies from Mecca was a matter of great satisfaction to everybody here.

The information also which you have been good enough to send me respecting Teflis agrees perfectly with all the intelligence from those parts which we have here. However, you mention that one of the sons of the late Prince is in Azarbaijan, and one in Daghistan; but both of them, one named Iskander Meerza, and the other Tannouras Murza, have lately arrived at Tehran, and have not failed to make to the King the amplest representations on the present state of Georgia.

In consequence thereof, his Majesty has it in contemplation to repel the invasion of the Russians, and to put Georgia on its former footing in respect to Persia; so that, God willing, after the regal feast of Nourouz, whatever resolutions his Majesty has formed on this subject will be apparent and public.

1st Note enclosed in the foregoing.

In the way of friendship, in reply to your inquiry of the present state of Caboul and Candahar, what has come to my knowledge for certainty on this subject is as follows:—

Some time ago, Shah Zadeh Kusir, the son of Shah Zeman, sought the protection and assistance of his Majesty, which having been granted to him, he departed from Tehran for Candahar and Caboul; Shah Zadeh Suja ul Mulk acquainted his brother Mahmood with the reception and assistance Shah Zadeh Kusir had met with from his Majesty; so that Shah Zadeh Suja ul Mulk fell on Mahmood on the one side, and Shah Zadeh Kuser on the other.

Suja ul Mulk quickly got possession of the city of Caboul, seized Shah Zadeh Mahmood, and imprisoned him in the strong fortress of Bala Hassar; and afterwards, remaining himself at Caboul, he despatched his brother Shah Zadeh Hyder, and Ahmed Khan Nourzaie, with a large army, to Candahar, to assist Shah Zadeh Kusir. They met near Candahar, and in consequence thereof, Shah Zadeh Kiamnan, the son of Shah Mahmood, fled with fifty horse to Herat.

Things at Herat are in the greatest state of confusion imaginable, and the inhabitants have entered into negociations with the Prince Ibrahim and Esau Khan, the King's general on the confines of Korassan, shortly to deliver up Herat to his Majesty Fateh Ally Shah.

2nd Note.

What you have written me about the person supposed to be a Turkish Ambassador to this Court, some of the people of the Government at Bagdad have written to the same purpose, namely, that his mission extended only to the examination of the accounts, &c., of the late Pacha.

Regarding the Pacha's intention of sending a Peisheush to his Majesty, and what you say, that it has been delayed on account of some of the Articles not being ready, it is most

manifest that his Majesty is by no means anxious on this subject; and I have to remark that, whatever proofs of a wish to preserve a good understanding and friendship the Bagdad Government give his Majesty, it will be for its advantage and benefit; for you may rely that in this way his Majesty will not be behind with them.

3rd Note.

What you have written to me regarding the accident at Imaum Hossein I have understood; and I received the paper mentioned to have been enclosed in your note. In respect to what you mention, that the Pacha will make proper inquiry into this business, inflict on those who deserve it such punishment as may be necessary, and take some measures to satisfy the pilgrims, I must remark, that it would have been much better and more proper that the account of the affray, and satisfactory measures the Pacha had taken thereon, should have reached us at the same time, so that they might both at once have been laid before his Majesty.

On this account I have, from friendship, done every thing in my power to keep the matter secret; and have recommended the same to my brother Ministers, lest this unfortunate business, in its present crude state, should reach his Majesty's ears, and so become the origin of serious and great misunderstanding. Therefore, you, who are our friend, will, I hope, without the smallest delay, send me a detailed account of the measures taken to punish the guilty, and to satisfy the injured pilgrims, by which means you will accomplish what true friendship demands.

Samuel Manesty to Harford Jones, Esq., Resident at Bagdad.

Bussora, November 19th, 1803.

Sir—Since I had the pleasure to write to you on the 21st September, I have received your several communications to

that of the 2nd instant with their enclosures, and the packets for India, by which they were accompanied, all which were carefully forwarded to Bombay, on the 15th instant, by the Antelope.

This morning, a strong south-westerly wind unexpectedly imported the Honourable Company's brig, the Viper, from Bombay, with the commands of the Honourable the President in Council, of the 25th September; and I now transmit you by an express Chocadar, with six packets, to your address from Bushire and Bombay, your private letters and twenty-two packages of newspapers for you and the King's ambassador at Constantinople, a large packet for the agent there, containing an original packet from Bombay for the Honourable the Court of Directors, which you will please to forward from Bagdad to Constantinople by an express Tartar without delay.

The duplicate of the packet in question for the Honourable the Court of Directors will be forwarded to you by another express Chocadar, previously to the close of the month, and I shall then explain to you my motives for my present arrangements. In the mean time, I request, in the event of arrival at Bagdad of messengers from Aleppo, robbed or pretending to be robbed of their camels, that you will take the packet or packets under their care from them, forward it or them to me by other messengers, or by a Carafee, and decline to advance them even one single piastre, on the public account, on any consideration whatever.

As the Viper entered the Gulf on the 25th ultimo, and was long detained in the vicinity of the Coins, by the prevalence there of a north-west wind, I calculate that the Atalanta frigate never entered the Gulf, and that, having accomplished the object of her voyage to Muscat, she returned thence to the Mauritius.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Translation ad Sensum of a Letter from Meerza Bozurg, received the 28th December, 1803.

After titles and compliments,—

My dear friend—Your letter by Hajee Hassan reached me in the most fortunate of all times, and gave me the greatest pleasure in finding it left you in good health.

In respect to the accident which happened at Kerbelai, the removal of the Thâbet, and the withdrawing the Agalee guard, &c., I have clearly understood all that you have written thereon, as, most fortunately, no memorial on this subject from the pilgrims or Persians living at Kerbelai has reached this Court. From the friendship I bear towards you, and the acquaintance which existed between my late noble uncle and the Ministers at Bagdad, to whomsoever has opened this matter, I have observed the fault must evidently be on the side of the Persians; for, had it been otherwise, they would not have neglected to have forwarded their supplications to us; besides which, I have prevented those who came here with a verbal account of the business making any representations to my brother Ministers. But, should it so happen that the affair should reach his Majesty's ears, I shall then lay before him the account you have sent me of it, and add that the Pacha has changed the Thâbet, and punished those who deserved it; and that you, my friend, lent the pilgrims and other Persians the most friendly and acceptable assistance.

Regarding what you wrote me before, that the Pacha intended to send a person to this Court, I must remark, there appears a delay in the affair; therefore, in the way of friendship, I must tell you, who are the mediator between the two Governments, that any longer delay in the despatch of this person will certainly create a coolness.

I beg the favour of you to give me always such intelligence as may come to your hand in respect to the Wahaby, and the

affairs of Mecca and Medina, and to favour me with such business as you may have here.

I have unavoidably detained your Cossid two days; but now, at ten o'clock on Friday the 23rd Shabaun, he is despatched; and it is necessary to inform you that, on the preceding night, the most excellent of ladies, the royal ornament of the Hareem, his Majesty's mother, departed this life, and that the corpse will be brought to be interred at Imaum Ally. The friendship existing between us requires I should apprize you of this.

Extract of a Letter from Owanes Pitcairn, dated Tehran, the 8th December, and received the 28th.

I have to inform you that five vessels belonging to the Emperor have arrived from Astracan, at Baku, which have brought great quantity of provisions, and a large sum of money, which they landed and returned. It is reported also that a number of troops will soon arrive; if this be true, it is a certain sign that hostilities will take place. The vessels that leave Astracan in the autumn must soon arrive, and they will bring something certain, but certainly every thing bespeaks approaching war.

The King continues to show great favour and respect to the sons of the late Wali; and he tells them I will give you an army, and I myself in the spring will march to Teflis, take it, and restore it to you. This, however, seems to me an empty sound (in the original a trumpet.) At all events, the King remains here this winter.

The Khan of Gandja has repeatedly required assistance, but I see no preparations going on here; and the Russians have a force beyond all account.

I heard that the Khan of Gandja has taken a foraging party of Russians prisoners, and is about to send them here.

Mr. Peter Tooke to Mr. Harford Jones.

Constantinople, December 16, 1803.

My dear Sir,—I had the satisfaction of writing to you, on the 7th current, by the Tartar, despatched by this Government, who, you will perceive, was detained to the 10th. My conjecture that the letter I was required to address to you hastily on the 6th, to acknowledge the reception of the cash, which, by the bye, I had not yet received, was solely intended to expose to the Sultan that it was remitted to the Pacha, was well founded, as I received the cash from the Sultan's private treasury; from whence I conclude that the Sultan furnished that supply: and it affords me some reason to apprehend that the Minister's call on his Highness for money is made without the knowledge of the Sultan; otherwise, how can we reconcile this mission to the Pasha with the pretension of a large sum to him?

The notes of your conference are exceedingly interesting: it appears that his Highness is very minutely informed of what passes here, and I assure you it is in no point whatever exaggerated. I took notice in my last of the reflection his Highness made—"and nothing happens at Constantinople;" we all apprehend it from day to day. The sole impediment to a catastrophe is that the heir is known to be violent, and it may be judged proper that his temper should be tempered by a more advanced age, as he does not exceed twenty years—a circumstance which interests equally the Ministers and nation.

Very lately, a commotion took place among the militia: they plainly declared that, according to the laws of the Empire, after seven years' sterility, the Sultan could no longer reign, whereas fourteen years were elapsed. It is said it cost the lives of about 300 persons. Nothing can be more judicious than his Highness's reflections on the position of public affairs, and his position, in particular. If the Government here is actuated by common sense, they will leave him to act on his own system.

I am, &c., PETER TOOKE.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, December 29, 1803.

My Lord—In transmitting to your lordship duplicates of my despatches of the 7th and 9th instant, I avail myself of the opportunity to acquaint you that, at audience which I had of the Pacha late on the night of the 18th instant, he imparted to me, under a promise of the strictest secrecy, (with leave, however, to make it known to your lordship) the following fact.

[The fact in question is communicated in cipher.]

This fact is now known only to me, the Grand Vizier, yourself, and my confidential minister.

Early this morning, the messenger despatched to Persia in the beginning of November returned, bringing me a letter and note from Meerza Bozurg, of both which I have the honour to enclose a translation.

The death of the Queen-mother of Persia is generally regarded as a very unfortunate event, as she was a lady of great prudence and ability, and contrived, by address and dexterity, to keep the King and several branches of the royal family on better terms than they would otherwise have been. The Government here assure me they mean to pay the same, if not greater, honour to the corpse than was paid to the Queen-mother when she visited Bagdad during her lifetime; and I apprehend that, considering the amity which fortunately subsists between his Persian Majesty and the Honourable Company, some attentions on this occasion will be necessary on my part.

I have also the honour to enclose the translation of a letter from a person who is employed by me at Reshd, but at present is at Tehran. I have every reason to believe the state of Affghanistan to be as confused and bad as it can be.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. Harford Jones to Mr. Tooke.

Bagdad, January 20, 1804.

My dear Sir—It is in consequence of a notification confidentially made to me a few days ago by the Pacha, that I mentioned to you his Highness is desirous to change his Agent, or Kapikiassy, at the Porte; and it is at the Pacha's earnest and particular request I solicit that you will be kind enough to transmit to me, as early as possible, your opinion of the person whom it may be most eligible for his Highness to make choice of, in the place of Mohammed Riffi Effendi, whose unfitness for his present employment was last year secretly noticed to me by his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.

The Pacha expressly desires me to say he places great confidence in your discernment and in your perfect knowledge of the characters of the principal and sous-ministres of the Porte; therefore I need only remark that, in addition to possessing activity and personal weight, it seems indispensably necessary the Pasha's Agent should have the degree of attachment and fidelity to his employer's interests, which will prevent him obsequiously sacrificing them to his devotion to the Ottoman ministers.

I must beg the favour of you privately to communicate the contents of this letter to his Majesty's Minister; and I am sure it needs not to be pointed out the benefit which must accrue to the public service from the Pacha's Kapikiassy being, as one may say, a person of our choosing, or the great necessity for keeping the Pacha's present intention an impenetrable secret, until the affair be ultimately concluded.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, January 24, 1804.

My Lord—With the duplicates of my last despatch to your lordships of the 29th December, I have the honour to enclose

a copy of the Calcutta Gazettes Extraordinary, of the 23rd and 24th September, 1803, and to offer you my respectful congralations on the brilliant success which has marked the progress of the British arms in the north of India.

The enclosed copy of a letter from the Resident at Bussora to me, dated the 17th December, will acquaint your lordship of that gentleman having taken charge from Mr. Lovett, the Resident at Bushire, of a mission to the court of Tehran.

The enclosed copy of a correspondence, which has lately passed between Meerza Bozurg and me, merits your lordship's notice, as it contains an intimation of the submission of Meshed, the capital of Khorassan, to the arms of his Persian Majesty, and an account of the steps I took in a very delicate affair between this Court and that of Tehran, in which my assistance and interference were requested by the Meerza.

The latest accounts received here from Caboul confirm in general the information contained in the bulletin which I had the honour to transmit, in the beginning of last December; that is to say, the deposition of Shah Mahmood, the restoration to the throne, though in a state of blindness, of Zeman Shah, and the scarcely precedented moderation in Asia of Sujaa ul Mulk, in acting as Vizeer to his brother. Shahzadeh Firouzeddin, together with the son of Shah Mahmood, remain possessors of Herât; and I hear, on the one hand, that they have made overtures of accommodation to their brothers and uncles at Caboul; and, on the other, that they have solicited, on certain terms, the protection of the King of Persia.

Several of the Pacha's distant relations have lately arrived from Georgia, and his Highness yesterday told me that he had examined them very particularly on the state of that country, and that the answers he had received from them confirmed the major and more consequential part of the information I had lately the honour to send your lordship on this subject.

A circumstance took place, at the presentation of Mustafa Khàn to the Pacha, which, as it marks the impression the in-

vasion of Georgia by the Russians has made in Persia, is worth noticing to your lordship. His Highness sometimes, either from absence of mind, or perhaps having his thoughts engaged on a particular subject, puts very unexpected questions to those introduced to him. To Mustafa Khàn, without using the customary etiquette of inquiring after the King's health, his Highness, after bidding him sit down, said—"Who is the present governor of Teflis?" The poor Khàn, with manifest confusion, answered—"A Russian." The next day he visited me, and complained bitterly of the Pacha's conduct; declaring he would represent the *insult* he had received to his Majesty. I told him I was convinced the Pacha meant him no insult by the question he had put to him; and that I believed I could account for the motive which induced him to make it so *mal à propos*. "A Tartar is under despatch for Constantinople," said I; "the Pacha and I have been puzzling to make out the real name of the Russian General in Georgia; and his Highness conceived it possible you might be able to clear up our doubts in this respect." The Khàn seemed satisfied with this excuse; but I think it is evident the invasion of Georgia is a subject on which the Court of Tehran is very sore, when a public agent thinks a question relating to it must necessarily imply a design to insult him.

The enclosed copies of private letters from and to the Honourable Company's agent at Constantinople contain some interesting information, and therefore I venture to lay them before your lordship, having the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Bagdad, January 29, 1804.

My Lord—The preceding letter was prepared for your lordship on the 24th instant, together with the copies of the papers mentioned therein, and designed to have been sent by a Tartar despatched on account of the Honourable Company; but on the 26th the Pacha sent me notice of his having suddenly

resolved to despatch a Tartar to Constantinople, who would depart within half an hour. I therefore addressed your lordship a few lines in great haste, to accompany the copy of the Calcutta Gazettes Extraordinary, which I had then the honour to transmit.

By an express Chocadar, who arrived this morning from Bussora, I received intelligence from Bombay as late as the 14th November. A gentleman at Bombay, under the 31st October, writes me—"The papers you will receive by this opportunity are very different from what you have lately seen: they contain intelligence of our late rapid and brilliant successes against the Mahrattas, in consequence of which, it is said, they are desirous to sue for peace.

"Major Malcolm, who is one of the commissioners appointed to treat with the Mahratta States, set off from thence this morning to join General Wellesley's army, which, by the last accounts, had descended the Ajunte Pass. Colonel Stevenson has taken possession of Berhampoor without resistance; indeed, Scindia, since his late defeat, seems studiously to avoid our armies. He is now at a place called Chupprah, a little to the northward of the Tappy."

Under the 14th November, the same gentleman writes me —"I have much satisfaction in communicating to you the following extract of a letter dated the 8th instant, from General Wellesley's camp:—

"We have no other news than the arrival, yesterday evening, of Esswant Raö Gorepoora, a Vakeel from Scindia to General Wellesley; and, as I know the General would not hear of any Vakeel, unless he was perfectly convinced of the sincerity of Scindia's desire to treat for peace, I think you may safely say we are in a fair way of finishing with one of the powers, General Wellesley meets the Vakeel, and conducts him to his tent. This evening, at 4 p.m., a salute of thirteen guns is to be fired on his arrival. The Borar Rajah continues far to the south-eastward of us, on the banks of the Godavery."

His Highness the Pacha having expressed himself desirous to answer the letter your lordship addressed to him, in the month of April last, I have not thought it by any means convenient to check this disposition of the Pacha to strengthen his connexions with the British Government, and more particularly in this respect, as an intercourse of friendly letters can be attended with no inconvenience, and, in the present situation of Turkey and Europe, may be found extremely useful. I have therefore the honour to enclose a letter in the Turkish language from the Pacha to your lordship's address, to which, if your lordship thinks it proper, I shall hope you will reply. The letter is written in Turkish, at the express desire of the Pacha, as he conceives your lordship will find no difficulty in getting it translated by some of the interpreters belonging to the Turkish mission in London.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, February, 1804.

My Lord—I had the honour of writing to your lordship last under the 29th January, and I have now that of enclosing a copy of the Bombay Courier Extraordinary of the 3rd December, a copy of a letter dated the 18th January, from the Resident at Bushire to me, and a copy of a letter from Captain Vashon, commander of his Majesty's frigate, the Fox, to the Resident at Bussora.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. J. H. Lovett to Mr. H. Jones.

Bushire, January 18, 1804.

Sir—I have the honour to inform you of the arrival here, on the 14th instant, of the Fyz Rebbany from Bombay, having on board Aga Husun, Aga Hosyn, and the remaining attendants of the late Persian Ambassador, under convoy of his

Majesty's ship Fox. They landed next day, under an appropriate salute from the ship.

I enclose you a copy of a letter dated 15th instant, from the commander of his Majesty's ship to the Resident at Bussora; by which you will perceive that he fell in with the corvette noticed in my last, of 13th January, though unfortunately without success.

The Centurion and Fox seized a number of Frenchmen in an Arab dow, during their stay at Muscat. The Imaum was at Hormuz at the time.

Yesterday cast anchor in the inner roads the Honourable Company's cruisers, Panther and Viper. Mr. Manesty, I have the satisfaction to add, has arrived by this opportunity.

The Creole, I am sorry to inform you, has been stranded at the entrance of Bussora River. The Diamond sails for India to-morrow.

A report has reached this of the capture of Meshed, which would complete the conquest of Khorassan. It is, however, by many looked upon as a fabrication: nay, the relief of the city by the Uzbecks, and the defeat and death of Eesa Khàn, the King of Persia's General, have been subsequently stated in direct contradiction to the first intelligence.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. H. Lovett.

Captain Vashon, R.N., to Mr. Manesty.

H.M.S. Fox, at anchor off Bushire, January 15, 1804.

Sir—I have the honour to inform you his Majesty's ship under my command is arrived here, in order to give convoy to the trade to Bombay, or afford any further assistance that may be conducive to the good of his Majesty's or Honourable Company's service; for which purpose, if circumstances require, I shall remain in the Gulf till the 10th or 15th of next month (February); and if you or Mr. Lovett (whom I shall consult) think it will answer any other beneficial purpose, by having a

more speedy communication with Bussora, I shall proceed as near the Sand Head of the entrance into the channel of the river leading thereto as may be safe for the ship.

It is proper to acquaint you that about three days' sail from Muskat (in latitude 23°, 12′, N. longitude, 65°, 14′, E.) we fell in with a French corvette; unfortunately, there being little wind at the time, enabled them to make use of their sweeps to great advantage, in consequence of which I am sorry to say she got away from us: from her hoisting French colours, when at a great distance, and making private signals, with other circumstances attending the chase, gives me every reason to suppose that other of the enemy's vessels are likely to be with her in this quarter. The Centurion will remain between Cape Roulgate and Jaques till the 16th instant, when she goes over to the Gulf of Cutch and contiguous coast of Guzerat.

I have the honour to be, &c., J. Vashon.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, February 17, 1804.

My Lord—In forwarding the duplicates of my despatches to your lordship of the 29th January and 8th February, I avail myself of the opportunity to lay before you a copy of my present letter to the Honourable the Chairman of the Court of Directors, and respectfully to offer your lordship my congratulations on the brilliant and unparalleled success which has attended the British arms in India.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Harford Jones.

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable Jacob Bosanquet.

Bagdad, February 17, 1804.

Honourable Sir—With the duplicates of my last despatches of the 31st January and 8th instant, I have the honour to enclose two packets to the address of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and one to that of the Honourable the Secret Committee, together with copies of letters from Mr. Manesty, at

Bushire, to me, which accompanied them. Two of these packets reached me on the 14th, and the other on the 16th instant.

Respectfully offering you my congratulations on the brilliant success which has attended the British arms in India, I beg leave to extract the following paragraph of a private letter to me, dated the 31st December, from the Honourable the Governor of Bombay, and received here on the 16th instant.

"A cessation of hostilities has taken place with Scindia, but not as yet with the Berar Rajah, one of whose principal hill forts, called Pyaut, or Gawul Gur, General Wellesley was about to lay siege to, when the latest accounts that have reached us, that is of the 7th instant, were despatched."

I also do myself the honour to enclose a sheet of the "Bombay Courier," of the 10th December, containing the official account of General Lake's glorious and memorable victory.

This morning his Highness the Pacha called me to conference at an assembled council, and delivered to me a letter for his Excellency the Governor-General; the purport of which, for your further information, is noted to Mr. Willis in cipher; but, as the greater part of what passed at this conference cannot be communicated to you but in cipher, I must solicit your indulgence to postpone forwarding an account of it until the despatch. I notified to his Highness the honourable treatment his envoy was likely to receive from the British Government, at which he expressed the highest satisfaction.

Mr. Charles Daniel Gottman returned here some days ago from Bussora.

Having nothing from Persia or Caboul worthy your notice, I beg leave to subscribe myself, &c., HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosure in Mr. Jones's of March 5, 1804.]

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable Jacob Bosanquet.

Bagdad, March 5, 1804.

Honourable Sir—The preceding is a duplicate of my address of the 17th February; and I have now the honour to enclose

a duplicate packet, to the address of the Honourable the Court of Directors, which I received from Bussora, by express Arab messengers, on the 26th February, in the morning. I have now also the honour to enclose, for your information, translations of notes to me from Meerza Bozurg, received on the 22nd ult., and the extract of a letter from a person employed by me at Tehran, which reached my hands on the 25th following.

The King has proceeded, some time since, towards Mazanderan, and I have been told the principal motive of his Majesty's journey is to possess himself of a considerable treasure secreted in that province by his late uncle Mohammed Khan, and disclosed to his Majesty by his mother on her death-bed.

About the 28th and 29th of last month, the Government here received information of great importance from the Mussaleem of Bussora; and on the 3rd instant, the Pacha directed the confidential Minister to communicate the contents of these despatches to me. I have now the honour to enclose a copy of the notes I took for my own satisfaction, after the Minister left me, as well as a copy of a note from me to Meerza Bozurg, written at the earnest and express desire of this Government, on the subject of the Mussaleem's despatches.

I have now the honour to enclose a copy in cipher of my address of the 19th February to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, which contains a full account of the affair alluded to in my last address, about which I was called to conference with the Pacha on the 17th February. I shrewdly suspect, although the Government here affirm the contrary, that the request therein made to his Excellency is somehow or other connected or rather has originated in hints or information it had previously received of the march of the Persians; and, therefore, though I am still of opinion that, under certain circumstances, it would be good policy to render the hands of this Government as strong as possible, yet it is certain no measure which might embroil us or bring on disagreeable discussions with Persia should be adopted. I shall,

therefore, take the liberty of submitting to his Excellency the Governor-General, supposing he should feel inclined to comply with the Pacha's wishes, the propriety of declining to do so until the disposition of the Court of Persia to this Government shall be better ascertained.

I have detained the duplicate packet to the address of the Honourable the Court of Directors, now enclosed, to the present day, in the hope of being thereby, as I hourly expect the arrival of a Tartar from Constantinople, enabled early to acknowledge the receipt of public despatches from London, of probably receiving original advices from India, and thereby saving the expense of an express Tartar, and of the arrival of the person mentioned to have been despatched to the Pacha from Tehran; which would have enabled me to have afforded you some certain lights respecting the Persian troops at Bebehàn.

The monthly accounts of the mission in December and January are now transmitted.

I have the honour to be, &c., HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosures from Mr. H. Jones.]

Translation ad Sensum of a Note from the Pacha to the Imaum.

Be it known—

It has reached us, that a person has arrived, with your honour, on the part of the French, the purport of whose coming was to obtain leave from you for a Balios to reside at Muscat; and that your honour made excuses on this point, and did not consent thereto, so that the French messenger returned unsatisfied.

This prudent conduct, on the part of your honour, has afforded us the greatest satisfaction; as we easily perceive therein that you exercised great penetration in sending away the Frenchman without complying with his request. We, indeed, have no doubt that your resolution to refuse the requests of this agent is a particular favour shown to you by

God for your protection in this world and salvation in the next; for, time out of mind, the French have conducted all their business by stratagem and falsehoods, which has been exemplified in their behaviour to the Sublime Porte, between whom and these people there had been neither war nor coolness, as had often happened between the Porte and other European powers. The Sublime Porte, therefore, perhaps at one time placed particular confidence in their friendship and alliance; and they, indeed, professed themselves to be such friends to the Sublime Porte, that they desired to be numbered amongst the *Osmanlies*, and to be ranked as Janissaries, whose uniform they put on. This went on until their schemes were ripe; and then they seized on Egypt, where they did whatever pleased them; which most certainly your honour knows.

And it was not possible to expel them from Egypt but at an enormous expense and trouble; so that the desire they have expressed to have a Resident with you at Muscat is only deceit, for their numbers are very great and their resources very small; and, therefore, they are always ready to seize on the possessions of others: not like the English, who have India in their hands, and are contented and satisfied therewith; as their numbers are small, and revenues very great. The French are, in all respects, the exact reverse of the English, for they get into countries on various pretences; and, when once there, they never rest until they have made themselves masters of them. Now, they regard Muscat as a most strong port, of which, if it once falls into their hands, no one can dispossess them: and this is very true, that, if they once get there, no one will be able to drive them out; and, by God, they will do this, if you are not on your guard, little by little, and become masters of all your ports! and from thence they will proceed to others, which will be a great affliction to all Muslim Governments, and affect equally their temporal and spiritual interests. Repentance will then avail nothing;

counsel will be useless; therefore, the very meaning of our addressing your honour is contained in three points:—First, to counsel you in regard to religion; second, to advise you in the way of friendship; and third, to tell you from experience what the Sublime Porte has suffered from French ambassadors and French emissaries.

God willing (and we repeat it)—God willing, a person like your honour will not loosely regard a business of this consequence; for to your wisdom the deceit, falsehood, and bad faith of these people must be apparent; but if your honour should be strongly pressed to admit this French Resident, and you should be inclined to do so, thinking, if the friendship of the English is not sincere, it may be a kind of balance to them, you have nothing to do but to inform us, and we will become a mediator between you and them; and procure such friendly arrangements from the English Government, between you and them, as shall last for ever. The English are the most perfect in their friendship of all other European powers; for they are a satisfied people, and do not envy the possessions of others, for their revenues are very great; but the French, as we have said before, are the reverse, and have now turned their thoughts towards plundering distant countries. Besides which, the English are become your neighbours, and the seas and India are in their hands, and a great commerce is carried on between you and them; and, therefore, if now or hereafter you permit a French establishment with you, it will certainly lead to a war, between you, the Sublime Porte, and the English; and this, most assuredly, will be very bad for your honour. A French establishment at Muscat can be no advantage to you in this world or the next.

Our motive in saying all this is no other than affection to your welfare; and, we repeat, should the French make a second proposal of this sort to your honour, on no account listen to their speeches, nor comply with their solicitations: separate yourself from their detestable proposals, and count it a peculiar

mark of God's providence that you, I, and all the Mussulmans, are at present secure from these diabolical rascals.

ALLY,
Governor of Bagdad, &c., &c.

Translation of a Note from Meerza Bozurg to the Resident, received on the 22nd February.

My dear friend—I must repeat to you, as you have been the cause of so intimate a connexion and friendship between this Court and the Government of Bagdad, that, in respect to the delay which has taken place in the despatch of the Pacha's proposed envoy, it is necessary for you to know that a longer procrastination of this affair will be considered here as ill according with the friendly dispositions and sentiments which you have assured us are entertained towards this Government by that of Bagdad; being informed of this, I am sure you will do all in your power to hasten the departure of the proposed envoy.

2nd Note received at the same time.

Before this, I sent you some particulars of what has passed in Khorassan: what has newly reached us from thence is, that Nadir Meerza, and all the sons of Shahrokh Shah, have fallen into the hands of the King's troops, and will shortly arrive at Tehran. The Governors of certain of the fortresses of Khorassan, which held out against the King, such as Kalaat, Chenaràn, and Derejez, have also lately arrived, with the Prince Mohammed Veli, the King's lieutenant in those parts, and have delivered up their fortresses to him.

Shahzadeh Ferouzeddin, the son of Teimour Shah, who is at Herât, has also directed the Khotbeh to be read in the King's name, and coins to be struck in the same; and has sent certain persons of consideration as hostages to Meshed, and has desired of the King to appoint him Governor of those countries; so that, God willing, in a short time Candahar and its dependencies will acknowledge the Government of his Majesty.

On the side of Azarbaïjan, the principal persons of Shirwan and Daghestàn have submitted themselves to his Majesty, and have most earnestly besought his Majesty that he would turn his arms and thoughts towards taking Georgia and driving out the Russians. Alexander and Teimouras Meerza, the late Prince of Georgia's sons, that are here, have requested to march on this business with the King's troops; but, as the Prince Royal has been appointed to conduct this affair, and has been directed to hold his forces in readiness, it has been declared to the principal persons of Shirwan and Daghestàn to await his approach.

In regard to the arrival of the European ambassador, notwithstanding it is your part to give me information on such affairs, nevertheless, as in these times, a letter from Ally Khàn Nasacchi Basti, who was appointed the Mehmandar to the said ambassador, has arrived; and in order that you be fully informed of its contents I enclose his letter, by which you will understand the whole; it is directed that I, your friend, am to attend to the affairs and reception of this person on his arrival at Tehran.

Ally Khàn to Meerza Bozurg.

Your honour will understand that, on the 10th of this month, Ramazan, a letter from Mr. Lovett, the ambassador, that is at Bunder Bushire, to Mohammed Nebu Khàn, and another from Aga Baba Khàn to Cheraug Ally Khàn, arrived — the contents of both which were, that the journey of Mr. Lovett has been postponed; and that Mr. Manesty, the Resident at Bussora, had been appointed to proceed to Eràn; and, according to Aga Baba Khàn's letter, the baggage of the new ambassador had arrived at Bushire, and himself expected to arrive in three or four days more. But, as the day of his arrival at Bushire is not exactly known, I have not written an arze dasht to the Prince Royal on this subject; when he arrives, I shall not fail to do so.

Extract of a Letter dated Tehran, the 6th February, from Owannes Pitcairn to the Resident, and received the 25th February, 1804.

Two days ago, Nadir Meerza, his three brothers, and five sons, arrived here as prisoners in irons, and were immediately strictly confined.

We have now accounts that the Russians have taken Pandja; in consequence, Peer Kooli Khàn has been despatched in haste to Azarbaïjan, where he is ordered to take the command of 12,000 troops, march to Pandja, and retake it.

Joût Khàn, who was in rebellion, and is with the Koor Oglus, has by force taken possession of Kooë, the Governor of which place, a Khajar, fled, and yesterday, with a few horsemen, arrived here. By report, Joût Khàn was enabled to seize on Kooë by the assistance of the Russians.

To-day, persons have arrived from Ibrahim Khàn, the Governor of Shushah, beseeching assistance, adding from him, that if this is granted it will be well; otherwise, to prevent his becoming in his old age a slave to the Russians, he shall submit to them on terms. This intelligence was immediately despatched to the King, and, it is to be supposed, will hasten his Majesty's return to Tehran.

The Russians have reduced Erivan to great straits, and have informed the Governor, unless he delivers the city to them, they will take it by force. To such straits is Erivan reduced, that the inhabitants are obliged to get provisions from the Three Churches; for which purpose the Khan's agent here told me his master had made a present of a chandelier to the Convent.

To-day, 6000 troops have been sent from hence to the assistance of Erivan. The son of the late Wali of Georgia has also despatched a horseman to obtain certain intelligence.

Notes of a Letter from Mohammed Ibrahim Khàn, the King of Persia's Commander-in-Chief at Bebehàn, to Mohammed Ameen Aga, the Mussaleem of Bussora, despatched by the hands of Moosa Khàn, and read to the Resident by the confidential Minister, on the 3rd inst.

Bagdad, March 3, 1804.

That his Persian Majesty, finding the Ottoman Emperor and the Pacha of Bagdad, either from want of inclination or of power, slow in punishing the Wahaby, who still continued to threaten the sacred tombs, and actually greatly annoyed the Persian pilgrims, had despatched him, Ibrahim Khàn, with twenty thousand men, to march against the Wahaby, by way of Bussora, and chastise them. That the King had also put all the forces of the different Persian ports of the Gulf under his, Ibrahim Khàn's orders, for effectuating the same purpose; that he was arrived at Bebehàn; that he desired the Mussaleem to prepare the necessary craft, to enable him and his troops to pass the Shat al Arab, and, from the good understanding which subsisted between the Persian and Turkish Governments, to afford him every assistance in his power. That a person had been despatched to the Pacha from Tehran, with letters to the same purport.

The Minister told the Resident, the Mussaleem of Bussora had despatched Moosa Khàn with an answer to Ibrahim Khàn, first of all stating the impossibility of marching against Dereya, by way of Bussora; and second, informing him, without the Pacha's express orders first obtained, it was impossible for him to admit the troops under his command into the Turkish territories.

Notes from the Resident to Meerza Bozurg.

Bagdad, March 4, 1804.

My dear and noble Friend—A few days before I received your note on the subject of the English Ambassador, I learnt

from Mr. Manesty that he was about to proceed to Tehran in the place of Mr. Lovett. It gave me, however, the highest satisfaction to hear that the affairs and treatment of this gentleman are left to you to conduct, as I am confident you will pay the most friendly attention to the former, and endeavour that the latter shall be as honourable as possible.

My dear Friend—About two days ago, I was shown a letter from the Mussaleem of Bussora, to the Pacha, enclosing a letter from Mohammed, Ibrahim Khàn, the Commander-in-Chief at Bebehàn, to the Mussaleem, and delivered to him by Mooza Khàn: the contents of which last-mentioned letter were, that as the Ottoman Emperor and this Government had delayed to punish the Wahaby, his Persian Majesty had ordered him, with twenty thousand men, to cross the Shat al Arab, and march by way of Bussora against the Wahaby, adding, that the whole forces of the different ports in the Persian Gulf were also put under his orders.

This letter of Ibrahim Khàn's has surprised me more than I can express; and I do not hesitate to say, the more I revolve its contents in my mind, the more inexplicable they appear.

In the first place, about two years ago, I had the honour, in writing, to state to you, one by one, the difficulties which a Persian army must encounter in marching against the Wahabies by this route, besides which, verbally I distinctly stated them to Mohammed Reza Khàn, and it appeared, by your answer to me, that you and the Court of Tehran were perfectly satisfied of the correctness of my statement.

Therefore, when I bring to my recollection the statements those letters contained, and the verbal information Mohammed Reza Khàn gave you on the same subject, and add to them the further consideration that the heats are fast approaching, and the favourable season for military operations in Neged is almost passed, it appears scarcely possible to believe this detachment designed to march against the Wahaby, particularly

as, if this were the case, it could not have escaped the Persian Ministry that the Mussaleem, who is only the Pacha's servant, has it not in his power, of his own head, to permit an army of 20,000 men to cross the Shat al Arab; and therefore is it not most strange that the first intelligence the Pacha receives of the march of these troops is from the Mussaleem of Bussora?

I must repeat that I wrote you before, it was impossible for you to march against the Wahaby by this route; and I am now firmly persuaded it is not only impossible for you, but for the Pacha also; however, for the sake of argument, we will suppose it possible, and then, did not friendship require that immediate notice of your intentions should be given directly to the Pacha, instead of the Mussaleem of Bussora? According to the established forms of all Governments, if such a body of troops were despatched, without any sinister design, was it not necessary previously to obtain the Ottoman Emperor's permission for their entrance into and march through his territories? and, as one cannot suppose these troops are provided with provisions, &c., for their march from Bussora to Dereya, was it not necessary, supposing the Ottoman Emperor's permission obtained, that you, some months previously to their departure from Tehran, should in friendship have desired this Government to prepare at Bussora what might be necessary for them, and by that request have ascertained whether it had the means of doing so or not?

The neglect of these things considered, what is it possible to make of Mohammed Ibrahim Khàn's letter, and the march of these troops? Thank God, there has hitherto been neither dispute nor enmity between the two States; but, if I must speak the truth, this proceeding ill accords with friendship, though it is to be hoped, from the past conduct to each other of both Governments, it is not meant as a designed act of hostility. I can only therefore return to what I mentioned at first—the affair as it stands is inexplicable.

I must, however, beg that, as early as possible, you will give me some hints, in order that I may understand my own situation, confidently trusting nothing but what is consonant to the good understanding subsisting between the two Governments is meant by the Court of Tehran.

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. Harford Jones to Alexander Stratton, Esq., Minister Plenipotentiary, &c., at the Ottoman Porte.

Bagdad, April 2, 1804.

Sir—I have the honour to enclose two letters to the address of his Excellency William Drummond, and two packets of Bombay newspapers to that of his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, which I received last night.

What this Government hinted to me some time ago, and on which, indeed, they solicited from me information, is now ascertained to be a fact, namely, that the Porte has sent directly an ambassador from Constantinople, by the way of Erzeroum, to the Court of Tehran. In confidence, I was shown the despatches of Ahmed Chellaby, the Pacha's Envoy, at present at Tehran, to his master. In these despatches, there is an account of a long conversation which passed between Meerza Sheffee, the Prime Minister, and Ahmed Chellaby, in which the Ambassador is described by the Minister as being the Ottoman Emperor's Deputy Master of the Horse, and the purport and object of his mission, to offer the Court of Tehran the assistance of the Porte, in forcing the Russians to relinquish the possession of Georgia and their further designs on the countries bordering thereon.

Although the late proceedings of the Russians in the quarter above alluded to must give just reason of suspicion and jealousy to the Porte, I cannot bring myself to imagine, that, in the present state of politics in Europe, the Ottoman Ministers would adopt so decisive a measure as sending an ambassador to Tehran, *directly and immediately to offer the Ottoman*

assistance for forcing the Russians to relinquish the projects they may have formed; particularly, as one must naturally suppose, if a measure of this sort had been adopted, some intimation thereof would have been given to the Pacha, considering how much the Government of Bagdad must be interested therein. It is to be presumed that you, sir, are acquainted with the real object of the mission in question, which, I must candidly confess my hopes, is meant as nothing more than preparatory to a closer connexion between the Courts of Constantinople and Persia than has latterly existed, and to treat of some points relating to the Wahaby.

Two or three days ago, the Pacha received intelligence, by way of Courdistan, that, in addition to Gandja, the Russians had taken Shushah; and report says, that the King himself, and not the Prince Royal of Persia, as formerly mentioned by Meerza Bozurg, has determined in the spring to march towards Georgia. Thus much I can add for certain, that the Persian troops which had arrived at Haviza and Bebehàn, as noticed in the Mussaleem of Bussora's despatches to this Government, were suddenly recalled thence. I have a messenger out, however, whose arrival I momentarily expect, and who probably will bring either to Government or to me some interesting intelligence.

You will perceive by the Bombay papers, which contain all I have learned by the present opportunity from Bussora about India matters, that a treaty of peace between General Wellesley and the Vakeel of the Berar Rajah was signed on the 17th of December; the articles of it I am yet ignorant of, though they may be well presumed to be highly favourable to us.

Mr. Manesty, in a letter dated Kazerom, the 6th of March, mentions he expects to reach Schyras about the 15th of that month.

I have the honour to be,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. Manesty to Lord Castlereagh.

Shiraz, April 18, 1804.

My Lord—Although I am fully sensible that I have not any personal claims on your lordship's attention and friendship, I am encouraged, by the evident disposition of his Majesty's Ministers to support individuals in their laudable exertions to promote the public interests, thus privately to solicit that the contents of my official communications of this date may be honoured by your immediate consideration and speedy decision; and that, in the event of his Majesty manifesting any favourable disposition towards me, you will do me the justice to comprehend that I shall make it my study still further to merit it, by unceasing perseverance in those active and zealous exertions, to support the honour of my Sovereign and the prosperity of the State, which have uniformly characterized my public life and public labours.

In addition to the official opinion which I have this day respectfully expressed to you, on the subject of the facility with which a European army might pass through this country, in the direction of Herât and Kabul, towards India, I deem it to be my duty in this less public manner to state to you that that facility has been latterly increased in rather an essential degree by the resort of Persians to India, where they have witnessed the effect on individual comfort and happiness of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General's mild, equitable, and paternal administration; made apposite comparisons between European liberty, under him, and Persian slavery, under cruel and despotic rulers; and given, on their return to this country, such relations on the subject as have already begun to incline the minds of the inhabitants towards the wish of enjoying the blessings which have been described to them. It is, my lord, really gratifying to hear the expressions used by such of the enlightened Persians who have opportunities of intercourse with the mission, respecting British honour, liberality, freedom, and justice.

I take the liberty to enclose a letter for the Right Honourable General Maitland, and I have the honour to subscribe myself,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Mr. Manesty to Lord Castlereagh.

Shiraz, April 18, 1804.

My Lord—Although I have not the honour to be personally acquainted with your lordship, I flatter myself that I am not unknown to you by reputation, and that you are apprised of the nature of my long public services in Arabia.

It is now my fortune to be officially employed in Persia, where I am executing the commands of his Excellency the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, with present success, and with the gratifying prospect of future honour and distinction.

Your lordship will rejoice to learn that, notwithstanding the very unfavourable impression made in this country by the lamented death of his Persian Majesty's Ambassador, Hajy Khulleel Khàn, at Bombay, in July, 1802, and the very awkward subsequent circumstance of the detention at Bushire of his Excellency's letter to the King, on the subject of the fatal accident which deprived his late Representative in India of life, from the commencement of December, 1802, to the 25th February, 1804, on which latter day I commenced my march from that place towards Shiraz, I have experienced here the most flattering reception, been admitted to the honour of sitting on the Musnud with the King's fourth son, Hossein Alli Meerza, who now holds his Provincial Court at Shiraz, with the title of Begler Beg, of Farz, an honour unprecedented in Persian history; enjoyed the happiness of hearing his Royal Highness and his principal Ministers declare their entire conviction that the fate of Hajy Khulleel Khàn was the effect of accident, permitted by the will of the Supreme, from which blame cannot, on any account, attach to the British Govern-

ment; and been confirmed, by various circumstances, in the hope, which I have long been inclined to encourage, that the Persian Monarch is himself reconciled to the melancholy event, which has been so justly deplored, as well in India as in Europe.

In explanation of the foregoing limited communication, I have the honour to enclose an extract from my address to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, of the 31st ultimo. I also enclose a brief Report on the subject of the political situation of this country, and the operations of the Russians in Georgia and Armenia; since the preparation of which I have received intelligence apparently worthy of confidence, that their military establishment at Teflis has been latterly augmented from 2,400 to 4,400 effective men, and will be speedily still further increased in a considerable degree.

In claiming your lordship's attention to these very interesting circumstances, I will not decline to express my opinion that there possibly exists, notwithstanding late appearances at Paris and Petersburgh, some secret political connexion between the Russian Emperor and the First French Consul, to the attainment of the object of which the large military force lately assembled on the sea-shores of France, Flanders, and Holland, under the pretence of a meditated invasion of Britain, may be very early devoted.

That hostilities have positively commenced between the Persians and Russians, in consequence of the encroachments of the latter on the King's territories, will become apparent to your superior judgment on a perusal of the accompanying translates of the enclosed Persian letters from Cherang Ali Khàn, Prime Minister to the Prince resident here, now at Tehran, received on the 13th instant, by myself and Mahomed Nebee Khàn, the recently appointed Ambassador from the Shah to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General; and it is principally in order to apprise the Honourable the Chairman, your lordship, and, through his Majesty's Ministers,

the King himself, of this truly interesting and important event, and to solicit their and your orders on the subject, that I now cause the express despatch to London, *viâ* Isfahan, Bagdad, and Constantinople, of my present advices for your lordship, the Right Honourable the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Honourable the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

It may possibly occur to your lordship, as it has already done to me, on a consideration of the tenour of Cherang Ali Khàn's letter to Mahomed Nebee Khàn, suddenly and unexpectedly calling him to the Presence, that it is the intention of the Persian Monarch to make use of that nobleman as a medium through which to intimate to me his desire that I should engage in a mediation between him and the Russian Emperor, through the channel of the commanding officer of the Russian forces at Teflis; in which case, possessed as I am of some knowledge of the sentiments of his Majesty's Ministers on the subject of the advancement in this country, in an eastern direction, of foreign European armies, and competent, as I am, from tolerable acquaintance with Asiatic politics, justly to appreciate the real interests of my country, and of my immediate honourable employers in Hindostan, I shall not hesitate to enter into the views of the King, nor to gratify him by an attempt to effect the attainment of the object of his wishes, by opening a correspondence with the Russian General, and by subsequently, if requisite, despatching Lieutenant Charles Pasley, who was employed under Major Malcolm on the late embassy to Tehran, is now acting under my orders, and is a young gentleman of superior abilities, with proper and necessary official advices and communications from Persia to Petersburgh or to London.

In consequence of the receipt of Cherang Ali Khàn's letter, I shall, on my departure hence, which cannot possibly take place before the 22nd instant, exert myself to expedite my arrival at the place of the King's residence, wherever he may

fix it, in the province of Aderbijan; and, on my admission to the royal presence, I shall, in appropriate language, express to his Majesty the activity and devotion with which I shall obey and execute his commands on all occasions during my residence at his Court.

It is to my judgment already evident that the present Russian military force collected in Georgia and Armena is fully adequate to effect the conquest of all Persia; and the knowledge which I have already acquired of the capabilities of this country convinces me that a European army might, with facility, traverse the provinces leading to Herât and Kabul, the troubled and inefficient government of which Afghan countries affords a very favourable opportunity for the attack and subjugation of them; and thence, without much difficulty, penetrate into the fertile regions of Hindostan—regions which it is now the duty of every Briton to exert himself to preserve to his country, as sources of future public wealth, prosperity, and glory.

I have the honour to assure your lordship that I shall make every possible exertion, by advisable policy, to check and protract the approach of the enemies of Persia from the North, until I receive the commands of his Majesty, through his Ministers, or of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General; and, during that intermediate period, to support the general interests of Great Britain in this quarter of the world.

I calculate that this address may reach London in June; and I might certainly receive necessary instructions in reply to it, by express, through his Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, by the 10th September, until which time I shall certainly remain at the royal residence, prepared to carry them into execution with courage and decision, whatever may be their tenour or nature.

I flatter myself that your lordship will rejoice that the nation has, in the present critical moment, an accredited agent in Persia, who has already there established a personal influence and reputation, and who, conscious of the rectitude of his inten-

tions, and the correctness of his wishes and pursuits, despises all political risks and official responsibility, self-exposure to which can possibly prove conducive to the promotion of the honour and prosperity of his country.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect and deference, my lord, your lordship's

Much devoted and obedient humble servant,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

[Enclosures in the preceding Letter.]

Report.

Shiraz, March 31, 1804.

On the present political state of Persia, I have the honour to make the following Report. It enjoys internal tranquillity, and a Government more likely to continue settled than it has experienced for many years. The Shah's authority is apparently fully established since the misfortunes of his brother, and has been most essentially extended by the capture of Meshed, and the consequent subjection of the entire province of Khorassan. This acquisition, rendered still more acceptable, as it has been attended by the capture and conveyance to Tehran of Nader Meerza and his eight sons, opens to the Shah the prospect of making thence a successful impression on the Afghan country, and will encourage and expand in his mind his favourite desire to receive homage in the royal palace of Kabul. The operations, however, of the Russians in Georgia and Armenia have, for some time, been of a nature to excite alarm in this country, and indeed, according to the best attainable information, they have been latterly unequivocally hostile to his Majesty's Government. We are well acquainted with the circumstances under which Georgia became an integral part of the Russian Imperial possessions; but the object of the Emperor, in causing the invasion thence of the Persian territory, is not apparent, and its obscurity will render it particularly worthy of my most active and uniform official attention.

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Extract from Address to His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, in the Political Department.

Shiraz, March 31, 1804.

In my address of the 3rd instant, from Hazeroon, of which I beg leave respectfully to transmit a copy, I had the satisfaction to inform your Excellency, that my progress from Bushire to that place had been marked by the most flattering and acceptable attentions from the different chiefs of the mountainous districts, through which I had pursued my journey.

I now enjoy the further satisfaction of acquainting you that my reception and treatment here have been very highly honourable to your Excellency and to your representative.

In my intercourse with the Prince and the Persian nobles here, I have observed a conduct sufficiently conciliating to correspond with the unhappy, lamented, and unprecedented cause of my mission, without, however, declining to assert, in a moderate, dignified, and determined manner, Ambassadorial rights; and the fortunate consequences of my arrangements have been that, although my conduct has compelled Nuser Oolla Khàn, the temporary Governor of Shiraz, in the absence of Cherang Alli Khàn, to come out himself to meet me on my approach towards the city, notwithstanding his official employment, and influenced the Prince to permit me to enjoy the distinguished honour of sitting on the Musnud with him; I have obtained their good opinion, forced on their minds a due estimation of the credit which must result to the King from the arrival at his Court of an embassy respectable in its appearance and respectable in its measures, and already nearly done away the unfavourable impression locally made by the death of Hajy Khulleel Khàn, by imprudent representations from Bushire, previously to Mr. Lovett's arrival there, and by the accident and events which have operated so long and so dangerous a retardment in the execution of the important commands of your Excellency, which I am now exerting myself to carry into beneficial and honourable effect.

Translation of a Letter from Coja Cawork Daoud, the Honourable Company's Linguist at Bussora, to the Resident at Bagdad, dated Bussora, the 19th April, 1804, and received the 28th following, at night.

Sir—I have before informed you of what has happened here, and at present have to add that Ahmood's brother and sons have arrived at Bussora with 400 horse and 500 musketeers, besides which, 1500 Chaabs, Coults, and Gezire Arabs, are come into Bussora. These are placed on the walls, and keep good watch, but no one goes out of the town.

Saoud, of his own accord, raised his camp on the 17th April, and marched from Dromea to Sefwan, where he has encamped; the road from Zobeir is now open, and people come and go. It is said also that Saoud has marched from Sefwan further into the Desert, some say to attack Grain. I hope some plan will be formed for the security of this place; for it is now evident the Ions of Bussora and the Montefick Shaik are not able to protect it.

On the 16th April, Mr. Manesty's family having become much alarmed, and very strongly importuned us, we, seeing no other remedy, embarked them on board the Panther, and sent her down to Bushire. I thought it necessary to mention this to you. I hope you will take an occasion to represent to the Pacha the state of this place, and that he will turn his thoughts that way, or else the town will certainly be lost; for here the very name of Saoud makes everybody tremble.

We are at present on shore here, Captain Stephenson, his first officer, the new surgeon, and a sick officer; and there is a small merchant vessel, the Queen, and therefore it is necessary you should communicate to us your sentiments. You will permit me to say that we are in great distress, and the Turkish Government is most feeble; and, therefore, I repeat, that Bussora calls for immediate attention. It being known everywhere that you are on the best terms with the Pacha, and that

you have frequent conferences with him, it is to be hoped you will represent this matter to him.

The force the Pacha should keep up here ought to consist of at least 2000 good Agalee musketeers, paid regularly every month, besides which, 1000 horse, paid in the same manner, and always ready to mount; without this, Bussora is lost.

Excuse me troubling you with this; but it is well known that the counsel you give the Pacha has the greatest weight, and it appeared to me necessary to mention what I have said above.

Translation of a Letter, dated Bussora, the 25th April, and received the 1st May, from Coja Cawork Daoud, the Honourable Company's Linguist at Bussora, to the Resident.

Sir—In continuation of the proceedings of the Wahabies, I have to inform you that Saoud is returned to his own country, Neged; but you may regard it as certain that he is determined, early in the autumn, to attack Bussora by land and water.

You are acquainted with the feeble state of this Government, and those who lately came to our assistance have plundered, robbed, and destroyed the gardens and houses of the poor, both within and without the town, and have nearly ruined the country.

The Montefick Shaik has brought about 2000 horse into Bussora, for which he is paid 1300 piasters per day, besides which he demands 500 piasters for contingencies.

Some proper plan for the protection of this country should be immediately adopted, otherwise it will soon be lost to the Turks; for it is impossible matters can go on longer in their present state.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, May 7, 1804.

My Lord—I beg permission to lay before your lordship a copy of my despatch, of the 30th April, to the Chairman of the

Honourable the Court of Directors; and to take the further liberty of recommending the contents of it to your lordship's consideration.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

To the Honourable Jacob Bosanquet, Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Bagdad, April 30, 1804.

Honourable Sir—I have the honour to enclose a copy of my despatches, of the 24th instant, to his Majesty's Minister at the Porte; and, having taken the liberty in the last paragraph of my letter to Mr. Stratton to give it as my opinion "it is the interest of the nation and of the Honourable the East India Company, with a view to the future, openly and unequivocally, if necessary, to support and defend this Government against all its enemies," it seems but proper I should trouble you with a statement of the grounds on which this opinion has been formed.

In a paper laid before you by me early in the year 1799, I calculated the annual average value of goods imported from India at Bussora to be 32 lacs and 20,000 piasters; and, having lately had access to some accounts of the Bussora Customs, the singular correspondence between them, and my estimate of India imports, emboldens me to say it is sufficiently correct for the present purpose.

It would be difficult perhaps to find another instance of a commerce carried on between any two countries to the same amount only as that between Bussora and India leaning so much in favour of one side; for probably full three fourths of these goods, costing in India 32 lacs and 20,000 piasters, are either paid for at Bussora by unwrought copper and specie, or purchased in India by these articles sent from Bussora; of which last, I may say that, within the twenty years I have now known this country, a sum little short of two millions of

pounds sterling has been sent from Bussora to India; indeed, I conceive two millions to be rather under than over the mark. This being the case, I presume it will easily be admitted the Honourable Company have a considerable interest in this country; and it only remains to show that the advantages we (I speak of India) draw from it would be diminished, or perhaps destroyed, by a change of Government; and then I imagine it will also be admitted it is our interest to support and defend this Government against all its enemies, on the same principle (though I grant on a confined scale) as we formerly were ready on all occasions to assist and take the part of Portugal.

I have used, in the preceding paragraph, the words, diminished and destroyed, as meaning to apply to the two powers, except we interfere, most likely to wrest this country from the Turks—I mean the Persians and Wahaby: if the business is effected by the former, the advantages we now enjoy will be diminished; if by the latter, destroyed.

The Persians in possession of Bagdad and Bussora, from their taste in dress, would consume, and consequently demand, but few of the articles of Indian luxury now purchased by the Turks, at the sacrifice of many a solid comfort: they would bring with them little money, a national habit of industry and economy, and that natural ingenuity by which they would soon make a country ten times less productive than this provide for nearly all their wants.

If the Wahabies be suffered to get possession of this part of the Turkish Empire, it would be absurd to suppose a people whose whole dress consists in a dirty, greasy clout about their heads, and a homespun woollen cloak on their backs—whose religion bids them abominate all sumptuosity of apparel as offensive in the sight of God—and whose enthusiasm leaves no room for the toleration of persons of a different faith—it would be absurd, I think, to suppose they would purchase articles they despise; or admit quietly to settle amongst them people whom

they think God has commanded them to convert or destroy, which must necessarily cause many Mahomedans, all the Jews, and all the Christians, the better part of the present mercantile community, to migrate. For the Wahaby selling a pearl which he has fished on the Arab coast proves nothing against what I have taken the liberty to advance, unless it were proved he buys a piece of India goods with the produce; or unless it is proved there is amongst the tenets of this sect that which I have not yet heard—a liberty of granting spiritual toleration for the sake of temporal interest.

In addition to these considerations, it seems to me at least necessary this country should continue in a decent state of tranquillity to enable us to draw hereafter the advantages we do from it at present. Should the Persians get possession of Bagdad and Bussora, many years, on account of the differences between the Sunnies and Shyiahs, must elapse before they will be admitted quietly as masters of the country. Should the Wahabies get possession of Bagdad and Bussora, they will only consider them as *points d'appui* from whence to undertake new conquests.

I know of no way of putting this last remark in a stronger light than recounting a part of a conversation which passed between myself and an Arab merchant of no common penetration, the other day. In joke, I said to him, "I am surprised, after the daily complaints you and many of your acquaintances make of the oppressive government of the Turks, and the praise you frequently bestow on that of the Wahaby, that your friends at Zobeir and Bussora did not eagerly seize this opportunity of at once getting rid of the former."

"I see," replied he, "that you mean to be pleasant; but I will let you into the real motive which has caused the Arabs to be faithful to the Turks on this occasion. If, when we had submitted to Saoud, he would permit us to remain with our families and be quiet, the choice would be soon made; but, the moment we had submitted, he would get our wives and families

into Bussora, and order us, with a small but select body of his own people, to go and make war with the Persians, which you well know would then be out of our power to refuse. If you want a proof of this, it is with the Laissa people that he is now come against Zobeir and Bussora." This is the true spirit of Wahabyism.

Should any accident happen at Constantinople, which, it is to be feared, is not far off, this Government will then become a nearer object of our concern: for it must exist, move, and act as we like; that is, if it chooses to exist at all. Having touched on this, I might advance some other reasons of a political nature, to show the interest we have in supporting and defending it; but I prefer to confine myself to those already stated, particularly as the first have been more or less explained in a letter to Sir Hugh Inglis; and as the last are facts and figures, and not speculations.

Having, I presume, proved it is our interest to support this Government, and being on the spot, I shall not, I hope, be thought intruding improperly, if I once more repeat the nature of the support which, it strikes me, would be most easy for us to afford, and most effectual for the Turks to receive. On this subject, I would advert to my letter, of the 29th July, to his Excellency William Drummond, making, however, this grand and material alteration in the plan there detailed, namely, that his Majesty's Minister should be authorized to propose to the Porte that, on certain considerations, the Honourable the East India Company will accept from the Grand Signor a patent, as Captain Pacha of his fleet at Bussora, in the same manner as they formerly did accept the Mogul's firman for the same office at Surat. A proper assignment on the customs[1] at Bussora should be made for the sup-

[1] I formerly calculated the Bussora Customs to amount to 499,740 piastres: one half of the Customs might be fairly asked, and the Turks probably lose but little in granting it, as it is impossible to say how far the amount of the Customs would be augmented in consequence of this

port of two stout vessels of twenty guns each, and three gallivats, as the Bussora fleet—a fleet that, under our management, would at once destroy every hope Saoud may entertain of making himself master of Bussora, and give security and confidence to the inhabitants.

The moment this plan is determined to be adopted, the Pacha and the Honourable Company's Resident at Bagdad should be authorized to negociate the detail of it; and the Resident should be authorized to communicate it the same instant to Saoud, inviting him to enter into a solemn agreement to abstain from all hostilities on the Turkish territories; otherwise, the fleet would immediately act against him, which, if it once did, would, in a very short space of time, by affording the maritime Arabs the means of shaking off, with security, their present bondage, and, by straitening Saoud for provisions, reduce his power and consequence to nothing. Indeed, a treaty of this sort, entered into against his will, which would be evident on the face of it, would go a great length in lowering him; and the offer of it, made on the terms above-mentioned, would put him in a cruel dilemma.

The advantages the Porte would derive from an arrangement of this sort are numerous, for if the Empire continues to exist, her power, by this means, would be full as well established at Bagdad and Bussora as in the capital itself. The revenues of the Pachalik would be increased; Bussora, from the state of security it would then be in, would soon become one of the most flourishing cities of Asia; and our exports to it from India would be greatly augmented, perhaps doubled.

How far what I have written above may coincide with the opinions of my honourable superiors is not easy for me to guess; their wisdom may devise a more eligible way of saving this unhappy country—a country which, as the Linguist at Bussora

arrangement, both by giving security to the merchants and preventing the great and abominable frauds now committed in this part of the Pasha's revenue.

says, no one seems to know the value of—from impending destruction; but I will venture to say, if we do not interfere, it will soon be lost to the Turks; and when it is lost, we shall soon regret it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, June 4, 1804.

My Lord—The departure for England of Lieutenant-Colonel Hoghton, who arrived here on the 31st ultimo, affords me an opportunity of conveying to your lordship a duplicate of my last despatches, and the copy of a paper of information given me by a person sent by the Pacha into the Russian camp at Pumbie. Colonel Hoghton, I understand, carries home copies of the ratified treaties lately entered into with the Berar Rajah and Scindiah, on which important event I beg to offer your lordship my respectful congratulations.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, 6th July, 1804.

My Lord—In forwarding to your lordship the duplicates of my last despatch, I beg leave to lay before you a copy of my present Address to the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and to subscribe myself,

with the greatest respect,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable Jacob Bosanquet.

Bagdad, July 6, 1804.

Honourable Sir—The preceding is a duplicate of my last Address, since which nothing has reached me from the India House, though I had the pleasure to forward to Bussora, on

the 16th June, the British newspapers to the 3rd April, and the foreign papers to a later date.

It is reported, with great confidence, by this Government, on the authority of a letter from Abdurahman Pacha, one of the Courdistan Pachas, that the Russians have retired from Gandja and Pumbie to Teflis; and it is also reported amongst the Persians that the King, in consequence thereof, means to pass some time at the foot of the Mountain Alwand, which is in the neighbourhood of Hamadan.

The Pacha is making very considerable preparations to march to Dereya, though few people here seem to think such an expedition will ever take place. Meanwhile, Saoud has issued orders to the various Arab tribes to rendezvous at a certain place, towards the end of the month of August, and from thence to proceed with him towards Bussora. It is not easy to guess whether this is meant as a predatory expedition, to possess themselves of the crop of dates on the Shat el Arab, which will then be ripe, or to combine more serious offensive operations against the town of Bussora. If, indeed, the report which is spread [be true], that the maritime Arabs are directed to hold their craft in readiness to enter the Bussora River, this leads, in fact, to no conclusion, for it may be for the purpose of lading thereon the dates.

A circumstance, however, of great interest to this Government and country has lately taken place, that is, a peace has been concluded between the Imaum of Muscat and Saoud, which consequently releases the Bahrem people, &c., from the apprehensions they were under before of the Imaum's fleet, and leaves more at liberty to co-operate with Saoud, at the head of the Gulf. There are letters in town of good authority, mentioning Saoud to be thirty days ago employed in besieging Medinah, and that he had reduced the Medinians to great straits, for want of provisions, on account of which it was probable, unless some unforeseen succour arrived, that they would, if possible, come to a compromise with Saoud.

I am told the Dewan Effendisi of this Government is soon to set off for Constantinople with presents of value to the Grand Signor. The Pacha himself has not said anything to me on the subject of the Dewan Effendisi's mission; but from another quarter I hear it embraces two objects—to represent the impossibility of the Pacha's complying with the reiterated orders of the Porte, that he should march direct to Dereya, and to endeavour to procure the re-establishment in his Pachalik of Abdullah Pacha, the ex-Pacha of Damascus, at present the Pacha's guest at Hillah. If this latter have any foundation, I presume the request will be made to the Porte, accompanied by a plan of combined operations against Saoud, to be undertaken by the Pacha and Abdullah Pacha, on his restoration to his office.

On the 28th June, by an express Chocadar from Bussora, I had the honour to receive a packet to the address of the Honourable the Court of Directors, contained in a tin box, which I have now the honour to enclose. This packet was accompanied by the orders of the Honourable the Government at Bombay, dated March, 1804; and my private letters lead me to suspect it to have been despatched from the Presidency about the 24th of that month.

As my honourable superiors at Bombay have probably communicated to you the distinguished, honourable, and hospitable reception they gave to Soleiman Aga, the Pacha's envoy, and have also notified the intentions towards this personage of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, it seems sufficient for me to say, that the Pacha appears much flattered by the distinguished attention and respect which has been paid him, in the person of his envoy.

I have detained the public packet from Bombay to the present day, partly from necessity, and partly from choice—from necessity, as the state of my health between the 29th June and 3rd instant did not permit me to attend to business; from choice, in the hope that original despatches might ere this

have reached me from India, which, had it taken place, the expense of a Tartar would have been saved.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Information given to the Resident by Medet Giorgee, a person belonging to Abdu Rahmàn Pacha, one of the Pachas of Courdistan, sent by desire of his Highness the Pacha into the Russian Camp, who arrived at Bagdad on Tuesday the 29th May, being eighteen days from the Russian Camp at Pumbie, and whom his Highness the Pacha was good enough to send to the Resident on the 1st June, 1804.

Zizianow (who is there called Strebaktoor) was encamped at Pumbie[1] with 14000 Russians and 3000 Cossacks, Boorhakes, and Shemseddines. The informant himself counted eighteen pieces of artillery, and heard that three heavy pieces of artillery had been sent back to Teflis, to be exchanged for others of lighter metal.

The King of Persia had summoned Mohammed Khàn, the Governor of Erivan, to the Presence, and Meerza Sheffee, from Tabriz, had written several times to him privately to the same effect. Mohammed Khàn, however, excused himself from present compliance, under pretence of guarding the city against the Russians. The Russian commander had desired Mohammed Khàn to surrender the city of Erivan on terms. To the Russian commander Mohammed Khàn had replied that, if the King advanced, he would surrender it to him immediately; or otherwise there was no haste necessary, as he was at all events determined to hold the city of the Russians; but wished that proper time might be given to draw up a suitable agreement.

Shereef Pacha, the ex-Pacha of Acalzikh, arrived in the Russian camp the morning the informant left it: a large salute

[1] In D'Anville's folio Atlas marked Bumbukie.

was fired on his arrival, and he brought with him, by count, 125 horse.

At Kazalaar a fresh Russian army had arrived, by report amounting to 50,000; and Zizianow, whilst the informant was in camp, detached 1000 to meet them at Alavar.

Zizianow disclaims all idea of penetrating into Persia, but says publicly he is ordered by the Emperor to reduce the province of Azarbaijan as far as Kaplantro,[1] (on this side Erivan,) and that, unless the King of Persia attacks him, he will not act offensively against him.

Mohammed Khàn, of Erivan, whilst the informant was in camp, sent Zizianow a present of four beautiful horses. Six large vessels had arrived at Baku, from Astracàn, with provisions.

Jaafer Kooli Khàn Koor Oglu is in rebellion to the King. The Russian camp is most amply supplied with provisions and wine, which is brought from Teflis, as the informant supposes, from the number of waggons constantly going backward and forward between that city and camp. The Russians have left a garrison of 700 men at Gandja.

The informant was taken before Zizianow, and, on being questioned, wished to pass for a merchant who had concerns at Gandja, and who had come to seek letters of protection and assistance from him to the Russian commander there. This account being doubted by Zizianow, he called for a horse, ordered the informant to mount and exercise him, which he did. Zizianow then told him he was no merchant, by his mode of managing the horse; and that he was a person sent to his army by either the Turks or the Persians, but that nevertheless he would not detain him.

The informant represents the whole of the Province of Azarbaijan as being ready to join the Russians whenever they enter it.

HARFORD JONES.

[1] In D'Anville's folio Atlas, the district is marked Capan.

[Enclosures from Mr. H. Jones.]

Alexander Stratton, Esq., to Mr. H. Jones.

Buyukdéré, June 8, 1804.

Sir—I have had the honour of receiving your letters of the 30th January, 9th, 4th, and 21st March, of the 2nd and 18th April, and of the 7th May, with their several enclosures. Permit me to express how much I am indebted to you for a correspondence so truly valuable as that with which you have favoured me, and which has enabled me at various periods to impart to the Porte more correct information respecting the state of the East than any that it has the means of procuring through other channels. The Ottoman Ministers are not ignorant of the source whence these communications are derived, nor are they insensible of the obligations that they owe to you.

Mr. Tooke was in such a hurry to forward the packet that came by the last Tartar, that I had not time to transcribe the copy of your letter of 30th April, to the Chairman of the Honourable the East India Company, which you sent to me. I however extracted (and inserted in my letter to the Secretary of State's Office, of 28th May) that passage which relates to the proposal of the Honourable the East India Company, accepting of the office of Captain Pacha of the Grand Signor's naval forces at Bussora, &c., under certain conditions; and, taking the liberty to recommend the interesting original to Lord Hawkesbury's attention, I requested of his lordship to transmit to me instructions for my guidance. Meanwhile, until the plan in question is matured for being carried into effect, by the approbation of our respective superiors, I entirely agree with you that it should be kept a profound secret: for, if I mistake not, individual interest will be found to stand in the way of its execution *here*, as well as at Bagdad or Bussora.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Alex. Stratton.

Extract of a Letter dated Tehran, the 18th June, from Owannes Pitcairn, and received the 15th July.

To-day, Meerza Bozurg sent for me, and showed me a letter from Meerza Reza Kooli, from the camp of Abbas Meerza, stating that when the Prince had arrived within one day's march of Erivan, he received intelligence that the Russians had retired from Gandja and Teflis to Kezlaar; and in consequence of which the Prince designs to enter both Erivan and Teflis.

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable William Elphinstone, Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Bagdad, July 26, 1804.

Honourable Sir — The preceding is a duplicate of my last address; I now beg to extract, for your information, the following paragraphs of my present letter to his Majesty's Minister at the Porte :—

" The reports from Persia have lately been so very contradictory, that one knows not what to trust to; and, though the intelligence contained in the enclosed extract of a letter to me from a person in my employ at Tehran seems to come from a source of undoubted authority, still I consider it as wanting confirmation; particularly as the Government here, by way of Courdistan, has lately received information that the Russians were preparing to advance on the Prince, and as I conceive Meerza Bozurg, if he had been convinced the Russians had abandoned the southern parts of Georgia, would not have failed to return one of my messengers express, in order to communicate this important fact. A person, arrived here on a commission to the Pacha, states that the King was preparing to march to Tabriz or Tauris.

" Shaik Ahmood, the Shaik of the Montefick Arabs, arrived here, at the request of the Pacha, a few days ago, in order to

concert with the Pacha the route and means of passing the army to Dereya. To judge from the preparations which are making, it would seem the Pacha really designs in the autumn to undertake such a march; but there are other circumstances which induce me to think the Pacha cannot nor will not attempt such a project.

"In the mean time, an immense force of the Wahabies is assembled at Jahra, ready to pour on the banks of the Shat el Arab, and perhaps on Bussora, as soon as the dates, of which this season there is an uncommon crop, begin to ripen."

The mission of the Dwan Effendisi to Constantinople, mentioned in my last, is laid aside. The Consul-General at Aleppo, no doubt, has informed you of the revolution which took place on the 5th instant in that city — of Ismail Pacha having made himself master of St. Jean d'Acre, and of his having put Shaik Taha to death.

On the 12th instant, I received advices from London as late as the 16th May; and on the 13th, at noon, I forwarded express to Bussora the "London Gazette Extraordinary" of the 15th May, containing an account of the change of the Administration.

On the 21st instant, I had the honour to receive a private letter from the Honourable the Governor of Bombay, dated the 17th May, of which the following are extracts:—

"I received yesterday a letter from Mr. Smith, the Mehmandar, with Suleiman Aga, dated Khedjeree, on the river Hooghlij, the 24th April, advising of their safe arrival that far, and that he had heard from Mr. Edmonstone, announcing the great preparations that were making for the ambassador's reception; adding, he (the ambassador) was in high health, and was much pleased with the commander of the Upton Castle, the vessel on which he had proceeded, and with all on board."

"I am sorry that we are again involved in a war, which may be considered as the after-piece to the great drama, so splen-

didly carried on and successfully closed with the two principal of the Mahratta confederates. Our present opponent is Jeswant Row Holkar, who, finding himself hampered by the extent of our late acquisitions, has betrayed a restlessness, and preferred such claims as have at length attracted on him what is tantamount to a declaration of war on the part of the Supreme Government; in pursuance of which, the Honourable General Wellesley returns to-day from this place, where he has, for these last two months, been resident, to reassume the active command of the British army above the Ghauts: while our forces, under Colonel Murray in Guzerât, and under General Lake in Hindostan, are likewise preparing to march to attack this imprudent chieftain, who will likewise have to defend himself against Dowlut Row Scindia, now become our close friend and ally; under all which circumstances, it is not to be supposed that he can long resist so powerful and combined an attack."

"The Imaum of Muscat has recently refused, in a manner the most public and decisive, to admit a French Resident at that port; he has also written to me on the subject of his correspondence with the Pacha of Bagdad; but, as the letter reached me only yesterday, I have not had time to consider its purport with the requisite attention, but may have occasion to write to you further on this subject."

"Considering the length to which Mr. Manesty's mission to the Court of Persia has extended, I am sorry his Excellency the Governor-General has deemed it requisite to recall that gentleman, and to order him to resume his situation at Bussora. How his place in Persia is to be supplied, I possess no information."

I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of the commands to me of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, dated the 23rd April; and of a very satisfactory letter from his Majesty's Minister at the Porte, dated the 8th June, and received the 12th July.

The accounts of the mission in the months of May and June are also transmitted.

Although I have not received any public despatches from Bombay, the following reasons, which I flatter myself you will approve, have determined me to despatch an express Tartar to Constantinople. There are at present only two Tartars absent on account of the Honourable Company, one of whom I expect momentarily to return. The Honourable Governor's letter being dated the 17th May, it is probable the vessel next despatched from Bombay to Bussora will be obliged to make the southern passage, and, consequently, her despatches not reach me ere the end of August or beginning of September, by which time the other Tartar will come in from Constantinople; and the agent, but for the present express Tartar, be left, in these critical times, without the proper means of transmitting any public despatches for India which he may receive from London—more particularly as the whole of the Government Tartars, now at or on the road to Constantinople, have been despatched *ad hoc* on particular affairs, and therefore could not be spared at the requisition of the agent.

I beg to offer you my most respectful congratulations on your accession to the chair, and

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

PERSIAN CORRESPONDENCE.

Extract of a Letter from Herât, dated 12*th Moharrun*, 22*nd April, and received* 17*th August*, 1804.

It is now two months that we are without advices from Cabul, and the communication between that place and Candahar is interrupted. On the 7th Moharrun, however, a horseman arrived from Candahar, and informed us that Shah Suja il Molk was arrived at Gezna; and Shah Zadeh Keisar,

hearing of this, sent his women for safety amongst the Balooges, and encamped one day's journey distant from Candahar, at a garden in which is the tomb of his great grandfather Ahmed Shah, carrying with him Ahmed Khàn Nourzaie, who recovered of his wounds; there, on Ahmed Shah's tomb, each swore oblivion of the past, and in future mutual friendship. After this, he nominated him Governor of Candahar; but it is generally supposed that Ahmed Khàn only waits an opportunity to revenge himself.

Sheer Mohammed Khàn, the Vizier of Suja il Molk, has written to the Dooranies at Candahar. If you choose to be received into monthly pay, repair to Suja il Molk: on receipt of this letter, the Dooranies all set out for Suja il Molk; so that at present Shah Zadeh Keisar has but very few people with him. The principal men now remaining with Shah Zadeh Keisar are Yekiah Khàn Dooranie, Shaddee Khàn Ajacazie, Meer Wofood Alakzanie, Medet Khàn Alakzanie, and Abdul Mequeed Khàn; but these are by no means warm in his interests, and only wait an opportunity to repair to Suja il Molk; so that, in a short space of time, you may expect to hear that all opposition at Candahar to Suja il Molk is at an end, and that the roads are again opened.

Shah Zadeh Kiamran and Shah Zadeh Melik Cossim are at Ferah, and know not what to do, but I am pretty well assured they will return to Herât.

In respect to the ambassador from Bokara, who arrived here respecting Shah Zadeh Ferouzzedeen, to lend the people of Bokara assistance in an attack on Meschid Shah Zadeh, Ferouzzedeen dismissed them with an answer, that, until the business at Candahar was settled, it was not in his power to afford the required assistance.

I wrote you about three months ago, that, after the capture of Meschid, Hyder Shah carried away from Merve about 1500 Kezil Bash and their families, who were settled there, to Bokara, with an intention of selling them for slaves. In-

telligence, however, is now arrived, that they have been permitted to settle at Bokara, but their whole property has been plundered.

Zeman Shah and all his children have been imprisoned in the Bala Hissar.

Extract of a Letter from Meerza Bozurg without date, received 17*th August*, 1804.

As you are always desirous to hear what is going on in these parts, I have only to inform you, that between 7000 and 8000 Turcomans, called Telih, made a predatory incursion into Khorassàn; but the Shah Zadeh, Mohammed Veli Meerza, the King's lieutenant there, attacked them with his troops, and killed and took prisoners about two thousand of them, and dispersed the rest.

On this side, the advanced guard of Abbas Meerza's army has fallen in with the Russians, and put them to flight. This caused the King to advance.

Translation of a Secret Note in country cipher, from a person at Tharan, to Mr. Jones, dated the 28*th July, received* 17*th August.*

Two days ago, a report was spread here, that the people at the Convent of the Three Churches had packed up all the plate and moveables there, and were carrying them to Erivan; and that the Persians fell in with them, took the packages, put some of the monks attending them to the torture, and killed others, and afterwards proceeded to the churches, and destroyed every thing that remained. This is given out as news arrived from camp. However, I some time ago got certain information, given me from Tauris, that it is long since the Khàn of Erivan threw off his obedience to the Persians.

Ten persons of great consequence, and a very considerable Russian force, have arrived at Teflis, and others are con-

tinually arriving. One person of consequence with troops came from thence lately to Pumbu, and fell in with the Persian troops. The Persians attacked them, and the Russians killed the Persians as thick as rain falls; on this, the Persians retreated. The King repeatedly sends orders to his son not to engage the Russians, but to keep at a distance from them. The King himself is encamped near to Zanquanch, and reports are daily given out that, in a short time, he will return either to Theeran or Cazvin; but this is without foundation, and is only meant to amuse the populace; to the same purport is the report of his making a new throne.

There is one thing, however, you may now rely on, that, unless the Persians attack the Russians, the Russians will not advance further. The Russians, however, have declared, that all districts depending heretofore on Georgia they will take possession of; that those that surrender of themselves shall be treated in the best manner, and that those that resist shall be treated in the same manner as at Gandja.

The end of this business, you will see, will be the same as what happened between the Turks and Russians—that is, the Persians will accommodate the matter by money and cession of territory, and so a peace will be brought about. God send it may end thus!

The Russians at first did not permit any vessel to sail this year from Astracan; on which the merchants presented a memorial to the Emperor, stating the injury they suffered thereby; this produced permission for the sailing of one vessel to Baku, which is ordered not to proceed to Enzelee.

All the King's jewels have been returned from camp here.

Extract of a Letter from Meerza Bozurg, without date, received the 4th September.

In regard to the affair of the Russians, we have received several advices following one another to this purpose, that their whole force, whether at Gandja, Erivan, or Teflis, has

been destroyed, and that these places have been taken possession of by the King's generals.

The principal persons of Daghestan and Shirwan have all repaired to the camp of the Prince. The King has also marched from Sultania, by easy stages, towards Azarbaijan, and by this time both camps have joined, and we receive daily accounts of different successes.

Translation of a Secret Note from Owannes Pitcairn, at Theeran, dated 12th August, and received 4th September.

It is now certain the King has marched from Tabriz towards Erivan, in consequence of the Prince having met with very great misfortune. In about five days more, I shall despatch an express to you with a full account of the whole business.

M. H. Jones to Alexander Stratton, Esq.[1]

Bagdad, July 25, 1804.

Dear Sir—I cannot sufficiently express the sense I entertain of the very polite terms in which you are kind enough to express yourself in your letter of the 8th June, or the pleasure it will afford me at all times to transmit such intelligence as I conceive may be acceptable to you, or useful to the Porte. The task, however, as far as it regards the Porte, would be more pleasant, were the intelligence I have to give you of this country of a more agreeable nature. You will perceive, from the public letter, it is most probable the Wahaby will be in possession of the banks of the Shat il Arab before I have the honour of addressing you again. Some people here think he will make a serious attack on Bussora itself; and the confidential Minister mentioned to me, in a conversation I had with him a few days ago, as to the crop of dates at Bussora, they had long considered them as lost; and they should most

[1] No address is affixed to this letter, which is undoubtedly the answer to Mr. Stratton's of the 8th of June.

heartily thank God if matters were no worse. It is most certain that Saoud can make himself master of Bussora whenever he pleases; and, as he seems to be well acquainted with the value of the country about Bussora, it seems to me that he will not strike the final blow until he has so manœuvred as to make the whole belong to the Beet il Mol, *i.e.*, the public treasury. Whatever country surrenders to the Wahaby, on capitulation, without previously using force in its own defence, the inhabitants of that country preserve their lands and their possessions in the most ample manner; on the contrary, force once used, and the country afterwards conquered, private property is then all confiscated to the Beet il Mol. Thus, the villages to the southward of Bussora, called the Jenoub, which Saoud took possession of last spring by force and plundered, will, if he ever gets the country, belong to the Beet il Mol; and my opinion is, that by plundering the crop of dates this year, from Bussora to the mouth of the river, Saoud will procure for himself the same future rights over that large and invaluable district; and the final blow on Bussora will be struck about the middle or end of next May. In the mean time, the misery of that unfortunate place may be better imagined than described.

Ahmood has had this morning a long conference with the Pacha, and, I hear, delivered his opinion to him like a man: he said—"Sir, if you know yourself strong enough to march to Dereya, and have any means of exterminating the Wahabies, when you get there, in God's name, let us march; but beware, sir, of undertaking an expedition that does not promise a moral certainty of achieving both these points; for the event of the failure would be ruin to us both." I incline the more to think that Ahmood said something like it, because he is a man of sound judgment, and because the spirit of his conversation with me yesterday on this subject was nearly this.

In the mean time, *by report* a ray of light has peeped in on us from the maritime Arabs, on account of a quarrel, in which

much blood is said to have been shed, between the Joasme and Beno Attoob Arabs. It is said, in consequence of this, the Imaum of Muscat is inclined to withdraw from his connexion with Saoud, and that a league will be formed between him and the Joasme people; which, if it be true, will, at all events, prevent the Beno Attoob Arabs from coming this year into Bussora River, and may be attended with further important consequences. I regard this merely as one of those *on dits* of which there are so many spread here.

On the other hand, some late measures of the Court of Persia (for it seems impossible for the Khâns on the frontier to have written, unless authorized by the Court in the manner they have done) render it most evident to me that peace between this Government and the Persians is not to be expected after the latter find themselves released from their present embarrassments with the Russians; nor even till then, if the Wahaby goes on in the manner he has lately done, and the Porte obliges the Pacha to quit Bagdad; for then, be assured, the Persians will enter this country under pretence of guarding the sacred tombs. The extraordinary detention of my messengers, and the *want of satisfactory intelligence* from Persia, incline me to think all is not right there.

I fear the business of the Wahaby is at Constantinople regarded on the same footing as that of Paswan Oglou; affairs such as those of Paswan Oglou's, from the nature of the Ottoman constitution, may frequently happen; such people blaze for a moment, or perhaps even get possession of a province for a time; but, in the end, the Porte is always uppermost. The tenets of the Wahaby strike at the very essence of the Ottoman constitution, at the thing which alone keeps the Ottoman Empire from tumbling to pieces, the chief priesthood of the Sultan, in quality of Supreme Imaum; add to this, upwards of a couple of hundred thousand fellows, always ready to obey the leader's call, who receive no pay—who think death, in support of their cause, most blessed martyrdom—who possess an almost

inaccessible country, and have almost incalculable means of annoying, harassing, and thereby ultimately subduing the Turks; and imagine how seriously this business ought to be regarded at Constantinople. What madness is it, then, in the Porte to persist in ordering the Pacha to attack such an enemy! It is little better than expecting, that at chess a person playing only with a king and pawn shall beat his adversary, of equal skill, playing with all his pieces complete.

The question the Ottoman Ministry have to consider—and a very serious consideration it deserves from them — is not how to *attack* Saoud, but how to defend this country *against the attacks of Saoud.* I am satisfied nothing can keep this country in the hands of the Turks for two years longer, at the very farthest, but a league between them and the Honourable Company for the defence of Bussora. I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter from the Governor of Bombay to me, dated 16th May; and begging you to excuse my having detained you so long. I beg to subscribe myself, with respectful good wishes, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, September 6, 1804.

My Lord—Your lordship's letter of the 24th of May having been forwarded by way of Bussora, it was not until the 2nd instant that I had the honour of receiving it.

Deeply and most gratefully penetrated by the gracious mark of his favour which the King has condescended to bestow on me, in the grant of his royal permission to wear the riband and badge of the Order of the Crescent of the second class, I must respectfully beg leave to offer your lordship my best thanks for the very great obligation you have conferred on me, in giving yourself the trouble to submit to his Majesty my wishes on the subject.

Your lordship's kind congratulations on the honour I have

received give it in my mind an additional value; but, my lord, I beg you will permit me, in all sincerity, to say that the condescending attention which leads a person in your lordship's exalted situation to take the trouble of so early giving me private intelligence of the event, has made on my mind an impression of gratitude and devotion towards you, that can never be effaced.

With sentiments of most profound respect, I have the honour to be, my lord, your much obliged and most devoted servant, HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, September 8, 1804.

My Lord—I take the liberty of annexing, for your information, a copy of a letter addressed by me this day, to the King's Minister at the Porte, which, as, at all events, it can do no harm, seemed to me particularly necessary from the commission with which Mr. Manesty has charged himself from the King of Persia being already a matter of some speculation in these parts. I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Bagdad, September 8, 1804.

Sir—Having reason to imagine that the late embassy to Persia may be a matter of curiosity at the Court of Petersburg, and conceiving it possible that, under present circumstances, the King's Ministers may wish to act in the most friendly manner towards that Court, I think it right to put you in possession of the following passage of a letter from the Honourable the Governor of Bombay, dated the 1st of July:

" Mr. Manesty is, in short, to return immediately to Bussora, leaving his lordship's letter to be presented by Mr. Pasley; and, beyond this single act, neither of these emissaries have authority to advance a single proposition to the Persian Court, as the Marquess's letter to the Shah expressly specifies."

I leave it to your superior judgment to determine whether it may be proper to give Sir John Warren[1] this information or not. I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, September 10, 1804.

My Lord—I had the honour of last addressing your lordship under the 26th of July, the duplicate of which letter, and of the papers mentioned therein, I have now the honour to enclose.

The packets forwarded from the India House, under the 1st and 5th of June, reached me on the 1st of August, left Bagdad the 2nd, in the evening, arrived at Bussora the 10th, and were forwarded to India on the 12th following.

The following are paragraphs of my present address to the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors:

"The Honourable the Governor of Bombay, in a private letter dated the 6th of July, is kind enough to give me the following intelligence:

"We have made peace, as you know, with Scindia; and the Berar Rajah and Major Malcolm (who, by the by, embarked here this day for Madras) has since concluded with the former a treaty of alliance in behalf of the Supreme Government; but we have been forced into a new war with Holkar, who, although more of a marauding power than either of the other two, may, from that very circumstance, and his own superior energy, hold out longer, and even do us perhaps more mischief than they did—as some indication of which, he has been able to push a party of about 10,000 men into our country, between the Jumna and the Ganges, where they were committing considerable ravages, but are, no doubt, ere now, beat out, or all seized on, or annihilated.

[1] That gallant Admiral was then British Ambassador at Petersburg.

" The Honourable General Wellesley has lately resigned his command on this side of India, and proceeded to Seringapatam, whence he will go to Bengal.

" Marquess Wellesley was on the eve of making a progress up the country by the last accounts from Bengal.

" Since my last, Sir James Mackintosh is arrived here as our Recorder.

" Affairs in Persia, as you will perceive from the translations of various letters to me, copies of which I have now the honour to enclose, wear the same inexplicable appearance as they did two months ago. The Cossid mentioned in the letter dated Tehran, the 12th of August, is not yet arrived; and the accounts this Government obtains by way of Courdistan speak very unfavourably of the situation of the King and his army; and it is reported with confidence, that the King's women, who usually attend him, have been sent back from his camp.

" To enumerate all the reports spread here would answer no purpose; and, as I have the honour to enclose a packet to your address, which I received some time ago from Mr. Manesty, I flatter myself that gentleman gives you therein more circumstantial and exact intelligence concerning Persia than at present it is in my power to do.

" I have the honour to enclose, for your information, copies of various papers, under the head of correspondence with Samuel Manesty, Esq., the *précis* of which is, a notification of Mr. Manesty's intention of visiting Bagdad in all his state, and of his being charged with a commission of considerable [importance] by the Shah; a declaration by the Pacha that he considered such intention as a fresh affront to him, and a wish that Mr. Manesty would adopt some other route; another declaration of the Pacha, contained in an official note to me, that, provided Mr. Manesty would dismiss the Persians, and was coming for the purpose of apologizing for his past conduct, his apology should be accepted; and an ultimate intimation

from the Pacha to me that, in consequence of Mr. Manesty having, in his letter to his Highness, refused to dismiss the Persians, &c., he would not appoint for that gentleman any mehmander, or take any other public notice of his arrival in the Turkish territory.

" The Pacha's preparations for marching in the autumn and the winter to Dereya are carrying on with great activity, and to great extent."

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosure in Mr. Manesty's of the 23rd of September, 1804.]

Extract from a Letter to his Excellency the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, in the Political Department.

Camp at Hamadan, July 31, 1804.

Having thus fully and respectfully reported to your Excellency the interesting points discussed during my conference with the Persian Prime Minister on the evening of the 4th inst., it becomes my duty as clearly to explain to you the reasons which influenced me then to intimate to him my inclination to endeavour to effect by my personal exertions, in a journey to London, the re-establishment of an honourable peace between the Shah and the Russian Emperor. They were as follows:

Because I had had every reason to be convinced, by mature and digested reflection, on the whole collective mass of political information which I had been able to obtain between the period of my arrival at Bushire and the day on which the conference in question took place, that the views, intentions, intrigues, and operations of the Russians in Georgia and Armenia, and on the confines of Aderbijan, were pregnant with the most serious evils and dangers to Persia, and in particular to the rule and existence of the present King, whose person, family, and immediate tribe and favourites are held

in the most decided and unequivocal detestation by all other Persian subjects, in consequence of their sufferings under the universally prevailing oppression and despotism of the Persian Government—

Because I had previously possessed the means of comprehending, from the conduct of your Excellency, in sending a splendid embassy to the Court of Tehran, under the able management of Major John Malcolm; and in expressing to his Majesty, in the letter with which I had had the honour to be charged, your intention to adopt a similar measure at a future period; from the constant solicitude of his Majesty's Ministers to receive the best attainable intelligence respecting the political views of Russia in Georgia, manifested not only in the communications to Major Malcolm of the Right Honourable Lord Melville, when presiding, in 1800, at the Board of Control, but in the official continuance of Mr. Jones as the Resident of Bagdad; and from the importance attached in Europe to the advices of the latter gentleman on the subject, however trivial, partial, imperfect, and useless; that the estimation and opinion of the British Government and of your Excellency, a political connexion with the Court of Tehran, and the prevention of Russian encroachments on the Persian dominions, had been long considered as objects of primary public magnitude—

Because, the disposition of his present Majesty towards the British nation being as cordial and amicable as it is possible that that of any future Persian monarch can ever be, it appeared to me that efforts made in England, in support of his government and authority, might essentially operate in promotion of the national interests—

Because a tolerably general knowledge of European politics and national capabilities and resources had convinced me that, if our truly invaluable possessions in Hindostan can possibly be at any period exposed to danger from the attacks of European enemies, the hostile designs of Russia against them

are more seriously to be apprehended than those of other nations—

Because I had ascertained, to my own judgment, during the course of my march from Shiraz to Sultania, as well from personal observation as corresponding reports from different quarters, that the passage of Russian armies through this country from Armenia, in an eastern direction to the northern and western parts of India, is of practicable, if not easy, accomplishment—

Because, in the present critical moment, the Persian military establishment, however formidable to indisciplined natives and neighbours, is literally incapable of resisting 20,000 hostile European regulars—

Because I had obtained, in a copy of a letter from the French Consul-General at Aleppo to the Sheik ul Islam at Isfahan, an evident and irresistible proof of the desire of the French Government speedily to open an intercourse, and to form a political connexion with Persia—

Because I knew that, dropping all state at Bagdad to become a courier, I could perform such a journey with celerity, and without any serious expense to the public—

Because I was persuaded that, at Bagdad, I could make such arrangements for the transmission of the national correspondence between India and Europe, by the route of Bussorah, during a temporary, short, personal absence thence, as would effectually provide for that consequential object—

Because I had acquired ample means of conveying to his Majesty and to the British Ministry, if admitted to the royal presence and to the Cabinet, by verbal communications and by conversations of only a few hours' duration, more correct and extensive information respecting this country than was ever yet obtained by Government, or than it ever could obtain from volumes of official written reports—

Because I deemed the circulation in Europe officially made on the grounds of my express arrival in London from the

royal camp at Sultania, with the intelligence of the entire reconcilement of the Persian monarch to the violent death of his late representative in India, to be an arrangement politically necessary and advisable, and likely to afford your Excellency peculiar satisfaction—

Because I considered it to be my positive duty, as a Briton and as a servant of the public, not to allow private interest or private considerations, nor the idea of personal fatigue, trouble, or responsibility, to operate in preventing advantage being taken by the British Government of an opportunity which might never recur, not only of supporting, by a positive, acceptable, and important act of friendship towards the Shah, the warm, cordial, and reiterated professions made to him in your Excellency's name and in that of the British nation by Major Malcolm, in 1800, and by myself during the present mission, but also of adopting, with expedition and effect, such political conduct as the British Ministry, on a full consideration of all the information which I was competent to communicate, might deem likely to influence the Russian Emperor to take new measures respecting his recent establishment in Georgia, and so to modify his views connected therewith as permanently to prevent interruption, by the route to Persia, to the prosperity and security of the British interests, as well commercial as political, in India ; and ultimately—

Because my knowledge of the disposition, zeal, ability, and extensive acquirements of Lieutenant Pasley had convinced me that, in the event of my proceeding to Europe, and leaving him in this country for the purpose of executing the commands of your Excellency, and, according to the spirit of general instructions from me, the orders which I had reason to expect to receive from England, in consequence of my communications from Shiraz, of the 18th of April, to the Ministers, to the Right Honourable Lord Castlereagh, and to the Honourable the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors, he would prove himself to be fully equal to the per-

formance of any public service which might be expected from a British agent stationed at a foreign court.

The foregoing reasons were, in my opinion, sufficiently important and substantial to justify the conduct which I have adopted and explained to your Excellency; and I flatter myself that they will appear to your superior judgment in a similar point of view, more particularly when they become, as your Excellency will perceive from the following part of this address, still further explained and elucidated.

Extract from a Letter to his Excellency the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley in Council, in the Political Department.

Camp at Hamadan, July 31, 1804.

Thus have I had the honour respectfully to state to your Excellency the various facts and circumstances worthy of your consideration, which occurred in the course of my late personal intercourse with his Majesty and his Minister, Meerza Reza Kouli. Much, however, must yet be added to the Report, in explanation and elucidation of them, and in support of the policy and necessity of the arrangements which I have in agitation, in order to render the knowledge and information which I have acquired during my passage through Persia as conducive as may be possible to the promotion of the national interests, and of the general line of conduct which I have adopted in this country.

In the course of this address, I have alluded to the King's ambitious views, political designs, and individual wishes. I shall here expatiate on the subject of them. His Majesty has in life experienced such a peculiar degree of good fortune, that he has almost persuaded himself that success must uniformly crown his desires; and, indeed, if the consequences of the Russian military operations and intrigues in Georgia and Armenia, and on the confines of Aderbijan, be excepted, the events of his reign seem to justify his presumption. Let me briefly recall them to recollection. The general policy of the

King's uncle and predecessor, Akan Mohammed Khàn, is universally known; but the advantages resulting from it to his present Majesty may not have yet been so clearly understood, nor placed in any striking and collective point of view. The facility with which, on the murder of his uncle in the distant kingdom of Georgia, the King mounted the throne of Persia, although in that interesting and eventful moment he was peacefully residing at Shiraz, in the execution of his duties of Begler Beg of Fars, and totally unprepared for the consequences of a catastrophe as serious as unexpected, was the first and most important effect of the cool, determined, and implacable cruelty and oppression with which Akan Mohammed Khàn had long tyrannized over his country, reducing, by his dreadful system, its inhabitants of every rank and description to a degree of poverty, distress, and ruin, unprecedented and almost incredible.

The feeble opposition made to the King's succession to the Imperial dignity was confined to one enterprising individual, encouraged by the accidental circumstance of his having been in attendance on Akan Mohammed Khàn, when he was assassinated at Shusha, and of his having necessarily, on that occasion, become the leading military man in the royal army; and he, Sadoc Khàn Shikakee, soon became the victim of his adventurous temerity, and an offering to the superior fortune of the King. An attempt to dispute with him the royal authority, boldly and desperately made by Mohammed Khàn, the son of Zichee Khàn Zund, cost that unfortunate descendant and representative of the family of the Vackeel Carim Khàn his eyes. The rebellious efforts of the King's brother, Hossein Kouli Khàn, to dethrone his sovereign, thrice repeated, at length reduced that impolitic and imprudent prince, at an early age, to the miseries of blindness and of continual guarded seclusion from society. Partial and less considerable attempts in resistance of the legal authority have failed, and brought destruction on individuals and on conspirators. His Majesty's

fate and fortune, rather than his management, have gradually reduced to regular subjection to his rule districts and people in Persia, over whom even Akan Mohammed Khàn himself never possessed more than temporary, doubtful, and precarious power, and forced even the Turcoman tribes inhabiting the vicinity of the Caspian, to the eastward of Astrabad and to the eastward and northward as far as the confines of Khorasan and Bokara, to acknowledge the King's authority, and to pay him tribute.

Accident has lately delivered into the King's hands and devoted to destruction Nadir Meerza, the lineal descendant of Nadir Shah, and all his male children, and placed under the King's jurisdiction the important province of Khorassan, against which the regal force, under former princes, and under the reigning monarch himself, has been, in repeated expeditions, vainly exerted ; and the misfortunes and dissensions of the Afghan princes, or rather the King's stars and destiny, have nearly annihilated that formidable and extensive power and dominion which, in the hands of Zeman Shah, were esteemed to threaten India as well as Persia, and thrown the affairs of the family and of their government into a state of anarchy, confusion, and disorder, which has opened to the King the flattering prospect of his commanding the means of subjugating a country whence the most ruinous attacks on Persia have been formerly made, and of accomplishing the great object of his ambition—to reign at Cabul.

It may, therefore, on the most substantial grounds of argument, supported by numerous and interesting events and circumstances, be asserted that the present potentate has hitherto been the most fortunate prince that has reigned in Persia for a long period of time ; but, in the present moment, the influence of his Majesty's horoscope seems to be on the decline ; and, instead of having found himself at liberty to take advantage of the internal settled state of his Government, and to prosecute, during the present summer, his favourite views in

person in the eastern boundaries of his dominions, he has been compelled to make such temporary arrangements in that quarter as may merely continue to him the quiet possession of the recently acquired province of Khorassan, and to direct his principal attention to the consequences of the serious and unexpected invasion of Armenia by a formidable Russian army, and of the alarming intrigues into which its commanding officer has entered with his subjects and governors on the confines of Aderbijan.

Having collected the most formidable force which his military establishment and resources have, after providing for the other indispensable services of the State, placed at his command, his Majesty ordered a Persian army to enter Armenia, detached his son, Abbas Meerza, towards Erivan, and in person took a military position on the plains of Sultania, whence, as already stated in this address, he marched to the northward on the 9th instant; thereby apparently manifesting a confidence in his own strength, and a degree of resolution, extremely foreign to his individual opinion and to his meditated political arrangements.

I have every reason to believe that Abbas Meerza has uniformly been instructed to avoid an action with the enemy, and to confine his operations to the reduction of the fortress of Erivan, in which Mohammed Khàn Kujar, the governor of that part of Persia, defends himself against the King's authority, under existing friendly agreements with the Russians: and it has been, to my judgment, demonstrated that, although his Majesty, in the month of March last, really felt much anxiety for my speedy arrival at Tehran, and has subsequently deemed it necessary to manifest an apparent continuation of personal solicitude on the subject of my early appearance in the royal camp, he has, in his own estimation, derived advantages from the events which operated the retardment of my progress from Shiraz to Sultania. It is evident that the circumstance gave him a plausible pretext for delaying his departure from Sul-

tania; and it will essentially aid him in the execution of his determination to contrive, notwithstanding the appearance of haste with which he at last actually marched from that situation, to prevent, during the present campaign, the exposure of his armies to defeat.

The present wishes of his Majesty are to temporize till the return of winter, in the hope of some favourable change being operated in the course of the inactive season; in the determination of the Czar respecting Armenia and Persia, either by his own reflexions, or new political views and pursuits, or by the influence at Petersburg of British interference in his behalf; of which his Majesty is ardently desirous to reap the obvious benefits, although the policy and etiquette of the Persian Court will not permit him to express his wishes on the subject in direct and decided terms.

Such interference might, according to my opinion, be rendered sufficiently successful to answer the purposes of the Shah and of the British Government, without encroaching in any degree on the regal rights newly acquired by the Russian Emperor, in the assumption of the sovereignty of Georgia; because the honour of the Czar only requires that the whole of that country should continue under his jurisdiction, in conformity to the proclamation issued at Teflis, and announced to the different European courts by his deceased father, the late Emperor Paul. Because the Persian monarch will willingly acknowledge the Czar as sovereign of Georgia, provided the Russian troops evacuate the forts and districts in Armenia, of which they have possessed themselves, either by hostile operations against or by intrigues with his Majesty's governors in that country; and because the negociation of any treaty between the Czar and the Shah, clearly defining the limits of their respective countries on the shores of the Caspian, and from the Caspian, in a western direction, to the Turkish territory, under the guarantee of Great Britain, must operate to prevent the advance in future periods of the Russians through Persia towards India.

The knowledge of ancient history teaches us that the wide and almost unlimited dominion of Rome, obtained in the zenith of the Republican glory, and celebrated by public triumphs, in honour of the victors, ultimately operated the ruin of the most mighty State which has ever yet troubled the universe. The modern additions to our possessions abroad have given rise not only to the discussion of the great political question, whether Great Britain derives new power from the dispersion of her military force employed in the support and maintenance of foreign conquests, or whether a more concentrated and connected rule would not contribute essentially to the stability of Government, and to the permanent prosperity of the country; but to the idea that the relinquishment of her colonies in Africa and America, and the confinement of further territorial acquisitions to Asia, might tend in a very high degree to the national advantage: and it remains to be ascertained, by the experience of future times, whether France will really benefit or suffer from the attainment of that rich and valuable country lying between her late monarchical boundaries and the Rhine.

If, therefore, in Europe, under the administration of men of superior genius, talents, abilities, integrity, and information, employed in the executive departments of Governments happily regulated by codes and constitutions established by the wisdom of successive ages, it is still doubtful whether widely extended empire be a blessing or an evil, I may surely, on safe and reasonable grounds, conclude that, under barbarous and despotic governments, where public welfare and public misfortune originate principally in the whims, caprices, tempers, habits, dispositions, of individuals, and the existence of States rests not on fixed and ever operating principles of general preservation, extension of territory must injuriously operate in reduction of the legal power. When applied to the person and to the political situation of the Persian monarch, these my ideas are elucidated by facts to be here explained.

Although the King be grasping, aspiring, and ambitious, he

possesses neither military genius, nor individual intrepidity or courage; although his mind constantly amuses itself with dreams of increasing greatness, it ceases not to be occupied and employed in the invention of new modes of avaricious and sensual indulgence and gratification; although his Government is generally acknowledged, and bears, particularly in the vicinity of the royal presence and residence, the appearance of a stable, powerful, and respected one, the principles on which it is founded are undermining, destructive, and ruinous; although his arbitrary authority may command obedience, and bear the semblance of settled sway, it neither fixes attachment, excites loyalty, nor gives security; although the influence of fear generally restrains, in Persia, the national feeling towards the monarch, the sense of suffering and misfortune constantly inclines the national mind to sedition, and necessarily causes advantage to be eagerly taken by men in office of the opportunities which occasionally present themselves of resisting oppression by rebellion, as has been recently exemplified in the conduct of the King's governors in Armenia and on the confines of Aderbijan; and, although, seated on his glittering throne, in the full splendour of Asiatic pomp, surrounded by suppliant and prostrate slaves, grossly extolled by fulsome and deceitful flattery, and satiated by the constant possession and repeated enjoyment of wealth and power, and unrestrained pleasure, the Persian monarch reigns, his situation is dreadfully precarious, exposed to chance, accidents, and misfortunes of various and complicated kinds, the occurrence of any single one of which might prove fatal to himself, his family, and dependents, and in an instant close his dangerous career.

From the existence of these facts I argue that, if the power of the Persian monarch within the limits of his present dominions be really inefficient, requiring for its support the royal presence and the arbitrary exercise of oppressive rule, it must be necessarily diminished by the acquisition of the Afghan country, the inhabitants of which are, if possible, a more despe-

rate and turbulent race than the Persians; by the King's consequent occasional absence, and by temporary relaxation in Persia of that dreadful system which can alone discourage seditious attempts and combinations, or prevent rebellion; and that the true interest of the Shah would be promoted by any Minister who could possibly persuade him to relinquish his views of foreign conquest, and to confine his exertions to the more effectual establishment of his authority within the range of that extensive territory to the sovereignty of which he has succeeded under circumstances of peculiar good fortune.

Be, however, the sentiments which I entertain, and the conclusions which I have drawn on the subject which has been treated in so much detail in the foregoing paragraph, correct or false, is not a question of much immediate importance; and whether, by adopting my opinion of the necessity of checking the progress of the Russians in this quarter, the British Ministry give the King an opportunity of invading the Afghan country, or different arrangements retard his projected expedition in that quarter, are not points of such material consequence to the British interests in India as those to which I shall hereafter claim your Excellency's particular attention, under the persuasion that their early investigation and determination alone positively require and will fully justify my presence in England for a few months.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, December 13, 1804.

My Lord—In forwarding to your lordship the duplicates of my despatches, of the 10th September, I have to mention that this Residency, by the intrigues and conduct of Mr. Samuel Manesty, during his late stay at Bagdad, has been thrown into great confusion, and has experienced from the Pacha the most unwarrantable as well as ungrateful treatment. The papers on this business are so voluminous, that I decline to

send them to your lordship's Office; but, as they are transmitted in detail to the Honourable the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors, your lordship will easily obtain them, if the matter, in any shape, comes under your cognizance.

My friend, Meerza Bozurg, having furnished me with a copy of the King of Persia's Fateh Nameh, addressed to the Prince at Tehran, I have the honour to enclose a *précis* of it, for your lordship's information, though I by no means pretend to guarantee the authenticity of the facts mentioned therein. I very much apprehend some accident has happened to Mr. Gottman, as he is not yet returned to me.

A French privateer, called La Fortune, and commanded by a Captain le Mésne, made her appearance in the Gulf of Persia, in the month of October, and captured four vessels, noted in the margin.[1] The Fly cruiser had on board packets from England of great importance, for his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General; they were, however, thrown overboard, previous to her capture, and landmarks taken, and, I understand, attempts from these marks will be made to recover them.

The Pacha is at present encamped near Hillah, and it is given out he means, after the present month of Ramazan, to march against the Wahaby. From what I know of the situation of this Government, of the Pacha's resources and of the state of his army, I cannot bring myself to suppose he will attempt any such thing; and I very much fear, from his late conduct to the Persians, he will bring on discussions with the Court of Tehran that will lead to the most serious consequences.

The despatches I at present have the honour to forward to the Honourable the Chairman of the Court of Directors left Bombay about the 28th September, and neither my public nor private letters from thence contain anything worthy your lordship's notice. I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

[1] Nancy, Creole, Shrewsbury, merchantmen; Fly, Honourable Company's cruiser.

Précis of the King of Persia's Fateh Nameh, addressed to the Prince at Tehran, containing an account of the victory over the Russians near Erivan, copy of which was transmitted to the Resident at Bagdad by Meerza Bozurg.

When we were at Sultania, news reached us that the Russians, who some time ago got possession of Teflis by art and stratagem, had, with a large force and numerous artillery, proceeded to Erivan, for the purpose of taking it; had arrived near it, and commenced hostilities.

On the receipt of this intelligence, we marched from Sultania towards Erivan, and pitched our royal camp in its neighbourhood. We first of all sent forward troops to take the Russian trenches. According to this order, our troops engaged the Russians, in which affair they lost about 1500 men, and we gained several of their trenches. The infidel Russians retreated towards the mosque and garden without the city. Some days after this, the Russians thought to beat up the royal camp at night, and marched about midnight for this purpose, at which time our camp was prepared to receive them, and a sharp engagement took place, in which the Russians, in killed and prisoners, lost 1000 men, and afterwards retreated to their trenches. Four days after this, the Russians despatched a detachment of 300 Georgians to bring supplies and assistance from Teflis; the detachment fell in with a detachment sent by us to watch the roads, which killed 110 of the Georgians, and took 190 prisoners, which were brought into our camp.

And having before despatched Peer Kooli Khàn with a large force towards Georgia, the Russian Commander-in-Chief got intelligence thereof, and despatched Mondezar, a Russian General, with 400 soldiers and 4 pieces of artillery, and 100 waggons of ammunition, to attack him. It happened that, in the neighbourhood of Pumbee, Peer Kooli Khàn fell in with Mondezar, and attacked him, and killed 350 men, and took the rest prisoners, and sent them, with the heads of those slain, to our camp. After this, Peer Kooli Khàn marched to

meet the forces which were coming to join the Russian General from Teflis, and, when he came up with them, broke them, and cut them in pieces, taking all their artillery and baggage.

On Saturday, the 9th of Jamadee al Aker, *i.e.*, 13th September, our troops marched to attack the Russian trenches, and the Russians marched out of them to meet us. After our foot had delivered our fire, our horse, under a very heavy fire from the Russians, charged them; notwithstanding which, our horse advanced, with sword and spear in hand, and in a few minutes broke them, and put them to flight, leaving behind them their artillery and baggage. Amongst the slain was Loveed and Dakon, and other persons of state, with about 6000 men. Forty-three guns and an immense quantity of ammunition and baggage fell into our hands.

The remainder of the Russian troops retreated to their trenches, and at night, taking with them such baggage as was most portable, fled towards Georgia. The next morning, on hearing this, we despatched after them a large force, which, God willing, will overtake and destroy them.

In order that you and our dear son might be apprized of this, we have despatched this firman, desiring that you will order illuminations and rejoicings for seven nights and days, &c.

Given in the month of Jenadee al Senee.

The Duke of Portland to Lord Castlereagh.

Bulstrode, Sunday, December 23, 1804.

My dear Lord—I beg you to accept my best thanks for the confidential communication you have made me of the arrangement which it is in contemplation to form, in consequence of Lord Wellesley's early return from India, and to be assured that I entertain a just and grateful sense of your persuasion, no less than of your endeavours to satisfy me that the measure proposed cannot be productive of any injury to the character of my son, or affect him in the public estimation, either in that country or in this.

When I was informed that Lord Wellesley was determined to quit his Government, and was assured that Sir George Barlow was not to be his successor, the possibility of Lord Cornwallis's being prevailed upon to accept that appointment was an event which, it cannot surprise you, should never have come within my contemplation; and, that being the case, and it not being possible, I think, to assign any other reason for not suffering Sir G. Barlow to succeed as Governor-General, but that of his being a regular-bred Company's servant, I hope you will be of opinion that I should not have done justice to my son, had I not brought his pretensions forward, and laid in that claim for his being placed at the head of the Supreme Government of India, for which it does not occur to me that any person can enter into competition with him upon equal terms. However, if Lord Cornwallis should consent to resume the office of Governor-General, of which I suppose there can hardly be a doubt, I have not a word more to say upon the subject than to wish that you may not have formed a wish or a hope in consequence of it that may not be completely fulfilled.

But I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my earnest and confident expectation, (as the determination of his Majesty's Government not to suffer the Company's servants to be placed at the head of any of their Presidencies, and more especially in that of the Supreme Government, cannot be misunderstood) that if the conduct of my son, in the administration of his present Government, shall continue to be such as to preserve to him the good opinion which your lordship has expressed of him, that, whenever Lord Cornwallis may happen to vacate the office of Governor-General, or should think fit before his departure to decline it, I may depend upon the exertion of your influence, and that of the rest of the King's servants, in prevailing upon the Court of Directors to nominate my son to that employment.

I am, with the most perfect regard and esteem, &c.,

PORTLAND.

Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, December 30, 1804.

My Lord—At the same time that I have the honour to forward to your lordship duplicates of my last despatches, I have also that of informing you that the French privateer, La Fortune, which did so much mischief to our shipping in the Gulf, has been captured, to the westward of Bombay, by H.M. frigate, La Concorde; and report says the Frenchman had on board the whole of the treasure formerly captured by him in the British vessels in the Gulf.

Indore, Holkar's capital, surrendered without resistance to the forces under Colonel Murray, on the 24th August last.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Précis from Sir George Barlow to Lord Castlereagh.

Calcutta, December 28, 1804.

States that he had observed, in Lord C.'s speech, [of July 29, 1803] that he adverted to his engagement to prepare a digest of the information received from the civil officers of that Government by the Governor-General on his visit to the Upper Provinces.

That he would certainly have advanced the work to a greater state of forwardness if he had been aware of the importance Lord Castlereagh attached to it.

That the interrogatories on which the information was obtained were framed to ascertain the operation of the constitution established by Lord Cornwallis in 1793; and that he intended his work to comprise an explanation of the principles of that constitution, and the nature of the laws enacted under it.

That he found he had undertaken a work, the early execution of which would be incompatible with his public duties; but that he will persevere in it, though he cannot fix a period for its completion.

That he will not trouble Lord C. at present with a detail on public affairs, as he will receive ample information from the despatches from the Government.

G. H. Barlow.

Mr. Bosanquet to Lord Castlereagh.

Broxbornebury, 1804.

My Lord—I congratulate your lordship upon the course which things have taken in India; and, if activity can palliate indiscretion, the Governor-General, no doubt, has done every thing that has been possible to produce such an effect. The world, who look only to events, will, I presume, think highly of his measures; but I am sure your lordship must see the danger we have escaped, if the force opposed to us had been properly directed.

Lord Melville, I think, has not done justice to the essential and substantial support which the Marquis has received, (if men and money be the basis of power) notwithstanding the objection which has been taken to some of his measures.

Your lordship will, I hope, excuse these random observations from a *campagnard* who points them from his retreat, and his cuts as Harlequin thrusts against the wall *par un reste de bravoure.* I have the honour to be, &c.,

Jacob Bosanquet.

I did not write to your lordship about the Cape, as I could procure nothing but what I knew your lordship would get elsewhere.

[Enclosures in Mr. Jones's of January 15, 1805.]

Mr. Alexander Stratton to Mr. H. Jones.

Buyukdéré, December 6, 1804.

Sir—I have had the honour of receiving your several letters of the 1st October, with their respective enclosures.

After a great deal of discussion on the subject of their contents with the Ottoman Ministry, I directed Mr. B. Pizani to

present a note, of which I herewith forward a copy. Its delivery produced a fresh discussion, which terminated in a promise, on the part of the Grand Vizier, to write to the Pacha of Bagdad. Enclosed is a copy in Turkish, with a French translation of his Highness's letter. The original will find its way to the Pacha through the channel of his agent here.

The day before the Vizier's letter was delivered to me, I received one from the Dragoman of the Porte, of which I think it right to transmit a copy, and at the same time to mention that, on my asking Prince Callimachi what he meant by the words "*s'abstenir dorénavant de s'immiscer dans les affaires interieures du pais*," he frankly said, that complaints had reached the Porte of your having extended the protections which you granted to individuals beyond the limits that your situation warranted, and to a degree that interfered with the Pacha's revenue. Persuaded as I am that this is not the case, I not only readily acquiesced in the request that accompanied the Prince's statement, to counsel you henceforward to abstain from any interference whatever in the internal concerns of the Government of Bagdad, but took upon myself to answer for your following it.

You will read, in the Vizier's letter, that I have promised to advise you to return to Bagdad; and, as there seems to be but little doubt of your finding the Pacha disposed to meet you half way towards an amicable settlement of the difference that has arisen between his Excellency and you, I trust that he will find you equally prepared to close with any reasonable proposal that he may be inclined to make for the purpose.

I refrain from entering into details, but I would fain hope that you will be satisfied with the turn that this business has taken. At all events, I beg that you will do me the justice to believe that, if more could have been done, it should not have been left undone to forward the attainment of your wishes.

I take the liberty of enclosing, under flying seal, my letters of this day's date to the Marquess of Wellesley, and to

Jonathan Duncan, Esq., which, after you have made yourself master of their contents, I beg the favour of your conveying to their respective destinations.

I have the honour to be, with perfect truth and regard,

ALEXANDER STRATTON.

Traduction.

Dépêche écrite de la part de S. A. le Grand Vizir au Gouverneur de Bagdad, Ali Pasha, en date du 28 *de la lune Shaaban*, 1219 (*November* 30, 1804).

Mon très heureux, très honoré, et très affectionné frère—

En consequence des dépêches que votre Excellence nous a cidevant adressées portant l'exposé de certains procédés contraires aux règles de l'amitié, de l'unanimité, et de la bonne correspondance, que Mr. Jones, Consul d'Angleterre, residant à Bagdad, auroit pratiqués, à la suite desquels il est parti et s'est eloigné de Bagdad; le Reis Effendi à été chargé de s'entrevenir amicallement sur cette affaire avec M. le. Ministre de sa Majesté Britannique residant auprès de la Sublime Porte, qui a par le moyen d'un mémoire exposé en substance le sujet de la froideur que des circonstances accidentelles ont fait naître entre V. E. et le Consul susdit, et nous a en même tems, représenté le zèle et le soin que le susdit Consul n'a cessé d'employer dès l'époque de sa résidence à Bagdad pour le haut service de l'Empire Ottoman, et pour toutes les affaires concernant V. E. en particulier; ajoutant en outre que le départ de Mr. Jones de Bagdad a été proprement occasionné par le traitement injurieux et menaçant pratiqué envers lui; et que si V. E. auroit donné à l'avenir son attention à user tous les égards dus au susdit Consul Anglais, et employoit ses soins à traiter d'une manière honnête et amicale toutes les affaires qui auront lieu entre V. E. et le susdit Mr. Jones, en s'abstenant de toute acte de violence et de sévérité envers lui; M. le Ministre d'Angleterre de son côté, auroit aussi adressé à Mr. Jones des lettres contenant des conseils et des

exhortations pour l'engager à retourner à Bagdad et à vivre en bonne intelligence avec V. E.

Il est plus que superflu de remarquer à V. E. jusqu' à quel point la Sublime Porte, désire que les devoirs de l'intimité et de l'alliance qui existent entre l'Empire Ottoman et la Cour d'Angleterre, soient maintenus constamment et dans toute leur étendue, et qu'étant d'une stricte obligation pour les officiers et agens respectifs d'avoir le soin le plus scrupuleux de s'éloigner en tout tems de toute circonstance opposée à ce principe et d'éviter le moindre procédé qui puisse y porter atteinte, toutes disputes et dissensions pareilles à celles dont il s'agit ne peuvent être que hautement desapprouvées par la S. P.

Ainsi, d'après ce qu'exigent la sagacité et la prudence naturelle de V. E. non moins que la parfaite union et harmonie qui regnent entre les deux Cours, il convient de considérer le passé comme non avenu, d'avoir tous les égards envers le susdit Anglais, de traiter d'une manière honnête et amicale toutes les affairs qui auront lieu entre lui et V. E., et d'abstenir de tout acte d'emportement et de violence contraires aux devoirs de l'amitié et de la parfaite intelligence.

V. E. sera donc informée que des lettres ont été adressées en consequence à Mr. Jones de la part de M. le Ministre de S. M. B. pour lui donner les conseils et exhortations propres à rentrer a Bagdad et vivre dorénavant en parfaite amitié et intelligence avec V. E., en lui recommandant de mettre toute son attention à ce qu'il n'arrive aucun procédé contraire à la parfaite consente et amitié qui subsistent entre les Cours respectives.

C'est pourquoi la présente lettre amicale est adressée et expediée à V. E., à son heureuse réception, s'il plait à Dieu, étant informé de ce dont il s'agit, nous voulons bien espérer qu'elle donnera des nouvelles preuves de sa prudence et de son zèle, aux fins comme ci-dessus.

(Signed) Elhaz.
Yousouf Zia.

Mr. S. Manesty to the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Bussora, January 13, 1805.

Honourable Sir—I have the honour to enclose a packet for the Right Honourable the President of the Board of Control; it is left open for your perusal, and I beg leave to make a very respectful reference to its interesting contents.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

MISSION.

Mr. Manesty to Lord Castlereagh.

Camp, near Bagdad, September 23, 1804.

My Lord—I had the honour to make rather a detailed official communication to your lordship, on the 18th April, from Shiraz; and I have since enjoyed the satisfaction of making known to you the successful issue of my mission to the Persian Court.

I now beg leave respectfully to inform your lordship of my safe arrival here on the 16th instant, and to make the Report on the subject of the political situation of Persia, and its probable consequences to the British interests in India, to which I made allusion in my address to the Honourable the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors, of the 18th July, from the vicinity of Hamadan.

The enclosed extracts from my address to His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, of the 30th July, contain a statement of my sentiments respecting the political situation of the Persian monarch, and the possible consequences of the very serious and alarming danger to which the Persian empire was at that period exposed by the operations of the Russians in Georgia, Armenia, and on the confines of Aderbijan, and their further probable views, plans, and intentions, and an unreserved explanation of my motives for

entertaining the idea of undertaking an express journey to England, in order, by circumstantial communications, to enable his Majesty's Ministers to decide on the important question of the eligibility or ineligibility of endeavouring to secure the existence and independence of the Persian monarchy by British diplomatic interference at the Court of Petersburg.

To the extracts in question I make a very respectful reference; and as I have been, by irresistible circumstances, compelled to abandon my above-mentioned intention to proceed hence to Europe, I must confine myself to a more limited written representation. It will, however, operate in support of my decided unchangeable opinion of the urgent necessity and beneficial policy of the adoption of such measures, on the part of our most gracious Sovereign, as may continue to Great Britain the advantages which result to her Eastern empire, from the barrier which Persia fortunately forms, under its present Government and princes, between Europe and Hindostan.

It is with great concern I respectfully inform your lordship, that the advanced Persian army, under the command of Abbas Meerza, has certainly suffered a very serious defeat in the neighbourhood of Erivan, and that the prince has been compelled to seek safety in flight, and to join his Majesty, who, according to the most recent reports and advices, inactively occupies a position to the northward of Tabreze, unable, with any prospect of success, to advance against the enemy, and forced to keep his ground by the still more serious danger of attempting a retreat; a measure which would certainly cause the immediate dispersion of the royal army, under circumstances of tumult and disorder which would inevitably expose him to great personal risk, and possibly occasion a general resistance of his authority throughout the empire.

Indeed, I have myself very serious fears for the personal safety of his Majesty; and, in the event of his death, it is extremely probable, under existing circumstances, that the race of Persian monarchs may cease with his life. If Persia

was not now engaged in warfare with a formidable European enemy, the present demise of the Shah would involve the country in yet unprecedented anarchy and confusion; for all his children, one only excepted, are yet much too young for active personal exertion in support of the right of succession; and amongst the Persian nobles, where is to be found a man of sufficient ability, energy, and resource, to imitate the conduct of former great usurpers with any probability of success? Internal peace might give a chance to his Majesty's eldest son, Mahomed Alee Meerza, who is a youth of eighteen years of age, and of much spirit and resolution, of obtaining, in the first instance, a degree of power ultimately leading again to regal rule; but that internal peace is only to be restored by British influence at the Russian Court, and that chance of re-establishing monarchy in Persia, in the event of the King's decease, can only be a consequence of such influence.

Every desirable political advantage may, in the present prosperous and fortunate situation of India, under the administration of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, be derived by Great Britain from the existing amicable connexion and intercourse with Persia; and the treaties negociated by Major Malcolm with the Persian monarch at Tehran, in 1801, having united the Persian and British empires in bonds of friendship, British honour is concerned in rendering that union permanent and durable; whilst the British interests require that the existence of the King, as a sovereign and independent prince, should by British energy be maintained.

It will, therefore, I trust, be evident to your lordship that my projected plan of authorizing his Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg to endeavour to effect an eligible change in the intentions and designs of the Russian Emperor respecting Persia, and to determine him to confine his views of conquest to Georgia, or at least to Georgia and Armenia, is an advisable one. That it is a practicable one must be admitted, when the

power of Great Britain is considered, and when I respectfully state that I conceive myself to be empowered by the Persian monarch to declare to the British Government that he will most readily consent to abandon all claims to jurisdiction in those Christian countries, provided the Russian forces are withdrawn from Aderbijan, and a treaty of peace, defining the limits in that quarter of the Russian and Persian dominions, be negociated under the guarantee of Great Britain.

Such is the military superiority of the enemy over the Persian troops, that any perseverance in attempts at resistance, on the part of his Majesty, must be impracticable and impossible; and, although some peculiar, unexpected, and improbable event or turn of fortune may possibly preserve the life and authority of the King till the approaching spring, and once again enable him to reach Tehran, it is evident that, unless the Russians themselves determine or are influenced to decline prosecuting their present apparent hostile intentions against Persia, the operations of the next campaign will effect their execution and accomplishment; and thence it follows, that the inactive period of the approaching winter and succeeding spring will afford the only opportunity which Great Britain can ever enjoy or command of preventing the subversion of a friendly Government, the permanent stability of which is very intimately connected with her own most essential and important interests.

The letters from the Shah to the address of his Britannic Majesty, and from Mahomed Alee Meerza, to the address of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, with which I was charged in the royal camp, and which I had flattered myself I should have enjoyed the distinguished honour of being permitted personally to deliver to the King and to the heir apparent, shall, with the horses and armour intended for the latter, as tokens of friendship of Mahomed Alee Meerza, be conveyed to the hands of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General at Fort William; and I will here only respectfully observe that their contents are very satisfactory,

although the original and immediate intention of the Persian monarch, in causing their composition and preparation, was that of thereby obtaining an opportunity, under circumstances of most respectful and cordial attention to his Majesty and his Royal Highness, of making a reference to me for an explanation of wishes and sentiments connected with the political situation of his country, in which he had the most lively and heart-felt interest, although local custom and the etiquette of the Persian Court would not permit a more decided written and open declaration and statement of them.

The King of Persia will, I am persuaded, be highly mortified when he receives intelligence of my having declined to proceed to Europe; but I ardently hope that my unavoidable change of route and intention will not injuriously affect his interests; because, although Government might have obtained from me, had I repaired to England, intelligence explanatory of subordinate points and circumstances extremely useful in the formation, on an extensive scale, of a general opinion on the subject of the present contest between the Shah and the Czar, yet my present and past advices state and explain all the leading ones; and your lordship's superior knowledge and judgment will enable you in a moment justly to appreciate my ideas of the necessity of that immediate British interference at St. Petersburg in favour of the Persian monarch, on the efficacy of which his Majesty evidently places much dependence and reliance.

The circumstance of the discovery of Buonaparte's inclination to open a political intercourse and connexion with Persia is a fortunate one; and I flatter myself that John Barker, Esq., British Consul-General at Aleppo, may, by the exertion of his uniform activity and ability, early have it in his power to obtain intelligence on the subject of an interesting nature. I have the honour to enclose a copy of my letter to that gentleman of this date.

It is my intention to prosecute my journey hence to Bus-

sora with every possible expedition, and I hope to reach my station by the 10th of the ensuing month.

It is with peculiar pleasure that I announce to your lordship that a complete reconciliation has taken place between me and the Bacha of Bagdad. I had this day the honour of an interview with him at the palace, on which occasion I experienced the most cordial, respectful, and handsome treatment, and received from his Excellency very acceptable assurances of his desire to cultivate my future friendship by frequent epistolary intercourse, and by constant attention to my wishes.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, &c.,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Mr. S. Manesty to Lord Castlereagh.

Camp, near Bagdad, September 23, 1804.

My Lord—I had last the honour to address your lordship on the 18th July, from Hamadan; but I have not yet enjoyed the satisfaction of receiving your commands. I have now the pleasure again officially to address you on the subject of the present situation of the Persian monarchy, in the prosperity and preservation of which, Great Britain must, according to my judgment, take a very lively interest. In that country, a single defeat exposes the sovereign to imminent personal risk; and any continuance of successful operations on the part of an enemy subverts the existing Government. It is impossible that the undisciplined Persians can resist a Russian force; and it consequently follows, that, if the Czar entertains serious hostile designs against Persia, the conquest of the country by him is inevitable, unless the British Government, by negociation at St. Petersburg, speedily operate a change in his views and resolutions.

You, my lord, are infinitely more capable than myself of justly estimating the political necessity of preserving Persia under its present rulers, as a barrier between Europe and Hindostan; but I have, during my late mission, obtained informa-

tion which decidedly convinces me, that, if the approaching winter and the succeeding spring are not employed by the British Ministry favourably to his Majesty the King of Persia, and the Russians are permitted to prosecute their hostile operations in his dominions, India will be exposed to a degree of possible future risk, which Great Britain may hereafter seriously lament.

Had it been in my power to carry into execution my projected plan of travelling hence to London express, I should have enjoyed, towards the close of the approaching month of November, an opportunity of making personal detailed communications to your lordship, on the subject in question; but, under present circumstances, I must content myself with making a reference to my public reports and representations, in the hope that my zeal will be duly appreciated, and that my sentiments and ideas may be deemed worthy of immediate adoption.

As I am preparing to prosecute my journey hence to Bussora, and as I may thence, at an early period, undertake a voyage to Fort William, for the purposes of paying my personal respects to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, and of explanation to his lordship of the events of the late mission, it is not very probable that I shall soon enjoy the honour of addressing you. I shall not, however, neglect to do so, on requisite occasions: your lordship may depend on my uniform exertions to promote the public interest; and I have now much pleasure in announcing to you the renewal of friendship between me and the Bacha of Bagdad, with every prospect of its continuance and increase.

Your lordship will probably early receive intelligence on the subject of a difference which has recently taken place between the Bacha and Mr. Jones; in consequence of which, Mr. Jones left Bagdad on this day; but I flatter myself you will not form a decided opinion thereon, without a reference to correspondence between me and Mr. Jones, copies of which will be herewith

forwarded to the Honourable the Chairman. I shall be really happy if I effect a reconciliation between them, previously to my departure hence.

I take the liberty to assure you of my constant solicitude for your health and felicity, and I have the honour to subscribe myself, &c.,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Mr. S. Manesty to John Barker, Esq., H.M. Consul-General at Aleppo.

Camp at Bagdad, September 23, 1804.

Sir—I have the pleasure to inform you of my safe arrival here, from Persia, on the 16th instant, and to apprise you of my intention to prosecute my journey towards Bussora as expeditiously as may be possible. I shall confine this communication to a particular subject, to which I claim your most active attention.

I enclose you a Persian copy, and a translation of a letter from Monsier Rousseau, late French Consul-General at Bagdad, and now residing, I believe, in the same official capacity at Aleppo, to the Sheik ul Islam, at Isfahan, dated the end of the Mahomedan month of Zilkaida, 1218, answering to the beginning of March last; from which you will observe the inclination and desire of the French Government to establish an intercourse and political connexion with Persia. You will in a moment comprehend the necessity and advantage of endeavouring to prevent the completion of that desire and inclination, through the agency of Monsieur Rousseau, by effecting, if possible, the interception of his advices for Bagdad, which will necessarily contain such further written communications as he may wish to make to the Persian Court, through his beforementioned correspondent at Isfahan. The letter of which I have furnished you a copy and a translation was transmitted hence by Cossid to Isfahan; and the reply thereto of the Sheik ul Islam, of which I have not been able to obtain a copy, was forwarded from Isfahan to a person named Coja Owannes Pit-

cairn, who is an Armenian merchant, residing at Tehran, and who has, no doubt, long ago taken means to effect its conveyance by this route to Aleppo.

You will please to communicate to the Honourable the Court of Directors, and to myself at Bussora, for the information of the British Government in India, such information on the subject in question as you may be able to collect, in requisite detail, by occasional conveyances.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Mr. S. Manesty to Lord Castlereagh.

Bussora, January 15, 1805.

My Lord—In addition to the information respecting the political situation of Persia, which I had the honour to transmit from Bagdad, I now think it my duty very respectfully to submit to your lordship's consideration the accompanying extracts from my official communications to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in council, of the 13th December and 5th instant; but, as I have already taken the liberty to express to your lordship, in very considerable detail, my sentiments connected with the invasion by the Russians of the Persian territory, I do not deem it requisite further to expatiate on the subject here. The question of the political expediency or inexpediency of checking the measures of that powerful Northern people, hostile to the Persian monarch, must be finally decided by understandings superior to mine.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, with the highest respect and deference, my Lord, &c.,

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Extract from a Letter dated Bussora, the 13th of December, 1804, to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, in the Political Department.

I beg leave to inform your Excellency that, on the 30th

ultimo, Mahomed Eusuf Khàn and Khàn Morad Khàn Nanaculli, arrived here express from the Persian camp in the vicinity of Erivan, *viâ* Kermaushah and Bagdad, charged with a firmaun from the Shah, and a letter from Meerza Reza Kouli to my address, of both which I have the honour to transmit copies and translates, and respectfully to call your Excellency's attention to the following observations connected with the circumstance.

My various communications to your Excellency, and my late one to the Right Honourable Lord Castlereagh, have clearly and forcibly explained my conviction of the impossibility of Persian armies resisting Russian troops; and the consequent very serious political difficulties in which perseverance on the part of the Russians, in invasion of the Persian dominions, must involve the Shah, are evident and obvious. It has fortunately, and, I may with propriety say, almost miraculously, happened, that, on the close of the late campaign, his Majesty has effected his retreat from Erivan to Tehran; but his late personal experience, obtained in the immediate vicinity of the former city, of Russian military prowess, and the total inability of his subjects to cope with them in arms, and his late personal exposure, seem to have driven from his mind all presumptuous ideas of his own means of resistance, and seasonably opened to his view and comprehension the real nature and extent of that truly alarming and impending danger, to which the Persian empire will be exposed in the summer of the ensuing year.

Even in the month of July last, the Persian monarch and his Minister had sufficient sense to correctly estimate the possible advantages which might result to them from British diplomatic negociation at St. Petersburg, having for its object the re-establishment of peace between the Czar and the Shah; and they consequently, with eagerness, though under the appearance of reserve, closed with the suggestions and proposals which I then thought it my duty to make to them on the sub-

ject; but they were still in some degree inclined to encourage hopes of its being possible for the royal armies to repel the invaders; and they marched from Sultania, on the 9th of July, with much apparent courage and confidence.

On the 1st October, however, when the Khàns left the royal camp, his Majesty and Meerza Reza Kouli must have felt that their only immediate resource was retreat; and their only chance of ultimate security was a decided application to the British Government, through me, for assistance. Indeed, it is very probable that the Persian monarch owes his safe return to Tehran, in a principal degree, to the impression made on his army by his openly-avowed intention of re-attacking the enemy in the approaching spring, aided and supported by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, and by the express despatch to me, from the vicinity of Erivan, of the bearers of his firmaun on the subject; and it must be admitted by all those who have had opportunities of obtaining an intimate knowledge of the Persian character that, unless both the King and his Minister had been conclusively convinced that they could not again venture to take the field against the Russians, they never would have consented to depart from the established rules and etiquette of the Persian Court, nor from their own habitual pride and haughtiness, by making a direct and unequivocal request to a foreign power for relief and protection.

The language of the King's firmaun is indeed pompous; and he has, in consideration of its being a State paper, to be publicly promulgated and read, therein necessarily represented serious defeats experienced as glorious victories obtained. But his real and literal meaning, in proposing that British fleets and armies should attack the Russians in Europe, whilst he overwhelms them in Asia, is, evidently, that he is without resource, unless the British monarch directs his Ministers to negociate at St. Petersburg an immediate peace between the Russian and Persian empires; because his Majesty knows from me, through Meerza Reza Kouli, that the amicable con-

nexion subsisting between the Czar and the British monarch precludes the possibility of hostile operations in his favour on the part of Great Britain against Russia.

The contents of Meerza Reza Kouli's letter manifest much artful contrivance. By his allusions to my projected journey to England, he indirectly claims the active performance of my promise and assurances to the King; by his forcible recommendation to my attention of his Majesty's wish to receive early military aid from Great Britain, although he himself must be convinced of the impossibility of such aid being ever granted, he impressed on my mind, without committing himself, the urgency of immediate negociation at St. Petersburg; and, by stating the reluctance of his royal master to form any political connexion with the French, he attempts to alarm and to influence the British Government to an active cultivation of that amicable intercourse and those friendly ties which now subsist between and unite the Persian and the British empires.

It will be extremely difficult to ascertain whether Meerza Reza Kouli's communications, respecting proposals having been made to the King by Buonaparte, be true or false; and I am myself inclined to doubt their veracity; although such proposals may, indeed, have followed Monsieur Rousseau's request to the Sheik ul Islam at Isfahan. At all events, however, as we know, from the tenor of that request, that the French Government have really entertained an intention and desire to form a political connexion with Persia, every hint on the subject, be it founded or unfounded, must excite the jealous attention of the British Government, and increase the necessity of observation, energy, and investigation.

Extract from a Letter dated Bussora, the 5th of January, 1805, *to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, in the Political Department.*

On the 30th ult., arrived from Bagdad, Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn, and on the following day, on my visiting him at

Maghil House, I received from him the very interesting and important intelligence, respectfully communicated to your Excellency in the following paragraph:

After expatiating very fully, in confirmation of the King of Persia's ardent desire to benefit by British friendship in the honourable termination of the existing hostilities between the Persian and Russian empires, Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn confidentially informed me, that he had received by Mahomed Eusuf Khàn, and Khàn Morad Khàn Nanaculli, new and additional instructions from Meerza Reza Kouli, for his guidance in the performance of his ambassadorial duties. Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn hesitated not to state to me, the increased inclination of the Shah to cultivate, with ardour and sincerity, the amicable connexion, so fortunately established under your Excellency's auspices, between the Persian empire and the Supreme British Government in India, and his own augmented personal solicitude and determination to expedite as much as might be possible his arrival in Bengal; nor to acknowledge that, exclusive of the original idea entertained by the King of cementing the connexion in question, by the manifestation of the cordiality of his sentiments towards your Excellency, by the employment of a favoured servant on an embassy to Fort William, his Majesty now promised himself, from the arrangement, the most important and substantial political benefits; and that he himself had received the royal commands to consider, as the most necessary and essential object of his official labours, the attainment of your Excellency's patronage, of his royal anxiety to influence his Britannic Majesty to take a friendly interest in the critical situation of his dominions, and to prevent, by negociation at St. Petersburg, the further hostile encroachments of the Russians in Armenia and the northern provinces of Persia.

Your Excellency will easily comprehend that the foregoing candid exposition of the feelings of the Shah, originating in the alarming danger to which he himself, as well as his empire, are

exposed from Russian enmity, could not have been expected from a Persian Ambassador, unacquainted with, or unaccustomed to the sincerity of British official communications. We owe it to Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn's education here, and to his consequent confidence in me; and it is, in my estimation, a proof that his conduct in India will afford your Excellency the highest pleasure and satisfaction.

At the request of Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn, who will proceed to Bushire in the Viper, about the 15th inst., I enclose a letter to your Excellency's address, and respectfully express to you my ardent hopes that one of the Honourable Company's cruisers, calculated to afford him an eligible, convenient, and creditable conveyance from Bushire, may early import at that place, with the commands of Government on the subject.

The intervention of the Mahomedan Feast of Biram has yet prevented my having such intercourse with Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn as would necessarily lead to more detailed communications on the subject of the political wishes of the Persian Monarch, and the exact political situation of Persia; and I am consequently compelled to limit the bounds of my present official representation.

I must, however, respectfully inform your Excellency that, having received from Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn, from whom I could not conceal the uneasiness which I have so long suffered, on account of my inability to perform the promises which I made to the Persian monarch on the plains of Sultania, to proceed from Bagdad to England, a most solemn assurance that he would take upon himself to reconcile his Majesty and Meerza Reza Kouli to the circumstance, I have finally determined to abide my resolution to await here the receipt of your Excellency's commands. I will respectfully explain the meaning of the assurance given me by Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn, that he will take upon himself to reconcile the King of Persia and Meerza Reza Kouli to the circumstance of my declining to proceed to England.

Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn comprehends that I made an official communication to the Right Honourable Lord Castlereagh, and to the Honourable the Chairman, from Bagdad, on the subject of the desire of his Persian Majesty to benefit by friendly British negociation at St. Petersburg, in the settlement of his differences with the Russian Emperor; and he is of opinion that such a negociation will consequently early take place, provided his Britannic Majesty and his Ministers deem it, in the first instance, to be an expedient one; and, as it is the particular wish of the Shah that your Excellency should interest yourself in effecting the accomplishment of his political views, that my immediate departure for England is not absolutely requisite, and that the delivery of the letters from his royal master and Mahomed Alee Meerza to our most gracious Sovereign and his Royal Highness the heir apparent, accompanied by a communication of your Excellency's sentiments, and under your Excellency's immediate direction, would be now a more advisable arrangement; and this opinion Akan Mahomed Nebee Khàn means to state in detail to Meerza Reza Kouli, for the information of the King.

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Translate of an Arzee from Samuel Manesty, Esq., to his Majesty the King of Persia, despatched from Bussora, the 11*th of November*, 1804.

After respectful Address—

At a time when all my mental powers were concentrated, in the hopes of receiving intelligence concerning the movements of the Imperial Army, I was honoured by the receipt of your Majesty's royal firmaun, which was delivered to me by Mahomed Eusuf Khàn and Khàn Morad Khàn, and filled me with inexpressible delight and satisfaction, by the particular account which it contained of the success of your victorious forces.

I return humble praises to the Almighty, by whose favour,

and the irresistible force of your Majesty's arms, the designs of your enemies have been frustrated, and their arrogant hopes destroyed.

The commands with which your Majesty has graciously been pleased to honour me have filled me with zealous devotion to your service. And I shall always consider it my duty to use my utmost exertions in the accomplishment of your royal wishes, &c.

SAMUEL MANESTY.

Translation of a Firmaun from his Majesty the King of Persia to Samuel Manesty, Esq.

Received at Bussora, November 30, 1804.

Know that, after the march of the Imperial Army from the plains of Sultania towards Aderbijan, it was represented to those who stand in our royal presence that the Russian General, with about 40,000 men, 400 cannon, and other military equipments, had erected his standard in the country near Erivan, and was then stretching forth the hand of invasion and usurpation.

Upon the receipt of this news, the Imperial ensigns passed rapidly forward, like eagles adorned with victory, and immediately upon their arrival at their destination, our orders were issued for the extirpation of that deluded race; repeated engagements consequently took place, in all of which great numbers of the invaders fell beneath the conquering swords of our heroic troops, till they were compelled by despair to entrench themselves strongly in a large garden. For forty-five days they there suffered a close blockade; but, at length, on Saturday, the 9th of Jemaudee ool Akir, our faithful servants advancing towards their fortifications, the enemy, vainly confident in the strength of their artillery, and presumptuously imagining that they could bend the bow of opposition against our victorious arms, rashly forsook their retreat, and commenced an engagement in the open plain; but the heroes of our

royal army, in obedience to the Imperial commands, quickly surrounding them, poured death and destruction from all quarters upon their devoted heads, rapidly charging them like a stroke of sudden fate or unexpected mortality, shivering the carriages of their guns to pieces by repeated blows from their ponderous maces, and rioting uncontrolled in carnage and devastation, till the blushing sand of the desert, by its sanguine hue, bore witness to the labours of the piercing steel, and the overflowing valleys indignantly discharged the impure burthen of the slain upon the groaning backs of the adjacent hills. 12,000 of their number in this engagement appeased the thirsty longings of the two-edged sword; and thirty-four guns, with all apparatus complete, enhanced the glory of the victory.

The contumacious invaders, now perceiving the star of their fortune to be shorn of its beams, and the victorious army anxiously following up the advantage it had obtained, quickly abased the proud standard of opposition, and sought security by a precipitate flight to their intrenchments. The very same evening, however, they collected lighter parts of their baggage, commenced their retreat towards Georgia, and left behind them all that was cumbrous, journeying with weary steps the valley of disgrace. Our august Majesty immediately despatched a large body of the conquerors to harass their flight, and complete their destruction. These, having followed them to the very gates of Tiflis, made great havoc, and took many prisoners.

As the Emperor of Russia has thus commenced hostilities against these realms, and his General has dared to lay waste and destroy a province immediately belonging to our dominions, doing infinite injury to its defenceless inhabitants, it is our royal intention, in retaliation for this provocation, upon the breaking up of the winter and the commencement of spring, to march in person with an innumerable army, in order to ravage and destroy the country of Kizler; and as you

are at this time prosecuting your journey towards England, you must, on arrival in the presence of your august Sovereign, give him due information of our intentions as herein expressed; that he, in consideration of the friendly and amicable relations which so happily subsist between the two empires, may also be pleased to fit out an armament for attacking the Empire of Russia on the other side, so that the two armies may, by their united and strenuous efforts in desolating that country, obtain vengeance for this unprovoked aggression.

Always consider yourself to be peculiarly distinguished by our Imperial regard and protection.

Yusoof Khàn and Khàn Morad Khàn Nanaculli are despatched with this firmaun.

The royal favour being ever extended towards you, let due attention be paid to its contents.

[Enclosure in Mr. Jones's, of January 15, 1805.]

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable William Elphinstone, Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Bagdad, January 15, 1805.

Honourable Sir—With the duplicates of my last addresses, I have the honour to enclose a packet to the address of the Honourable the Court of Directors, received from Bussora.

Since the date of the above-mentioned despatches, that is to say, on the 10th instant, a Tatar arrived here from Constantinople, and, in a public note from the agent, dated the 10th of December, brought me the important intelligence of England having declared war against Spain; of our having, in consequence thereof, captured two Spanish galleons, richly laden; and of the French having attempted to seize the person of his Majesty's Resident at Hamburg. A copy of the agent's note was carefully transmitted to Bussora, on the 11th instant, and the Resident there advised of its contents.

The same Tatar brought me a letter, dated the 6th of December, from his Majesty's Minister at the Porte, accompanied by the copy and translation of a letter from the Grand Vizier to the Pacha, on the subject of the misunderstanding between his Highness and myself. Copies of Mr. Stratton's letter, and of the translation of the Grand Vizier's letter, I have now the honour to enclose; and I beg leave to extract, for your notice, the following paragraph of my address to my honourable superiors at Bombay, in the political department, of the 11th of January:

"This Tatar also brought me a letter from his Majesty's Minister at the Porte, dated the 6th of December, and the translation of a letter from the Grand Vizier to the Pacha, copies of which I have the honour to enclose. I need make but little remark on the nature of Mr. Stratton's despatches, which I hope will be as satisfactory to the Honourable Board as they have been to me, and prove the prompt means of putting an end to the disgraceful and shameful proceedings which have been carried on here for several months past. Nothing consistent with what I owe to my situation as Resident here shall be wanting, to re-establish a perfect good understanding between the Pacha and myself, as I shall most readily meet any overture made from him to that effect. I must, however, recall the Honourable Board's attention to one or two points, and particularly solicit their attentive perusal of the copy of my despatch of the 30th of December, to the Honourable the Chairman. The immediate recall of Conductor Raymond is indispensably necessary; and the demand of Azaboun Ibn Bazargan Bachi's being in some suitable way punished by the Pacha, for his interference in the national affairs, is no less so. This person yesterday sent out presents and his Janissary to the camp, probably with a design to counteract, if possible, the effect of the Grand Vizier's letter."

In continuation of this subject, I have to solicit your perusal

of my address, of the 13th January, to Mr. Stratton, in reply to his letter, mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

On the 6th instant, by an express messenger from Tehran, I received different papers of intelligence, translations of which I have now the honour to enclose, and others, which, with my reply to them, form a separate despatch, in cipher, to my Lord Castlereagh, a copy of which is also transmitted for your information.

The following are paragraphs of my most secret despatch, of the 14th January, to his Majesty's Minister at the Porte:—

"Conceiving the communication of them might be acceptable to you, and that parts of them may be useful for our Ambassador at Petersburg to be acquainted with, I do myself the honour to enclose sundry papers concerning Persia. Had I had a cipher for the King's mission at Constantinople, I should have transmitted these papers therein.

"If the Ottoman Ministry depends on the Pacha marching against the Wahaby, my opinion is, they will be deceived. It seems as if he was diffident of crossing the Euphrates. It may well be expected, whenever he returns to Bagdad, the Wahaby will commence offensive operations against him; and I fear there will be a horrible scene of confusion here in the spring. Whatever part of this you may think necessary to communicate to any friend of yours in the Ottoman Ministry, pray do not let my name appear.

"The Imaum of Muscat has, I believe, certainly lost his life in an action with the Jowasme[1] Arabs, and they have seized on two of our vessels, the Shannon and the Trimmer. Report says they gutted them of their cargo, and returned the vessels. This, however, is only known to me by report.

"Nothing can secure this country to the Turks but the

[1] Wahabies.

measures I took the liberty of laying before you in the spring."

The despatches now transmitted to you from Bussora arrived at Bagdad on the 7th instant, and it was only yesterday that a Tatar arrived from camp to take charge of them. On this subject, however, I beg leave to call your particular attention to the enclosed copy of an address, dated the 14th January, to the King's Minister. The orders of my honourable superiors at Bombay, which accompanied the despatches abovementioned, are dated 26th November.

It will strike you, honourable sir, the extraordinary time the Tatar, who arrived on the 10th instant from Constantinople, took to perform his journey; in explanation of which I beg to extract the following paragraph of my address of the 11th January to my honourable superiors at Bombay.

"Your Honourable Board will please to observe that the Tatar who arrived yesterday has been uncommonly tardy in performing his journey, owing to the insecure state of the roads, in different parts of it between this place and Constantinople, which obliged him to make use of the precaution of taking guards, &c. I flatter myself, however, from the acceptable friendship which the Pacha of Mosul and the Waivodeh of Mardin have manifested to me, notwithstanding my dispute with this Government, that I shall be able to pass the public despatches with perfect security, though perhaps not with the accustomed celerity."

Notwithstanding the substance of the preceding paragraph, I regard the route of Bagdad to be at present more secure than the route of Aleppo for the transmission of public despatches between Bussora and Constantinople; and, whenever the Pacha returns, the latter route must become infinitely more insecure than it is at present.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Translation of a Letter from Owannes Pitcairn, at Tehran, to the Resident, dated October 7, 1804, *received January* 6, 1805.

I have to inform you that one hundred merchants, with a large sum of money, set out from Teflis, to purchase cotton at Erivan, but, not being able to enter the city, they returned to the Russian camp,[1] where they found ten Towants (persons of rank), and a grandson of Prince Heraclius. After some days, the merchants and the persons above-mentioned, in all 130 persons, left the Russian camp to return to Teflis, and, in the road, fell in with a detachment of the Persian army, by which, after a long struggle, they were captured with all their property. The King ordered the ten persons of rank to be confined at Tauris, and the remainder he sent here in a miserable condition, and distributed them as slaves amongst the Persians, who make them by day work at mason's work, and return to confinement at night. These people have been here a month, and I have from them procured intelligence to be depended on. According to their account, there were 14,000 troops at Teflis; 6,000 are in the neighbourhood of Etchmiasin and Erivan; 300 men and 3 guns are placed in the Convent of the Three Churches. The 6,000 troops above-mentioned and 22 guns are those opposed to the King's army. There has been no general action between them, but nine skirmishes have taken place, in which a great number of Persians have been slain, and 200 taken prisoners, and brought in a very handsome manner to Etchmiasin. The greatest action that took place was between the Prince and Russians, in which the former lost his tents and baggage.

The Russians frequently battered Erivan, and breached it on one side, notwithstanding which, they did not storm. The Khàn of Erivan, by report, has allied himself with the Russians, but he continues to send tents, provisions, and money to the

[1] At Pumbec, probably.

King. Yàoul Khàn frequently solicited the Russian Commander-in-Chief to allow him to attack the King; but the Russian General's reply was, his master had not ordered him to make war on the Persians; but, if they attack us, we shall then be at liberty in that respect.

The two armies were in sight of each other for a long time, and the King manifested a disposition to return. In this situation, the Armenian Patriarch David, and the principal men of Erivan, overruled the King and the Lezghis of the tribe of Oos, and the people of Basusheech and other Georgians seized on all the roads. The Russians, seeing this, were alarmed, and began to distrust the Georgians. To the King was given intelligence of all this. This is as far as the Georgian prisoners knew.

We have since learned from the King, that he defeated the Russians; but the fact appears to be, they were in want of provisions and ammunition, and retreated. The King will shortly arrive at Cazvan, where the Prince is gone to meet him. His Majesty has left Peer Kooli Khàn and troops on the side of Erivan.

Extract of a Letter, dated December 11, 1804, *received January* 6, 1805.

The history of the King's business with the Russians is this. The Khàn of Erivan had agreed with the Russian General to give up the place; but in this he was opposed by the Mohammedan and Armenian inhabitants, of which he informed the Russian commander, who thereon battered the fortress; but, seeing the disposition of the inhabitants, was afraid to take possession of it.

In consequence of the advices of the Russian General at Pumbee, 12,000 troops and large quantities of provisions were despatched to join him, a small part of which had passed the Kur (Cyrus) on bridges. The people of Besachech, Kerakalhan, and Oos, hearing that the King was approaching,

contrived to break the whole of the bridges over the Kur, by which means the troops above-mentioned were detained on the opposite side; so that the tribes above-mentioned made themselves masters of whatever ammunition and provisions had already passed to the Persian side of the Kur, together with about 300 or 400 troops, all of whom they put to death.

When the Russian General at Pumbee heard this, he attacked the King, who lost 30,000 men on this occasion; but, being in want of provisions and ammunition, he returned to Pumbee.

The King has arrived here extremely out of spirits, and endeavours, by frequent excursions, to dissipate his melancholy. He has issued, however, orders for making preparations for war; in the mean time, it is said, he means to go to Mazanderan, to remain there two months, as they seem to be much afraid of an attack on the side of the Caspian. The whole of the Persian army is extremely dispirited, and the King does not pay them liberally.

The Russian prisoners here have had letters from their friends, that the bridges over the Kur are repaired, and that an immense quantity of provisions and 6,000 troops are already arrived at Pumbee.

Extract of a Letter from Meerza Bozurg to the Resident, dated January 6, 1805.

What intelligence I have to give you from hence, at present, is from the letters received from different merchants in Khorasan, which advise that Shah Zeman and Suja el Molk, who fled from Peshawar, have arrived at Kandahar, and have taken possession of it. Shah Zadeh Kiamran, and Feti Khàn, who were the Governors there, fled to Herât, and endeavoured to stir up a disturbance against Shah Zadeh Ferouzzedeen, the Governor, and to put the inhabitants under severe requisition.

Ferouzzedeen, seeing this, and knowing their designs, dispersed their adherents, confined them to a certain part of the town, and placed a guard over them; on account of which, these countries are now in a tolerable degree of tranquillity, caravans and merchants passing to and fro, in the greatest security.

This is all I have to say worth your notice.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, February 12, 1805.

My Lord—I beg to lay before your lordship the copy of a despatch, dated this day, from me to the Honourable the Court of Directors, and to subscribe myself, with profound respect, my lord,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosures in Mr. Jones's, of February 12, 1805.]

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable William Elphinstone.

Bagdad, February 3, 1805.

Honourable Sir—The preceding is a duplicate of my last address; and I have now the honour to inform you that, on the 22nd of January, I received, by a Chocadar despatched express from Bussora on the 13th of that month, a small packet to the address of the Honourable the Court of Directors, represented as a duplicate of despatches brought to Bussora per Mornington.

The same Chocadar brought a large packet to the address of the Honourable the Court of Directors, which the Resident of Bussora acquaints me contains such parts of the public despatches, per Shameon, as were recovered from the hands of the Jowasme Arabs. Both the above-mentioned packets, and the private letters from Bombay accompanying them, I have now the honour to enclose.

The Tatar to whose care the present despatches are entrusted arrived only yesterday from camp; but it is proper to observe, I have been less anxious than ordinary on this occasion for being promptly furnished with a Tatar, from conceiving the despatches in question required no extraordinary haste for their transmission to Constantinople, and from being in hopes that the arrival of a messenger I hourly expect from Tehran would have enabled me to communicate interesting intelligence from that quarter.

By a private letter from Tehran received the day before yesterday, by an occasional conveyance, I learn that the King, in consequence of understanding the pecuniary difficulties his Ambassador, Mohammed Nebee Khàn, was under here, had ordered a very considerable sum to be remitted to his Excellency; and, as this order appears to have been issued previously to his Majesty being acquainted with the assistance I afforded his Excellency in that respect, it is to be presumed the loan I made him here, on the Honourable Company's account, to be repaid at Bombay, will have a striking good effect when known at the Court of Tehran.

The Pacha still remains encamped near Hillah, and, whatever measures may be adopted, it now seems certain he will not in person march against the Wahaby. It is useless to trouble you with all the various reports current here on the Pacha's intentions, particularly as, in a short time, it must be evident what they really are. His Highness, since the date of my last despatches, has been joined by about 1,500 Courd horse and as many foot, and about 600 musketeers from Mosul; so that I compute the force he has at present with him may amount, exclusively of Arabs, to 5,000 troops, horse and foot.

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of this Mission, in the months of November and December, and a copy of a letter to my honourable superiors at Bombay, by which these accounts, when transmitted to the Presidency, were accompanied.

The latest accounts I have from England were received here on the 23rd January, and were dated the 19th October, being the copy of a paper dated "Lloyd's Coffee House," containing the account of the capture of the Spanish frigates off Cape St. Vincent, which was forwarded to Bussora on the same day. I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Bagdad, February 12, 1805.

Honourable Sir—I had the honour of addressing you last, under the 3rd February, the duplicates of which despatch shall be transmitted by the first opportunity, *viâ* Constantinople.

Having detained the messenger, who arrived here from Aleppo on the 23rd January, to the present moment, in the expectation of receiving advices from Persia, I now do myself the honour to enclose the copies of translations of different papers which I received yesterday morning from Meerza Reza Kooli, Meerza Bozurg, and from a person in my employ at Tehran; and, in consequence of the receipt of these papers, I return the messenger to Aleppo, with a request to Mr. Barker that he will forward my present address to Constantinople by the earliest occasional conveyance that shall present itself.

The flattering pictures which Meerza Bozurg, in his note to me, draws of the King's affairs to the eastward is very far from being correct. Hossein Khàn, to whose management, in the name of the Prince Ibrahim Meerza, who is with him, the affairs of the province of Khorasan were committed, and whose wife and family were left at Tehran as securities for his fidelity, having manifested signs of discontent and disobedience, was ordered to repair to Tehran, an order with which he refused to comply, and immediately seized on Ibrahim Meerza as a pledge for the safety of his own family at Tehran. Meerza Sheffee, by the King's order, despatched to him a Koran, on which the

King had sworn to overlook everything past, and to regard him as favourably as heretofore. Hossein Khàn, however, has demanded that his family be sent to him, and has added, when that takes place, he will release the Prince, and send him to Court. It is supposed that Hossein Khàn means, if pressed, to call to his assistance the Turcomans and Eusbegs; and this affair is already serious enough to have prevented the King undertaking his projected journey to Mazanderan.

If the papers I had the honour to transmit last month, in cipher, are deemed to merit any notice, no time should be lost in acting on them; as I consider it extremely possible the present year, unless some accommodation like that sought after in those papers takes place, may produce events highly disastrous to his Persian Majesty.

The affairs of this Pachalik appear to me to become day by day more embarrassed, and consequently the future operations of the Wahaby more and more to be apprehended. From whatever hand the Porte may receive her ruin in Europe, it will be from the hand of the Wahaby alone that her power in Asia will be destroyed, and probably this quarter of the globe, in a few years, may again witness the verification of a celebrated author's observation on the first Mahomedans, "Rien n'est plus terrible qu'un peuple qui, n'ayant rien à perdre, combat à la fois par esprit de rapine et de religion."

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Translation of a Letter from Owannes Pitcairn, dated January 21, and received February 11.

We have nothing here but reports of the King being this day and the other day to set out for Mazanderan, notwithstanding which his Majesty still continues here. There is arrived from Astracan, off Astrabad, a Russian merchant-vessel;

she cast anchor off the port, not suffering any person to come on board. The captain, however, sent to inform those persons who had goods on board they might send off boats for them. There is an Armenian merchant here who has goods in the vessel above-mentioned, and, hearing of her arrival and what had happened, set off in a great hurry. I hear the King has sent a Choppar to obtain more certain information of this vessel, and to desire that some person of information might be sent to him. The Choppar is not yet returned. I hear likewise that two other vessels are arrived at Aramlea (probably Orenburg), where they are to deliver their cargo, and to return to Baku.

Some days ago, I heard that 1,200 troops were arrived at Pumbee, and that the bridges over the Kur are all repaired, and that a further reinforcement, under the command of a famous General, is hourly expected. This day I have heard they have arrived at Erivan, and taken it.

In some of the affairs between the Persians and the Russians, the former captured a small gun which one man can manage; this gun is taken here for a model, and a general impress of carpenters and smiths has been made here and from other places, who, in the course of four months, have made three guns, but so clumsily, that they require six men to manage them. This is what I see to the present day of preparations for war. The King, however, has required of Mohommed Hossein Khàn, the Governor of Isfahan, thirty such guns. Two Georgian gunners have been sent from hence to Isfahan to assist in the making of these guns and their carriages, after the European fashion. Orders are likewise sent to enroll a hundred men at Isfahan, and to learn them the exercise of the great guns. It is said, in the spring, all these will be ready.

It is said that Abbas Meerza, after the Nou Rouze, will march towards Aderbijan; my opinion, however, is, from what I see, that these people will be very cautious of marching

again against the Russians. I am pretty certain, however, that the King himself will not march. Last year, the King was induced to march, by the promises of the Wali's son: he found them without foundation, and he returned with shame. He can never make a second attempt; if the army does march, it will be by force.

The King's disposition leads him to seek peace and shun war; but, in the whole Government, there does not appear any man of foresight sufficient to calculate the end of this business. God send it may end well! Whether it be the King or his Ministers, they all alike think of amassing money—are all alike slaves of two piasters, and have not the heart to spend a couple of piasters. This avarice will ruin him.

Translation of a paper of Information given by Hajee Nou Rouze, a confidential servant of Meer Ahmed Khàn, brother to Sheer Mohommed Khàn, Vizier to Suja el Mulk, on his arrival from Cabul and Candahar at Bagdad.

Suja el Mulk had entertained an idea of marching towards India, but, Feti Khàn having fled and retired to Shahzadeh Kaiser, at Candahar, whom he persuaded to revolt and proceed towards Caboul with about 20,000 horse, Suja el Mulk, on hearing this, gave up his Indian expedition, and returned towards Caboul. Kaiser pitched his tents at about a day's journey distant from Caboul, on the one side, and Suja el Mulk at about half a day's journey distant on the other. It was Suja el Mulk's design, on the night of the day of their arrival, to have surprised Kaiser's camp, but his Vizier, Sheer Mohammed Khàn, dissuaded him from it, and managed in such a manner that the principal Sardars, of their own accord, came next morning into Suja el Mulk's camp, and Kaiser fled towards Candahar.

When Kaiser left Candahar, Kiamràn, by the intrigue and assistance of Ahmed Khàn Nourzaie, got possession of the

place; so that, on Kaiser arriving at Candahar in this state, he found no admittance.

Suja el Mulk, after the flight of Kaiser, entered Caboul, and remained there twenty days, after which he prepared to march towards Candahar. Kiamràn, hearing this, fled from Candahar to Herât; and Kaiser took advantage of this to obtain admittance. In this state of things, his father, Shah Zeman, and his mother endeavoured to prevail on Kaiser to make his peace with Suja el Mulk, and repair to him, but without effect; and Kaiser was again obliged to retire from Candahar.

Suja el Mulk then entered Candahar, and Shah Zeman followed Kaiser, entreating him to return. Kaiser's answer was that his entreaties were to no purpose, and that he would return on no other terms than the Vizier coming to him in person. The Vizier sent him his son, but this also was without effect. After this, the Vizier despatched a confidential person to him, and Kaiser approached two days' journey towards Candahar, and then the Vizier met him, and, after passing the most solemn engagements, brought him to Suja el Mulk. Suja el Mulk was then disposed to appoint Kaiser to the Government of Candahar, and to leave Ferouzzedeen at Herât, and return himself towards Scind.

But this was prevented by the conduct of Ferouzzedeen intriguing amongst the Afghans; but the heads of the principal Afghan tribes, perceiving that, if matters went on this way, the Afghan Government must be annihilated, went with a Koran in their hands to Suja el Mulk, and swore allegiance to him. In this manner, this business was settled.

Ferouzzedeen then sent his son with an army to besiege Khorasan. Suja el Mulk from this proceeding being fully satisfied of Ferouzzedeen's fidelity, sent Kaiser to assist him, with a promise of a further reinforcement if the people of Khorasan were assisted by the Persians. Besides which, Suja el Mulk promised Ferouzzedeen that any conquests he

might make in Khorasan should belong to himself in sovereignty. Suja el Mulk desired him to recollect what Shah Zeman had done to Hamaioon, what Mahmood had done to Shah Zeman, and to consider that such things ought not to happen between brothers; at the same time calling on him to always recollect that they were now bound by the most solemn engagements to bury all family broils, and by that means prevent the children of Teimour being dispersed and becoming vagabonds.

The Princes that are at present with Suja el Mulk are: his elder brother, Shah Zeman, blind; Shah Zeman's children, Hyder, Kaiser, Mansoor, and Nasser. Shah Mahmood is in the prison of Bala Hissar. Shah Zadeh Ferouzzedeen is Governor of Herât. The Governor of Cabul is Sardar Jan Dan. The King of Bokhara is Hyder Shah.

Translation of a Letter ad Sensum, from Meerza Reza Kooli to the Resident, received the 11*th of February*, 1805.

After Compliments—

The friendly Letter which you wrote me arrived in the happiest time, and afforded me the greatest pleasure. I have also to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from our Ambassador, Mohammed Nebee Khàn, which you sent me enclosed, by which I was completely informed of what passed at Bagdad regarding him.

In regard to what you have mentioned concerning the increase of our future friendship, it is well known everywhere how true and faithful you are to the friendships you form; and, on my part, I can say that I am equally desirous to cultivate your friendship and intimacy. Hearing, therefore, that your Cossid was on the point of returning, I have written purposely to make you this profession, to desire that you will continue to write to me, and to assure you that any business you have here, God willing, I will execute.

Translation of a Letter from Meerza Bozurg, received the 11th of February, 1805.

My dear Friend—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your most kind letter, for which I am more than ever convinced of the extent of your friendship for me; besides which, Mohammed Katem Beg mentioned to me the handsome manner in which you behaved to him; from whence, and from the letter you sent me from Mohammed Nebee Khàn, who is in the place of a brother to me, I received additional proofs of your kindness. I call God to witness, that, on my part, my friendship for you is beyond expression.

What you mentioned to me of the proper and respectable manner in which Mohammed Nebee Khàn, our Ambassador, conducted himself at Bagdad, I reported to the Prince Royal, who expressed the highest satisfaction thereon, as well as at your conduct towards the Ambassador, and the acceptable attention you paid him.

Concerning Slefan Babick's estate, nothing is more certain than that the Dewan, (*i.e.* King) is heir to the effects of those who die without children, and that it was only on your account, whose services and friendship to this State are so apparent, that the affairs of this estate in Persia were conducted in the manner they have been. God knows, and I call Him to witness, that whatever favour or respect the Constantinopolitan merchants have received here has been to please you, and in consequence of the treaty between Persia and England.

As I do not wish to detain your Cossid longer, I despatch him with these few words, only adding, that I desire you to continue to write to me frequently, and command me in all things I can be serviceable to you.

Note in the Meerza's own hand, enclosed in the above.

My dear Friend—Knowing that you are always anxious for news from hence, I therefore beg to acquaint you that Nasid ed Deen, the son of Beg Ian, has quarrelled with his brothers,

and offered obedience to the King, and requested assistance from him, and, in consequence thereof, has delivered up Saloon Sarook and Merue, and other dependencies to the King's lieutenants on the borders. Yadeegar Beg, a confidential person and a relation of Nasid ed Deen, is arrived with letters to the King, and accompanied by the principal inhabitants of the districts above-mentioned. The King's intention is to despatch these persons on their return, with large presents, and a royal aigrette for Nasid ed Deen, by which means, and by the forces which are ordered to join him from the borders, he may enter Turkestan in a manner able to support himself.

Of the Russians, what I have to tell you is, that from 12,000 to 15,000 troops had been ordered from Petersburg to join Shebkatoon,[1] at Pumbie; but, in the way thither, the tribes of Oos and Cheikoo, whom the King had ordered to harass them in their march, engaged with them, killed a great number, and took many prisoners; the remainder fled in very miserable condition. Shebkatoon, hearing of this, was so much alarmed, that he was afraid to remain in Tiflis, but encamped without the city, where he is in a constant state of apprehension.

In respect to the march of the Pacha against the Arabs, I must beg of you to give me particular accounts of the continuation and end of this business.

In regard to what you mentioned of the Pacha's behaviour to you in Stephanoos's business: in the first place, under God, you were the cause of the Pacha's promotion and establishment in the Government of Bagdad. 2nd. You were the person who was the mediator and intercessor between him and the Ottoman Ministry, to procure him the Vizaret. This, I know, you know, and God knows that I state nothing but the truth; considering this, how could he think of displeasing you about such a business as that of Stephanoos?

[1] Zizianoff.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, March 31, 1805.

My Lord—It is with singular satisfaction I do myself the honour of offering your lordship my sincere congratulation on the signal success of the British arms, on the 13th of November, under the fort of Deeg, where, after a very severe action, we obtained possession of eighty-seven pieces of ordnance, and the greater part of the enemy's baggage, &c., obliging him to take shelter with the remains of his army in the Fort of Deeg. I am sorry, however, to add, that the gallant General Frazer, severely wounded in the action, died, in consequence of his wounds, on the 24th of November.

A private letter from Bombay, dated the 20th of January, and received yesterday morning, contains the following paragraph :

" General Lake was to open his trenches against the Fort of Deeg, on the 7th ult., and we daily expect to hear of its surrender. No certain accounts have been received of Holkar's motions since he was driven out of the Doab."

I have the honour to be, &c., HARFORD JONES.

Précis of Secret Letters and Despatches from Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General of India, to Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control.[1]

No. 1.

Barrackpore, February 12, 1803.

1. Acknowledges receipt of Lord C.'s " Secret" Letter, No. 1, September 27, 1802 ; will reply to it in detail, by the Swallow packet.

[1] Among the papers of Lord Castlereagh, I have not met with any trace of the official letters which he addressed to the Marquess Wellesley, while Governor-General of India. For these the inquiring reader is referred to the collected Despatches of the Marquess, edited by Mr. Montgomery Martin. Though that work comprehends also the originals of these Précis, with the omission of some passages, I have thought it right to insert them in the form in which I find them.—EDITOR.

2. States that his Letter, "Most Secret," No. 1, to Lord C., with his despatches to Mr. Addington and Court, will have apprised Lord C. of his determination to remain in India until January, 1804, for the accomplishment of the great objects referred to in his recent communications.

3. Expresses his grateful acknowledgments for the cordial co-operation and support manifested towards his administration by Lord C., that he will omit no effort to facilitate the success of Lord C.'s measures in India. WELLESLEY.

No. 2.

Fort William, February 25, 1803.

1. States that his anxiety to hasten Mr. Wellesley's departure has determined him not to detain the Swallow packet for his detailed reply to Lord C.'s "Secret Letter," No. 1.

2. That the remaining ships of this season will be despatched in the course of a fortnight, when he expects to state the circumstances of the financial prospects with more accuracy than he could at present.

3. That Mr. Wellesley's communications will furnish Lord C. with every information he could have conveyed in writing. WELLESLEY.

No. 3.

Barrackpore, April 20, 1803.

States his reply to Lord C.'s "Secret" Letter, No. 1, would be incomplete, without accurate references to the state of the charges and revenues in the year ending April 30, 1803; and, as his various despatches to Secret Committee, Court, &c., with Mr. Wellesley's communications, will have apprised Lord C. of his sentiments on all the other topics stated in that letter, he will postpone his detailed answer until the end of May, when he will be in possession of all the accounts of last year. WELLESLEY.

No. 4.

Fort William, April 27, 1803.

1 and 2. States that a person from the Cape of Good Hope

intimates the restoration of that settlement to the Batavian Republic, and that the British garrison had embarked and sailed for India on the 25th of February.

3. That he has derived great satisfaction from this intelligence, concluding from thence that all apprehensions of a renewal of hostilities had ceased. WELLESLEY.

No. 6.

Barrackpore, November 8, 1803.

1. Acknowledges receipt of the following letters from Lord C.:

Most Secret,	No. 4,	16th October,	1802.
,, ,,	No. 5,	15th November,	,,
,, ,,	No. 6,	17th December,	,,
,, ,,	No. 7,	17th December,	,,
,, ,,	No. 8,	14th February,	1803.
Secret,	No. 2,	16th March,	,,
Most Secret,		19th March,	,,
Private,		19th March,	,,
Most Secret,		4th April,	,,
,, ,,	No. 10,	28th April,	,,
,, ,,	No. 11,	14th May,	,,
,, ,,	No. 12,	16th May,	,,

and refers Lord C. to despatches to Secret Committee and Court, for replies to the most essential points in these despatches.

2. That the Belle packet will convey his detailed reply to Lord C.'s several communications. WELLESLEY.

No. 7.

Fort William, December 15, 1803.

1. States that he had hitherto delayed his detailed reply to Lord C.'s Letter, "Secret," No. 1, in consequence of his despatches to the Court, &c., containing replies to the most essential parts of that letter.

2. That Lord C. has been already apprised of the motives

which induced him to continue in India beyond January, 1803; and subsequent events have proved that he was not mistaken as to the importance of that crisis. That, as the grounds of jealousy entertained by the Court have not been announced to him officially, he cannot express any other sentiment than that of indignation, at their injustice and illiberality. That every event, since the conquest of Mysore, ought to have impressed the Court with a due sense of the personal exertions by which he saved the Indian empire from ruin, and increased its resources and glory.

3. That he is to learn the causes which have induced the Court to forget his past services, but for which they would have been bankrupt, and deposed with disgrace from their sovereignty in India.

4. That, under the declaration of the jealousy and dissatisfaction of the Court, signified through the Chairs, Lord C. must have anticipated this distinct assertion of his indisputable rights. That the conscious sense of the principles of his administration inspires a disdain of jealousies unfounded in public sentiment, and contradicted by public events. That he is entitled to the confidence, approbation, and gratitude of the Company, but he will never prefer any claim even upon the justice of the Court, while their interests and views shall appear to be incompatible with the interests and honour of his King and country, and even with the maintenance of an empire in India.

5. The illiberal calumnies, fabricated by the Court, upon the frivolous pretext of Mr. Henry Wellesley's appointment, have received ample refutation by its happy result.

6. With these sentiments he received the Court's public despatch, requesting his continuance in his present station, and thereby virtually retracting every libel published by them against him. That he experienced sentiments of disgust, in receiving an application from persons who had employed every artifice to traduce his public character and services, which was

not accompanied by any symptom of remorse for long and unmerited injury.

7. That, unconnected with the public motives which induced him to continue in India, he should have considered the request of the Court as an additional insult; and, attaching no value to their approbation, censure, or wishes, he would have retired with an alacrity proportioned to the Court's declared desire for his continuance in their service. But his sentiments are far different with regard to his Majesty's Ministers, and a single signification of Lord C.'s wishes would have convinced him that the public interests required his services.

8. That, by the tenour of the Court's conduct for the last year, Lord C. has been enabled to judge whether their wish for his continuance in India has proved sincere. That the numerous instances in which the Court has broken faith with his Majesty's Ministers, as well as with him, during the last year, must have satisfied Lord C. that their acquiescence was insincere.

9. That the personal indignities offered to him by that body have not impaired his confidence in Lord C.'s honour and public spirit, his zeal for the prosperity of the arduous cause in which his Majesty's Ministers are engaged, or his solicitude for the welfare and glory of this empire. He is convinced that Lord C. has used every endeavour to induce the Court to adhere to the faith of its public engagements with him.

10. That, from the inherent defects in the constitution of the Indian Government in England, he has felt less regret, when Lord C. has failed in restraining the excesses of the Court, than surprise when he has obtained any portion of justice for his services.

11. That the public service requires he should suppress the emotions of his just indignation; but he anticipates with satisfaction the moment when the vindication of his personal character and services will open the sources of improvement in every branch of this empire, and establish the constitution of its Government upon a firm and durable basis.

12. The determination of Government and Court, upon the settlement of the Carnatic, gave him great satisfaction. It appears that an erroneous conception had been entertained in England, in consequence of an intention expressed by him of entering into a detailed review of that settlement: but that the Papers from Fort St. George and this Government contain every information, and no additional argument appears necessary upon any branch of the question.

13. The Court's Letter has noticed with propriety that the further documents expected from him were unnecessary to the formation of a final decision in England upon that question.

14. Lord C. and the public being in possession of the information upon which his decision respecting the Carnatic was formed, he has no doubt that a correct judgment will be delivered upon any discussion relative to that settlement—that he retains no further solicitude upon the subject than that such an arrangement as may appear to Parliament to be just and wise may be permanently secured.

15. If any misrepresentations should be fabricated of the principles and objects of the settlement, Lord C. is in possession of ample materials to refute any calumny; and, if it should reach him, he shall be prepared to assist in asserting the truth.

16. That Lord C. has already drawn a just conclusion from the transactions in the Carnatic which, he is satisfied, will be confirmed by further deliberation, and will be maintained with ability and energy.

17. That the faction of the Nabob's creditors are not the most respectable even of Indian growth, and the active exertions of such a body will naturally combine a considerable portion of artifice, low intrigue, bold falsehood, secret calumny, and skilful corruption.

18. That the agents of this faction are supposed to have received considerable reinforcement from some of the late Omdut ul Omrah's relations, who have possessed themselves of

his treasure, for the purpose of purchasing in England such a succession to the Musnud as might serve their private interests and perpetuate former abuses, to the benefit of a tribe of extortioners, to the advantage of the French, to the destruction of the British interests, and to the misery and ruin of the unfortunate inhabitants.

19. That opinions manifestly proceeding from the fabrications of such a faction will not find any degree of consideration in his mind, although implanted in the minds of some persons generally entitled to respect. The representatives of this faction in England are eminently qualified, by principles congenial with the character of their constituents, to undertake such a cause.

20. The reference to the arrangements in Oude and Guzerat, as connected with the Settlement of the Carnatic, and as proving a systematic plan of territorial acquisition, inconsistent with the policy of the Act of 1793, must have appeared to be the least ingenious of the inventions devised by the Nabob's creditors.

21. The Act of 1793 declares that "the pursuit of schemes of conquest and extension of dominions in India is repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of the nation." This declaratory preamble introduces the regulation for preventing hostilities, or conclusion of treaties involving the contingency of war, without the express command of the Court of Directors or Secret Committee.

22. No inference can be drawn from the Act of 1793 to preclude the extension of the British territories by just and legitimate means, unconnected with schemes of conquest and irregular ambition.

23. The conquest of Mysore, in 1799, might otherwise have been condemned, on similar grounds. That conquest was the result of a just and necessary war, and the transfer of the enemy's dominions to our authority was never deemed to be inconsistent with the policy of the Act of 1793, but was de-

clared to be justified by the same principles which had justified the commencement of the war.

24. In 1792, Lord Cornwallis concluded subsidiary engagements with the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Rajah of Tanjore, which stipulated an extension of the Company's territory, in case of failure on their part in the regular payment of the subsidy. But it never yet has been contended that, in the event of such a failure, it would have been inconsistent with the Act of 1793 to have insisted on the Company's right to demand the execution of those articles which entitled the Company to an extension of territory in commutation of the subsidiary payment.

25. The Company, on various occasions, with his Majesty's authority, has expressed great anxiety to commute the subsidies of the Carnatic and Tanjore for adequate territorial security. It never has occurred until now to represent such a commutation as inconsistent to the honour or policy of the nation, or to the letter and spirit of the Acts of Regulation.

26. On his arrival in India, in April, 1798, he endeavoured, in conformity to his original instructions from the Court, to obtain a commutation of this nature in the Carnatic—that, in pursuing this object, he followed the steps of Lord Hobart's Government, which had proceeded also under the commands of the Court.

27. That Lord Hobart and he were equally unsuccessful, but their efforts received unequivocal testimonies of public and official approbation; nor were their endeavours for the improvement of the subsidiary engagements ever represented as a violation of the Act of 1793; although the success of these endeavours must have been accompanied by an extension of territory.

28. In his letter to Court, of August 3, 1799, he has declared that his object in concluding subsidiary engagements with the Rajah of Mysore was to facilitate the direct control of the Company over the whole of Mysore, with a view to the

more effectual security of the subsidy. The territory governed in the Rajah's name was actually annexed to the Company's dominions by the article of the treaty of Seringapatam, which empowers them to assume the direct management of the whole country. But this treaty has never been quoted to prove the existence of a plan of territorial acquisition inconsistent with the Act of 1793.

29. He effected in Tanjore, in 1800, a commutation of subsidy, founded on his original instructions respecting the Carnatic; and the territory of Tanjore was annexed to the Company's possessions.

30. In 1800, a new treaty of subsidy was formed with the Nizam, upon the principle of obtaining territorial security for the payment of the subsidy.

31. That these treaties have not been arraigned on the grounds recently stated.

32. That the treaties with Surat, and those with the Guickowars, were founded on similar principles with those of Tanjore and Hyderabad — the right to conclude subsidiary engagements with the Guickowar was derived from the treaty of Salbije.

33. That the subsidiary treaty with the Nabob of Oude, in November, 1801, rested on the same foundations.

34. That the treaty of Bassein proceeds on the same grounds; it has cemented the ancient alliance between the Company and the Peshwa by a subsidiary engagement and by a territorial cession upon the improved plan of policy, repeatedly sanctioned by his Majesty's and the Company's authority, in preference to that defective scheme of subsidiary alliance, which had produced innumerable evils, and the policy of which appeared to have been exploded by the deliberative wisdom and long experience of the Court of Directors.

35. That the transfer of the Government of the Carnatic to the Company was warranted upon the justice and necessity of that proceeding, founded upon the forfeiture incurred by Mo-

hamed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah, and upon the dangers which menaced the Company's rights on the coast of Coromandel by their treachery. The justification of this proceeding rests upon principles similar to those by which war is justified: and the extension of territory which accompanied the prosecution of a just and legitimate public right cannot be condemned upon principles derived from the Act of 1793.

36. In prosecuting the just rights of the Company against the Nabob of the Carnatic, he resorted to his original instructions, reframed the new settlement with a reference to the expediency of a commutation of subsidy for territorial security, and of rescuing the Carnatic from the evils of divided Government, by establishing the authority in the Company, with a liberal allowance to the Nabob. He is at a loss to comprehend the application of the Act of 1793 to any part of this transaction.

37. That the acquisitions of territory accomplished during his administration have proceeded either from successful war, from forfeiture in consequence of violation of dependent alliance, or from the improvement of existing or formation of new treaties of subsidy and guarantee. The first includes the possessions of Tippoo, retained by the Company; the second consists of the possessions of Omdut ul Omrah; and the last comprehends the Rajah of Tanjore, the Nizam, the Nabob of Oude, the Nabob of Surat, the Guickowar, and the Peshwa.

38. That the Company's Records will furnish Lord C. with sufficient evidence that every extension of territory acquired under each of these classes has originated in principles not only strictly conformable to the Act of 1793, but to the maxims of justice and policy applicable to India.

39. That no territory has been acquired otherwise than by the prosecution of just and necessary war, or of just and legitimate public rights. The result of these acquisitions has not involved the necessity of defending any territory which had not previously furnished means of offensive war, or which we

were not previously bound to defend. Our means of defence are now greatly augmented by the annexation of the civil and military Government of the territories, from which we derive the military resources for their protection.

40. That he has intimated his opinion to Mr. Addington regarding the floating debts of the Carnatic, as far as it appeared to be proper, while the Settlement of the Carnatic remains in suspense in Parliament.

41. He trusts that Lord C. will not recognise any part of the Nabob's unconsolidated debts, without previous investigation, under the authority of the Legislature, when he shall be prepared to offer his sentiments on every branch of the subject.

42. Encloses extracts of the opinions which he has communicated to Mr. Addington in a private letter.

43. That the condition of the Company's territorial possessions in India cannot be considered as similar to that of a proprietor of a landed estate—that the Company must be viewed in the capacity of a Sovereign Power.—That if any other principle be recognised, endless confusion must ensue, which nothing could remedy but the assumption of the direct Executive Power by the Crown.

44. If any accommodation with the Nabob's creditors should be attempted, it appears to him that his letter of the 24th April, 1799, to Omdut ul Omrah would form an eligible basis of such an arrangement. But, in the present circumstances, it would not be advisable to recognise any part of the debt, without previous authority of Parliament to the Court of Directors, and from the Court to the Governor-General.

45. Lord C.'s observations respecting the Settlement of Oude, and Mr. Henry Wellesley's conduct in the negociation of the treaty with the Vizier, and in the superintendence of the Provisional Government of that country, has afforded him the highest satisfaction. The ample details on this subject by the Swallow packet preclude the necessity of any further remark.

46. Lord C.'s attention will be directed to the recent com-

munication from the ceded provinces, and he will observe the happy result of that appointment, which has been alleged by the Court as a just ground of jealousy and suspicion.

47. That it is impossible for him to anticipate the arguments by which the Court may have endeavoured to impute to this appointment any relaxation in the general principles of the service. These principles are inapplicable to this case. It was doubtful whether, upon the first transfer of Oude, it might not have been necessary to have laid the basis of the settlement by a Military Commission.

48. That, under these circumstances, Lord C. will be enabled to form an estimate of the degree of astonishment with which he received the intelligence of the Court's jealousy respecting the constitution of the temporary commission for the settlement of that valuable acquisition. No arrangements could have been imagined which could have led so speedily to the introduction of the Company's civil servants.

49. That it has been a matter of great surprise and satisfaction to him to have found himself enabled, in so short a space of time, to establish the Company's civil authority in a country, the lawless and disorderly state of which, under the Vizier, had long afforded occupation to the Bengal army. He should have deemed it a reasonable compromise with the Court to have secured the introduction of their civil servants at the expiration of a Military Commission of five or seven years.

50. He feels pleasure in assuring Lord C. that, although the tranquillity of that province is not yet completely secured, and although the final settlement of the Dooab may hereafter require the employment of authorities which may again move the jealousy of the Court, great advantages have been derived, in the prosecution of the present war, from the improvements already accomplished in Oude. Lord C.'s letter expresses a hope that, with regard to the policy and justice of the treaty of Lucknow and the recent settlement of Oude, he will receive the approbation of the Court. On this question, as on the

subject of the Carnatic, he has completely discharged his duty by applying his utmost exertions to the formation of a settlement on principles which appear to him to be just, expedient, and durable. And, in submitting to the Court the grounds of his decision, he entertains no further anxiety than that the public interests in Oude should be saved for his country; and if the Court should condemn the arrangements by which he has saved those interests, he trusts that their wisdom and justice will amend his errors, and reform the present Government of the ceded provinces.

51. This correspondence with the Secret Committee upon Finance embraces every point stated by Lord C. upon that important question. That, if the prime cost of investment be regularly supplied in bullion from England, for a few years, every object in Lord C.'s contemplation will be secured.

52. War with France, unless extended to India, will not materially retard Lord C.'s plan for the reduction of debt.

53. That war in India must produce a temporary delay. The war has, however, been attended with a large increase of revenue; and, as an early peace may be expected, the result of Lord C.'s plans may be rather accelerated than retarded by the events of the present war.

54. That he cannot close this letter without repeating to Lord C. his high respect and entire confidence; that it is due to that confidence to apprize Lord C. of his sentiments with regard to the conduct and views of the Court of Directors; but these sentiments will not appear in his official relation to that body, or in any form which can embarrass the public service; and that his primary object will be the success of Lord C.'s just and wise plans for the prosperity and honour of this empire.

WELLESLEY.

No. 9.

Fort William, July 9, 1804.

States that the official communications will have informed Lord C. of the general state of affairs in India—that every

thing promises durable peace—that the necessity for reducing Holkar will not lead to an interruption of it, and will consolidate our connexion with Scindia—that the Commander-in-Chief is returned to Cawnpore—that the army will be withdrawn from the field, and the military charges reduced—that he is himself intending to embark for Cawnpore, hopes to meet there General Wellesley, with the Commander-in-Chief, to settle finally, in August and September, all the military arrangements, and to resume the system of reducing debt.

That many public details remain for adjustment, but he hopes to embark for England in February—that he is impatient of the restraint of the Directors under their conduct to him, although his Government in India has received weak support and applause.—That Lord C. will have observed by the despatches the accident which has exposed the investment from Bengal to hazard—that he will use every exertion to maintain it at the highest scale—that public credit improves —that the financial system at Fort St. George has been put on the system prescribed by his orders, and that public credit there wears a most favourable aspect—that the state of public credit here cannot fail to accelerate the reduction of the Public Debt, as soon as peace shall be restored.

That the importance of Bombay has been too much augmented by the success of the war; that he has altered his plan of reducing the Government, and making it a Provincial Establishment, under the supreme Government; that he therefore hopes Lord C. will suspend any alteration in the constitution of the Government of Bombay till he receives his sentiments on the subject; that he will write again to Lord C. in August.

That he is extremely anxious to hear from England—that Lord C.'s last was of the 28th November, 1803, and the last intelligence from England of the 23rd February, 1804.

WELLESLEY.

Secret, No. 10.

Fort William, July 9, 1804.

States that he transmits a further note respecting the recruiting of the European force serving in India.

(Signed) WELLESLEY.

Précis of Enclosure in the above.

That when any of his Majesty's regiments are drafted, the volunteer, on entering another of his Majesty's corps, receives only three guineas, and is compelled to enlist for life—that by enlisting in the Company's European Artillery he receives five guineas for three years, and that then he may renew his service at an additional bounty of five guineas, or may return to Europe at the expense of the Company.

That the Company's corps of European Artillery has also many comforts and advantages attending it that a corps of European infantry has not, arising from the large body of Lascars and natives attached to it—that the pay is superior—that they are not submitted to the same rigid control—that his Majesty's regiments will never be able to procure men drafted from other regiments, as long as the corps of Artillery want recruits.—That, therefore, the Company's Artillery ought to procure recruits from a source quite unconnected with the source from which his Majesty's corps derive their supply.

W.

Secret, No. 11.

Fort William, August 8, 1804.

States that, as the object of the enclosed despatch from the Governor-General in Council to the Government of Fort St. George is of the utmost importance, he transmits a copy of it to Lord C., lest the Court should be induced to withhold it for a longer period than may be consistent with the public interests.

(Signed) WELLESLEY.

No. 10.

Private and confidential. Fort William, March 10, 1805.

Mentions the gratification he has received from Lord C.'s letter, private, No. 8, communicating the marks of the King's favour conferred upon Lord Lake and General Wellesley, and thanks Lord C. for his obliging attention towards him on this occasion—that his Majesty's just consideration for the services of the above officers has been peculiarly acceptable to him, and that the delay in conferring those honours has been fully compensated by the manner in which it has been done.—That he has forwarded to Lord Lake and Sir Arthur Wellesley the letters transmitted in Lord C.'s of 29th August, 1804.

(Signed) WELLESLEY.

Private. Fort William, March 28, 1805.

States that, in consequence of the able, zealous, and successful services of Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, at the Court of Hyderabad, he had solicited for him of his Majesty's Ministers the dignity of a Baronet—that he received a favourable reply from Lord Melville, then at the head of the Board of Control—but that, as he has since heard nothing on the subject, he apprehends it has been forgotten. He therefore requests Lord C.'s attention to this solicitation.

That Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick has continued to hold his situation at Hyderabad till the present time, and his conduct has been perfectly satisfactory, particularly during the late Mahratta contest, and that the effects of his exertions have been of the greatest importance to the country.

That it is of extreme importance to bestow adequate rewards for such services, in order to animate officers in such stations of high responsibility to a zealous discharge of their duty.

That Sir J. Kenaway and Sir Charles W. Malet received similar honours for services in 1789 and 1790 at Poonah and Hyderabad; and that Colonel Kirkpatrick is an equally strong claimant.

That his anxiety in this case will induce him to write to Mr. Pitt on the subject, and to enclose a copy of this.

(Signed) WELLESLEY.

[Précis of Enclosures in Marquess Wellesley's Despatches to Lord Castlereagh, of March 28, 1805.]

Enclosure 1, *from Colonel Collins to Lord Wellesley.*

Lucknow, August 29, 1804.

States that he forwards, for Lord W.'s information, copy and translation of a letter received yesterday from the Nabob-Vizier.

2. That the Nabob has promised to advance ten lacks of rupees at the shortest notice, and as much carriage as he can spare; that the money is to be repaid in two months; that he hopes, in a day or two, to be able to apprize the Commander-in-Chief how much carriage the Nabob can supply.

3. That, although he feels highly gratified by the Nabob's conduct, he shall leave it to the Governor-General to express his sentiments on the occasion, and that he will only observe, in compliance with the Nabob's wishes that, in his thus coming forward, he was influenced as well by a personal regard for the Governor-General as attachment for the interests of the Company.

4. That the Nabob's offers were voluntary, and the result of his own feelings.

5. That he encloses copies of his reply to the Nabob.

(Signed) J. COLLINS,
Resident at Lucknow.

Translation of a Letter from the Nabob Vizier to Colonel Collins.

Lucknow, August 28, 1804.

That he has just learned of fresh disturbances among the Mahrattas, and of Lake's determination to repress them;

that this intelligence gives him concern; that, although it has not been communicated to him by General Lake, his regard for the interests of the Company will not permit him to be silent: he, therefore, offers his assistance to the utmost of his ability, and begs to know what may be necessary in carriage or money; begs Colonel C. will accept his offer, and not wait for the Governor-General's approbation; that, although it is not incumbent on him, his sincere attachment to the Company induces him to do it; and he will feel uneasy till his intentions are put in execution.

Letter from Colonel Collins to the Nabob-Vizier.

States—that he has received his letter replete with sentiments of friendship, &c.

That it has excited in his mind the highest gratitude, &c.

That it is true that the Commander-in-Chief is about to enter on a war with Holkar, which he cannot immediately do for want of cash and carriage for the army; that, as the Nabob had before the generosity to comply with the Governor-General's application through Colonel Scott, he felt ashamed to apply to him on this occasion; that he cannot express his gratitude and admiration at the noble manner in which the Nabob has now come forward; that, as his kindness has desired him to state what may be necessary for the march of the army, he informs him that he has been ordered within these few days to raise a loan of fifteen lacks, of which he has procured five; that, if his Highness could supply the remainder, with some cattle and carriage for the army, it would enable it to take the field, and would highly oblige the Governor-General.

Précis of Enclosure No. 2.

To the Vizier from Lord Wellesley, September 7, 1804.

States that he has been informed by Colonel Collins of his

Excellency's offer of money and carriage-cattle for the use of the army under Lord Lake.

That he has received this testimony of his regard, &c., for the interest and prosperity of the British Government with peculiar satisfaction, and that it exceeds all obligations of the alliance.

That he offers his most cordial thanks for his expressions of personal regard to himself, as a motive for this generous offer.

That he contemplates, with the highest gratification, any additional instance of the union and harmony subsisting between them, and that this is a fresh and distinguished proof.

That it will never be forgotten, and must tend to strengthen and perpetuate their mutual amity and affection.

That for further particulars he refers to Colonel Collins's verbal representations.

WELLESLEY.

Précis of Enclosure No. 3.

To N. B. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government, Fort William.

Lucknow, September 19, 1804.

States that he waited on the Nabob-Vizier this morn, to present the Governor-General's letter.

2. That the Nabob expressed extreme satisfaction on the receipt of the Governor-General's letter.

3. That, perceiving the friendship the Nabob expressed towards the British Government, he considered it a proper opportunity to mention to him that it was not solely his offer of the ten lacks for two months that was so extremely satisfactory to the Governor-General, but the friendly motives from which it arose, which were so gratifying to him ; that, in fact, a loan of ten lacks for two months was no accommodation ; that, if he would extend the time to eighteen, it might be a considerable one.

That the Nabob readily consented to the extension to

eighteen, and even proposed nineteen months, and begged the substance of the conversation might be communicated to the Governor-General.

4. That he embraced this opportunity of reminding the Vizier of the delay that had taken place in furnishing the cattle he had promised; that the Vizier said it had given him much vexation; that it was on account of the cattle having been sent so far for forage; that he had received intelligence of their arrival within a few coss of Lucknow.

(Signed) J. Collins.

Précis of Enclosure No. 4.

From the Nabob-Vizier to Lord Wellesley.

October 24, 1804.

Acknowledges Lord Wellesley's letter to him of the 7th September.

That his expressions of regard and approbation of his conduct merit his utmost gratitude, and lay him under the highest obligations.

That his own interest and welfare are involved in the prosperity of the British Government; that he is, therefore, constantly anxious to promote the latter, and to improve the alliance between them.

That, although his offers may have exceeded the obligations of his alliance, he could not help coming forward on this occasion.

That he hopes Lord W. will receive it as a testimony of the sincerity of his solicitude on all occasions for the interests of the British Government, and for the dignity and glory of the Honourable Company.

Begs he will frequently acquaint him with the state of his health.

That Colonel Collins has communicated to him the further particulars, for which he was referred to him by Lord W., and that he has complied with Lord W.'s wishes.

Précis of Enclosure No. 5.

From Lord Wellesley to the Vizier.

November 19, 1804.

States that he has been informed by Colonel Collins of the Nabob's consent to advance ten lacks more for six months.

That this affords him the highest satisfaction—that it is a complete proof of his entire confidence in the faith and equity of the British Government, and of his just conception of the spirit of the alliance.

That he will have great satisfaction in communicating it to the King of Great Britain and to the India Company.

That he has directed Colonel Collins to accompany this with expressions of his cordial thanks and acknowledgments.

Précis of Enclosure No. 6.

From the Vizier to Lord Wellesley.

December 9, 1804.

States that Colonel Collins presented his letter of the 19th November, every word, every line of which was replete with the purest friendship and regard.

That it gave him the greatest satisfaction, &c.; that his heart expanded like a rose, &c.; that he rendered thanks to the Almighty, &c.

That he cannot express his acknowledgments for Lord W.'s intention to mention his conduct and attachment to the interests of the British Government to the King and the India Company.

That neither the pen nor the tongue can properly express his sentiments on this occasion.

That Lord W. referred him to Colonel Collins for the further expression of his sentiments; that it was unnecessary; that his letter was quite sufficient; that he (the Nabob) could not sufficiently utter his acknowledgments personally to Colonel C.; that he, therefore, writes this.

That he is subservient to his will, and anxious to possess

his personal regard; and begs to be frequently honoured with letters denoting his welfare.

Précis.

Fort William, March 28, 1805.

States that, since the conclusion of the treaty of 1801 between the Company and the Nawaub-Vizier, his Highness's conduct has been of the most satisfactory nature; that, previous to the commencement of the war with the Mahrattas, he furnished us with supplies of elephants and bullocks for the army, and offered to mount the 8th regiment of Dragoons; that, since the rupture with Holkar, his faithful and attached conduct has been peculiarly eminent.

That he offered a loan of ten lacks of rupees, in August, 1804, for the use of the army under Lord Lake; that he provided carriage and draught cattle; that in November he advanced a further sum of ten lacks. For Lord C.'s information, he annexes documents noted in the margin.[1]

2. That, in December, the Vizier offered a loan of five lacks for six months, without interest, and has since furnished an additional sum to the same extent.

3. That he deems it his duty to communicate to Lord C. these satisfactory demonstrations of his Highness's disposition.

4. Suggests the expediency of his Majesty writing a letter of acknowledgment to the Vizier, and the good effects it would be likely to promote.

[1] Nc 1. From the Resident at Lucknow of 29th August, 1804.

No. 2. From the Governor-General to the Nabob-Vizier of September 7, 1804.

No. 3. From the Resident at Lucknow to the Secretary of the Government, of the 19th September, 1804.

No. 4. From the Nabob-Vizier to the Governor-General.

No. 5. From the Governor-General to the Nabob-Vizier, of the 19th November.

No. 6. From the Nabob-Vizier to the Governor-General, in reply to the above.

5. That Major Ouseley, the Vizier's aide-de-camp, will afford Lord C. every information on the subject.

WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure in Mr. Jones's of June, 1805.]

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable William Elphinstone, Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Bagdad, June 17, 1805.

Honourable Sir—The state of this Government and country having been such, for some time past, as to give reason to imagine something important might early take place, I have hitherto postponed, under the idea that my communications on this subject, by a little delay, would become more interesting and worthy your attention, troubling you with any thing more than noticing several events as they took place.

It will be remembered, that, in the course of last year, the Porte forcibly and repeatedly commanded the Pacha to undertake an expedition against the Wahaby; and, from the preparations and professions he made, his character in a manner became pledged to the Ottoman Ministry and to the inhabitants of this country to undertake it. Under this pretence, he received a kind of forced loan from the merchants, and actually left Bagdad on the 12th November for Hillah.

The force with which the Pacha marched from this capital seemed to intimate his operations were not intended to be carried on upon an extensive plan; but it was said that the troops from different quarters were to join him at Hillah, and these being there assembled, he would march into the Wahabies' territories by the route of the Ghabelel Shumar.

The first troops that joined the Pacha were the quota demanded of the Pacha of Mosoul, and the month of January was well advanced before the two great Courdistan Pachas, with their troops, reached his camp. The inferior Pachas of the Courdistan had commuted their services, on this occasion,

for a sum of money; and some of the Arab Shaiks, particularly Ahmood Ibn Tamar, the Shaik of the Montificks, had refused to obey the Pacha's summons to join his camp.

To those who considered the smallness of the force collected at Hillah; the hardships they had suffered in being uselessly exposed to the rigour of the winter; the advancing state of the season, if viewed in respect to operations to be carried on in Neged; and, above all, the scanty supply of beasts of burthen the Pacha had been able to obtain for the transportation of his forces, it was most evident his Highness could undertake nothing effectual against the Wahaby.

In order, however, to save appearances (I presume), about the end of January, a detachment of Osmanlees was formed and put under the command of Suleiman Beg, the Pacha's sister's son; and this was accompanied by Shaik Faris, of the tribe of Gerba, and about one thousand of his Arabs mounted on camels; the intent of this detachment was said to make a predatory incursion into the Wahabies' country; but, after wandering about for some days in the desert, and, ridiculous as it is to relate, the commanders quarrelling because the Turks would smoke their pipes and light fires at night, which, on expeditions of this sort, the Arabs always avoid doing, as they inevitably lead to discovery on the plain desert at a great distance—Suleiman Beg and Faris el Gerba returned to the Pacha's camp at Hillah; and the only fruits of the expedition were complaints to the Pacha of each other's misconduct.

As if it were to retrieve the disgrace attending on this failure, the Pacha marched against the Ghesaal Arabs, who inhabit between Hasca and Samavat, on both sides of the Euphrates, and whose country, from being a marshy swamp, in some places, and intersected throughout with creeks, is, in the very middle of summer, difficult of access. The waters of the Euphrates had begun to rise; and, therefore, the event of the Pacha's warfare against the Ghesaals might easily have been predicted to be what it really turned out—the loss of

many men, a prodigious quantity of cattle, and a precipitate and difficult retreat. The retreat, however, was effected; and the Pacha returned to his camp at Hillah.

The Arabs, with the Pacha, as the spring advanced, became daily less inclined to continue encamped at Hillah, as they wished to join their flocks, and lead them to those pasturages which are so necessary for recruiting their strength after the severities of the heats of summer, and the want of forage in the winter. These discontents induced the Pacha to permit the Gerba Arabs to leave him early in March; and, on the 22nd of that month, as has been already mentioned, the Pacha himself came into town, leaving the Kia and the Courdistan horse at Hillah.

It will now be necessary to recall to your recollection that the Pacha, on returning from his expedition against the Sanjars in the year 1803, put to death Mohammed and Abdul Aziz Beg, the heads of a powerful tribe of Arabs called the Alabaade. The great desert, as well as the plains of Mesopotamia, are, by the Arabs inhabiting them, parcelled into districts for pasturages and residence, of which each tribe assumes a kind of property, which is never, without a quarrel, encroached on by a neighbouring tribe. When the Alabaade Arabs lost their chiefs, Mohammed and Abdul Aziz Beg, the tribe under the conduct of Mohammed Beg's family retreated from their usual pasturage and residence to the tribes bordering thereon, by whom they were received with kindness and cordiality. Three of the younger children of Mohammed Beg, having fallen into the Pacha's hands at the time of their father's execution, were committed by him to the care of Abdurhaman Pacha, and by that Pacha kept in Courdistan as a kind of state prisoners. Alarm for the fate of these youths, and the hope that time and circumstances might effect their release, kept the Alabaade Arabs from doing any thing very offensive to this Government; induced them, from time to time, to send insincere and unmeaning professions of obedience to

the Pacha; and prevented them hostilely resenting the permission given last year to Faris el Gerba to occupy their pasturage in the spring.

Early in the present year, the most favourite of the youths above-mentioned died in prison at Sulimanea, the capital of Abdurhaman Pacha's Government. Resentment for his loss, and the small prospect there appeared, both from the temper of the Pacha and the successful intrigues of persons about him, of any melioration taking place in the condition of the surviving youths, immediately caused a difference in the conduct of the tribe towards this Government. One of the first steps they took was to form an alliance with Teimour Pacha, the ex-Pacha of Orfa, and this alliance was strengthened by a marriage.

In this state of things, Faris il Gerba, on leaving the Pacha's camp at Hillah, conducted his tribe and flocks to the rich pasturages of the Alabaades, which lie near where the Chaboor falls into the Euphrates. Cossim Beg, the son of Mohammed Beg, acknowledged head of the tribe, and his new ally, Teimour Pacha, prepared to receive them; and, making the ostensible cause of their quarrel an old accident of some of the Gerba Arabs having ravished an Alabaade woman, in which affair blood had been spilt, which had never been atoned for, either by the Lex Talionis or the legal commutation in money, they made a desperate attack on Shaik Faris el Gerba, obtained a prodigious booty in camels and cattle, and obliged him to retreat between Tecrib and Degeal, on the Tigris.

It was then that Faris applied for assistance to the Pacha; and, in order to enable him to afford it, orders were sent to break up the camp at Hillah.

On the arrival from Hillah of the Kia and the Courdistan Pachas, a plan was formed for attacking the Alabaade Arabs; it was said to be that Abdurhaman Pacha, the principal Pacha of Courdistan, and the second in rank, Mohammed

Pacha, the Pacha of Coëc Sanjack, should proceed to Courdistan, there reinforce the troops they had with them, and cross the Tigris a little above Tecrib, whilst the Pacha or the Kia should march on the western bank of the Tigris, and join the Gerba Arabs, and the whole army to be assembled to the westward of Mousul, where it was to be joined by a certain number of musketeers from that city.

In pursuance of this plan, very early in the month of May, Abdurhaman Pacha and Mohammed Pacha marched for Courdistan; and, on the 10th May, accounts were received that Abdurhaman Pacha had put to death Mohammed Pacha about three posts distant from the city, and plundered his camp and baggage.

The first impression this unexpected event made in the city was, that the murder had taken place by order of the Pacha; and the Government, had they politically availed themselves of it, had means of causing this to be generally believed; but the reception the Pacha gave to the messenger and letter which Abdurhaman immediately despatched to Bagdad, instantly declared to the public the Pacha's sentiments of the transaction.

Almost the first step taken by the Bagdad Government was to issue an anathema against Abdurhaman Pacha, his family, and those who adhered to his cause, and to appoint, on the 16th May, Khaled Beg, the brother of the late Mohammed Pacha, to the Pachalick of Coëc Sanjack; and Suleiman Beg, the brother of the late Ibrahim Pacha, who was actually in Bagdad, to the Pachalick of Sulimanea. It was hoped that the anathema would cause the Courds of Abdurhaman Pacha's party to desert and join the new Pacha's; but this kind of spiritual weapons in Turkey, as well as elsewhere, is seldom of much use unless aided by force or other temporal assistance.

The chagrin the Pacha may naturally be supposed to have felt, from the unpromising state of his affairs, in every part of the Pachalick, probably made him receive, with more than

usual avidity, every tale of suspicion and disaffection; and this moment was chosen to accuse, whether truly or falsely I know not, the Kia of being engaged with Abdurhaman Pacha in a conspiracy against him; the Pacha was so far convinced of it as, on the morning of the 21st May, to seize the Kia and Abdullah Aga, formerly the Mussoleem of Bussora, and confine them with irons on their legs in the castle of Bagdad.

Imprisonment of great men in Turkey and confiscation of their property always take place together; and the ill-gotten wealth of the Kia, to an enormous amount, thirty lacks of piastres, was seized by the Pacha, and a fine laid on Abdullah Aga of 300,000 piastres.

To the 3rd June, the Kia remained prisoner in the castle; on the night of that day he was strangled. On the 4th June, the Pacha joined his tents, under the walls of Bagdad; on the 5th June, in the morning, he moved his camp.

To return to Abdurhaman Pacha. On receiving the news of the anathema, he easily saw that all hope of accommodation between himself and the Pacha was at an end, and in consequence thereof moved towards Courdistan, laying the villages under contribution, and abandoning some of them to be plundered by his troops. When Khaled Beg was appointed Pacha of Coëc Sanjack, he was between Mousul and Altoun Koupri, a town with a bridge over the lesser Zâb; and in this station he was ordered by Ally Pacha to wait until he was joined by the troops which had been solicited from the Pacha of Mousul.

Abdurhaman Pacha stationed his brother, Selim Beg, on the southern side of the Zâb, near Altoun Koupri, to guard the pass of that river, and took station himself with the main body of his troops at Derbend, one of the passes into the mountains of Courdistan.

The auxiliary troops from Mousul having joined Khaled Beg, he passed the Zâb, and encamped on the southern bank of it. In this position, he was attacked by Selim Beg, de-

feated, his army dispersed with considerable slaughter, and most of the fugitives who escaped from the field drowned in attempting to recross the Zâb. This action is said to have taken place in the morning; and, though the number of killed is always exaggerated in these countries, there is reason to believe that the slaughter in this action was considerable, as many bodies have floated down the Tigris to Bagdad.

It seems to have been the Pacha's intention that the troops under the command of Khaled Pacha should have attacked Abdurhaman Pacha on one side, and those under his own command on the other. This scheme, however, by the defeat of Khaled Beg, was rendered abortive, and the Pacha immediately entrenched his camp under the idea that Abdurhaman Pacha would proceed to attack him. Skirmishes are also said to have taken place between advanced parties of Abdurhaman's forces and the forces of the Pacha, in which the former have uniformly had the better; and report says (but there are so many flying about one knows not what to trust to) that the Pacha has advanced to Kerkook, the Mussoleem of which city, Negim Beg, is said to be in Abdurhaman Pacha's camp. If the news of the Pacha's advance be true to the extent related, there is now about ten hours' journey of a caravan distant between the two armies, and it is not likely either party will keep that position long—action, desertion, or the Sâm, must soon produce something decisive to one party or the other.

When the Pacha left Bagdad, his force probably amounted to 1,000 Laywond horse, 500 or 600 household troops, 400 or 500 musketeers; and his force is now said to be increased to 10,000 men: but, by what means, or where they have come from, I am totally ignorant; for, allowing conjecture as wide a scope as possible for the Arabs who may have joined him, I cannot persuade myself they can possibly amount to more than 3,000; and these, I conceive, are little to be depended on as men of war, but will prove excellent hands in plundering his camp, in case of any sinister accident. The

Pacha has with him fourteen or fifteen pieces of artillery, on which, I fancy, he principally depends; and Conductor Raymond, highly contrary to my wishes and judgment, and, in the event of success inclining to the Courds, most probably highly to the risk of our personal safety here, is in his camp. I have received nothing from the Honourable the Government of Bombay on the subject of his disobedience of my arrest. I cannot take him from the Pacha by force; and, until some voice more powerful than mine demands him, the Pacha will not give him up. Assuredly, however, on all accounts, he ought not to be where he is.

The united force of Abdurhaman Pacha and Selim Beg, his brother, is said to be 5,000 excellent horse, and about 1,000 musketeers, and this force is highly credible. I know not for certain whether he has any guns. Abdurhaman has delivered to Cossim Beg the hostages of the Alabaade Arabs under his charge, and it is generally believed he has been joined by a considerable body of horse from that tribe.

The situation of the two armies, in other respects, is altogether in favour of the Courds; the Pacha's army, without confidence in their leader, disheartened by the defeat of Khaled Pacha, fatigued with constant watchings and guard, encamped in a plain where, under a shell tent, the thermometer now stands at least at 110°, and convinced, if they cannot advance, that to retreat with safety is still less practicable. Besides which, supposing the Pacha be mad enough to attempt keeping the field during the Sâm, or pestilential wind, which must soon blow, the supplies for his camp, after he has devoured the grain now on the ground around it, will become very precarious.

The Courd camp presents a very different view. Abdurhaman Pacha has the character of a great General; his personal courage has been tried in most desperate actions, and his soldiers and people have the utmost confidence in his abilities. His principal camp is in a place so fortified by nature as to render it needless to fatigue his troops by watch-

ing; the troops in the passes of those mountains which he occupies are in a mild climate compared to that of the plains; he has nothing now to fear from Khaled Pacha or from the northward; and, having his own country open behind him, his supplies can never fail; and, as he cannot be attacked, so, on the contrary, he may attack whenever it best suits his purpose. The anathema so ridiculously issued by the Pacha has not yet produced any effect in his favour; it has only exasperated the Courds; and I conceive they will make much less account of such harmless productions than of submitting to receive from Ally Pacha those frequent orders which they have had lately to attend him, at their own expense, on his foolish, trivial, and unmeaning expeditions.

This part of the letter ought not to be closed without mentioning the fate of Abdullah Aga. Shortly after the Pacha left Bagdad, he sent orders to the Kaimacam to release Abdullah Aga; and, if any thing remained unpaid of his fine, to desist from enforcing the payment of it. Abdullah Aga had paid, by the sale of his houses, lands, household utensils, clothes, and ornaments belonging to the women of his family, 208,000 piastres; and, in two days after the arrival of the Pacha's orders, set off with all his family for Bussora, with a purpose of returning to Bushire. The very day after his departure, orders came from the Pacha to the Kaimacam to send people after him, to put irons on his legs, and to deliver him to the Mussoleem at Bussora, but with what intent is not clearly ascertained.

Of the two extremities of this great Pachalick, Bussora unquestionably at present enjoys the greatest tranquillity, as Teimour Pacha, the Sanjars, and other tribes, are said in a manner to have surrounded Merdin; but how long Bussora, in the present state of things, will remain quiet, appears to depend on the pleasure of Shaik Ahmood, who is known to be highly discontented with this Government.

The principal tribe of Arabs on the Tigris to the southward

of Bagdad, the Benelams, has openly refused obedience to the Pacha; the two rival Shaiks have settled their difference, and the annual tribute of the tribe has not yet been received.

One of the principal tribes on the Euphrates to the southward of Hillah—that is, the Ghesaals—are in the same situation as the Benelams; and it may fairly be said that the influence this Government has over the smaller distant tribes is rather nominal than actual. Whilst mentioning Arabs, it ought not to be omitted, that about twenty days ago a large body of Thofereet Arabs (Wahabies), with their wives, and families, and cattle, who pretend to have resorted to the Pacha for protection against the Wahaby Shaik, were admitted between the two rivers to the northward of Bagdad, and large supplies of grain and other things afforded them. Of these people, there is altogether near 15,000 souls, and there are not wanting those who regard these new guests of the Pacha as persons of suspicious character.

If this state of the Government and of its forces affords no very consoling picture, the state of its commerce, revenue, and resources, is by no means satisfactory.

I have good reason to believe that, since the year 1798, the year of my arrival, to the present year, the gross amount of the commerce of Bagdad has diminished two-fifths; that at least two-fifths of the specie at Bagdad, when I arrived, has since been withdrawn from commerce — first, by the plunder of Karbalay by the Wahaby; second, by all the great moneyed Persians having returned with their wealth to Persia; and, thirdly, by many of the Turks, who, under the lenient Government of the old Pacha, engaged their money in mercantile speculations, or lent it on terms of advantage to others, having, under the present Government, put that money under ground. The natural consequence of this is, that ruinous credits are obliged to be extended to most articles of commerce; and, strange as it may appear in countries better regulated, and where the principles of commerce are better understood, the

person who buys on twelve months' credit and pays within fifteen months is called a good paymaster. Of the attention paid by the present Government to the merchants and to commerce, I cannot advance an instance that will speak more forcibly for itself than observing, that a caravan for Aleppo, consisting of 4000 loads, has been ready since the beginning of the winter; that the Government, on one frivolous pretence or other, continually delayed its departure; and, now that it set off some days ago, the camels are dying of excessive heat, and it is doubtful whether it will be able to proceed further until winter than a place called Heal, on the Euphrates.

From circumstances come to my knowledge, I consider the last year's collection of the revenue to be deficient in full one-third to that of 1798; and this deficiency would have been greater, had not extraordinary means been resorted to. Bussora, under the Mussaleemship of Abdullah Aga, not only cleared its expenses, but remitted near ten lacks of piastres to the treasury of Bagdad. If my information be correct, no remittance has been received from thence since the Mussaleemship of Selim Beg in 1801. The last and present Governors of Bussora have contrived to make that noble dependence on this Pachalick a debt to it.

Many of the Mokatas (farms of districts let annually) were, in the course of last year, let three times over, and each time to persons less able, and, consequently, less likely to pay the rent than the prior taker; but who advanced on his price three or four thousand piastres. If I may trust my information on this head, the general balances of last year against the renters are from one quarter to one half of the gross rent. This frequent change of renters necessarily produced some new demand on the sub-renters of each district, and this naturally occasioned these latter to be shy of taking grounds when the terms of their taking were liable to be continually augmented. The cultivation here, or at least the most valuable part of it, is produced by canals of some size, cut in happier

times than the present; these canals are bled, at certain distances, by smaller ones, and these are what the sub-renter takes of the renter of the district. Several of these have this year in every district remained untaken; and it will be easily conceived that in a light soil these smaller canals, unless constant pains are taken to keep them clear, will become choked up in one twelvemonth. This, I understand, has in many places happened; and it will require a Government acting on liberal and enlarged views to make the necessary allowances to the chief and sub-renters to re-open such as are in this state.

The Customs of Bagdad, if compared with the first year of the Pacha's Government, are supposed to have fallen off one-third; if with the year 1798, three-fifths: and I have reason to think the deficiency at Bussora is nearly in the same proportion. Some part of this deficiency, however, may be attributed to the Customs being better managed formerly than at present; and it may be worth while to say, that, although the Mokata renters are so much in arrear, they have not, in any shape, enriched themselves by their takings. The presents they are obliged to make to the harpies in office to keep their situation is the principal occasion of their default, and the greatest of all these harpies was the late Kia.

To remedy the general deficiency of the revenue, the Mery collected on articles of consumption at Bagdad has been stretched to the utmost; and, without any particular failure in the crops, barley, which was sold in 1798 at 27 piastres per togar, was lately sold here at 76, and other grain in proportion; and this without the currency of the country having suffered any debasement in its value.

Amongst the resources of this country, I reckoned the treasures left by the late Suleiman Pacha; these have been partly divided amongst his children, and the greater part dissipated by the present Pacha in his expeditions to no purpose whatever. The Pacha has now filled the Pachalick thirty

months; of these thirty months, he has passed thirteen in the field.

This letter has unavoidably run to a greater length than I could have wished; but in the present moment it might be acceptable to you to know the real state of this Pachalick; and we are commercially and politically so much interested in its welfare, that the rapid decadence it has experienced under its present Government is truly lamentable.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Garbally, July 4, 1805.

My dear Lord—Having undertaken an arrangement and report upon the papers found on Lieutenant Muller, a French prisoner at Montgomery, I have, in the first instance, separated those written upon general topics from those of a political nature; and, not to tire you with a recital of the first of these, I shall merely observe, 1st, that there is among them a very complete Persian manuscript, fairly (and as it should seem from there being several loose blank sheets of paper of the same exact size and quality) written either by, or under the inspection of Muller himself; and, 2ndly, that there being found a packet of papers and letters of a perfectly private nature, I forwarded this to Mr. Secretary Cooke on the 4th ult., in order that it might be returned to Mr. Muller. In going through the other voluminous papers, I find that a large portion of these, containing very minute intelligence, was addressed in the form of letters *from a French officer to his General*, and probably were, or at least many of them, forwarded by Muller to General Decaen, during the residence of the former in India.

The first attempt I have made to arrange the political papers, therefore, has been to divide those of the description of letters from the mass of other papers; it appearing to me important

to be known, so far as the materials will admit, the substance and amount of the information concerning our Indian empire, which may have actually come into the possession of the enemy.

Before I enter into the detail of information contained in the letters, it may not be amiss to say a few words concerning the object which brought Muller into the province of Bengal, and the time at which his journey was undertaken, as collected from the papers; and likewise to make some short remarks upon the letters themselves.

In a note to his eighth letter, he says that, being at Madras, he learned that a body of troops were assembled in the Circar of Chicacole; and, knowing that a war was about to break out between the English and the Mahrattas, he was not deceived by the reported destination of these troops, which were said to be intended for Negapatam and Ceylon.

On his arrival at Carringa, he states that he was confirmed in his opinion, and resolved to embark for Cuttack without delay; that this resolution was contrary to his original plan, but that many circumstances had arisen to render the execution of this plan[1] extremely difficult, and that he thought he perceived a favourable opportunity to injure the enemy. That he thus reasoned with himself: "Whatever Mahratta force I shall find in the Cuttack, this will suffice to defend that province, by taking advantage of the favourable circumstances which are afforded by its positions and rivers; this will be the worst that can happen; but, if the number and kind of the troops should answer my wishes, then I shall not for one instant hesitate to abandon that province, and make an incursion into Bengal—an incursion which will greatly derange the bright projects of the Governor-General." He then goes on to state, that he arrived, on the night of the 12th of September, at the mouth of the Chilka Lake, and that he had designed to have disembarked the next morning early at Manickpatam;

[1] I have not yet been able to discover what this exact plan was.

but that unfortunately the English convoy, which had the day before disembarked Colonel Harcourt and the detachment of Captain Dick at Ganjam, came and anchored close to him before he could execute his design. He then states what he calls *a pleasant scene* to have taken place: that an English officer came into his boat to acquire information of the passage into the Chilka Lake, fearful that he had been carried too far to the northward by the currents; and that from this officer, who did not even suspect with whom he had to deal, he (Muller) obtained every information which the officer was able to give, the particulars of which induced him to relinquish the idea of disembarking in the Cuttack; and that, soon after the officer had quitted him, he profited by a favourable breeze to continue his voyage towards Bengal. This is all that I have yet been able to find among the papers, concerning the object and time of Muller's progress to Bengal.

With respect to the letters, most of them are rough drafts, written for the most part on paper of British manufacture, many of them obviously misnumbered, probably for the purpose of misleading. Some are duplicates of the same information differently detailed, some of them fragments with considerable breaches in the information; and if the last numbers, from 7 to 13 inclusive, are correct, as I believe they may be, then a very considerable portion of the first numbers is actually missing. Enough, however, remains, whence to collect the nature and, in many instances at least, the particulars of the information. The first paper in the order of arrangement I have adopted is marked "Lettre $(\frac{A}{P})$ ^{4}M." It is apparently the fragment of a rough copy of a letter which appears, from subsequent papers, to have been actually sent, and, from the context, appears to have been written from Calcutta or Chandernagore.

It commences, "Citoyen Général," urges his zeal to fulfil his duty to his country, and apologizes for a long silence for the following reasons: That the events which had taken place

in that country, since his last informations, were so extraordinary, so multiplied and complex, that it was extremely difficult to acquire a sufficient knowledge of their causes and effects, as to enable him to communicate these events and their results with such precision as would render a relation of this nature useful.

That the situation of the Republic and England in Europe rendered a delay in the transmission of these despatches of little consequence; while, on the other hand, it appeared absolutely necessary to the proper understanding the details intended to be given that the General should first possess exact information of the political situation of the principal powers in India, at the time of his (the General's) arrival at Pondicherry, in July, 1803.

He then proceeds to a political division of India, taking independence as the distinctive mark of his classification, and placing those powers which are influenced under the head of allies, or tributaries, of the power paramount.

According to this distinction, he divides the whole of India into, 1st. The English power; 2nd. That of the Mahrattas; 3rd. That of the Afgans; 4th. That of the Seiks. The description of the different parts of which these powers are composed, their governments, names and characters of their governors, their territorial possessions, revenue, expenditure, commerce, military force, and their political relations, both interior and exterior, he states to be the object of the despatch; and that the detail of political and military events which had lately overturned those countries would then be much more intelligible, and their disastrous effects more sensibly felt.

The power of England in India, or rather in the East, he states to be formed of her possessions in Indostan, the Deckan, the Isle of Ceylon, in the Isles of Sunda and her factory of China, the Isle of Pulo Penang and St. Helena, her allies and tributaries.

The Mahometan and Hindoo princes who are under the

influence of England he states to be, 1. The Peshwa and such Mahratta chiefs as recognise his authority, such as the Gwickwar, &c.; 2. The Soubadar of the Deckan; 3. The Soubadar of Oude; 4. The Nabob of Arcot; 5. The Nabob of Surat; 6. The Rajah of Mysore; 7. The Rajah of Tanjore; 8. The Rajah of Travancore.

All these princes are more or less under the influence of this power; and he states that he should not have made mention of many of them, whose political existence is absolutely chimerical, if their being placed upon the list had not furnished occasion to publish the infamous methods which the English Government had employed to seize upon their possessions and treasures. "No Indian prince," he adds, "has ever had connexions, either of a political or commercial nature, with that government which have not become fatal to him. It is, nevertheless, the English Government which unceasingly vociferates against the pretended ambition and tyranny which we exercise over the weak States which border on our empire."

The power of England in India he states to be the most precious portion of the British empire. It equals in extent, population, and riches, the first powers in the world; but, he adds, "you would form a very erroneous judgment of its strength or solidity, if you should calculate these from her possessions. It is consoling to me to be able to assure you, that this source of wealth, so dangerous to our peace and happiness, may be diverted and dried up more easily than is conceived."

The principal Mahratta chiefs he states to be—1. Scindia; 2. Holkar; 3. Bhoomsla; 4. Chuncher Behander; 5. Ambajee.

The tributaries of the independent Mahratta chiefs[1]—1. The Rajpoots Rajahs of Jyepour, Judpour, Ondipour, Kotta, Bondi,

[1] Many of the territories of these chiefs I have not been able to discover on Rennell's Map; where this has been the case, I have left the spelling of the names as found in the original; the others I have altered to Rennell's mode of orthography.

Kerrowly, Macherry. 2. The Bindela Rajahs of Ounja, Datteah, Jaundeni Ghurhumta, Callinger, Mahandpour, Narsimghur, &c. 3. The Jant Rajahs of Burtpour, Padjour, Ballanghar, &c. 4. The Petan Nabobs Bapoul and Kourrai. 5. The Seik Chiefs to the borders of the Sutledge river, such as the Chiefs of Pattialas, Assendi, Tamapar, &c. 6. The Boghila Rajahs of Chandail, Chohan, Goand, &c., who possess the districts about the sources of the Saone and Nerbudda rivers, and Mahanouddy, exclusive tributary to the Bhoomsla.

The Emperor Shah Allum is a prisoner of Scindia, who, when of service to his plans of ambition, under the title of *Oukil al Mutowluk*, revives and enforces with his power the extinct authority of this unhappy prince. The Mahratta States, he says, are almost equal in extent, but not in population, fertility, or industry, to those of the English; but the incapacity of their chiefs, continual civil and foreign wars, a vicious government, foretel their speedy dissolution, and would render it inevitable even if the adjoining powers were not on the watch to profit by an occasion so inciting for their aggrandizement.

He states that the General will perhaps be surprised to see the nominal chief of the Mahrattas classed as part of the English power; but, when the political relations between the Peshwa and the English come to be known, this division will be found both necessary and just. "It would have been as ridiculous," he adds, "to have considered Bagee Row as chief of a Mahratta empire, as to have considered Shah Allum emperor of a Mogul empire."

He next goes on to show the geographic and political division of the British empire in India. He states their establishments to be divided into five presidencies. 1. That of Fort William. 2. Fort St. George. 3. Bombay. 4. Ceylon. 5. St. Helena.

That the Presidency of Fort William comprises the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; the district of Benares; those of Bareilly and Moradabad, in the Rohilcund; those of

Furrackabad and Etawa, Caunpour and Allahabad, in the Doab; and that of Garrackpour, on the east of the Gogra, upon the frontiers of Nepaul, the Isle of Pulo Penang, or Prince of Wales, in the entry of the straits of Malacca, and the establishment of Bencoolen, or Fort Marlborough, on the island of Sumatra; a small part of the Rohilcund, viz., the district of Rampour.

Rampour is left in Jagheer to Amed Ally Cawn, the grandson of Fyzzoula Cawn, and the country comprised between the Gogra and Rohilcund, and the Ganges, forms the present possession of the Soubadar of Oude, the ally, and more properly the *subject*, of the British power.

The extent, the fertility of these provinces, the industry, riches, and the quiet and submissive dispositions of the inhabitants, make, as he states, this Presidency the most precious part of the British empire in the East. It is the only one of which the revenues exceed the expenditure, and whose army is superior in vigour, bravery, and discipline, to all the others. In a word, it is the true seat of her power, and the importance of all the other governments is merely secondary.

The Presidency of Madras he states to comprehend all the possessions of the English and their allies in the Deckan. To make known what these are, he states it to be more expeditious to enumerate those provinces in the Deckan which they do not possess than those they do: and these, according to him, are Berar, the Cuttack, forming the territories of Bhoomsla, and a part of Ellickpour, the Candeish, the district of Amednegar, and some pergunnehs of little extent in the Concan, belonging to Scindia. He then again enumerates the tributaries of the English in this part of India; sets out their respective boundaries; states the Nabob of Oude and the Rajahs of Tanjore and Mysore to be merely pensioners of the English; and the political connexions of these last with the Peshwa, the Nizam, and the Rajah of Travancore, to be such that their possessions and resources may be considered as belonging to the British.

The Presidency of Madras he states to be greater in extent than that of Fort William, but that it does not produce half the revenue, while the charges are almost equal. This disproportion proceeds from the want of cultivation of many of the provinces, but principally from the turbulent and refractory character of its inhabitants, which necessitates a considerable and expensive military establishment. Past events, he goes on to say, have sufficiently proved that this Presidency could not have long sustained itself without assistance in money, provisions, ammunition, and even in men, from that of Bengal. "It is provoking," he adds, "that our Cabinet of Versailles did not feel this truth when all was not yet lost; for it has always seemed to me certain, that one half of the blood and treasure uselessly sacrificed in the Peninsula, directed by more able hands, and against another point, would have sufficed to crush our rivals."

The Bombay Presidency he states to comprehend the island of Salsette and the English part of the Guzerat, but that it is impossible to determine the exact possession of the British in a province divided between so many masters. It is certain, however, that the town and district of Surat form a part, and that its Nawab[1] is a pensioner like the rest.

Having considered the Guickwar as one of the Mahratta Chiefs who acknowledge the authority of the Peshwa, and, consequently, like him, under the influence of the British Government, he says he shall make no further mention of him, although one of the possessors of the Guzerat.

With respect to its finances, the Presidency of Bombay is stated by him to be a real incumbrance, its demands prodigiously exceeding its revenues; but, from its port, its situation with reference to the Mahratta power and to the Arabian and Persian Gulfs, it acquires a great degree of importance in the general system.

The Government of Ceylon is mentioned to be formed by

[1] Son Nawab a été mis à la pension, comme tous ses confrères.—*Orig.*

the possessions of Great Britain in that island and the small adjacent islands; these he states to be upon the coasts, the interior being either uncultivated, or under the government of the King of Candia. The port of Trincomallee, the best in India, and the rich productions of this island, have given considerable importance to this Government; but the ferocious and impolitic conduct of the present Governor, F. North, has occasioned a war with the King, which, joined to an epidemic fever, has ravaged and depopulated the greater part of this beautiful island.

The establishment of St. Helena he considers to have been formed merely with a view to afford the shipping a place to touch at, and at which ships may be supplied with water, provisions, and an hospital for their sick.

Upon the extent of the British possessions, he states the want of exact information, except what is to be derived from Rennell's map; but that the want of more accurate knowledge furnishes no cause for regret, as a cursory inspection of the map[1] (sent with the despatch) would afford sufficient for the most important combinations.

Upon the population, produce, and industry, he says he can speak with greater certainty. That the first is immense—that of Bengal, Bahar, Orissa, and Benares, having, by the best authorities, been estimated at thirty millions; and though these provinces have been reckoned the most populous of the British possessions, yet those of the Peninsula and West of India[2] are of much greater extent, and may, therefore, confidently have assigned to them an equal number of inhabitants. From this calculation, there would result a total population of sixty millions; and this he states it as his persuasion to be a very moderate, rather than an exaggerated, estimate. "When we consider," he says, "that the population is held in obedience by about 26,000 English or Europeans in their service, we are

[1] There is no copy of this map among the papers.

[2] He seems to have omitted the Oude-ceded districts.

tempted to doubt whether the Indians form part of our species, or whether their country is placed on our globe. I shall, however, speak elsewhere of this phenomenon in a more circumstantial manner."

The British territory in India he states to be incontestably one of the most fertile parts of the world; without entering minutely into details, he confines himself to its most considerable productions. These he states to be corn of all sorts, but particularly rice—that Bengal, Bahar, Benares, Tanjore, and Mysore, are the most fertile provinces. That the sugar-cane is spontaneous, and that a great quantity of sugars are made in all parts of India, but that the cane is only cultivated in Rajamundry and Ganjam. That indigo is likewise indigenous, and cultivated considerably in Bengal, Benares, and Oude, and surpasses in beauty the indigo of America. That opium is produced in Bahar and Benares; salt on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa; saltpetre in Bengal; building timber on the coast of Malabar; timber for cabinet-work in the Rohilcund; sweet wood, such as sandal, in the Mysore; silk in Bengal; tobacco almost everywhere, but particularly in Oude and the Northern Circars—that of Masulipatam is highly esteemed; spices, such as cinnamon, in Ceylon; and pepper in Malabar; ivory, coral, pearls, and precious stones in Oude, Malabar, Mysore, and Ceylon; excellent cattle, particularly in the Guzerat.

That the British territory is in want of metals, more particularly of iron; also of horses, and even of cotton,[1] of which the fabrication forms the principal part of the industry of its inhabitants. That iron is imported from Europe; horses from Arabia and Persia, from Pegue, and the interior parts of India; and cotton from the Mahratta Empire.

The principal manufactures of British India he states to be

[1] Muller does not seem to have been aware that cotton is grown in the Upper Provinces, or ceded districts of Oude.—*Vide H. Wellesley's Report.*

those of cotton. That, in Bengal, these are fabricated into cloth, and particularly into those beautiful muslins, inimitable for their fineness and the beauty of their colour; on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, into cloths of a close and fine texture, and into handkerchiefs esteemed for the vivacity and elegant variety of their colour; and in the Guzerat, into cloths of all kinds. That, in Bengal, they manufacture silks; and on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, painted linens. That opium is refined at Benares and Bahar; salt in Bengal, and sugars in the Circars. That an immense quantity of indigo is manufactured in Bengal, Benares, Oude, and the Douab; and rum and spirituous liquors are distilled at Bengal, Madras, and Bencoolen. "The English power in the East is," he adds, "actually the preponderating power in this quarter of the globe; and the possessions of this nation in India, and those of its vassals, or allies, as she affects to call them, surpass in extent, population, and riches, the greatest Empires in the world. The advantages which England has reaped from them are incalculable, and the true foundation of her present greatness. The acquisition and employment of these advantages have been equally criminal, and ought to render the English nation execrable in the eyes of the people of Asia and of Europe.

"When we reflect that it is with the treasures of India that England has excited and maintained against us such multitudes of enemies during the space of ten years, every Frenchman should employ all his physical and moral faculties to discover the means of destroying resources which, in the hands of a people as ferocious as selfish, become a vehicle to plunge mankind in ignorance and barbarity, which would, in fact, have been the result of the war, if we had not proved victorious.

"It is, however, a consoling circumstance to be able to assure you that this source of riches, so dangerous to the tranquillity of Europe, and particularly to that of France, may be dried up more easily than is thought. But it would be imprudent to speak more at length on this subject here. You

have, besides, too much penetration not to discover the proper means, from the observations which I shall have occasion to make upon the elementary parts which compose this power; and, besides, the moment is perhaps not far off when I shall be able to converse more freely with you upon a subject of this importance."

What I have written contains the whole substance of the paper marked Letter ($\frac{A}{P}$) ^{4}M, and which, as you will have perceived, by no means conveying the sum of intelligence promised at its outset, may fairly be presumed to be a fragment.

A great part of this promised information, at least, though here defective, can, however, be supplied from the mass of papers not coming under the denomination of letters; but, as my object is to convey, in the first instance, what appears actually in the shape of letters, I shall, for the present, confine myself to these, reserving, till after we shall have gone through them, whatever may be to be said upon the contents of the other papers.

In a few days, I shall transmit you a full translation of a very voluminous paper, containing the most minute account of the military and naval forces of Great Britain in India. This has appeared to me of such importance as not to allow of any part of it being omitted. Its substance, I can safely assure you, is of sufficient consequence to merit your serious perusal and consideration.

I remain, my dear lord, yours very affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, July 23, 1805.

My Lord—With the duplicates of my last despatch to your lordship, I have the honour to enclose the copies of two papers, containing the latest intelligence I am in possession of from Persia.

Accounts from the Pacha's camp were received here early in

the present month, of the Pacha having attacked Abder Rahman Pacha, in his post at Derbend, driven him from it, and defeated his army with great slaughter. The guns of the fortress were fired accordingly. There is, however, strong reason to believe Abder Rahman voluntarily quitted his post at Derbend. He is stationed with all his force at Serdusht, on the Persian frontier; and, I hear, communications have taken place between his Majesty, Fat Ali Shah, and Abder Rahman Pacha.

The Pacha, I understand, to be at or near Ervil, and preparing to cross the Tigris. He has sent Ahmed Chellaby, the lowest member of his Council, to the King of Persia.

Abdullah Pacha, whom the Porte has recently reinstated in his Pachalik of Damascus, is at present here.

I have the honour to enclose, for your lordship's notice, the copy of a letter I received on the 19th instant from his Majesty's Minister at the Porte, containing certain interesting information concerning the Sieur Romieu, which your lordship may rely shall have every attention from me it deserves.

The latest intelligence from England, transmitted by this route to Bussora, reaches down to the 7th May.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosure.]

Translation of a Paper of Information, dated June 24, *and received from Owannes Pitcairn, July* 9, 1805.

It is ten days since the King marched from Sultania for Tauris, occasioned, it is said, by some unpleasant information received by a person arriving from Erivan. We have since heard that the King, with his troops and artillery, halted at Meereah, and that the Prince Royal had advanced three days' march from Tauris.

Tahian Beg, with 10,000 troops under his command, has been sent towards Carabourg, and it is reported that considerable Russian reinforcements arrived, and that Zeziani, with them,

has marched towards Gandja, leaving a large detachment of troops before Erivan. Jaafer Kooli Khàn, who has joined the Russians, occupies this year exactly the same ground and entrenchments that the King did last. The Russians have taken everything out of the Convent of the Three Churches, and carried it to Teflis. The Khàn of Erivan has sent the families of the inhabitants to Koë, and has retired himself to the citadel of Erivan.

The Russians have taken Shushah. It is reported Sadoc Shekahkee's son, with the whole of his tribe, 6,000 families, has gone over to Teflis, it being the King's intention, in which he was prevented by his Ministers, to send a force against them and destroy them. It is reported also that the King has ordered them to destroy the country all beyond Taurus, and render all that part of Azarbaijan a desert.

It is written from Gazvin, that seventy vessels are arrived at Baku, fifty of which have troops on board, and twenty provisions. From Tauris, it is also written, that different sorts of bad scents assail us from afar, of which we cannot write plainer.

In the camp, there is an Armenian gunner, who writes, "We have nothing but a continuation of bad news."

Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, August 12, 1805.

My Lord—I cannot permit my present public despatch to proceed, without respectfully, but at the same time forcibly pressing on you the policy, indeed the necessity, of authorizing me to give some reply to the communications from Meerza Bozurg, which were laid before your lordship in my despatches of January last. Your lordship may rely on it that a total neglect of them will be impolitic; and if the person mentioned in the public despatch be going to make any stay in Persia, which I cannot persuade myself he is, but rather endeavouring

to pass to India, the neglect this communication has experienced to the present moment will, I fear, be very ill thought of by the Persian Court and Minister.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, August 12, 1805.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose the duplicate of my last despatch, and, likewise, for your lordship's information, extracts of letters to me, dated the 17th and 28th July, from the Consul-General at Aleppo.

Your lordship may rely that the matter contained in these extracts shall have my best attention; and I yesterday despatched a messenger to Meerza Bozurg with a letter, a translation of which I have the honour to enclose.

The very flattering expressions made use of towards me, in the enclosed copy of a letter, dated the 16th July, from Mr. Stratton to me, your lordship may be assured will prove a fresh incitement to me to communicate to the King's Embassy at Constantinople whatever I may imagine can be worth its notice or be useful.

I have the honour to acquaint your lordship, that on the 8th instant intelligence from England as late as the 4th June was transmitted from hence to Bussora; and the enclosed letter, dated the 15th July, from Dom Leopoldo Sebastiani, the very learned editor of the "Cassandra of Lycophron," contains the last certain news I am in possession of from Persia. The Pacha is at present at Mosul.

I have the honour to be, &c., HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosures.]

Mr. Alexander Stratton to Mr. H. Jones.

Pera, June 14, 1805.

Sir—On my sending, on the 12th instant, to the Pacha of Bagdad's agent for a Tartar to forward the accompanying

packet, he informed me that he had but one here (the bearer, Ali Aga) at his disposal, and that, as he had some despatches to write himself, he begged that I would defer his (the Tartar's) departure until to-day. With this request, I could not but comply, as I understand that the Tartars of the Porte do not always find their way to Bagdad in safety. As Ali Aga is not to return to this place, I have agreed to pay him 200 piastres, and promised that you would give the usual gratuities.

It may not be superfluous to mention, for the information of all the Honourable Company's servants, that there is here, at present, a French officer of the name of Romieu, who was formerly French Minister at Corfu, and whose destination, after some further stay in this country, is suspected to be the East. The Sieur Romieu has the reputation of being a man of talents, of having a considerable sum of money at his disposal, and of being a great proficient in the science of intrigue.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ALEXANDER STRATTON.

From the Consul-General at Aleppo to Mr. H. Jones.

Extract of a Letter, dated Antioch, the 17th July, 1805.

I have to apprise you of the arrival here, a few days ago, from Constantinople, of a Monsieur Romieu, the person who brought the last letter of Bonaparte to the Grand Vizier.

He is accompanied by a secretary or companion, one European servant, and two Tartars. He is styled, in his travelling firman, "a Bach Officer, who proceeds from Constantinople to *visit* Aleppo." I have strong reason to believe his intention is to penetrate into India, or at least into Persia; he possesses not, however, the advantage of knowing any oriental language. It seems pretty certain his next step will be to Bagdad; but, before his departure, I will again address you on the subject of this suspicious personage, and inform you of the route which he is likely to take, with any other interesting circumstances that may come to my knowledge.

Extract of a Letter, dated Antioch, the 28th July, 1805.

In support, nay, almost confirmation, of the opinion which I took the liberty to express to you in my last, that the next step of Monsieur Romieu would be to your residence, I can now add, that he has changed considerable sums of money at Aleppo into gold coins of the readiest currency at Bagdad, such as *Yeldiz*, Ahmedies, &c.

You will, of course, have been informed by Mr. Stratton that Monsieur Romieu was French Minister at Corfu; that he has extensive credit upon Paris; that, during his stay at Constantinople, he purchased bills on Aleppo to a considerable amount, at a price much above the market one, for the purpose of procuring paper payable at sight; and that it is almost certain he carries with him jewels of great value, to dispose of as occasion may require.

Allow me also to inform you that I have learned, through a secret but authentic channel, that Monsieur Rousseau and his son have been lately appointed by the French Government, the first to resume his post at Bagdad, and the latter to the new Residency at Bussora, each on an annual salary of twenty-five thousand piastres.

The age and infirmities of Rousseau the elder must render him a feeble rival to you at Bagdad, nor do I think the abilities of the younger are such as may be dreaded by our representative at Bussora.

Mr. Alexander Stratton to Mr. H. Jones.

Pera, July 16, 1805.

Sir—On the 12th instant, I had the honour to receive your letters of the 12th, 17th, and 18th June, with their several most interesting enclosures.

The packets directed to the Honourable the Chairman shall be forwarded by a messenger, whom his Excellency the Right Honourable Charles Arbuthnot, his Majesty's Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, intends to despatch to England in the course of a few days.

Mr. Arbuthnot's appearance here having, of course, put a period to my mission, it has not been in my power to take those steps at the Porte which I could have wished, in order to endeavour to remedy the abuses arising from the conduct of the Pacha of Bagdad, that exist in the transmission of the Honourable the East India Company's packets. But the case has been laid before Mr. Arbuthnot, who, I believe, I may safely venture to say, will use his best exertions for the furtherance of an object which involves the essential interests of the East India Company, and consequently those, as you very justly observe, of the British Government. Of this, he has requested me to assure you, and, at the same time, to express a hope, that you will have the goodness to continue to him the favour of that confidential correspondence, from which I have derived so much important information, and for which I beg that you will accept of my most grateful acknowledgments.

I am in possession of no intelligence beyond what you will find in the newspapers which are forwarded by this conveyance, except that the combined Toulon and Cadiz fleets have been seen off the Cape de Verd Islands.

The enclosed packet to your address reached me yesterday, under cover of a letter from William Ramsay, Esq., containing directions to forward the said packet with all possible expedition. It proceeds by the route of Aleppo ; that of Mosul, &c., being reported to be unsafe.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ALEXANDER STRATTON.

Translation of a Letter from Mr. Harford Jones to Meerza Bozurg.

August 10, 1805.

After compliments — The hope which I have daily entertained of hearing from you has occasioned me to put off, from

time to time, the pleasure of writing to you. My expectation, however, not yet being gratified by the receipt of your letters, I can no longer deny myself the satisfaction of inquiring after your health.

I wish I could accompany these inquiries by a communication on the subject of your letter to me in January last; but Europe is very distant from hence, and it takes many months for letters to arrive there, and for me to receive answers thereto; so that, though no reply has yet been received by me, it is extremely possible one may be on the road, which, the moment it arrives, I will send to you. I can, indeed, repeat my assurances that the great men of the State in England are inclined to pay particular attention to every thing regarding Persia.

You will have heard the Pacha has been absent from Bagdad for some time, on account of the rebellion of Abder Rahman, whom he is said to have defeated. The Pacha is at present at Mosul.

There are some rumours here of a Frenchman being on his way to Persia, with a design of visiting the King. This, however, I can scarcely credit, because what can a Frenchman have to do in Persia? The French have no alliance with Persia—the French have no trade in Persia—the French have no territory that borders on Persia; and, consequently, can have no political interests in Persia. Besides, as you very justly remark in your secret note to me, in January, it is expressly stipulated in the Treaty concluded by Captain Malcolm, "the enemies of the one State are to be considered as the enemies of the other." What business, then, can a Frenchman, while France and England are at war, have in Persia? The thing itself seems improbable; however, it is by some so confidently believed, that I shall consider myself extremely obliged to you not only to tell me immediately if you have heard anything about the matter, but also to communicate how far the sentiments I have expressed above coincide with yours.

Should there be any foundation for these reports, I have no doubt but his Majesty and the Ministry, faithful to the happy alliance formed between the King and the British Government, will conduct themselves in the strictest conformity thereto; and I confidently hope that no intrigues or wiles will ever be able to raise the slightest disagreeable discussions between England and Persia. The King of Persia's faith is not less manifest to the world than his puissance and renown; and your attachment to the English is of long standing.

I beg the favour of you to return the Cossid as soon as possible, in order that I may be gratified with what I long desired —pleasing accounts of your health.

I am, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

[Enclosures in Mr. Jones's of September 15, 1805.]

Original in cipher.

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable Charles Grant, Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Bagdad, September 14, 1805.

Honourable Sir—The person mentioned in the enclosed secret despatch left me to-day. Upon our joint calculation, the expense of his journey, including the presents he carries, will not exceed 3000 rupees. I should have thought myself miserably deficient in judgment either to have permitted Romieu to have gone into Persia, and made no effort to learn the purport of his journey, or to have hesitated incurring the expense above mentioned, or even a larger one, in endeavouring to become acquainted with it. The Pacha's Tartar, who accompanied the Frenchman from Mosul to Carcook, arrived here on the 12th, and says, the Frenchman left Carcook for Persia nine days before. The Tartar adds that he was most profuse of his money. A copy, in cipher, of my instructions to the Vackeel shall be sent hereafter.

Original in cipher.

In addition to the verbal information and instructions I have given you for your conduct at Teheran, it seems convenient to put the following into writing. The first point to be ascertained with certainty is, whether the Frenchman has brought any letter or written credentials from Buonaparte to the King; and, that found to be the case, to endeavour to obtain, by means of the Ministers to whom I have recommended you, a copy thereof. In this I think Meerza Bozurg will be more useful than Meerza Reeza Cooli, and I would have you apply to him first. The next point is, whether the Frenchman is to remain at Teheran, or to proceed; and, if to proceed, where he is going. The detail of the presents he is to make to the King is an object of importance. The Ministers to whom he applies himself must have your particular notice. If the Frenchman delivers a letter to the King, it is possible, though you may not be able to obtain a copy of it, that Meerza Bozurg will verbally communicate to you the general contents, which, immediately on going home, you will commit to paper, and two or three days afterwards endeavour verbally to learn of Meerza Reeza Cooli the contents of the letter, which you will also commit to paper, and send me a copy of both these papers. But you will remember, that no pains are to be spared to procure a copy of the letter; and these verbal communications are only required under the supposition that the former is impossible to be obtained. You will endeavour to learn what passes at each audience the Frenchman may have of the King, and the purport of all the conferences he has with the Minister; and, whatever you learn on these points, you will commit to paper, carefully putting down the date. With Meerza Reeza Cooli you will talk of the service he will render the Ambassador, by giving you all the information he can respecting the Frenchman. With Meerza Bozurg you will mention the proof he will thereby give of his attachment to

the English nation. If you find the Frenchman is to remain at Teheran, the same moment you have certain intelligence of it, you will send away a messenger to me, and promise him a gratuity for despatch. In case the Frenchman proceeds to Shiraz, you will immediately despatch to the Resident at Bushire, by an express, the letter I gave you to his address. If the Frenchman proceeds towards Candahar, you must tell Meerza Bozurg and Meerza Reeza Cooli that, in the treaty concluded by Major Malcolm, it is stipulated that the enemy of the one State shall be considered the enemy of the other; that the Frenchman is evidently going to Candahar, to get to India to some of our enemies; and, considering the stipulation of the treaty, and the King having an Ambassador with our Government in India at this moment, what will our Government think of his permitting our enemy to pass through his country, in order to create disturbance in the countries in India of his allies the English. In this case, you will press both Meerza Bozurg and Meerza Reeza Cooli to detain the Frenchman. In case of his going to Shiraz, you will press his detention also; but, in the former case, you must press it with all your might. If you find the Frenchman is to stay at Teheran, you may ask Meerza Bozurg and Meerza Reeza Cooli if the King has not stipulated with the English not to receive French agents in Persia; and, if he does, what will our Government say of such conduct? You will perceive some part of these instructions are issued under the idea that the Frenchman reaches Teheran before you, and that he is admitted to an audience of the King before you arrive. But, should you get to Teheran before his audience, you must labour to prevent it, urging the strange inconsistency there will be in the King receiving a Frenchman at the time he has an Ambassador in India exchanging the ratification of a treaty by which he is bound not to receive such persons. The Ministers must surely see this is not for the King's honour. The general language you must hold to the Minister is, that Russia, being in alliance with

England, and perhaps about to enter into the war, the Frenchman's object is to keep up the disputes between Persia and Russia, to keep Russia employed. If the Frenchman (which I do not think unlikely, as they do not spare men to serve their purpose) should promise the King assistance, in case he continues the war against Russia, ask Meerza Bozurg and Meerza Reeza Cooli how the French are to afford it. They have no country bordering on Persia; they have no means of doing it by sea, because the English ships will prevent it; and, that you may make this clear to them, I furnish you with a set of Turkish maps. In the event of Meerza Bozurg complaining of not having received an answer to his secret letter to me in January last, you will say it takes frequently four months to send a letter from Bagdad to England, and four months to receive an answer; and, if Ministers in England sent the papers to Russia, answers cannot be expected in less than four months more; and that I have no reason to think the business neglected.

Keep a copy of all the papers you send to me, and write everything of importance in the great cipher. Your stay you will regulate according to circumstances; but if the Frenchman be going on at all events, you will not leave Teheran before he departs, unless I send you orders.

You are at liberty to make small presents for the purpose of procuring intelligence. You will keep an exact account of your expences, and be as economical as possible.

The presents prepared and delivered to you for Meerza Bozurg and Meerza Reeza Cooli you will deliver to them.

You are at liberty to despatch messengers to me as you think proper. You are not to send letters of intelligence to the Ambassador but open, and through me.

Endeavour to learn the King's intention respecting Abdul Ramon Bashaw. If the Frenchman strikes off from Carmanshaw to Isfahan, send away the letter for the Resident at Bushire by a horseman, and return to Bagdad.

Hajee Mossen is directed to send you this letter, in case he finds Romieu has left, or leaves Teheran for Isfahan or Shiraz; in which case I advise you and Captain Seaton to keep a good look-out for him at Bunder Abasse, and the other ports in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable Charles Grant.

Bagdad, September 15, 1805.

Honourable Sir—As it appears (to my judgment, at least) that the late appointments of the Rousseaus to the Commissariats of Bagdad and Bussora are made principally with a design of conveying to France intelligence from these quarters, I deemed it extremely proper unreservedly to lay before my honourable superiors at Bombay, as early as possible, my sentiments as to the possibility of their effecting a considerable part of their probable instructions on this head, even at our expence, and to state very fully the measures which occurred to me as most likely to prevent it. A copy of this despatch, No. 1, I have now the honour to lay before you, accompanied by a copy of a letter, No. 2, dated the 10th September, from me to his Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, in continuation of the same subject.

The enclosed copy of a letter, No. 3, addressed by me to the Honourable the President in Council in the Political Department, on the 6th instant, contains the general transactions of the Residency to that period, the arrival on the 2nd, and departure hence, on the 6th instant, of Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer and Captain Foulis, and the capture of Enzellee by the Russians. In addition to what this letter contains on the subject of the Sieur Romieu, I have to call your attention to the copies of letters dated the 11th August and 3rd September, No. 45; the former received on the 3rd, and the latter the 13th instant, from the Consul at Aleppo; and also my letter of the 14th instant, No. 6, to his Majesty's Minister at the Porte.

The conjecture I expressed to the Honourable the President in Council in the Political Department, in my letter, No. 3, that it is probably the design of the Sieur Romieu to proceed to Teheran, and ultimately from thence to some of the ports at the bottom of the Gulf to Muscat, is much supported by Citizen Outrey having yesterday applied to many persons in town for bills on Isfahan. I have also learned, from a person to whom it was communicated by some of the female part of Outrey's family, that the remuneration promised to George Outrey is 5,500 piastres for his journey, and the place of first interpreter to the French Mission at Bagdad, with a salary of 6,500 piastres per annum.

The letters No. 7 and 8 will acquaint you of the steps I have taken to give the Residents at Bushire and Muscat information of the possibility of the Sieur Romieu's arrival at some of the ports in the Persian Gulf; and the person mentioned in the cipher despatch is enjoined, the moment he finds Romieu has made any motion to the southward of Teheran, to despatch express a letter I charged him with to Mr. Bruce. I willingly flatter myself the several measures I have taken in this affair will meet your approbation.

The papers numbered 9, 10, 11, are copies of the letters I have had the honour to receive from his Majesty's Minister since the date of my last despatch; and I have the honour to mention that, accompanying the last mentioned paper, which reached me on the 13th instant, I received the orders of the Honourable the Secret Committee, communicated to me through Mr. Secretary Ramsay, under date of the 5th July, together with a packet to the address of Mr. Manesty, which was carefully forwarded by express to Bussora, within five hours after it reached my hands. I gave the Linguist at Bussora, who is again in charge of the Factory, those directions for its despatch which were consonant to the spirit of Mr. Secretary Ramsay's letter to me.

Having occasion to mention the name of his Majesty's

Minister, I conceive I should be greatly wanting in duty were I not to represent the great and essential favour Mr. Stratton has conferred on the Honourable Company, by taking charge of the troublesome affair of the public despatches, and by the minute and condescending attention he deigns to pay to the most trifling part of it.

On the 13th instant, I received also the commands of my honourable superiors at Bombay, dated the 8th July, accompanied by several public despatches, which I have now the honour to enclose in bands superscribed Packets from India, accompanied by their list. These packets arrived from India in a box to my address, which the Linguist at Bussora opened, and packed the packets contained therein, and now transmitted, so very carelessly, that many of them have suffered considerable injury on the journey from Bussora to Bagdad. With the packets above-mentioned I have the honour to enclose No. 12, a copy of Mr. Secretary Warden's letter to me, dated the 8th July; and also the copy of a letter, No. 13, dated Bushire, the 24th August, from Mr. Bruce to me, which contains the latest accounts I have of affairs in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Bruce, in a private letter, informs me his Excellency Mohammed Nebee Khàn was expected to leave Bushire about the 5th or 6th September.

Yesterday, in the evening, I had also the honour to receive the commands of my honourable superiors at Bombay, dated the 2nd July, with various public despatches directed to be forwarded by express to England. Both of the packets now in my possession arrived at Bussora in the Ternate; so that I naturally conclude the one received here with the commands of the Honourable Governor, of the 8th July, to be a duplicate of that packet which accompanies his commands of the 2nd, with some intelligence received between the 2nd and 8th July.

The Pacha being still absent, at a very great distance from Bagdad, the Government here having found it almost impos-

sible to get their despatches to his camp; and two excellent messengers, who arrived from Aleppo on the 13th instant, being in readiness to return, I have considered it most advisable to transmit my present despatches by them to Aleppo, and to direct the Consul there to send them to Constantinople, without loss of time, by an express Tartar. The impediment in the regular route from hence to Constantinople cannot be considered otherwise than a temporary one; but, in the event of the Agent at Constantinople finding it necessary again to transmit any of the public despatches for India by way of Aleppo, directions should be given to him to send, at all events, those despatches to Bagdad; because, though the risk is great in passing across the desert from Aleppo to Bussora, the risk from Aleppo to Bagdad is but little, since the messengers, in two days after their departure from Aleppo, can cross the Euphrates, and come to Bagdad between the two rivers, which I consider as safe ground; and I can always forward the packet to Bussora by water, by which it is exposed to little or no risk. An Arab messenger, if he does his duty, will always reach Bagdad, from Aleppo, in eight days, and packets in consequence generally get down from hence to Bussora in five more.

The Pacha, by the last accounts, had marched to Chabour against Tamar Pacha and the Alabaade Arabs; and there is but too much reason to consider the report prevailing in town, that the Arabs have encircled his camp, as well founded.

The accounts of the Mission in the month of August, No. 14, are now laid before you.

I cannot close this letter, without respectfully remarking that a most grateful sense of the indulgence and munificence I have had the honour to receive from the Honourable the Secret Committee will make me ever ready to encounter any difficulties to serve the Honourable Company as far as my humble abilities go; but the expected arrival here of a French Mission, and the probable early return to Bussora of Mr. Manesty, authorize me to point out the advantage it will be to the

Honourable Company immediately to form a definitive arrangement for the Residencies of Bussora and Bagdad, and the comfort and satisfaction it will be to me to receive it.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Alexander Stratton, Esq.

Bagdad, September 14, 1805.

Sir—The enclosed papers, as noted in the margin, which I beg the favour of you to lay before his Excellency the Ambassador, will put his Majesty's Mission in possession of all I know at present concerning the proceedings of the Sieur Romieu, except that it is certain he struck off from Karkook to Persia about ten days ago.

I wish particularly to call his Excellency's and your attention to the extract of the Consul at Aleppo's letter to me, dated Antioch, the 3rd September, and received here yesterday. I must say, as far as regards myself, I was totally without suspicion in respect to Leopoldo Sebastiani being employed in the manner Mr. Barker mentions. Mr. Vaughan, who, as you know, travelled with him from Constantinople here, had the same opinion of him I had; but I shall probably, in a few days, have the means of clearing this matter up beyond doubt, and I shall not fail to give his Majesty's Mission every information thereon.

The Pacha is still absent from Bagdad.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

Bagdad, September 6, 1805.

Honourable Sir—On the 4th, arrived here a messenger for the merchants at Aleppo in ten days. By this messenger, Outrey received a letter from his son, mentioning that the French Commissary at Aleppo had directed him to proceed

with Romityro,[1] as interpreter, and that on his return he should be rewarded with the rank and appointment of a first interpreter;[2] that he would write to his father from Mosul or Teheran. I have learned to-day is the fourth day since Romityro arrived at Carcook; and, as he has not made his appearance here, nor Outrey received the promised letter from his son, I conclude he has struck off from Carcook to Persia. It is now past doubt Romityro is charged with something of consequence; and what is of consequence to the French to attempt is of consequence to us to endeavour to know. On this plain position, if Romityro make not his appearance to-day or to-morrow, I shall despatch that Vakeel of the Persian Ambassador, who is partly left by his principal under my orders, to Teheran, for the purpose of gathering every intelligence in his power of Romityro's proceedings. This person is a very able man, and trustworthy, and there is this peculiar advantage in employing him, that he has a key of the Persian cipher left by the Persian Ambassador with me and him for our use, in which his son, who remains with me, is instructed, and which will prevent my recurring in my correspondence to my common Persian writer. Should anything of sufficient consequence turn up, I shall not hesitate to proceed myself to Teheran in the most private manner, until Government at home or in India issue their orders on this business.

Extract of a letter from the Consul-General at Aleppo, dated the 3rd of September, 1805.

I have learned nothing further respecting Romieu, except that he made an unsuccessful application to engage a young

[1] So in original.

[2] Here follow some words, which, by an error of the person who copied the ciphered letter, are not intelligible; but they do not appear to convey any matter of importance. Literally rendered, the passage reads thus:—"That, in consequence, he had considerable importance—a Frenchman at Aleppo, all his father, and other merchant, and had come on with Romityro."

man at Aleppo, conversant in the Persian language, to accompany him as linguist into Persia.

The salary of the Outrés is, I understand, fixed at 12,000 piastres per annum.

In addition to what I took the liberty to state in my last, I can now inform you that I have obtained, through a neutral channel, the knowledge of circumstances which I am not at liberty to disclose, but which place beyond all doubt the reality of Leopoldo Sebastiani's agency of a French spy, and of course afford extreme probability that the common talk of the merchants of Aleppo, respecting the connexion between that man's mission and Romieu's, is founded in fact.

It is very probable that the clerical character of Sebastiani has served to cloak his political intrigues in Syria ever since the French invasion of Egypt, about which time he first made his appearance in this country as a missionary of the *Propaganda*, charged with the ostensible duty of regulating some disorders in the Catholic convents of Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, &c.

Permit me also to say that, in the year 1800-1, he obtained from Lord Elgin a patent of the British protection, in which he was styled *English physician*, and that he has lately carried on his *official* correspondence with Toulon, the Catholic Bishop of Constantinople, *under cover* to Mr. Bartholomew Pisani, first British Interpreter, by whom he was recommended last year to my benevolence.

Mr. H. Jones to William Bruce, Esq., Provisional Resident at Bushire.

Bagdad, September 4, 1805.

Sir—I had the honour of writing you last, under the , and on the 7th of August, I had that of receiving your letter of the 2nd of July, and its several enclosures, for which I beg you to accept my best thanks.

I feel myself particularly obliged by the transmission of the copy of your letter to the Resident at Muscat, of the 30th of

June, and on the subject of it I expressed myself, under date of the 13th of August, to the Honourable the Chairman of the Court of Directors, as follows:—"The latest account I have of affairs in the Gulf is contained in the enclosed copy, No. 5, of a letter from Mr. Bruce, at Bushire, to Captain Seton, the Resident at Muscat. I have before had occasion to express my sentiments of the conduct of Mr. Bruce at Bushire, and I flatter myself you will be of opinion the tenor of his letter to the Resident at Muscat is peculiarly well judged and prudent."

I have the honour to enclose for your information such further accounts of the Sieur Romieu as have come to my knowledge since I last addressed you on this subject, and I beg you will rely on receiving from me such further information thereon as I shall judge necessary for you to be acquainted with. The Sieur Romieu is expected to arrive at Bagdad to-night, or to-morrow morning.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to Captain David Seton, Resident at Muscat.

Bagdad, September 4, 1805.

Sir—The enclosed papers contain such further circumstances as have come to my knowledge since I had the honour to write you last, respecting the Sieur Romieu, in addition to which, I have to mention this personage is expected to reach Bagdad to-night, or to-morrow morning. The Pacha continues absent from Bagdad.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Mr. H. Jones to William Bruce, Esq.

Bagdad, September 9, 1805.

Sir—I had the honour of writing you on the 4th inst., and I have now that of acknowledging the receipt yesterday of

your letter of the 6th of August, and its several enclosures, for which I beg you to accept my best thanks.

I sincerely hope your conduct, both in respect to Abdallah Aga, and to the measures adopted by you, in consequence of the report brought to Bushire by the Euphrates, of a vessel being stranded near the Arab shore, will appear to our Honourable superiors, as it does to me, highly judicious and prudent; and, indeed, I have no hesitation in mentioning that the whole of your conduct, in every point that has come to my knowledge, does you great credit.

There is now but little if any doubt that the Sieur Romieu has struck off for Persia from Carcook, at which place I have accounts of his arrival near ten days ago; and, as there is a possibility that it may be his intention to proceed as quickly as possible to some of the ports at the bottom of the Persian Gulf, and there embark either for Muscat or India, I consider it extremely expedient to put you as early as possible on your guard as to the possibility of such an event.

The following is the description of the Sieur Romieu, as I received it from Lieutenant Colonel Frazer a few days ago. His person is of the middling size, that is, about five feet eight or nine; without any very prominent feature of countenance; his complexion and hair dark; his age about thirty-six; and his habit rather spare; and, when he speaks, a slight lisp in his speech is discoverable. The Sieur Romieu is attended by an interpreter, and two persons, apparently servants. The Sieur Romieu has the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the French service, and is decorated with the Order of the Crescent of the second class.

I take the liberty of recommending to you to give the Resident at Muscat early information of the Sieur Romieu's motions, either by transmitting to him a copy of this letter, or in such other manner as you may think proper. I have directed a person, who proceeds by my directions to Teheran in the course of the week, to give you notice by an express, if

he finds that the Sieur Romieu has proceeded from thence to any of the southern ports of Persia. The Pacha continues absent from Bagdad.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

September 24, 1805.

The translation of a Report, No. 4, made to me by an Armenian merchant, who arrived from Teflis by way of Erzerum, contains the best account I am at present possessed of, in respect to the warfare of the Russians in Persia; to which I have to add, there are letters in town, thirty-six days from Reshd, stating that the Russians had been forced to retire from their camp at Pero Bazar to Enzelee, and from Enzelee, to which one account says they set fire, on board their ships. This retreat of the Russians is represented to have been partly owing to a violent sickness which raged among their troops, and partly to the exertions of the Persians.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HARFORD JONES.

Translation of a Report made by Grecoore, who arrived at Bagdad, on the 19th of September, 1805, after a Journey of thirty-six days, from Tiflis.

In the month of May, arrived at Tiflis a very large reinforcement of Russian troops from Petersburg. Zizianow afterwards sent a person, attended by an Armenian priest named Ouwannes, and fifty horsemen to Ibrahim Khàn, the Governor of Shushah, in quality of an envoy, requiring him to give up the fortress of Shushah, and submit to the Russians. Ibrahim Khàn agreed to this; and, his private interest being promised to be properly regarded, he proceeded, with his four sons and the envoy, to meet Zizianow at Gandga, where Zizianow received him in the handsomest manner. After some time, he de-

spatched Ibrahim Khàn on his return to Shushah, with 700 Russian troops. Another envoy was sent to Nookee, to Selim Khàn, in a similar manner, and with similar effect. A Russian garrison of 700 men was also placed at Nookee.

The Khàn of Shumachi, Mustafa Khàn, sent persons of his own accord to Zizianow, offering submission. To this Zizianow replied, that he must make his overtures through Ibrahim Khàn. Mustafa Khàn and Ibrahim Khàn being on bad terms, the overtures of Mustafa Khàn were not accepted. On this, 600 Russian troops were despatched against Shumachi: the Khàn fled, and the inhabitants delivered up the city. Four hundred Russians were stationed at the bridge over the Arras, near Khoda Peri, accompanied by 400 of Ibrahim Khàn's horse as an advanced guard.

The Prince Royal, hearing of this, marched towards the bridge, beyond which, at some distance, on the side of the Azarbaijan, were stationed 600 horse, which the Prince attacked and cut to pieces, three only escaping to the bridge. On intelligence of this reaching the guard at the bridge, 300 of the Russian troops crossed the bridge towards the Prince, and 100, with two guns, remained on the other side. The Prince attacked the party of 300, which, as was concerted, retreated, and led the Persians in pursuit of them over the bridge, and then faced about. The Persians, not being able to break them, were retreating; at which time the party of 100, with the two guns, having formed an ambuscade, attacked the Persians on both sides. The Prince's forces were now completely routed, a great number of them slaughtered, and more drowned in attempting to recross the Arrass.

The King, receiving intelligence of this, marched forward, and Zizianow, hearing of his approach, advanced to meet him, with 4,000 troops, and both remained encamped in sight of each other for four days: on the fifth day, the King sent away all his heavy baggage to Tauris, and there took place some slight skirmishes. At night, the King kept the flambeaux, as

usual, burning near the royal tent, but, in the night, marched off himself to Tauris. The Russians, in the morning, found that the King had made use of this stratagem to strike his tents and retreat; on which Zizianow retreated to the bridge over the Arrass.

The Russians, to the present time, have got possession of Gandga, Nookee, Shushah, Derbend, Bakoo, Shumachi, Nuckshivan,[1] Erivan,[1] Tiflis, Enzellee.

Mr. Harford Jones to Lord Castlereagh.

Bagdad, September 24, 1805.

My Lord—In transmitting to your lordship the duplicates of my last despatches, I have the honour to extract, for your notice, the following paragraph of my letter of this day, to the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors:

"With the duplicates of my despatch to you of the 15th inst., I have the honour to enclose the several duplicate packets from India, brought to Bussora in the Ternate, which, as you have been already informed, reached my hands on the 14th inst., at night. These packets, like those despatched on the 15th inst., arrived at Bussora in a box, which the linguist opened, and packed the contents of it so very carelessly, that the covers of many of the packets were so seriously injured, that I judged it prudent to put new covers on them over the old ones, for their greater security. The list of these packets is enclosed; and such as I have put new covers on, I have specified in the list with red ink."

As the suspicions communicated to me by the Consul-General at Aleppo, of the Abbé Sebastiani's journey into Persia being connected with Romieu's appearance in these quarters, have been laid before you, I consider it proper to enclose, for your information, the copy of a Letter, No. 3, received by me yesterday from that very learned person.

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[1] Doubtful. H. J.

Mr. Duncan, Governor of Bombay, to Lord Castlereagh.

Bombay, June 1, 1806.

My Lord—We have heard overland of the death of Mr. Pitt, in January last, and of the consequent new arrangement of the Ministry, in which I flatter myself that your lordship still continues to fill our department; and indeed, it is here so concluded, since there is no notice to the contrary: and we are all satisfied that the place cannot otherwise be so well filled.

Whatever may, in this respect, have occurred, I trust that your lordship will allow me to continue your correspondent, and to rely on being favoured with your commands, which, be assured, my lord, it will ever afford me the greatest satisfaction to be able to execute.

The general appearance of internal peace continues in India; for I will not suppose it susceptible of being disturbed by Scindia's seeming disposed (although even that be not certain) to expect tribute from the Rajahs of Loonwarra and Soonth, who are declared exempt from it by virtue of one of the Articles of the Treaty of Soorjee Anjemgaung; neither can we judge here whether, by Sir George Barlowe's last treaty with Scindia, that Prince may not think himself freed from the effect of that clause in the preceding treaty. The case has therefore been referred to Bengal, and meanwhile nothing material can happen.

Sir Edward Pellew has very attentively lent us the Dedaigneux, to proceed (as she will about the middle of this month) to Mocha; for the purpose of counteracting the French intrigues in that Gulf, and preventing their taking possession of the island of Camran, if they should seriously attempt it.

We have news from Teheran as late as the middle of April. At that period, they had heard of the successes of the French over the Russians, over whom the Persians pretend to have gained several advantages on the side of the Caspian; and the King had even taken under his protection one of the Curd

chieftains, who had rebelled against the Pacha of Bagdad, and appeared disposed to support him by force of arms—a pretty strong indication that he did not feel himself much pressed by Russia at that period.

We have heard of three squadrons of the French fleet having escaped from Brest, and Admiral Pellew is collecting his ships, and intends to take up a position at Trincomalee, till we hear further of the enemy's destination and objects.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

JONATHAN DUNCAN.

Governor Duncan to Lord Castlereagh.

Bombay, July 11, 1806.

My Lord—I had last the honour of writing to your lordship nnder date the 1st of last month, since which we have received accounts of the entire change in the Ministry, and that your lordship no longer presides at the Board of Control, which will not, I hope, deprive me of the honour and gratification derived from your lordship's correspondence, nor of the support and countenance I have hitherto experienced from your kindness; in which confidence, I purpose to continue, to keep you advised of our proceedings; and I shall hope to be favoured with hearing from your lordship on all points on which it may be in my power to be of use.

Everything is quiet in India, with the prospect of its continuance. I believe I had before intimated that the reductions in our military charges amounted to about thirty-eight lacks since the peace with Juswunt Row Holkar, to which has recently been added a farther one of nine lacks, in the war and other establishments of the Poona subsidiary force; and, with farther saving in the Commissariat department, our general military retrenchments will not fall far short of fifty lacks per annum, which, in view to the limited extent of our whole establishment, is as much as could be expected.

The French are carrying on some intrigues in the Red Sea,

through the agency of a Mahommedan merchant, with a view (it is supposed) of acquiring the island of Cameran. Two of the Company's cruisers are on the eve of proceeding thither with letters to the Arab chiefs in that quarter, such as will, I hope, frustrate the enemy's views; or, otherwise, the Supreme Government and the Admiral will prosecute such ulterior measures as the circumstances may call for, it being probable that, if necessary, an expedition would be fitted out from hence to dispossess the French, if they shall appear to have really taken possession of the island in question.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

JONATHAN DUNCAN.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS.

1805—1808.

OBSERVATIONS ON BONAPARTE'S PACIFIC COMMUNICATIONS.

Mr. Robert Francis to the Right Hon. William Pitt.

London, January 22, 1805.

Sir—It may be that the following observations will not give you one new idea. They are designed to explain what I conceive to be the principal cause of the late communications from France.

1. A fear that Spain may lose her American Colonies, and impute such loss to her alliance with France, which would be the fact.

2. A fear that, either by taking possession of those Colonies, or aiding them to establish independent governments, you will direct nine-tenths of their commerce to this country, and give an immense additional wealth and influence to England; for it must be obvious that, should the Spanish possessions in America become British Colonies, or be erected into independent States, a great number of British subjects would settle in those countries for the purpose of trade, which British capital and credit every where promote. Such settlers would introduce English habits of industry, laws, and customs, which, giving security to property, would cause the productive arts to spread over the whole country, encouraging population, and multiplying the articles of trade, from which England would draw great advantages, particularly as those warm climates would open a great demand for the cotton and light manufac-

tures of this country, giving in return gold and silver for the India and China trade.

On tracing this subject through all its meanderings, it is probable we shall find that, in a few years, more wealth would flow into England from South America than from India and China, which, creating an immense disparity between the resources of England and France, would give to England a vast and decided superiority; for it may safely be estimated that giving a free trade to the Spanish American Colonies would very soon create a new demand for English manufactures, to the amount of six millions sterling per annum.[1] This is, perhaps, one of the most effectual methods of convincing Bonaparte that he can be fought and humbled single-handed; he knows your fleets give you this power; if, then, he views this subject as a political economist ought to do, he must dread such an event, and, consequently, wish to ward it off by peace or delay, till means can be adopted to prevent it.

3. The French in general believe that the fountains of British wealth are in India and China. They never appeared to me to understand that the most abundant source is in her agriculture, her manufactures, and the foreign demand; that, in proportion as population and wealth augment in foreign countries, the demand for British manufactures will increase. Thus, the rapidly-increasing population of North America and South America, if independent, presents a perspective of immense resources to this country.

Ignorant of these principles, and conceiving that the Bank paper of England would depreciate, like the Assignats of France and the paper-money of America, Bonaparte hoped the expenses of the war would ruin your finances. In making

[1] Should you find any useful information in this letter, I shall probably trouble you with one on a system which will direct a flood of wealth into this country which never can be rivalled by France, and which will be beyond the influence of fluctuating politics, in consequence of being established on natural principles, and governed by human habits.

the expensive experiment, there is good reason to believe that much of his resources are exhausted, and his finances in a very bad state, and that the plan of ruin he contemplated for you has fallen on himself. Although, in his speech to the Legislative Body, he affects to be content with the state of his finances, it is a certain fact that the whole revenue of the year 13 was anticipated and consumed in the year 12; and, from the best information I can get, it is presumed that the revenue for fifteen months to come is already expended, although 66 millions of livres[1] were received from Spain, and 60 millions from the United States, for the purchase of Louisiana. These resources at present fail him; and, although he boasts of the confidence which the people repose in his government, he cannot, by any art, draw from the whole people of France a voluntary loan of one million of livres, at 8 or 10 per cent. interest. The reason is that the Government of France, under all its forms, has violated public faith when pressed for money; and Bonaparte has hitherto shown too little respect for justice and his own contracts to create a more favourable opinion of him. The impositions on Hamburg and Bremen are additional proofs of his distress for money; but, though they afforded a temporary supply, they, with Holland, are now exhausted. In his embarrassment, six months ago, it was proposed to issue paper-money grafted on the Bank of France; but, as such money would be the representative of nothing, they foresaw that it must depreciate, and, perhaps, involve the Bank in its ruin. The scheme was opposed by the most experienced financiers; and they have resorted, as usual, to temporary measures, and anticipated the revenue. Thus situated,

[1] The 66 million livres, or 12 million dollars, which Bonaparte was to receive annually from Spain during the war, would pay an army of 90,400 men at Boulogne, allowing, on an average, 40 sous per day for each man. Thus, the army which most annoys England was no expense to France; and Spain, by this means, gave more energy to the war than had she furnished 90,400 Spanish troops.

it is probable he will soon be under the necessity of laying additional taxes on the people; or the army, navy, and public functionaries must remain ill paid, in which case his popularity will diminish; for, having been intrigued into his present situation by the military and individuals in public employ, who each sought favour and additional pay, and whose expenses keep pace with their new dignity, a deficiency of revenue will create general embarrassment and teach humility.

4. The stagnation of trade in the seaport towns must tend to diminish his popularity; the war being considered as the consequence of his ambition and tyranny over neighbouring States.

5. A conviction that he cannot make a descent on this country; and, finding that his resources will fail before yours are exhausted, he seeks to withdraw honourably from the enterprise by a peace; thereby to gain time to perfection the harbour of Boulogne, and build ships of the line.

6. He appears not to be without his fears that the dagger of Brutus awaits him, which is always probable, particularly should embarrassed finances or misfortunes in war turn the current of opinion against him; for it is not easy to conceive that so many high-minded republicans, both military and civil, who have flourished during the Revolution, can patiently see a foreigner usurp the whole military, legislative, and executive power, place a diadem on his head; treat their principles with contempt, and themselves as subjects and slaves; that, notwithstanding the well-known ruin of his finances, he is insulting the nation with immense and unrestrained expenses; maintaining the ceremony of three legislative bodies, without the least shadow of legislative power, or even liberty of speech. It is evident that nothing but the bribery of lucrative places can support an accumulation of power so degrading to the nation. When his finances fail, his power will diminish; distrust will pervade every department of government, and drive

him to acts of violence. Want of money and credit brought on the first revolution, and ruined the Directory; the same cause will probably destroy his power. For these reasons Bonaparte must desire to put an end to the war, at least for the present. If peace was established, he could disband 200,000 of his conscripts, who wish to return to their families and industry. Still he would have 300,000 men for a standing army, with arms for new levies, in case he should wish to commence another war. The disbanding 200,000 men, whose expenses, on an average, may be estimated at 40 sous per day for each soldier, would be an economy of 146 millions of livres a year, which economy would be instantly felt on the finances, and enable him to meet all other powers. The military returning to their families and peace to the nation always gives joy to the people; and this would render his usurpation and government popular, giving it a solidity not to be shaken but by his death, and not even then, should he live many years.

With peace, commerce would revive the sea-port towns; the Custom House duties would increase the revenue. These circumstances, with the economy of 146 millions, will not induce him to diminish the taxes, but to build ships of the line: 50 millions would enable him to build 20 ships a year; and, although it would be difficult to man them when built, yet such a growing fleet would require much watching to prevent it doing mischief; as is now the case at Brest and Boulogne. The remainder of the economy might be laid out in public works, such as establishing canals, iron-works, manufactures, and improving the agriculture. A few years thus employed would re-animate France, which, increasing the wealth of the people, would make the taxes feel less burdensome, and give him great resources. Humanity would commend the man who turned his talents to such useful works, provided he should use the fruits of them humanely; but it is a question whether Bonaparte would do so: his insatiable ambition and extra-

vagant ideas do not warrant so much confidence in him. Raised from nothing by military talents and a combination of extraordinary events, he is intoxicated with success; and adulation has become as necessary to his happiness as high seasoning to a vitiated appetite. His mind is, therefore, perpetually working on schemes which he thinks will give great *éclat*. He seeks to be estimated by the future historian above Cæsar and Charlemagne: his avowed principle is, that future ages never take into consideration the detail of miseries which accompany war; they only listen to the brilliant actions of the Chief. With a mind thus organized, and resources to carry his plans into execution, what can be relied on! It was this disposition which led him, eighteen months ago, to offer his brother Lucien the throne of Constantinople, and to place him on it with 300,000 French troops. The project was to make their two empires meet as soon as they found it practicable. The same unguarded vanity urged him to say, that he would reduce London to ashes, leaving only St. Paul's as a solitary mark to show *Hic fuit Carthago*.

But his greatest and most favourite scheme of ambition, since Lucien declined entering on that of the Ottoman Empire, is one that he has more thoroughly digested, and which nothing but the exertions and firmness of this country will force him to lay aside. It is to annex Spain and Portugal to his empire, and to send the two reigning families to their respective possessions in America. The indications I have had on this subject leave no doubt of the fact on my mind. His failure in the conquest of England, and seeing the British navy remain in British hands, have convinced him that this object cannot be accomplished during the present war; and, now that you have commenced a war with Spain, he must be apprized of the possibility of your defeating his project altogether by severing those countries from Spain and Portugal: for, if you annex those countries to the British empire, or set them free, which doubtless would be more advantageous for England, they could

no longer be considered as domains in reserve to compensate the families who now stand in the way of his ambition. To dethrone them, without a splendid asylum of this kind, would excite all the other monarchs of Europe against him; and the friends of those families, moving from court to court, would keep the spirit of enmity from abating; but, if sent to America, and there amply provided for, he would not have them to fear. His late declaration to the Legislative Body that he did not intend to enlarge the limits of his empire, furnishes rather a confirmation than a doubt that he means to enlarge it. Whenever he is ready for the operation, he can intrigue, excite revolt in the country against the Government, then offer troops to quell the insurgents, which troops may stimulate a general rebellion, and bring on a revolution; in which case he can induce or compel the two monarchs in question, *one after the other*, to solicit the acceptance of their dominions, and to ask as a favour his compliance with such an arrangement as may settle them quietly in their new and more eligible situations. In that case, neither the subjects of those monarchs, nor the other Powers of Europe, can (*according to his logic*) have a word to say against it; and his having previously declared that he would not enlarge his dominions will serve as a solemn and lasting memorial that such a condescension to the wish of his neighbours was against his known inclination, and must be regarded as an act of benevolence both to his new subjects and their former sovereigns; but this project will be impracticable as long as the present war shall last; and liberating the Spanish colonies will probably render it so for ever.

I am sensible, sir, that the whole of these schemes may be ridiculed as extravagant, and so was that of his making himself Emperor, when first he ordered his writers to try the public mind three years ago; so likewise were many of his other projects, which, nevertheless, we see he has found means to realize. There is no project flattering to vanity which is

too extravagant for men who consider conquest and military fame as the most estimable of all acquirements. Alexander, Jenghiz Khàn, and Bonaparte have been guided by similar sentiments.

In writing this letter, I have no enmity to the people of France or any other people; on the contrary, I wish their happiness, for my principle is that every nation profits by the prosperity of its neighbours, provided the Governments of its neighbours are humane and just. This is particularly the case with the English nation, whose increasing manufactures require increasing markets abroad; for it is found by experience that foreign nations, *as far as their trade is free*, consume of English goods in proportion to their wealth and the means of payment.

What I have here said is directed against the ambition and tyranny of Bonaparte, a man who has set himself above all law. He is, therefore, in a state which Lord Somers compares to that of a wild beast, unrestrained by any rule, and should be hunted down as the enemy of mankind. This, however, is the business of Frenchmen with regard to the nations of Europe: they can only hold him in governable limits by fencing him round with bayonets.

I am, Sir, your most obedient, ROBERT FRANCIS.

Lieutenant-General Urquhart to Lord Castlereagh.

Catton Grove House, near Norwich, April 21, 1807.

My Lord—Permit an old, deserving officer, upwards of forty-five years in his Majesty's service, with unblemished reputation and inflexible integrity, and who had the honour to serve with your lordship in the late war, in Ireland, in the same camp at Loughlinstown, in 1795, and afterwards in the garrison of Dublin, in the winter of that year, and part of the spring of 1796, to state his services and situation, and to propose to your lordship, as the head of the War Department of the State, to

raise a disposable force in Britain and Ireland of 114,200 men (including officers), of infantry, in 100 regiments, of 1,142 each, including officers.

I would propose that 70 regiments of 1,142, officers included, be raised immediately in England and Wales by ballot, out of the 200,000 levy *en masse* men now about drawing for, and to be proportioned in the different counties, and these to be called Fencible Infantry, and after the cities, dioceses, and towns, as in the enclosed list, to be for general service anywhere his Majesty shall be pleased to order them ; to be enlisted for seven years, or during the war, and not discharged in the event of the war continuing longer than seven years, in less than twelve months after a general peace in Britain, Ireland, or Europe ; and out of Europe in not less than two years and a half after a peace ; and the men, at the time of their discharge, to have the offer to enlist into regiments of the line, receiving a fresh bounty.

Ten regiments of 1,142 men each, including officers, to be raised in Scotland by ballot, and named after ten principal towns, as in the enclosed list, which make 80 regiments for Great Britain ; and 20 regiments, of 1,142 men each, including officers, to be raised in Ireland by ballot, and named after the principal towns in that kingdom, as in the enclosed list.

These Fencible troops to receive the same bounty, on being balloted and attested, as the regiments of the line, and to be on the same footing as to pay, clothing, allowances, &c., as all his Majesty's other troops ; the officers to be commissioned by the King, and all to have rank in the army, but not half-pay, except the colonels, field officers, and staff, the whole to be raised by Government ; and the colonels of the whole 100 regiments to be taken from the Lieutenant-Generals, Major-Generals, and Brevet-Colonels who have not regiments.

These 100 Fencible regiments to be raised and completed in three months, and the officers for them to be immediately appointed and commissioned, and sent into the different counties,

cities, dioceses, and towns they are named after, under the direction of their respective Colonels, to complete, form, and receive the men; and the 20 regiments to be raised in Ireland should, as soon as formed, be sent to Britain or abroad, and replaced by the same number from Britain.

The captains and subalterns are not to have half-pay (the staff excepted), but they are to have permanent rank in the army, and to be placed in regiments of the line as vacancies happen; and such of the captains or subalterns as shall be disabled or worn out in the service are to have half-pay.

I beg to state, in regard to myself, that I received my first commission as ensign on the 13th of April, 1762; that I have served in America, the West Indies, the Mediterranean, and in Ireland. In the late war, I raised a regiment of Fencible Infantry (late Loyal Essex) in three months, in December, 1794, January and February, 1795, in England, at a considerable expense to myself, which was inspected and put upon the establishment in March, 1795, and immediately ordered to Ireland, where my regiment remained till June, 1802, when it was landed at Bristol, and reduced in consequence of the Peace of Amiens; that, during the whole time my late regiment continued established, it was remarkable for good conduct, regular behaviour, and military discipline, and neither officer nor soldier was, during the whole time, tried by a general court-martial.

That, during my command at Ballyshannon, in January, 1798, I was seized with a most dangerous, painful, and alarming illness, brought on by my exertions in those parts of Ireland to keep the country quiet, which brought on a mortification in my right leg and foot, and ended in the loss of the toes of my right foot; and so well was I liked for the mildness of my command, that, on the landing of General Humbert at Killala, having sent my regiment to join the army against the French, in the county of Mayo, I remained voluntarily in command at Ballyshannon, with the sick and convalescents of my regiment,

and a few yeomanry and volunteers of Ballyshannon and its vicinity, though I was then only in a convalescent state of health (and in the rank of Major-General), till after General Humbert and his troops were prisoners; and while they were in the country, and my regiment absent from Ballyshannon, a body of Roman Catholics, to the number of 1,000 men fit to bear arms, made a voluntary offer to act under me against the common enemy; an offer of the like kind not having been made at that time to any officer in Ireland but myself, and which offer I had the honour to transmit to your lordship in Dublin, for the information of the Lord-Lieutenant (the late Marquess Cornwallis), and had orders to supply those Roman Catholics who voluntarily offered their services to act under me with arms out of the stores at Ballyshannon, then under my charge; and, on my applying for leave to go to England, for the recovery of my health, at the end of September, 1798, his Excellency was pleased to return me thanks for my services and readiness on every occasion.

I have suffered considerably, to the amount of £3,000, by the shameful negligence, inattention, and irregularity, in their books, of my Irish agents, Wybrants and Son, now bankrupts, while I was in England, and my regiment remained in Ireland, under the management of my Irish agents.

In 1803, I had the misfortune, in a fever, by an inflammation of the iris of my right eye, to lose the sight of that eye. I was Town-Major of Boston, North America, in 1775 and 1776, till the evacuation of that garrison by the British troops; and in 1782 was Commandant of Fort Charles and Port Royal, Jamaica, till the peace of 1783 put an end to the appointment; and I am the only officer in the army now living who held a staff appointment in America and the West Indies, during the American war, that has not been provided for by Government.

I am now, after so long and faithful service to my King and country, and in the rank of Lieutenant-General, on the half-

pay of only five shillings per day; and no one can ever say anything against my character, which will bear the strictest inquiry, and has been honourable and meritorious through life; and I can also declare myself a firm friend to Government, to my King and country, and to the Constitution in Church and State, and a friend and admirer of the present Administration.

I hope, therefore, that your lordship will take into consideration the case of an old deserving officer and servant, who has suffered much in the public service, and will be pleased to recommend me to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, that my name may be brought forward for a regiment of infantry of any description that may become vacant, or may be intended to be raised or formed; and may I hope also that, your lordship having also the patronage of the Colonial department, would think of me for any of the appointments in the Island of Curaçoa, or any of the other islands or colonies which have no salaries attached to the offices, but fees only, which offices can be executed by deputy or deputies on the spot, such as Provost-Marshal, Vendue-Master, or Naval Officer, of Curaçoa or any other island or colony belonging to Britain.

Though I am lame, from the loss of the toes of my right foot on service, and deprived of the sight of my right eye, I am otherwise in good health, and should be willing, and I flatter myself able, to take a command or government in a healthy climate abroad.

I have the honour to submit myself to your lordship, &c.,

J. E. Urquhart, Lieut.-General.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Urquhart.

Lord Castlereagh very much regrets that the claims upon his department are at present so numerous as not to justify him in holding out to General Urquhart any expectation that he will have it in his power to offer him a situation in the

Colonies. As his military claims are best known to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Castlereagh recommends his addressing himself directly to his Royal Highness.

The Comte de la Châtre to Lord Castlereagh.

4, Old Cavendish Street, 16 Juin, 1807.

Milord—J'apprends dans le moment qu'il est question d'établir en France une correspondance par M. Guilwick et ses agents : ils peuvent être très bons, mais il est de mon devoir, comme chargé des pouvoirs de Monsieur le Comte de Lille (Louis XVIII.) de m'opposer, en son nom, à toute mission en France, sans que j'en sois informé, et que j'y aye donné mon adhésion, toutes les fois que ce ne sont pas des sujets de Sa Majesté Brittanique qui ne sont pas personnellement chargés. N'ayant plus le bonheur de parvenir jusqu'à vous, milord, pas même jusqu'à Monsieur Coock, je me trouve forcé, bien malgré moi, de vous importuner jusqu'à que vous ayez bien voulu m'accorder une audience.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la plus haute considération, &c.,

Cte. de la Chastre.

Lord Castlereagh to the Comte de la Châtre.

Draft. St. James's Square, June 18, 1807.

Sir—I have to acknowledge the honour of your letter. I am not aware that I have failed to receive with due respect any communication with which you have thought fit to honour me; though I certainly have not deemed it consistent with the interests of his Majesty's service, or with the personal safety of the Loyalists in the western departments of France, to give any encouragement whatever to insurrectional movements in that quarter.

You will forgive me for observing, with every possible respect for your person and for the honourable principles which,

I am persuaded, govern your conduct, that I can by no means acquiesce in the claim apparently brought forward by you, viz., that those measures which I may think fit to institute, with a view of procuring information of what is passing in an enemy's country during a period of war, are either to be communicated to or controlled by you.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Wimbledon, July 9, 1807.

My dear Lord—I send your lordship a letter I have this morning received from Mr. Oswald of Dinneheer, a very respectable friend of mine in Scotland. He is connected by relationship to Lord Elgin, which, I presume, is the ground on which his lordship has been induced to forward to Mr. Oswald the communications contained in the letter and Memorandum, which I likewise transmit to you. They are not intended for me, but for the consideration of his Majesty's Government, who, I make no doubt, are not unprepared for all the consequences which they naturally feel must be the conquence of the failure of the allies on the Continent. The idea of an attack on India, either through Persia or some part of Asia, is one I have had long and often in contemplation, in the event of several adverse contingencies; and it was upon that ground that I insisted with the Court of Directors on establishing a Resident at Bagdad.

As to the invasion of this country, there is no doubt that the menace will be again held out, and, perhaps, attempted; but if the principles on which I acted when at the Admiralty have been persevered in, I must still consider, as I have long done, such an attempt as next to physically impossible.

I remain, &c.,

MELVILLE.

[Enclosures in Lord Melville's Letter.]

J. F. Oswald, Esq., to Lord Melville.

Dinneheer House, July 5, 1807.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose for your lordship's perusal a letter and memorandum, which came to me this morning from Lord Elgin. Your lordship's sound judgment and comprehensive mind will easily lead you to estimate the value of the intelligence which may be obtained from that quarter. On that point I cannot presume to form, much less to hazard, an opinion; but the zeal which Lord Elgin has always in conversation testified to me to be by his communications useful to his country, and the anxiety he expresses in his letter that these communications might be made known to your lordship have made me consider it as a point of duty on my part to transmit his letter and memorandum for your perusal. I have the honour to remain, &c.,

James F. Oswald.

PS. I have further to add, that Lord Elgin desired me to state that, from his personal knowledge, he could assert that Bonaparte, in his plan of invasion, had decided to attack this country in three points—in Ireland, in the Moray Frith, and on the eastern coast of England; and that he was possessed of plans and maps for these purposes, which Lord Elgin had accidentally seen while a prisoner in France.

The Earl of Elgin to J. F. Oswald, Esq.

Broomhall, July 4, 1807.

My Dear Sir—The accounts, however vague, which have reached us of a victory said to be gained by the French over the Russians on the 11th June naturally revive the strong feelings I have of Bonaparte's gigantic plans, and of his deep-rooted, persevering enmity against this country. I should like to communicate to Government all I know. But while, on the one hand, I might be brought into considerable difficulties, in

my capacity of *French prisoner*, were my name to be coupled with any such information, on the other I have been marked of late in so extraordinary a manner by Government, that I really am in great embarrassment in this attempt. I accordingly have only written the most prominent circumstances within my observation to Mr. Canning. Still, when I reflect how peculiarly I have been called to watch Bonaparte, from the first period of his coming to command in France, and what singular opportunities of seeing him (closer than, perhaps, any man in England) I have had this war, I do, in my conscience, conceive it to be of the highest importance that, in so alarming a crisis as the present, all the intelligence I possess should be brought under Lord Melville's notice. Under this impression, it has occurred to me to draw up the enclosed Memorandum, which, I imagine, your habits with Lord Melville will enable you to recommend to his perusal.

I trust you know me too favourably to think that I have in this any motive whatever but a strong sense of public duty, and a most anxious desire that the points which I bring under view should be fairly and manfully met. In regard to many of them, I have had means of knowing Lord Melville to have been much interested. On all, no man is more likely, from experience and strength of mind, to form a sound judgment, and boldly to adopt resolutions adequate to the emergency. Should any further information be wanted from me, I need hardly add I shall most readily give it.

Adieu, my dear Sir,

most faithfully yours, ELGIN.

Memorandum.

July 4, 1807.

When it is recollected that Bonaparte considers Great Britain as the great obstacle in the way of his ambition—that he actually does conceive the invasion to be practicable, and, if effected, to be decisive of the conquest of this country—that, on every occasion where he can possibly influence the public

opinion in France, or in the rest of Europe, he loses no opportunity of endeavouring to detach England from the Continent politically and commercially—that he is unceasing in his purpose of overturning our system of neutral navigation and naval blockade—when, besides, it is known that, in the negociation with Prussia, which preceded the rupture last year, he insisted on that country concurring to engage Denmark to give up her navy (then consisting of 19 sail of the line), professedly for the prosecution of his views against England—on these considerations, it cannot be doubted that Bonaparte will now carry into effect, as far as he possibly can, the object of obtaining aid from the Northern powers in these favourite plans.

What occurs as likely to be in his power, as soon as he may have forced Russia to peace, obviously is—that he will secure a great naval reinforcement from the Baltic.

If he continues to rely as much as he has lately done on the submission of the Continent, he may embark a considerable part of his victorious French army from the Northern ports for the invasion of England.

If he places any of his adherents on the thrones of Poland and Prussia, or even if he dictates peace in regard to those countries, he will then oblige them to co-operate in the invasion, by sending armies in combination with his more direct operations from Holland and France.

At all events, he will obtain a great supply of good seamen. His supply of naval stores will be unlimited, while ours will be proportionably embarrassed. The points from which his expedition may depart, and the points on the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland where they may land, become infinitely more numerous.

His next object against England is to overturn our Indian interests. It is well known that, during the Emperor Paul's reign, he proposed a combined measure, in the view of sending a European force through Asia. It can now be added, that a similar expedition is in his contemplation by Syria, and in the

direction of Bagdad—when, besides this, attention is had to the affectation with which he has demanded and received the Persian embassy at Warsaw, and sent it back accompanied by many hundred French officers. To his views regarding Egypt, which undoubtedly are as steady and strong in his mind as ever they were; and to his conduct recently towards Turkey, about which Government must possess recent information, in support of the assertion in General Clarke's late declaration on the cause of the rupture in the negociations this winter — when his whole conduct and the unchangeableness of his plans are considered, no doubt can remain of the necessity of a strong system of defence for the protection of India.

Connected with the present considerations is our situation, in reference to the weight we have a right and interest to claim on the Continent of Europe — and the use we possibly may be to any powers there, who may now or ultimately be able to offer resistance to France. On this subject, this war has proved to demonstration that our naval superiority cannot present the smallest co-operation, or furnish any check on the means France has it in her power to direct against a Continental State.

In this view of the dangers and necessities of our situation, there does not appear a moment's doubt of the indispensable urgency of our augmenting very considerably indeed our regular army. The great differences of opinion on the questions of the Volunteer system, *armée en masse*, &c., make them from that alone liable to instability. Still it seems agreed, on all hands, both that some such force is indispensable, and, on the other hand, that it cannot be relied on, except where acting along with regular troops. It can be distinctly offered as Bonaparte's opinion—that nothing can save England, secure her Colonies, or enable her to check him on the Continent, except a far more considerable regular army than our present establishment.

In regard to the more immediate pressure from the danger or the possibility of an invasion, nothing certainly can be more alarming than the total want of means or plan of defence in Scotland, which certainly cannot be unknown to Bonaparte, and where necessarily an attack could most easily be directed from the North.

Lieutenant-General Urquhart to Lord Castlereagh.

Catton, near Norwich, September 10, 1807.

My Lord—Permit an old and respectable officer, and a firm friend of his King and country, and a friend to the present Administration, of which your lordship forms so conspicuous and brilliant a part, to suggest to your lordship, as Minister of the War Department, some plans for the benefit, glory, and honour of Britain, and which will more than recompense for the loss of Monte Video, Buenos Ayres, and the River Plata, and be the means of securing an honourable and safe peace.

I would propose to send immediate orders to the acting Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Gibraltar to take possession of the town, port, and garrison of Ceuta, opposite to Gibraltar, and to keep the same. Troops might be sent out immediately with sealed orders, not to be opened by the officers commanding till they were clear of the Channel, and then only to inform them that they were to proceed to Gibraltar, where they would receive further instructions and sealed orders on their arrival at Gibraltar to proceed to Ceuta, and an Admiral to proceed in a single ship of war to Gibraltar to await the arrival of the troops, and to command the expedition against Ceuta; and frigates, sloops of war, bombs, gun-brigs, cutters, to be sent out singly to Gibraltar, to join the Admiral, and two frigates to escort the transports with troops.

Ceuta, with Gibraltar, would give England complete command of the Gut of Gibraltar, open a lucrative trade for British manufactures with the Moors and all the Barbary States, and command a supply of provisions for Gibraltar at an easy and

cheap rate from Barbary; and, if England chose, she might make a treaty with the Emperor of Morocco for the purchase of Tangier, formerly belonging to England, at the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar, which would give England another good port and harbour at the entrance of the Mediterranean, and open a trade with the Kingdom of Morocco, &c., and friendly treaties to be entered into between England and the Barbary States.

I propose sending sealed orders immediately in a fast-sailing frigate, sloop of war, or armed cutter, to Jamaica, to both the Admiral on that station and the Governor of Jamaica, to send down a frigate or two and a regiment, to take possession of the Island of Rattan, in the Bay of Honduras. This island is made little use of by Spain, and not fortified or defended, and but few inhabitants on it; was uninhabited till the year 1742, when Major Crawford was sent down from Jamaica, took possession of it, and began a settlement, in order to protect the logwood-cutters in the Bay of Honduras, and to secure a trade with the Spaniards of Guatimala for cochineal, indigo, &c. This island is so well situated, though neglected by Spain, that it may be regarded as the key of the Bay of Honduras, and might command the trade of all the provinces round the Bay. It is a healthy island, well watered, and has a good harbour on the south side, called Port Royal, sufficiently capacious for 500 sail of ships to ride in, in the utmost safety, and has several other harbours, though smaller.

The Spaniards dispossessed us of it in the year 1782, by a very small force from Honduras, as we had no force at Rattan. It is only eight leagues from the Mosquito Shore, whose native Indians have always been friendly to the English, and 200 leagues west by south from Jamaica; is 30 miles long, 13 broad, and contains upwards of 250,000 acres, which would raise every production which the West India islands and that part of America cultivate. The land might be sold by Government to proprietors, in lots of from 50 to 100 or 200 acres

each. An annual quit-rent of 1*s.* per acre might be reserved to be paid to the Crown. The produce of the sale of the land in Rattan would bring in a sum of £250,000 sterling at least, which might be laid out in the purchase of stock in the British funds, for the purpose of defraying the expense of the colony, under the direction of the Treasury; and the quit-rents would produce the yearly sum of twelve or thirteen thousand pounds; and by making Rattan a free port and encouraging the trade of that island and Curaçoa, I am not too sanguine in stating, that both these islands might bring in a revenue of half a million to England.

It is probably the intention of Government to secure for our ally, Portugal, as much as we can from French and Spanish seizure and plunder, by taking possession of Madeira and the Azores, or Western Islands, for Portugal; and it would be good policy in Britain to agree with Portugal for the purchase of three of the Azores or Western Islands, viz., the islands of Fayal, Pico, and St. Michael. It would be of great importance to England to keep those three islands in the Atlantic Ocean. They could easily be spared to us by Portugal, and might be kept at a small expense, and be a proper station for a squadron of frigates, sloops of war, and armed cutters, both in war and peace, under the command of a senior Captain of the navy, as Commodore, with a distinguishing pendant, but no Captain under him, and be a protection to our outward-bound East and West India and American trade, as well as a security for Madeira and the remainder of the Azore, or Western Islands, for Portugal. England has long wanted some islands in the Atlantic Ocean near Madeira, for our outward and homeward-bound East and West India and American trade to touch at: Fayal, Pico, and St. Michael, might produce wine equal to Madeira; indeed, a great deal of what is called Fayal wine goes to Madeira, and is mixed with it; and the Fayal wine answers for the American and West India markets, and might do also for the East India trade.

As it is the intention of France and Spain to seize the fleet of Portugal, this should, if possible, be prevented by England sending a squadron to the Tagus, and securing the Portuguese fleet for Portugal; and a squadron might also be sent to the Brazils, to secure and keep that country for Portugal.

I would propose to send a squadron and troops from Sicily, to take possession of the Greek islands of Scio, Mitylene, Samos, and Milo, and to offer to the Porte a compensation in money for these islands, and also for the retaining and keeping possession of Alexandria in Egypt, and being put into possession of Rosetta; to offer the Porte the assistance of our ships of war in protecting their other territories, and improving their marine; the rest of Egypt, with the exception of a small district round the two towns above-mentioned, to be subject to the Porte: Rosetta, Alexandria, and their districts, sold to England, to be independent of the Porte, and declared free ports under the government of England, and subject to her mild and equitable laws. These places would be of great use in the security of our East India possessions, and bring the whole produce of Egypt into our hands: their acquisition would be of immense advantage to our manufactures, and produce a large revenue to the Crown; while they might be kept up and defended by partly British and partly country troops, in British pay, at no very great expense, considering the benefit that would be derived from it.

Scio, Mitylene, and Samos, would completely command the Gulf of Smyrna and the trade of that place and Constantinople: they are fine, well-inhabited islands, the population all Greeks. Milo has one of the finest harbours in that part of the Mediterranean; and the inhabitants, Greeks, are among the best sailors of the Archipelago.

The island of Heligoland, though of no value of itself, yet as a safe haven for small craft, even in winter, and as a key to the rivers Ems, Weser, Jade, Elbe, and Eyder, and as an asylum for our cruisers in those seas, ought to be kept and

fortified; and, by the possession of it, so close to the continent of Germany, it would serve as a depôt for English goods, and enable England to send her manufactures and her colonial produce into Germany, &c. The possession of Ceuta, with Gibraltar, Malta, and perhaps Tangier, with the islands of Scio, Mitylene, Samos, and Milo, with the towns of Alexandria and Rosetta, with Rattan and Curaçoa, and, lastly, with Heligoland, would open new sources of trade for England, and put it out of the power of Bonaparte to deprive us, as it is his intention to do, of the trade of the Mediterranean and the continent of Germany—indeed, of the trade of the whole world. It should, therefore, be the policy, as it is the interest, of England, to make friendly offers to the Porte and the Barbary States, and to conclude treaties with them; and, as France wants nothing from us, we ought, on a peace, to keep all we have got and what we may acquire, viz., Malta, St. Lucia, Tobago, Rattan, Cape of Good Hope, Surinam, Demerara, Essequibo, Berbice, Pondicherry, Goree, Ceuta, Tangier, Scio, Mitylene, Samos, Milo, Alexandria, Rosetta, Fayal, Pico, St. Michael, and Heligoland; and, on gaining possession of the above, we might declare Napoleon Bonaparte Emperor of France and King of Italy; Joseph Bonaparte King of Naples; Louis Bonaparte King of Holland; and Jerome Bonaparte King of Westphalia.

Ferdinand IV. to keep Sicily as King of Sicily only, which, till a peace, should be protected by a British squadron, and four or five thousand troops in British pay; and Spain to give the King of Sicily the islands of Majorca, Ivica, and Minorca, to be held with Sicily, in compensation for the loss of Naples.

The Imperial Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland to grant to the King and his heirs for ever the yearly sum of £150,000 sterling for the loss of Hanover, to be paid into the privy purse, and to be independent of the grant of the Civil List establishment of the Crown. A stipulation, in the event of a peace, to be made for the integrity of Portugal and its

colonies, and also of Sweden and the possessions that did belong to it in Germany or elsewhere. The sovereignty of the seas and right of search ought to be maintained by England.

Submitting to your lordship's consideration, as a zealous friend to my King and country, the plans contained in this letter, I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. E. URQUHART, Lieut.-General.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. John Foster.

St. James's Square, March 18, 1808.

My dear Sir—Allow me to remind you of the arrangement with respect to the export of salt, which is much desired by our friends in the north of Ireland. The object is, that a drawback, equal to the import duty on salt, should be given with all manufactured salt sent out. As the advantage sought for is to enable foreign ships, particularly American, which bring cargoes to Ireland, to return from thence with an assorted cargo, taking salt as their ballast, there will be no objection, I apprehend, to confine the drawback to the salt exported in vessels of 80 tons burden and upwards, and to except export to England altogether, if it will serve the better to protect this part of the United Kingdom against illicit import from Ireland.

I am sure you will feel the justice, as well as the importance to Ireland, that vessels arriving from America in our northern ports should not have the inducement of going to Liverpool for their home freight, because they can there take in salt as *ballast with a full drawback* of all internal duty: whereas, in Ireland, contrary, I believe, to the provisions of the Act of Union, the duty paid on English rock-salt, to the amount of about £4 10*s*., as well as I recollect, is retained, which must confine our manufacture to the home market.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

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